Proportional  Representation, 


OR 


THE  REPRESENTATION  OF  SUCCESSIVE  MAJORITIES  IN 

FEDERAL,  STATE,  MUNICIPAL,  CORPORATE  AND 

PRIMARY  ELECTIONS. 


BY 


CHARLES    R.    BUCKALEW, 

LATE  U.  S.  SENATOR  FROM  PENNSYLVANIA. 


MX  it!)  an  appendix. 


EDITED  BY 

JOHN    G.    FREEZ] 

COUNSELLOR  AT  LAW. 


"  In  all  Free  States,  the  evil  to  be  avoided  is  tyranny  ;  that  is  to  say,  tne  '  swnma 
perii?  or  unlimited  power,  solely  in  the  hands  of  one,  the  few,  or  the  many." — Swift. 

"Constant  experience  shows  us,  that  every  man  invested  with  power  is  apt  to  abuse  it. 
He  pushes  on  till  he  comes  to  something  that  limits  him.  To  prevent  the  abuse  of  power, 
it  is  necessary  that  by  the  very  disposition  of  things,  power  should  be  a  check  to  power.'' 
— Montesquieu. 


PHILADELPHIA: 
JOHN    CAMPBELL    &    SON, 

LAW  BOOKSELLERS,  PUBLISHERS  AND  IMPORTERS, 
740  SANSOM  STREET. 

1872. 


5* 


■\ 


■ 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1872,  by 

JOHN  CAMPBELL  &  SON, 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


3  4  h  9  *- 


"Westcott  &  Thomson,  IIenrt  B.  Ashmead, 

Stereotypers  and  Electrotypers,  rhila.  Printer,  Phila. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Editor's  Preface vii. 

Preliminary  Remarks xi. 

Senate  Speech,  July  11,  18o7 1 

Philadelphia  Speech,  November  19,  18G7 31 

Senate  Report,  March  2,  1869 65 

Social  Science  Address,  October  25,  1870 138 

Borough  Supplement  Speech,  March  27,  1871 157 

The  Jordan  Letter,  November  30,  1871 182 

Choice  of  Presidential  Electors 187 

Illinois  Amendments 219 

West  Virginia  Amendments 226 

Pennsylvania  Statutes  for  Reformed  Voting 228 

Local  Elections  in  Pennsylvania 245 

Nominations  to  Office 256 

Columbia  County, Rules  of  Nomination 258 

Appendix 273 

Proceedings  and  Debate  in   Parliament  on  Limited 

Voting;  an  Essay  on  Minority  Representation. 

Index 297 

iii. 


ANALYSIS   OF  CONTENTS. 


Choice    of    Representatives    in    Congress    and    Presidential 
Electors  : 
Senate  Speech,  1. 
Philadelphia  Speech,  31. 
Senate  Report,  65. 

General  Application  of  Free  Vote  : 
Social  Science  Address,  138. 

In  what  Elections  can  be  Used,  143. 
Concerning  Fractional  Votes,  145. 
Filling  of  Vacancies,  148. 

Reformed    Voting    in    Municipalities:    Objections    to    Plan 
Answered  : 
Borough  Supplement  Speech,  157. 

Representation  of  Successive  Majorities: 
The  Jordan  Letter,  182. 

Constitutional  Amendment  : 

Proposed  for  Presidential  Electors,  187. 
Illinois  Amendments,  219. 
West  Virginia  Amendments,  226. 

Reform  in  Pennsylvania: 

Statutes  for,  228. 
Local  Elections  in,  245. 

Nominations  to  Office: 

Columbia  County  Plan  of  Nomination,  258. 


APPENDIX. 

Parliamentary  Debate  on  Limited  Voting. 
Minority  Representation  ;  an  Essay. 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 


Within  the  last  few  years  the  public  mind  has  been 
awakened  to  many  questions  relating  to  government,  but 
to  no  one  more  important  than  that  discussed  in  the  vol- 
ume now  presented  to  the  reader.  The  editor  believes  it 
to  be  a  necessity  of  the  times,  in  view  of  current  discus- 
sions of  electoral  reform,  that  the  papers  now  collated  and 
arranged  should  be  put  into  a  permanent  and  accessible 
form.  For  not  only  in  Pennsylvania,  but  in  many  other 
states  of  the  Union,  the  great  evils  of  the  present  system 
of  voting  and  of  deficient  representation,  are  being  earn- 
estly discussed.  Therefore,  whatever  can  assist  in  bringing 
about  just  conclusions  either  as  to  the  necessity  of  some 
fundamental  changes  in  electoral  action,  or,  that  being  con- 
ceded, as  to  the  best  method  of  adapting  the  changes  agreed 
upon  to  the  needs  of  the  people,  may  be  accepted  as  fit, 
timely  and  useful. 

Although  a  number  of  works,  more  or  less  elaborate, 
have  been  recently  published  upon  electoral  and  represent- 
ative reform,  no  one  of  them  covers  precisely  the  ground 
covered  by  the  present  one.  They  have  dealt  mostly  with 
the  theoretical  and  philosophical  aspects  of  the  questions 
treated,  whereas  the  volume  in  hand  is  largely  devoted  to 
the  practical  application  of  the  plan  proposed  in  it  for 
popular  acceptance.  Herein  will  be  found  not  only  the 
theory  of  a  reform  to  extend  representation,  but  sundry 


viii  editor's  preface. 


acts  of  legislation  for  its  enforcement,  and  the  returns  of 
elections  which  illustrate  the  practical  workings  of  reform 
and  the  results  to  be  obtained  from  it.  This  information 
is  believed  to  be  more  useful  and  convincing  than  abstract 
arguments  with  the  great  mass  of  persons  with  whom  po- 
litical power  is  justly  lodged  by  our  American  Constitu- 
tion. And  as  to  theory :  If  the  people  shall  once  be 
satisfied  that  a  system  can  be  applied  whereby  in  popular 
elections,  nearly  the  whole  mass  of  those  who  vote  shall 
be  represented  in  government,  they  will  accept  it  promptly 
upon  the  sound  theory  of  equal  and  exact  justice  to  all. 

The  matter  contained  in  this  volume,  it  will  be  observed, 
is  arranged,  as  nearly  as  may  be,  in  chronological  order, 
thus  exhibiting  the  growth  and  modifications  of  opinion 
in  the  author's  mind,  contemporaneous  with  movements 
in  other  states  and  publications  abroad.  And  although  it 
consists  mainly  of  legislative  arguments,  popular  addresses 
and  casual  papers  thrown  off  or  produced  as  occasion  in- 
vited during  several  years,  yet  the  collected  volume  has 
nearly  the  completeness  and  symmetry  of  a  regular  wTork, 
with  little  of  surplusage  or  repetition.  There  is  a  regular 
development  of  argument,  illustration  and  thought,  and 
each  separate,  successive  part  presents  the  question  in  hand 
from  a  new  or  enlarged  point  of  view. 

The  haste  with  which  this  volume  is  put  to  press  pre- 
cludes careful  revision,  a  correction  of  former  errors  of 
publication  and  slips  unavoidable  in  oral  discourse,  but  for 
these  the  intelligent  reader  will  make  due  allowance  with- 
out prolonged  apology. 

As  a  citizen  of  the  State,  and  a  resident  of  the  town  in 
which  the  free  vote  was  first  applied  at  a  popular  election, 
the  editor  has  felt  the  promptings  of  a  laudable,  or  at  least 


EDITORS   PREFACE.  iX 

a  natural,  ambition  in  presenting  this  work  to  the  public, 
convinced  as  he  is  that  the  reform  which  it  presents  and 
vindicates,  when  accepted  generally,  will  purify  elections, 
establish  justice  in  representation,  elevate  the  tone  of  pub- 
lic life  and  give  additional  credit  and  lustre  to  that  system 
of  government  by  the  people  which  is  our  proudest  boast, 
and  our  best  legacy  for  those  who  come  after  us. 

J.  G.  F. 

Bloomsburg,  Nov.  12, 1872. 


>*  OP  THE 

'tjn  it      :ty; 


PRELIMINARY  REMARKS. 


Mr.  Dutcher,  in  his  recent  work  on  Proportional 
Representation,*  has  shown,  by  elaborate  statistics,  that  of 
the  votes  cast  at  important  contested  popular  elections  in 
the  United  States,  over  forty  per  centum  are  lost  or  over- 
ruled in  the  computation  of  results.  Of  the  electors 
throughout  the  country  who  voted  for  representatives  to 
the  Fortieth  Congress,  no  less  than  forty-two  per  cent, 
failed  to  obtain  representation  by  their  votes ;  and  precisely 
the  same  percentage  of  voters  failed  in  elections  for  repre- 
sentatives to  the  Forty-first  Congress,  and  again  in  the 
elections  to  the  Forty-second.  For  six  continuous  years 
the  rate  of  actual  representation  in  the  popular  branch  of 
Congress  was  but  sixty  per  cent,  of  the  votes  polled.  At 
the  session  of  the  New  York  Legislature,  in  1869,  the 
voters  unrepresented  in  the  Senate  were  forty-one  per  cent, 
of  the  whole,  and  in  the  House  forty-two;  and  at  the 
session  of  1871,  in  each  House,  forty-two. 

Mr.  Hare  is  authority  for  the  statement  that  the  per- 
centage of  disfranchisement  upon  votes  cast  in  Parlia- 
mentary elections  is  very  nearly  as  great  as  in  the  above 
examples.  He  says :  "  Those  who,  disagreeing  with  the 
majority  in  their  electoral  districts,  are  now  in  Parlia- 
mentary elections  outvoted  and  left  without  representation, 

*  "  Minority  or  Proportional  Representation,  by  Salem  Dutcher,  JVT.  York, 
1872." 

xi 


Xll  PRELIMINARY    REMARKS. 

cannot  ordinarily  be  taken  at  less  than  two-fifths  of  the 
whole  electoral  body."*  It  may  be  assumed  that,  in  con- 
tested State  and  municipal  elections  in  this  country,  the 
average  proportion  of  unrepresented  voters  is  as  great  as 
in  elections  for  members  of  Congress  and  members  of 
Parliament — in  other  words,  that  the  average  rate  of  vir- 
tual disfranchisement  of  voters  in  our  contested  popular 
elections  is  fully  two-fifths  of  the  total  vote.  This  start- 
ling fact  is  the  first  one  to  be  considered,  and  considered 
attentively,  in  any  intelligent  examination  of  the  great 
subject  of  electoral  reform  in  the  United  States ;  for  all 
schemes  for  the  amendment  of  popular  representation  in 
government  must  be  insufficient  and  illusory  which  ignore 
it  or  underrate  its  enormous  significance.  For  it  means 
that  our  popular  elections  are  unjust ;  it  exposes  the  princi- 
pal cause  of  their  corruption,  and  it  may  instruct  us,  if 
we  duly  consider  it,  concerning  those  measures  of  change 
which  will  most  certainly  impart  health,  vigor  and 
endurance  to  our  political  institutions. 

The  plan  for  securing  Proportional  Representation  pre- 
sented in  this  volume,  and  other  plans  similar  to  it  in 
character  or  object  which  have  been  proposed  in  recent 
years,  strike  at  this  great  evil  of  disfranchisement  in 
popular  elections,  and  are  intended  to  reduce  it  to  its 
smallest  possible  dimensions.  But  the  advantages  of  the 
plan  set  forth  in  the  following  pages  will  best  appear  by 
comparing  it  with  the  old  one,  which  it  is  intended  to 
supersede. 

Under  the  old  plan  of  majority  voting,  whenever  two 

*  "  Memorandum  on  the  History,  Working  and  Results  of  Cumulative 
Voting"  (prepared  by  Thomas  Hare  at  the  request  of  the  English  Gov- 
ernment,) p.  14. 


PRELIMINARY    REMARKS.  Xlll 

or  more  persons  are  to  be  elected  at  one  time  to  the  same 
office  and  for  the  same  term  of  service,  the  law  assigns  to 
the  voter  as  many  votes  as  the  number  of  persons  to  be 
chosen,  and  then  commands  him  to  distribute  them  singly 
among  candidates.  It  restrains  and  prevents  him  from 
exercising  his  own  judgment  as  to  the  manner  of  polling 
his  votes,  and,  in,  fact,  undertakes  to  judge  for  him  and 
to  determine  in  advance  what  will  be,  under  all  circum- 
stances, a  judicious  exercise  of  his  right  of  suffrage.  But 
in  this  it  must  blunder  extremely  and  constantly.  For  as 
the  law  maker  cannot  know  the  future,  cannot  from  sheer 
ignorance  take  into  exact  account  its  ever-changing  con- 
ditions, his  injunction  or  command  to  the  voter  must  be 
purely  arbitrary,  and  must  be  often  or  commonly  unsuited 
to  the  circumstances  to  which  it  shall  come  to  apply. 
Hence  the  virtual  disfranchisement  and  actual  non-repre- 
sentation of  a  large  part  of  the  voters  is  a  common  fact  in 
all  constituencies,  large  and  small,  throughout  the  country, 
the  inevitable  consequences  of  which  are  deeply  injurious 
and  truly  deplorable.  Misgovernment,  injustice,  violence, 
corruption  and  discontent  are  created  and  increased  by  an 
unnecessary  and  absurd  restriction  upon  electoral  freedom ; 
by  a  wholly  gratuitous  and  impertinent  interference  of  law 
with  the  free  action  of  the  citizen ;  by  an  open  and 
palpable  violation  of  the  principles  of  self-government 
upon  which  all  our  political  institutions  are  founded.  Only 
when  a  constituency  shall  be  unanimous,  or  nearly  so,  in 
opinion  and  action  can  the  enforced  distribution  of  votes 
singly  among  the  whole  number  of  candidates  operate 
justly ;  in  all  other  cases  it  must  result  in  the  non-repre- 
sentation of  a  part  of  the  electors,  and  in  consequent 
injustice  and  evil. 


XIV  PRELIMINARY    REMARKS. 

But  we  turn  from  this  view  to  the  free  vote,  now  pro- 
posed to  us  as  an  instrument  for  the  improvement  of  elec- 
tions and  amendment  of  representation.  Its  advantages 
over  the  majority  vote  may  be  roughly  stated  as  follows : 

1.  It  reduces  greatly  the  number  of  candidates  at  popu- 
lar elections,  because  under  it  parties  will  usually  nominate 
only  the  number  they  are  entitled  to  and  have  power  to 
elect.  Surplus  candidates  will  not  commonly  be  run,  and 
but  few  persons  will  be  beaten  in  struggles  for  place. 

2.  It  secures  nearly  complete  representation  of  the  whole 
body  of  voters  in  plural  elections,  by  permitting  each  con- 
siderable interest  of  political  society  to  take  to  itself  its  just 
share  of  representation  by  its  own  votes. 

3.  It  reduces  enormously  the  expense  of  election  con- 
tests,— not  the  legal  charges  borne  by  the  public,  but  vol- 
untary outlays  by  parties  and  candidates.  These  will  no 
longer  be  required  to  subsidize  the  floating  vote — the 
balance-of-power  vote — the  mercenary  or  impressionable 
vote — of  a  district  or  constituency,  as  the  indispensable 
condition  of  success.  Whether  applied  to  legal  elections 
or  to  primary  ones ;  to  elections  to  office  or  to  nominations 
for  office,  in  this  regard  its  effect  will  be  the  same — to 
produce,  comparatively,  cheap  elections. 

4.  It  is  a  powerful  check  upon  all  forms  of  corruption 
and  undue  influence  at  elections,  because  it  takes  away  the 
motive,  or  most  of  the  motive,  to  corrupt  or  pervert  them 
in  rendering  all  ordinary  efforts  to  that  end  unavailing 
and  useless. 

5.  It  produces  satisfaction  to  voters  in  gratifying  their 
desire  for  representation,  and  thus  increases  their  attach- 
ment to  the  government  under  which  they  live. 

6.  It  permits  the  representation  of  a  greater  variety  of 


PRELIMINARY   REMARKS.  XV 

opinions  and  interests  in  legislative  bodies,  without  impair- 
ing the  right  and  power  of  the  majority  to  rule. 

7.  It  will  often  continue  fit  and  able  men  much  longer 
in  public  service  than  is  now  possible,  because  they  will 
not  hold  their  places  subject  so  much  to  fluctuation  of 
power  between  parties  as  to  changed  preferences  in  their 
own  party. 

8.  It  will  greatly  reduce  party  violence,  and  give  a 
kindlier  tone  to  social  relations  among  the  people,  without 
producing  stagnation  or  indifference  to  public  affairs.  In 
this,  as  in  other  cases,  justice  means  peace,  but  it  does  not 
mean  stagnation ;  for  it  is  beyond  question  that  reformed 
voting  "  wakes  to  newness  of  life,"  to  activity  and  interest 
in  public  affairs,  large  numbers  of  persons  who,  under 
majority- voting,  are  inert  because  disgusted  or  discouraged 
by  their  exclusion  from  representation.  Upon  this  point 
Mr.  Buxton  spoke  wisely  and  soundly  in  Parliament  in 
the  Eeform  debates  of  1867.* 

9.  It  discourages  election  cheats,  whether  in  the  giving, 
receiving,  counting,  or  returning  of  votes,  because  by  it  the 
effect  of  cheating  is  greatly  reduced.  And,  for  a  like  reason, 
it  also  discourages  the  trading  of  votes,  or  bartering  of  the 
electoral  privilege. 

10.  It  is  adapted  to  the  bolting  of  nominations  by  an 
aggrieved  interest,  for  such  interest,  if  of  respectable  size, 
can  represent,  by  its  own  votes,  without  disturbing  or 
changing  the  whole  result  of  an  election.f 

11.  It  renders  elections  more  independent  of  each  other. 
No  one  will  much  influence  another;  each  one  will  be 
determined  upon  its  own  merits,  or  upon  the  issues  directly 

*  Appendix,  p.  279. 

f  See  case  of  Northumberland  borough  election,  post,  251. 


Xvi  PRELIMINARY   REMARKS. 

involved  in  it,  and  not  with  reference  to  its  effect  upon 
other  elections. 

12.  Lastly,  it  is  a  certain  remedy  for  the  evil  of  gerry- 
mandering in  the  formation  of  Congressional  districts,  and 
may  be  made  to  remedy,  partially  or  completely,  the  same 
evil,  in  apportionments  for  members  of  State  Legislatures. 

Rightly  understood,  the  free  vote  is  not  a  plan  of 
minority  representation.  It  is,  on  the  contrary,  a  plan  for 
the  representation  of  successive  majorities  in  plural  elec- 
tions, by  which  will  be  realized,  more  fully  than  ever 
before,  our  fundamental  principle  of  government  by  the 
people.* 

It  only  remains  to  add,  in  this  place,  that  in  order  that 
this  or  any  other  plan  of  reformed  voting  shall  be  thor- 
oughly effectual,  it  must  not  stop  wTith  the  legal  elections, 
but  must  extend  to  the  primary  ones  also.  In  fact,  upon 
plans  for  the  nomination  of  candidates  to  office  must  be 
fought  out  the  ultimate  battle  of  electoral  reform. 
*  Letter  to  Secretary  Jordan,  post,  p.  182. 


Proportional  Representation. 


A    SPEECH, 

DELIVERED  IN  THE  SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
JULY  it,   1867.* 


The  Senate  having  under  consideration  Senate 
bill  No.  131,  to  give  effect  to  an  act  entitled  "  An 
act  to  provide  for  the  more  efficient  government  of 
the  rebel  States,"  passed  March  2, 1867,  Mr.  Bucka- 
lew  proposed  the  following  amendment  as  a  new 
section : 

Sec.  — .  And  be  it  further  enacted,  That  in  the  election  of 
Kepresentatives  in  Congress  from  the  said  States  mentioned  in 
the  act  of  March  2,  1867,  each  elector  shall  be  entitled  to  give 
as  many  votes  as  there  are  Kepresentatives  assigned  to  his  State 
by  apportionment  of  law,  and  he  may  give  one  vote  to  each  of 
the  requisite  number  of  persons  to  be  chosen,  or  may  cumulate 
his  votes  and  bestow  them  at  his  discretion  upon  one  or  more 
candidates  less  in  number  than  the  whole  number  of  Repre- 
sentatives to  be  chosen  from  such  State. 

After  prolonged  debate  and  a  vote  of  the  Senate 
on  a  question  of  order,  Mr.  Buckalew  delivered  the 
following  speech  for  cumulative  voting  and  in  vindi- 
cation of  the  amendment  which  he  had  proposed  : 

*  Congressional  Globe,  1st  Sess.  40th  Cong.  575. 

1 


2  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

Mr.  Buckalew.  The  Senate  has  furnished  me  a 
very  good  argument  against,  the  passage  of  this  bill. 
I  think  no  bill  of  this  kind  should  be  passed  and 
placed  upon  our  statute-book  which  does  not  contain 
the  proposition  covered  by  my  amendment;  and  I 
propose  to  enter  upon  an  exposition  of  that  amend- 
ment and  a  statement  of  the  arguments  by  which  it 
is  supported. 

The  plan  of  cumulative  voting  has  been  thor- 
oughly discussed  in  Great  Britain,  and  is  perhaps 
better  understood  in  that  country  than  in  our  own. 
What  is  it  ?  Where  more  persons  than  one  are  to 
be  elected  or  chosen  by  a  body  of  electors,  the  first 
idea  is  that  each  elector  may  have  votes  equal  in 
number  to  the  number  of  persons  to  be  chosen. 
Formerly  in  this  country  we  elected  members  of 
Congress  in  the  several  States  by  what  was  called  a 
general  ticket,  under  which  plan  each  voter  in  the 
State  voted  for  as  many  candidates  as  there  were 
Representatives  in  Congress  to  be  chosen  from  his 
State,  giving  to  each  candidate  one  vote.  That  was 
the  system  which  obtained  throughout  the  United 
States.  In  process  of  time  it  came  to  be  discovered 
that  this  plan  of  choosing  Representatives  in  Con- 
gress by  general  ticket  was  a  complete  and  perfect 
mode  of  stifling  the  voice  of  the  minority  within  a 
State.  A  political  majority  of  only  five  hundred 
votes  in  such  a  State  as  New  York  might  send 
twenty-five  or  thirty  members  to  the  lower  House 
of  Congress,  while  the  large  mass  of  the  minority 
voters  were  entirely  disfranchised,  although  nearly 
as  numerous  as  those  who  were  thus  presented  in 
the  other  House. 


SENATE   SPEECH.  3 

This  plan  of  electing  by  general  ticket  was  there- 
fore abandoned  in  a  number  of  the  States  because 
of  its  rank  and  notorious  injustice  and  because  of  the 
dissatisfaction  which  it  produced.  The  habit,  how- 
ever, of  so  electing  Representatives  remained  in 
many  of  the  States  until  Congress  interposed  by 
virtue  of  its  power  under  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  to  regulate  this  subject,  and  there  is 
now  a  law  upon  our  statute-book  which  provides 
that  Representatives  in  Congress  shall  be  selected 
from  each  State  by  districts ;  each  State  where  more 
than  one  are  to  be  chosen  is  to  be  broken  into  single 
districts  and  a  member  elected  from  each.  That 
action  by  the  States  and  this  ultimate  legislation  by 
Congress  were  for  the  purpose  of  doing  away  with 
the  injustice  of  the  former  system.  It  was  to  enable 
the  minority,  or,  to  speak  in  other  words,  to  enable 
the  various  political  interests  of  society,  to  have  a 
voice  in  the  councils  of  the  nation,  to  be  heard  in 
these  Halls,  where  laws  were  to  be  enacted  which 
would  be  binding  universally  upon  the  citizens. 
The  establishing  of  the  system  of  single  districts  for 
the  election  of  members  of  Congress  was  a  great  re- 
form and  a  great  improvement  in  American  politics; 
it  broke  the  power  of  the  party  majority  to  this  ex- 
tent, that  they  could  not  absorb  the  whole  repre- 
sentation of  the  State  in  the  popular  House  of  Con- 
gress. But  when  you  established  the  system  of 
single  districts  you  retained  still  the  majority  rule 
for  elections  in  the  districts.  The  majority  rule 
which  obtained  previously  for  the  States  was  sent 
clown  into  these  divisions  into  which  the  States  were 
broken,  and  now  obtains  in  the  election  of  Repre- 


4  PKOPORTIONAL   EEPKESENTATION. 

sentatives  from  those  several  districts.  But  as  soci- 
ety with  us  has  increased  in  magnitude  and  in  the 
variety  of  its  interests,  inconveniences  and  evils 
which  formerly  were  unnoticed  or  unimportant  have 
grown  in  magnitude  also,  and  have  become  exceed- 
ingly important,  and  the  majority  rule  which  pre- 
vails in  the  selection  of  Representatives  by  districts 
operates  hardly  and  badly  and  requires  amendment. 
At  least  that  is  my  opinion ;  and  in  vindication  of 
that  opinion,  before  I  conclude  I  will  submit  such 
reasons  as  have  occurred  to  me  in  its  support. 

A  majority  in  a  congressional  district,  although 
it  be  a  majority  of  one  vote,  though  it  have  but  a 
preponderance  of  one  vote  over  the  opposing  inter- 
est, is  entitled  to  select  a  Representative,  and  its 
voice  is  heard  in  the  Hall  of  the  people's  House. 
In  theory  the  men  who  do  not  vote  for  the  Repre- 
sentative are  represented  by  him ;  but  that  theory  is 
simply  a  falsehood ;  it  is  opposed  to  the  fact ;  it  is 
not  true.  Instead  of  representing  the  men  who  do 
not  vote  for  him  in  his  district,  the  ordinary  fact  is 
that  the  Representative  opposes  their  opinions  and 
contributes  all  the  power  which  he  possesses  to  ren- 
der those  opinions  unpopular  and  fruitless  in  the 
administration  of  government. 

INJUSTICE  TO  THE  M1NOEITY. 

Now,  sir,  it  is  a  hardship  that  large  masses  of  the 
American  people  should  have  no  voice  in  the  peo- 
ple's House,  that  they  should  be  shut  out  from 
representation  in  the  Hall  where  popular  represent- 
ation is  supposed  to  prevail  with  completeness  and 
perfection.     Everybody  admits  that  the  fact  is  so, 


SENATE   SPEECH.  5 

that  there  is  such  disfranchisement ;  and  at  some 
times  when  the  cases  are  very  glaring,  that  disfran- 
chisement arrests  public  attention  and  elicits  indig- 
nant debate. 

But  we  are  told  that  although  a  minority  may  be 
under  our  present  system  disfranchised  in  one  dis- 
trict, the  opposite  party  may  be  disfranchised  in 
another;  and  so  taking  the  whole  State  and  the 
whole  country  together  a  sort  of  equilibrium  is  pro- 
duced ;  the  party  which  fails  in  one  district  is  suc- 
cessful in  another,  and  vice  versa  ;  so  that  when  you 
carry  this  thing  throughout  the  whole  country 
there  is  some  approach  toward  justice  and  a  correct  J 
result.  My  answer  to  that,  which  is  really  the  ( 
main  plea  for  the  existing  system,  is  this :  in  the 
first  place  I  do  not  see  that  the  perpetration  of  in- 
justice in  one  locality  is  any  compensation  for  the 
perpetration  of  injustice  in  another ;  that  because  a 
certain  minority  of  voters  in  Pennsylvania  are 
without  a  voice  in  this  Government,  therefore  the 
non-representation  of  a  different  class  of  voters  in 
Kentucky  is  justified  and  made  equitable  and 
honorable  and  of  good  repute  under  a  republican 
system.  In  short,  sir,  my  idea  is  that  when  you 
show  me  a  multiplication  of  cases  of  injustice,  you  \ 
have  simply  swollen  your  evil  in  statement  and  I 
made  it  more  odious,  more  deserving  of  blows  in- 
stead of  favor,  of  opposition  instead  of  support : 
that  the  variety  of  the  interests  which  may  be  dis- 
franchised under  your  majority  rule  as  applied  to 
congressional  districts  is  the  very  fact  which  pro- 
nounces the  most  weighty  condemnation  of  that 
rule  instead  of  furnishing  it  a  justification   or  an 


6  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

apology.  Then  I  have  another  reply  to  this  sug- 
gestion ;  and  that  is  that  it  is  not  true  in  point  of 
fact  that  the  disfranchisements  throughout  the  coun- 
try taken  together,  or  the  disfranchisements  in  dis-. 
tricts  in  a  particular  State  taken  together,  do  result 
in  an  equilibrium.  The  fact  has  never  been  so ;  it 
is  not  likely  to  occur;  the  chances  are  a  thousand 
to  one  against  it.  Therefore,  even  if  there  were 
some  soundness  in  this  doctrine  of  set-off,  of  setting 
off  one  wrong  against  another,  the  result  would  not 
be  the  production  of  an  equilibrium  of  political 
forces  or  their  just  distribution.  How  was  it  in  the 
last  Congress  ?  Sixteen  hundred  thousand  voters  in 
a  particular  section  of  country  represented  in  Con- 
gress— the  North  and  West — had  but  thirty  votes ; 
while  two  million  voters  in  the  same  section  were 
represented  in  that  same  House  by  one  hundred  and 
twenty-eight!  Therefore,  sir,  it  is  manifestly  ab- 
surd to  talk  about  the  equalization  of  disfranchise- 
ment. There  is  no  such  result ;  there  is  no  equal- 
ization. 

Mr.  President,  we  have  all  heard  a  great  deal  said 
in  our  time  about  the  "  sacred  principle"  that  the 
majority  shall  bear  absolute  rule.  Well,  sir,  I  deny 
that  there  is  any  such  principle  in  our  system  of 
government ;  and  if  it  could  be  established,  I  should 
deny  that  it  possessed  any  sacred  character.  What 
is  our  principle,  the  principle  upon  which  our  repub- 
lican system  is  founded  ?  It  is  that  the  people  shall 
rule ;  that  they  shall  rule  themselves  ;  that  we  shall 
have  a  system  of  self-government.  Does  that  mean 
that  a  part  of  the  people  shall  rule  over  another 
part  ?     Does  that  mean  that  they  shall  be  divided 


SENATE   SPEECH.  7 

numerically,  and  that  twenty  shall  absolutely  con- 
trol nineteen  ;  or  does  it  mean  volition  and  action  of 
the  whole  mass  in  the  business  of  self-government  ? 
We  have,  however,  from  what  we  have  supposed  to 
be  the  necessity  of  the  case,  a  majority  rule  at  elec- 
tions. It  is  a  simple  rule,  nothing  sacred  in  it  or 
about  it ;  an  arrangement,  a  thing  of  detail,  by 
which  we  have  attempted  in  a  rude  manner  to  appty 
practically  our  principle  of  government  by  the 
people ;  and  this  majority  rule  formerly  obtaining 
in  the  States  and  applied  to  a  system  of  voting  by 
general  ticket,  yet  applies  in  the  districts  into  which 
the  States  are  divided.  It  is  the  same  in  its  nature 
and  to  a  great  extent  it  is  the  same  in  its  effects  as 
before,  and  the  very  mischief  and  evil  which  led  to 
the  abolition  of  the  general  ticket  plan  yet  obtains 
and  prevails  in  elections  in  single  districts.  Though 
mitigated  somewhat,  it  requires,  as  I  think,  the 
vigorous  hand  of  reform. 

I  have  made  these  introductory  remarks  in  order 
to  approach  the  subject  in  an  intelligible  manner. 
What  is  meant  by  cumulative  voting  is  this :  that 
an  elector  in  any  State,  whether  he  belongs  to  the 
majority  or  to  the  minority,  can  give  his  votes  for 
some  candidate  or  candidates  who  will  be  elected 
and  who  will  actually  represent  him  in  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States.  That  is  all  there  is  of  it. 
That  is  the  Alpha  and  the  Omega  of  this  whole 
plan.  It  is  a  device  by  which  there  shall  be  actual 
instead  of  sham  representation  in  Congress ;  by  which 
men  who  come  here  into  the  people's  Hall  shall  rep- 
resent the  men  who  vote  for  them  and  nobody  else, 
and  by  which  it  shall  not  happen  that  nearly  half 


8  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

the  people  of  the  United  States  shall  have  no  effi- 
cient or  fair  representation  where  the  laws  are  made. 

HOW  TO  CORRECT  IT. 

How  is  this  object  accomplished  ?  The  manner 
of  accomplishing  it  is  as  simple  as  the  thing  is  itself. 
Take  the  State  of  Kentucky,  about  which  there  is 
some  discussion  now,  I  believe,  in  the  House  of 
Kepresentatives  as  to  membership.  She  is  entitled 
to  nine  members  in  that  House.  What  is  proposed 
is,  that  an  elector  in  Kentucky  may  go  to  the  elec- 
tion and  vote  for  nine  members,  if  he  choose,  to  rep- 
sent  his  State  in  that  House,  giving  each  candi- 
date one  vote ;  or  bestow  his  nine  votes  upon  four, 
if  he  choose,  or  upon  one,  or  upon  any  other  num- 
ber less  than  the  whole.  All  the  provision  of  law 
that  is  necessary  is  that  the  elector  may  vote  for  a 
less  number  of  candidates  than  the  whole  number 
to  be  chosen,  and  that  he  may  distribute  his  votes 
among  that  less  number  according  to  his  judgment 
and  discretion,  enlightened  or  directed  by  his  con- 
victions of  public  duty.  That  is  simple.  It  does 
not  require  a  long  explanation  here ;  nor  to  the 
commonest-minded  man  in  the  country  is  it  neces- 
sary to  go  into  a  protracted  argument  in  order  that 
he  may  comprehend  it.  The  Senator  from  Kentucky 
remarked  a  short  time  ago  that  he  was  in  favor  of 
this  reform  if  it  were  practicable ;  he  was  in  favor 
of  some  improvement  of  this  kind. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  did  not  mean  to  say  that  it  was 
impracticable.  I  am  very  ready  to  receive  informa- 
tion as  to  the  practicability  of  it  from  the  honorable 
Senator. 


UN       a  si 


>, 


SENATE   SPEECH. 


Mr.  Buckalew.  The  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  says  you  may  regulate  the  manner  of  electing 
members  of  Congress ;  you  have  interposed  already 
by  law  to  abolish  the  evils  of  the  general  ticket  plan 
by  which  a  majority  could  elect  all  the  members  from 
a  State.  Now  what  I  ask  you  to  do  is  in  the  same 
line  of  reform  with  that  former  legislation ;  that 
you  shall  go  on,  and  instead  of  allowing  any  portion 
of  the  people  of  a  State  to  be  disfranchised,  you 
shall  permit  them  so  to  vote  that  they  shall  get 
actual  representation. 

Mr.  Davis.  If  the  honorable  Senator  will  per- 
mit me,  I  will  mention  as  an  evidence  of  my  friend- 
liness to  his  principle,  that  I  was  a  member  of  the 
House  at  the  time  that  bill  was  passed,  and  voted 
for  it ;  and  I  was  then  upon  the  Committee  of  Elec- 
tions, and  I  made  a  report  in  favor  of  the  bill. 
Some  of  the  States  then  voted  by  general  ticket, 
and  some  did  not.  Some  voted  by  the  district 
system,  with  districts  entitled  to  send  two  or  three 
or  four  Representatives,  as  was  the  case  in  the  hon- 
orable Senator's  State.  That  measure  was  deemed 
entirely  a  Whig  measure ;  it  was  opposed  by  the 
Democracy ;  and  there  were  four  States,  according 
to  my  best  recollection,  two  of  which  I  remember, 
Mississippi  and  New  Hampshire,  who  refused  obe- 
dience to  the  law,  and  continued  to  elect  their  Rep- 
resentatives upon  the  exploded  general  ticket  system, 
defying  the  law  of  Congress.  But  their  represen- 
tation, elected  on  the  general  ticket  system,  was 
accepted  in  the  next  House  by  a  majority.  I  merely 
make  this  statement  of  my  being  a  friend  to  that 
measure  to  give  some  assurance  to  the   honorable 


10  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

Senator  that  I  am  not  hostile  to  the  principle  of  his 
proposition. 

Mr.  Buckalew.  Well,  sir,  whatever  may  be  said 
of  this  measure,  it  is  certainly  practicable.  It  re- 
quires nothing  but  an  act  of  Congress  of  half  a 
dozen  lines  permitting  an  elector  in  any  State  choos- 
ing members  of  Congress  to  bestow  his  votes  on  any 
number  of  candidates  less  than  the  whole.  Nothing 
further  is  necessary  than  that  the  votes  so  taken 
shall  be  reported,  counted  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Commonwealth  in  a  State,  and  the  returns  signed 
by  the  Governor  in  the  usual  way,  and  sent  to  the 
Speaker  of  the  House  of  Eepresentatives.  The 
scheme  requires  no  machinery;  it  requires  no  in- 
volved legislation;  it  involves  no  difficulty  in  put- 
ting it  into  execution. 

ILLUSTRATIONS  OF  THE  NEW  PLAN. 

Now,  let  me  show  how  this  scheme  would  work 
by  a  particular  example.  Take  the  case  of  Ver- 
mont, a  State  with  sixty  thousand  voters,  forty  thou- 
sand of  whom  are  members  of  the  majority  party, 
and  twenty  thousand  of  the  minority.  By  act  of 
Congress — the  existing  apportionment  law — that 
State  is  entitled  to  three  members.  The  numbers  I 
have  stated  are  very  nearly  the  exact  numbers  of 
voters  in  that  State.  Every  one  at  a  glance  can  see 
what  ought  to  take  place.  The  maj ority  having  forty 
thousand  votes  should  choose  two  members  of  Con- 
gress from  that  State,  and  the  minority  having 
twenty  thousand  votes  should  choose  one  member. 
Then  there  would  be  just  representation.  Then 
there  could  be  no  complaint  in  any  quarter.     Then 


SENATE   SPEECH. 


11 


our  principle  of  the  representation  of  the  people 
would  be  applied  in  the  particular  case,  and  no 
human  being  can  conceive  of  any  argument  or 
objection  against  the  result. 

This  plan  of  cumulative  voting  renders  just  that 
result  certain — renders  it  morally  impossible  that 
any  other  should  take  place ;  and  why  ?  Because  \ 
the  minority  cumulating  their  votes  upon  a  single  \ 
candidate  can  give  him  sixty  thousand  votes ;  each 
elector  giving  his  candidate  three  votes,  it  would 
count  him  sixty  thousand.  The  forty  thousand 
constituting  the  political  majority  in  the  State,  if 
they  attempt  to  vote  for  three  candidates,  can  give 
them  only  forty  thousand  each.  If  they  cumulate 
their  votes  upon  two  candidates,  (which  is  what  they 
are  entitled  to,)  they  can  give  them  sixty  thousand 
votes  each ;  so  that  two  men  will  be  elected  to  Con- 
gress representing  the  majority  and  one  man  repre- 
senting the  minority,  and  it  is  impossible  for  either 
one  of  those  political  interests  to  prevent  the  other 
from  obtaining  its  due  share  of  representation. 

Take  the  case  of  Pennsylvania,  with  twenty-four 
members.  In  that  State  at  the  last  congressional 
election  there  were  polled  five  hundred  and  ninety- 
six  thousand  one  hundred  and  forty-one  votes.  The 
majority  party  polled  three  hundred  and  three  thou- 
sand seven  hundred  and  ninety  and  the  minority 
two  hundred  and  ninety-two  thousand  three  hun- 
dred and  fifty-one.  It  thus  appears  that  there  was 
a  majority  in  favor  of  one  political  interest  in  that 
State  at  that  congressional  election,  amounting  to 
eleven  thousand  four  hundred  and  thirty-nine  votes. 
Multiplying,  that  by  five — one-fifth  of  the  popula- 


12  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

tion  ordinarily  being  the  voters  of  the  State — and 
you  see  that  that  surplus  which  one  party  possessed 
of  votes  over  the  other  represents  a  population  a  lit- 
tle exceeding  fifty-five  thousand — less  than  one-half 
the  number  of  inhabitants  in  the  State  entitled  to  a 
representative  in  Congress — so  that  this  surplus  of 
votes  of  one  party  over  the  other  represents  a  mi- 
nority fraction  upon  a  ratio  of  apportionment  of 
members  of  Congress  to  the  State.  The  returns  of 
that  election  (held  in  October  last)  were  as  follows  : 

PENNSYLVANIA  CONGRESSIONAL  DISTRICTS. 

Republican.     Democratic. 

1 7,728  12,192 

II 12,612  9,475 

III 12,520  11,516 

IV 14,551  12,120 

V 12,259  11,800 

VI 11,447  14,009 

VII 12,011  8,531 

VIII 6,999  13,188 

IX 14,298  8,675 

X 13,186  12,971 

XI 9,121  15,907 

XII 13,274  15,280 

XIII 11,940  10,653 

XIV 14,190  12,675 

XV 12,489  15,830 

XVI 13,589  12,964 

XVII 11,298  9,979 

XVIII 14,734  12,688 

XIX 15,107  12,481 

XX 17,106  15,222 

XXI 13,023  12,669 

XXII 12,720  9,655 

XXIII 14,197  10,012 

XXIV 13,391  11,853 

303,790  292,351 

292,351 

Majority 11,439 

Ratio  of  votes  for  a  Representative,  according  to  votes  polled... 24,839 


SENATE   SPEECH.  13 

Now,  sir,  what  is  the  result?  Judging  by  the 
actual  votes  polled  at  that  congressional  election, 
there  should  have  been  an  equal  division  of  Repre- 
sentatives in  the  House,  standing  12  to  12  ;  or,  if  a 
Representative  should  be  assigned  to  the  majority 
interest  on  account  of  the  excess  of  its  vote,  the 
numbers  would  stand  13  to  11.  But  in  point  of 
fact,  under  your  single  district  system,  the  result  in 
that  State  is  that,  the  delegation  stands  18  to  6,  in- 
stead of  being  equally  divided  between  parties 
according  to  the  actual  votes  which  were  polled  at 
the  election.  But  under  this  plan  of  cumulative 
voting,  what  would  take  place  ?  As  each  political 
interest  in  the  State  knows  that  its  vote  is  .about 
the  same  as  that  of  the  opposing  one,  and  that 
if  it  attempt  to  obtain  more  than  its  fair  share 
of  representation,  it  may  actually  lose  instead  of 
gaining,  it  will  be  forced  to  concentrate  its  votes 
upon  twelve  candidates,  or  upon  thirteen  at  the 
most,  and  it  is  impossible  that  by  any  ingenuity  or 
device  whatever  it  can  increase  its  representation  in 
Congress  above  about  what  its  actual  numbers  en- 
title it  to.  If  it  should  make  the  attempt,  the 
opposite  party  would  gain  an  advantage  as  the  result 
of  the  sharp  practice  attempted  upon  them. 

I  have  taken  Vermont  and  Pennsvlvania.  Now 
take  the  case  of  Kentucky.  There  are  nine  mem- 
bers of  the  House  elected  from  Kentucky,  all  of  one 
political  complexion.  They  are  now  demanding 
membership  in  the  House,  and  they  are  met  by  a 
refusal  for  reasons  which  I  need  not  discuss,  and 
which  it  would  be,  perhaps,  improper  to  discuss 
here.     Suppose  a  just  system  of  election  had  pre- 


14  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

vailed  in  Kentucky,  would  the  whole  nine  have 
been  Democratic — a  clean  delegation  of  one  political 
opinion  ?  No  such  thing  would  have  been  possible. 
At  that  election  the  majority  was  about  forty  thou- 
sand for  the  party  that  prevailed. 

Mr.  Davis.  Larger  than  that. 

Mr.  Buckalew\  I  thought  it  was  about  forty 
thousand.  As  I  make  the  number  of  voters  re- 
quired for  the  election  of  a  member  of  Congress, 
that  would  represent  nearly  two  members.  There- 
fore the  preponderance  of  one  political  interest  in 
Kentucky  over  the  other  would  represent  two  mem- 
bers. That  would  leave  seven  members  of  Congress 
to  be  equally  divided  between  the  two  political  in- 
terests ;  one  party  having  four  and  the  other  three, 
and  the  result  would  be  that  the  representation  in 
the  House  would  have  been  divided,  more  une- 
qually, to  be  sure,  than  in  most  cases,  but  still  not 
with  gross  inequality  between  the  two  parties  that 
contend  for  mastery  in  this  country. 

Take  the  case  of  Maryland  at  the  last  election. 
You  find  that  representation  in  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives is  not  just,  considering  the  men  who 
gave  the  votes  by  which  those  Representatives  were 
elected  ;  that  instead  of  there  being  but  one  Repub- 
lican Representative  from  Maryland  there  should 
be  two  on  account  of  the  actual  votes  polled  in  that 
State.  Then,  sir,  take  the  case  of  Connecticut,  an 
election  recently  held,  and  a  most  notable  trial  of 
political  strength  in  the  North.  There,  where  the 
vote  was  a  tie  substantially,  where  the  preponderance 
of  one  side  over  the  other  was  very  slight,  not  more 
than  about  a  thousand  or  twelve  hundred,  perhaps, 


SENATE   SPEECH.  15 

the  delegation  stands  three  to  one,  whereas  it  should 
be  equally  divided  according  to  the  actual  votes 
polled  and  returned  according  to  law. 

I  cite  these  cases  of  recent  State  elections,  and 
elections  which  on  the  whole  have  been  favorable  to 
that  interest  in  the  country  which  when  the  votes 
are  taken  in  the  aggregate  is  in  the  minority,  and  I 
cite  the  other  two  cases  of  Vermont  and  Pennsyl- 
vania as  other  illustrations.  But  nearly  every  State 
might  be  mentioned  in  illustration  of  the  argument. 

Thus,  sir,  whether  you  go  to  the  North  or  to  the 
West,  or  confine  your  researches  to  the  central  por- 
tions of  the  country,  you  find  gross  misrepresenta- 
tion of  the  people  of  the  United  States  in  that 
House  which  was  peculiarly  intended  to  represent! 
them,  and  to  represent  them  completely,  year  by! 
year.  The  Senate  was  intended  to  be  a  more  per- 
manent body,  and  to  possess  somewhat  of  a  different 
character.  What  I  propose,  then,  is  the  correction 
of  this  injustice,  whether  it  exist  in  the  States  I 
have  mentioned  or  in  any  other  States  represented 
in  Congress,  and  to  guard  against  its  extension  to 
the  States  which  you  are  about  to  restore  under  your 
legislation  to  their  former  places  in  the  Union,  and 
with  regard  to  which  a  reform  of  this  kind  is  more 
important  than  it  is  to  the  States  of  the  North,  the 
centre,  or  the  West. 

ITS  ADVANTAGES. 

Mr.  President,  I  will  now  proceed  briefly  to  state 
in  succession,  not  to  elaborate,  several  distinct  argu- 
ments by  wdiich  cumulative  voting  can  be  sustained, 
vindicated,  and  made  good  as  I  think  against  all 


16  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

objection.  In  the  first  place,  this  plan  is  one  of 
justice ;  it  is  recognized  as  just  by  every  one  who 
hears  me  upon  its  mere  statement ;  it  will  be  recog- 
nized as  just  by  any  man  in  the  country  to  whom 
you  carry  the  proposition  and  submit  it  for  his  judg- 
ment. It  will  deal  equal,  even-handed  justice 
among  political  interests  in  the  country,  whether 
they  exist  now  or  are  created  by  the  exigencies  of 
our  affairs  hereafter. 

In  the  next  place,  this  plan  would  bring  into 
public  life  and  keep  in  public  life  many  able  men 
who  are  now  excluded  under  your  single  district 
system.  A  man  of  ability  in  a  State  can  never 
reach  the  Hall  of  the  House,  of  Representatives  as 
a  Representative  of  the  people  unless  there  be  a 
majority  in  his  district  to  send  him  ;  and  if  he  com- 
mence a  career  in  public  life,  with  high  ambition 
before  him,  and  devote  himself  zealously  to  the 
service  of  the  people,  and  so  qualify  himself  for 
high  statesmanship,  and  to  take  rank  in  Congress  as 
men  take  rank  in  the  Parliament  of  Great  Britain, 
he  knows  that  a  little  shifting  of  the  political  scale 
in  his  district  will  leave  him  out.  Those  who  agree 
with  him  in  opinion  cannot  continue  him  in  the 
public  service.  The  result  is  that  you  have  no 
twenty,  thirty,  or  forty-year  men  in  Congress. 
They  are  mostly  men  of  the  moment ;  they  are  two 
and  four-year  men  in  the  House,  and  the  example 
extends  even  here.  If  a  member  of  this  bodv  sets 
re-elected  his  friends  think  it  is  a  subject  for  warm 
congratulation,  regard  it  as  a  wonderful  result  to  be 
wrung  from  a  caucus  and  from  managers  at  home. 
But,  sir,  I  insist  that  in  this  country,  as  abroad,  the 


SENATE    SPEECH.  17 

House  of  Representatives  ought  to  be  the  great 
House  of  our  Legislature ;  its  Hall  should  be  re- 
sorted to  for  words  of  eloquence,  for  profound  logic, 
and  for  the  exhibition  of  the  highest  traits  of  Amer- 
ican statesmanship.  How  is  it  and  how  must  it  be 
as  long  as  you  keep  members  there  two,  four,  and  six 
years  only  ?  They  have  no  opportunity  to  grow  up 
into  distinction ;  they  have  no  opportunity  to  ma- 
ture their  abilities  and  become  able  statesmen. 

The  result  is  that  the  weight  of  that  House  in  the 
Government  is  far  below  what  it  should  be.  This 
may  increase  the  relative  importance  of  the  Senate  ; 
but  upon  the  whole  it  is  not  a  desirable  condition 
of  things,  and  the  continuance  of  this  system  of 
rapid  rotation  in  the  membership  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  bids  fair  to  be  one  of  those  injurious 
influences  which  will  bring  republican  institutions 
into  contempt. 

I  say  then,  sir,  that  this  plan  of  election  by 
cumulative  voting  will  allow  electors  of  a  particular 
party  in  a  State  to  continue  their  favorites  in  Con- 
gress, and  will  result  in  improved  statesmanship  in5 
the  House  of  Representatives,  elevating  that  branch 
of  the  national  Legislature,  and,  of  consequence, 
promoting  the  public  interests. 

Again,  sir,  one  great  advantage  of  this  plan  is 
that  it  abolishes  gerrymandering  in  the  States,  cuts[ 
it  up  by  the  roots,  ends  it  forever.  That  is  one  of 
the  most  crying  evils  of  the  time.  Now,  sir,  I  ven- 
ture to  say  that  from  Maine  westward  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  in  the  last  ten  years,  in  no  State  whatever, 
has  there  been  an  honest  and  fair  district  apportion- 
ment bill  passed  for  the  selection  of  members  of 


18  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

Congress.  Nowhere,  in  no  State,  has  there  been  a 
fair  apportionment,  unless,  indeed,  it  was  in  a  par- 
ticular and  exceptional  case  where  the  two  branches 
of  a  Legislature  were  divided  in  political  opinion 
and  one  checked  the  other ;  but  ordinarily,  as  we 
know,  in  the  course  of  northern  politics,  legislative 
bodies  have  been  of  the  same  political  complexion 
in  the  upper  and  lower  houses  ;  and  I  venture  to 
say  that  whenever  this  wTas  the  fact,  unfair  and  dis- 
honest apportionment  bills  have  been  passed. 

Under  the  present  system  the  temptation  to  party 
is  too  great  to  be  resisted  ;  party  interest  appeals  to 
members  of  a  Legislature,  and  they  yield  to.  its  de- 
mands and  enact  injustice  into  law.  The  party  that 
does  this  knowTs  perfectly  well  that  when  a  future 
apportionment  shall  be  made,  the  opposite  party,  if 
it  be  in  power,  will  retort  this  injustice,  perhaps 
with  increased  force.  Thus  you  have  a  competition 
between  political  interests  with  reference  to  the  ap- 
portionment of  the  States  continually  increasing  in 
injustice,  leading  to  degradation  of  the  Legislatures 
and  the  corruption  of  the  people.  The  plan  of 
cumulative  voting,  however,  dispensing  with  single 
districts  in  a  State,  avoids  altogether  this  capital 
evil  and  mischief  of  gerrymandering  and  brings  it 
to  an  end  so  far  as  the  selection  of  members  of  Con- 
gress is  concerned. 

Well,  Mr.  President,  in  the  southern  country,  as 
already  hinted  by  me,  I  consider  this  plan  of  cumu- 
lative voting  to  be  indispensable  to  the  harmony,  to 
the  welfare  of  that  section  of  the  Union.  You 
have  vast  masses  of  voters  belonging  to  two  different 
races  there  who  are  to  be  brought  into  antagonism 


SENATE    SPEECH.  19 

to  each  other  at  the  polls,  and  that  in  and  through 
every  State  of  the  whole  ten  now  unrepresented. 
How  will  you  have  them  vote  ?  Against  each  other, 
voting  each  other  down  under  the  majority  rule, 
producing  bad  blood  and  riot  and  turbulence  upon 
thousands  of  occasions,  with  wide-spread  discontent 
and  dissatisfaction  through  the  whole  social  body  ? 
Will  you  permit  the  majority  rule  of  elections  to 
have  uninterrupted  effect  there,  causing  results  like 
these?  Will  you  make  no  provision  for  amend- 
ment, for  counteracting  and  countervailing  these 
manifest  evils  and  dangers  ? 

Take  the  case  of  Georgia,  with  seven  members. 
You  can  see  what  the  result  would  be  under  cumu- 
lative voting  following  a  regular  registration  of 
voters.  It  could  be  known  beforehand  about  what 
number  of  representatives  the  colored  voters  and  their 
white  allies  were  entitled  to,  and  how  many  repre- 
sentatives under  that  registration  the  other  elements 
of  population  would  be  entitled  to.  The  election  would 
take  place  quietly,  without  collision ;  neither  side 
could  deprive  the  other  of  its  Mr  share  in  the  result. 

I  should  like  to  enlarge  on  that  point,  but  I  shall 
not  do  so ;  for  the  reason  that  the  decision  of  the 
Senate  ruling  the  amendment  proposed  by  me  out 
of  order  upon  this  bill  does  not  render  a  discussion 
of  the  effects  of  this  plan  in  those  States,  in  connec- 
tion with  the  coming  elections,  as  important  as  it 
would  otherwise  be. 

I  go  over,  as  briefly  as  I  can,  the  different  heads 
of  the  argument,  in  order  that  they  may  be  con- 
sidered here  and  elsewhere,  because  this  is  not  the 
end  of  this  subject.     A  proposition  which  is  just  in 


20  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

itself,  which  is  capable  of  being  vindicated  by  de- 
bate, which  is  important  and  vital  to  the  working  of 
our  representative  system,  cannot  be  kept  down  or 
suppressed.  If  it  be  pushed  aside  at  one  time  it 
will  recur  upon  us,  it  will  return  again  and  again, 
until  it  be  determined  upon  its  merits  and  according 
to  an  enlightened  public  sentiment  developed  or 
produced  by  discussion. 

In  the  last  place,  Mr.  President,  this  plan  of  cumu- 
lative voting  will  be  a  most  valuable  check  upon 
fraud  at  elections.  No  measure  ever  proposed  in 
this  Union  would  have  so  extensive  and  salutary  an 
effect  in  checking  election  frauds  and  corruption  as 
this  plan  of  fair  and  honest  voting  which  I  defend. 
Do  you  not  discover  at  a  glance  in  looking  over  the 
States  of  the  Union  the  main  source  from  which 
electoral  corruption  issues,  the  main  cause  that 
brings  it  into  existence  ?  What  is  that  ?  Why,  sir, 
the  motive  put  before  every  candidate  in  every  dis- 
trict of  the  country  that  is  anything  like  close,  the 
strong  incentive  and  the  strong  temptation  is  to  cor- 
rupt a  few  votes  in  order  to  turn  them  into  his  scale 
and  carry  his  election  over  an  opposing  candidate. 
And  when  one  candidate  resorts  to  this  mode  of  pro- 
moting his  interests,  the  opposing  candidate  feels 
justified  in  acting  in  the  same  way  ;  and  thus  it  is 
that  an  iniquity  perpetrated  on  one  side  begets  simi- 
lar iniquity  upon  the  other.  There  is  a  pitting  of 
corruption  against  corruption,  in  the  closely  con- 
tested districts  at  all  events,  or  most  noticeably  at 
commercial  points,  and  our  system  of  government  is 
thereby  poisoned  at  its  very  fountain.  The  evil  is 
growing  yearly. 


SENATE   SPEECH.  21 

As  the  country  becomes  denser  in  population,  as 
wealth  accumulates,  as  the  various  interests  of  society 
become  more  diverse,  its  affairs  more  complicated 
and  dependent  upon  legislation,  this  evil  of  electoral 
corruption  must  increase  and  swell  in  volume.  You 
must  correct  your  arrangements  for  elections  in 
order  to  check  it.  Cumulative  voting  will  check  it. 
There  will  be  no  longer  a  struggle  for  district  ma- 
jorities, a  struggle  for  a  few  votes  for  one  man  over 
another,  because  one  party  in  a  State  casting  its 
votes  for  the  number  of  men  or  about  the  number 
of  men  it  can  elect  according  to  its  numbers  in  that 
State  will  elect  them  against  the  whole  world,  and 
there  will  be  no  motive  to  corrupt  anybody,  no 
turning  of  the  scale  by  any  species  of  illegitimate 
influence  which  may  be  brought  to  bear.  Then,  no 
little  local  interest  can  come  to  a  political  party  and 
command  terms  from  it,  command  its  action.  Then 
no  man  with  his  pocket  full  of  accumulated  gain  can 
go  to  election  agents  and  through  them  corrupt  a 
part  of  the  electoral  body  to  turn  the  scale  in  his 
own  favor,  provoking  thereby  similar  corruption  on 
the  other  side.  Then  illegitimate,  pernicious,  and 
selfish  interests  in  a  State  will  not  use  the  machinery 
of  your  electoral  system  for  the  purpose  of  poisoning 
the  sources  of  political  power,  because  there  will  not 
be  a  sufficient  motive.  It  is  these  contests  for  ma- 
jorities between  candidates  that  cause  the  major 
part  of  the  evil  of  which  we  complain. 

COKKUPTION  OF  THE  PKESENT  SYSTEM. 

Sir,  we  have  not  in  this  regard  attained  to  the 
full  height  and  depth  and  breadth  of  possible  evil. 


22  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

But  we  have  declined  far  below  the  purity  of  former 
times.     The  Senator  from  Massachusetts  [Mr.  Wil- 
son] thinks  our  elections  in  this  country  are  models 
of  purity,  that  nobody  is  corrupted,  that  there  is  lit- 
tle departure  from  honest  principles  in  their  manage- 
ment.    Notwithstanding  his  opinion,  I  think  that 
this  evil  is  already   extensive  enough  with  us  to 
alarm  every  patriot  and  every  honest  man.     I  could 
if  it  were  necessary  and  time   permitted  put   my 
finger  upon  cases  in  my  own  State  which  would 
establish  a  very  different  opinion  (at  least  as  to  that 
section  of  the  Union)   from  that  which  the  Senator 
from  Massachusetts  announces. 

Let  me  illustrate  the  extent  to  which,  under  a 
system  of  elections  by  the  majority  rule,  corruption 
niay  be  carried  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  these 
local  majorities.  I  take  cases  from  England — some 
parliamentary  boroughs.  In  the  debate  in  the 
House  of  Commons  on  the  30th  of  May  last  a  pro- 
vision of  the  reform  bill  was  pending  which  had 
been  proposed  by  the  ministry  for  the  disfranchise- 
ment of  certain  boroughs,  on  the  ground  of  the  cor- 
ruption of  the  electors  therein.  Four  boroughs 
were  to  be  struck  from  the  list  of  those  to  be  repre- 
sented hereafter  in  Parliament,  (whether  the  inhab- 
itants were  to  be  counted  as  electors  of  the  counties 
in  which  they  were  located  or  not  was  not  deter- 
mined at  the  last  accounts.)  There  had  been  an 
examination  by  a  board  of  commission  of  the  subject 
of  corruption  in  those  boroughs  at  the  previous  par- 
liamentary  election.  Witnesses  were  examined 
under  oath ;  the  case  of  each  borough  was  thor- 
oughly investigated,  and  the  facts  were  laid  before 


SENATE   SPEECH.  23 

Parliament.  What  did  the  report  of  the  commis- 
sion show  ?  The  statement  is  a  startling  one,  and 
here  it  is : 

CORRUPTION   IN  ENGLISH   BOROUGHS. 

Registered  Voters.     Impure  Voters, 

Totness..' 421  158 

Beigate 912  346 

Great  Yarmouth 1647  528 

Lancaster 1498  916 

In  Totness  and  Eeigate  the  corrupt  voters  were  thirty-eight  per  cent, 
of  the  whole ;  in  Yarmouth  thirty-two  per  cent.,  and  in  Lancaster  sixty- 
four  ! 

The  reason  why  Yarmouth  shows  the  lowest  in 
this  scale  of  infamy,  is  that  by  act  of  Parliament 
some  years  since  the  freemen  were  disfranchised, 
and  suffrage  was  confined  to  householders ;  so  that 
the  percentage  of  corrupt  voters  is  only  thirty-two 
per  cent.,  whereas  in  Lancaster,  a  borough  of  some- 
what similar  character,  the  percentage  amounts  to 
sixty-four  per  cent.  This  is  shown  by  a  detail  of 
the  voters  in  Lancaster.  There,  of  freemen,  there 
were  980  registered,  of  whom  708  were  proved  to 
be  impure ;  whereas  of  the  householders,  439  regis- 
tered, the  number  of  corrupt  was  only  208.  Here 
three-fourths  of  the  freemen  were  bribers  or  bribed, 
whereas  less  than  one-half  of  the  householders 
were  corrupt. 

These  are  the  facts  as  proved,  and  they  of  course 
do  not  include  the  corruption  in  those  boroughs 
which  was  not  detected  by  the  commission,  of  which 
there  may  have  been  a  considerable  amount.  You 
see  here  to  what  length  electoral  corruption  may  be 
carried  under  the  district  system — because  in  Eng- 
land their  boroughs  are  districts — where  the  ma- 


24  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

jority  or  the  plurality  rule  obtains,  and  where  there 
is  a  motive  for  a  corrupt  man  to  struggle  for  the 
balance  of  power  in  order  to  turn  the  scale.     One 
great  objection  I  have  always  had  to  colored  suf- 
frage, and  which  I  have  stated  upon  this  floor,  has 
been  this :  that  thereby  you  cast  into  the  hands  of 
corrupt  and  ambitious  and  evil  men  in  this  country, 
a  vast  opportunity  for  mischief,  for  using  this  mass 
of  votes  for  their  own  improper  purposes.     Looking 
from  the  practical  point  of  view  upon  this  question, 
I  supposed  that  it  connected  itself  with  the  subject 
of  corruption ;  but  if  you  had  a  system  of  cumu- 
lative voting  in  the  South,  each  political  party  there 
would  have  the  power  to  secure  to  itself  due  repre- 
sentation   in    Congress   in   spite    of    another ;    the 
causes  of  corruption  would  be  cut  off  or  limited, 
and  you  could  have  a  system  comparatively  pure. 
Sir,  I  show  you  these  English  examples  as  a  warn- 
ing, as  pointing  out  to  you   the  great  danger  to 
which  our  representative  system  is  liable,  particu- 
larly in  that  section  with  which  your  measures  of 
reconstruction  are  concerned. 

Mr.  President,  I  had  prepared  some  time  since  a 
complete  analysis  of  the  recent  elections  in  the 
States  represented  in  Congress,  from  the  best  means 
of  information  within  my  power,  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  the  operation  of  our  existing  system  under 
the  majority  rule ;  but,  sir,  it  is  not  necessary  for 
me  to  go  over  that.  All  I  shall  say  upon  that 
point  is  that  you  cannot  examine  the  facts  as  to  any 
State,  taking  your  figures  from  any  authentic  publi- 
cation, without  perceiving  that  your  representative 
system  requires   reform ;    that  you   must   advance 


SENATE   SPEECH.  25 

from  the  position  you  have  heretofore  maintained 
as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  right  of  suffrage 
shall  be  exercised  by  our  people ;  and  the  farther 
this  investigation  shall  be  carried  the  more  thorough 
will  this  conviction  be. 

Mr.  President,  I  have  done  what  I  supposed  to 
be  a  duty  in  calling  attention  to  this  question,  pre- 
senting it  to  the  consideration  of  the  Senate,  know- 
ing perfectly  well  that  it  will  be  again  before  us, 
and  feeling  assured  that  the  proposition  will  event- 
ually triumph  here  on  this  floor  and  throughout  the 
country,  that  you  will  make  your  plan  of  taking 
the  sense  of  the  people  in  the  election  of  members 
of  Congress  just,  equitable,  reasonable,  fair;  that 
you  will  make  and  shape  it  according  to  the  infor- 
mation which  you  now  possess,  instead  of  continuing 
your  present  imperfect  arrangement ;  that  as  you 
extend  the  basis  of  suffrage,  as  you  make  changes 
in  the  foundations  of  political  power,  you  will 
improve  the  plans  upon  which  your  system  shall  be 
worked  and  made  to  accomplish  its  proper  objects. 

MILL  AND  GEEY  ON  REFORMED  VOTING. 

I  have  in  conclusion  only  to  cite  authority,  which 
will  be  brief  upon  this  question.  In  the  first  place 
I  will  read  from  an  author  of  the  first  rank — from 
John  Stuart  Mill's  work  on  parliamentary  reform, 
page  28.  He  is  speaking  of  districts  which  shall 
elect  each  three  members  of  the  Parliament,  and  is 
proposing  the  application  of  improved  modes  of 
voting  to  them : 

"  Assuming,  then,  that  each  constituency  elects  three  repre- 
sentatives, two  modes  have  been  proposed,  in  either  of  which  a 


26  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

minority,  amounting  to  a  third  of  the  constituency,  may,  by 
acting  in  concert,  and  determining  to  aim  at  no  more,  return 
one  of  the  members.  One  plan  is,  that  each  elector  should 
only  be  allowed  to  vote  for  two,  or  even  for  one,  although  three 
are  to  be  elected.  The  other  leaves  to  the  elector  his  three 
votes,  but  allows  him  to  give  all  of  them  to  one  candidate. 
The  first  of  these  plans  was  adopted  in  the  reform  bill  of  Lord 
Aberdeen's  government ;  but  I  do  not  hesitate  most  decidedly 
to  prefer  the  second,  which  has  been  advocated  in  an  able  and 
conclusive  pamphlet  by  Mr.  James  Garth  Marshall. 

"  The  former  plan  must  be  always  and  inevitably  unpopular, 
because  it  cuts  down  the  privileges  of  the  voter,  while  the 
latter  on  the  contrary,  extends  them.  And  I  am  prepared  to 
maintain  that  the  permission  of  cumulative  votes,  that  is,  of 
giving  either  one,  two,  or  three  votes  to  a  single  candidate,  is 
in  itself,  even  independently  of  its  effect  in  giving  a  repre- 
sentation to  minorities,  the  mode  of  voting  which  gives  the 
most  faithful  expression  of  the  wishes  of  the  elector.  On  the 
existing  plan,  an  elector  who  votes  for  three  can  give  his  vote 
for  the  three  candidates  whom  he  prefers  to  their  competitors ; 
but  among  those  three  he  may  desire  the  success  of  one 
immeasurably  more  than  that  of  the  other  two,  and  may  be 
willing  to  relinquish  them  entirely  for  an  increased  chance  of 
attaining  the  greater  object. 

"  This  portion  of  his  wishes  he  has  now  no  means  of  expressing 
by  his  vote.  He  may  sacrifice  two  of  his  votes  altogether,  but 
in  no  case  can  he  give  more  than  a  single  vote  to  the  object  of 
his  preference.  Why  should  the  mere  fact  of  preference  be 
alone  considered,  and  no  account  whatever  be  taken  of  the 
degree  of  it?  The  power  to  give  several  votes  to  a  single 
candidate  would  be  eminently  favorable  to  those  whose  claims 
to  be  chosen  are  derived  from  personal  qualities,  and  not  from 
their  being  the  mere  symbols  of  an  opinion.  •  For  if  the  voter 
gives  his  suffrage  to  a  candidate  in  consideration  of  pledges  or 
because  the  candidate  is  of  the  same  party  with  himself,  he 
will  not  desire  the  success  of  that  individual  more  than  that 
of  any  other  who  will  take  the  same  pledges  or  belongs  to  the 
same  party. 

"When  he  is  especially  concerned  for  the  election  of  some 
one  candidate,  it  is  on  account  of  something  which  personally 


SENATE   SPEECH.  27 

distinguishes  that  candidate  from  others  on  the  same  side. 
Where  there  is  no  overruling  local  influence  in  favor  of  an 
individual,  those  who  would  be  benefited  as  candidates  by  the 
cumulative  vote  would  generally  be  the  persons  of  greatest  real 
or  reputed  virtue  or  talents." 

In  his  subsequent  work  on  representative  govern- 
ment he  has  gone  elaborately  into  an  investigation 
of  the  existing  evils  of  the  representative  system  as 
shown  in  Great  Britain,  and  has  laid  elaborately  the 
foundations  of  an  argument  upon  grounds  distinct 
from  those  which  I  have  stated,  although  in  some 
cases  approaching  them,  for  the  adoption  of  this  or 
some  other  adequate  plan  of  reform ;  and  in  that 
subsequent  work  he  repeats  his  recommendation  of 
cumulative  voting  as  one  of  sensible  and  material 
reform.  He  proceeds,  however,  to  state  that  his  own 
opinion  inclines  to  a  still  further  reform,  the  intro- 
duction of  a  system  of  personal  representation, 
which  I  shall  not  discuss  here  because  the  occasion 
does  not  invite  it,  because  I  do  not  suppose  it  is  a 
system  which  can  be  within  a  twelvemonth  or 
within  several  years  debated  and  understood  and 
adopted  by  the  American  people.  It  is  one  much 
more  complicated,  requiring  perhaps  a  higher  state 
of  political  experience,  or  a  more  advanced  stage  of 
discussion  for  its  comprehension  and  adoption  by 
our  people. 

I  have  quoted  the  authority  of  Mr.  Mill  in  favor 
of  cumulative  voting  as  a  convenient,  practicable, 
just,  and  useful  measure  of  reform,  confident  that 
his  authority  will  be  accepted  both  by  the  Senate 
and  by  the  people  of  this  country  as  the  highest 
perhaps  which  can  be  produced  upon  a  question  of 


28  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

this  character.  Next  I  quote  from  Earl  Grey's 
work  on  Parliamentary  Government  and  Reform, 
seventh  chapter.  This  is  a  new  edition,  iDnblished 
in  1864.     He  says  : 

"  The  first  of  the  reforms  of  a  conservative  tendency  which  I 
should  suggest,  and  one  which  I  should  consider  a  great  im- 
provement under  any  circumstances,  but  quite  indispensable  if 
any  changes  favorable  to  democratic  power  are  to  be  admitted, 
would  be  the  adoption  of  what  Mr.  James  Marshall  has  called 
the  '  cumulative  vote ;'  that  is  to  say,  the  principle  of  giving 
to  every  elector  as  many  votes  as  there  are  members  to  be  elected 
by  the  constituency  to  which  he  belongs,  with  the  right  of  either 
giving  all  these  votes  to  a  single  candidate  or  of  dividing  them, 
as  he  may  prefer. 

"  The  object  of  adopting  this  rule  would  be  to  secure  to  mi- 
norities a  fair  opportunity  of  making  their  opinions  and  wishes 
heard  in  the  House  of  Commons.  In  order  that  it  might  fully 
answer  this  purpose,  the  right  of  returning  members  to  Parlia- 
ment ought  to  be  so  distributed  that  each  constituency  should 
not  have  less  than  three  representatives  to  choose.  Supposing 
that  three  members  were  to  be  elected  together,  and  that  each 
elector  were  entitled  to  three  votes,  which  he  might  unite  in 
favor  of  a  single  candidate,  it  is  obvious  that  a  minority  ex- 
ceeding a  fourth  of  the  whole  constituency  would  have  the 
power  of  securing  the  election  of  one  member.  It  is  probable 
that  in  general  three  members  wTould  be  thus  returned,  each 
representing  a  different  shade  of  opinion  among  the  voters. 

"  The  advantages  this  mode  of  voting  would  be  calculated  to 
produce,  and  the  justice  of  making  some  such  provision  for 
the  representation  of  minorities,  or  rather,  the  flagrant  injus- 
tice of  omitting  to  do  so,  have  been  so  well  shown  by  Mr.  Mar- 
shall in  the  pamphlet  I  have  already  referred  to,  and  by  Mr. 
Mill  in  his  highly  philosophical  treatise  on  Eepresentative 
Government,  that  it  is  quite  needless  for  me  to  argue  the  ques- 
tion as  one  of  principle.  But  I  may  observe  that,  in  addition 
to  its  being  right  in  principle,  this  measure  would  be  in  strict 
accordance  with  the  lessons  of  experience  if  read  in  their  true 
spirit.     One  of  the  most  remarkable  peculiarities  of  the  British 


SENATE   SPEECH.  29 

House  of  Commons,  as  compared  to  other  representative  bodies, 
is  that  it  has  always  had  within  its  walls  members  representing 
most  of  the  different  classes  of  society,  and  of  the  various  and 
conflicting  opinions  and  interests  to  be  found  in  the  nation. 
Much  of  the  acknowledged  success  with  which  the  House  of 
Commons  has  played  its  part  in  the  government  of  the  country 
has  been  attributed  (I  believe  most  justly)  to  this  peculiarity. 

"  The  changes  made  by  the  reform  act,  and  especially  the 
abolition  of  the  various  rights  of  voting  formerly  to  be  found 
in  different  towns,  and  the  establishment  of  one  uniform  fran- 
chise in  all  the  English  boroughs,  (with  only  a  small  exception 
in  favor  of  certain  classes  of  freemen,)  tended  somewhat  to 
impair  the  character  of  the  House  in  this  respect.  The  greatly 
increased  intercourse  between  different  parts  of  the  country, 
and  the  rapidity  with  which  opinions  are  propagated  from  one 
extremity  of  the  kingdom  to  another,  have  had  a  similar  tend- 
ency ;  and  there  is  no  longer  the  same  probability  as  formerly 
that  different  Opinions  will  be  found  to  prevail  in  different 
places,  so  as  to  enable  all  parties  to  find  somewhere  the  means 
of  gaining  an  entrance  to  Parliament  for  at  least  enough  of 
their  adherents  to  give  expression  to  their  feelings." 

And  then  he  goes  on  with  an  elaborate  investiga- 
tion and  application  of  this  scheme  to  the  House  of 
Commons.  There  has  been,  therefore,  not  only  an 
inquiry  abroad,  but  an  assent  from  minds  very  dif- 
ferently or  variantly  constituted,  in  favor  of  cumu- 
lative voting;  from  Mr.  Mill,  a  representative  of 
radical  opinion,  than  whom  there  is  no  one  more 
eminent  in  political  literature;  and  then,  again, 
from  Earl  Grey,  representing  a  more  conservative 
shade  of  political  sentiment  in  that  country.  Why 
has  not  this  plan  been  adopted  in  Great  Britain  and 
applied  in  practice,  and  why  has  it  not  been  incor- 
porated in  the  existing  reform  bill?  Because  in 
that  country  they  have  not  the  same  advantages 
that  we  have  for  its  introduction.     Here  our  exist- 


30  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

ing  States  offer  the  facilities  for,  introducing  this 
plan  without  inconvenience,  whereas  in  Great 
Britain,  where  they  have  their  districts  formed, 
districts  which  have  existed  for  centuries,  where  the 
habits  and  relations  of  the  people  have  been  formed 
for  long  periods  of  time,  until  they  have  become 
inveterate,  it  is  almost  impossible  to  make  up  politi- 
cal constituencies  upon  whom  to  apply  this  plan  of 
voting.  In  our  States,  however,  in  nearly  all  of 
which  more  members  than  one  are  to  be  elected  by 
the  same  body  of  electors,  the  introduction  of  this 
plan  is  both  possible  and  convenient. 

I  conclude,  Mr.  President,  by  saying  that  I  shall 
attach,  j^robably,  to  my  remarks  a  tabular  statement, 
summing  up  the  results  of  representation  as  they 
are  exhibited  by  the  existing  system  in  the  compo- 
sition of  the  Fortieth  Congress,  excluding,  possibly, 
some  of  the  returns  which  I  do  not  possess.  Now, 
I  submit  to  the  Senate,  and  to  whoever  in  the  coun- 
try may  pay  attention  to  our  proceedings  and  see 
my  remarks  on  this  occasion,  that  upon  grounds 
of  both  reason  and  authority  this  proposition  has 
been  sustained ;  and  that  if  it  be  introduced  into 
this  country,  whether  in  one  State  or  in  many  States, 
or  universally  throughout  the  country,  in  any  event 
it  will  bear  the  character  of  a  material,  useful,  and 
necessary  reform  of  our  political  system. 


SPEECH 

AT   THE 

ASSEMBLY  BUILDINGS,  PHILADELPHIA, 

TUESDAY  EVENING,  NOV.  19,  1867. 


Fellow-  Citizens  of  the  City  of  Philadelphia : — 

You  have  had  stated  to  you  the  circumstances 
under  which  I  appear  in  your  presence  to  speak 
upon  the  subject  of  representative  reform.  With- 
out any  introductory  remarks,  without  pausing  over 
preliminary  topics,  I  shall  proceed  to  the  subject- 
matter  of  my  discourse. 

Ours  is  said  to  be  a  Government  of  the  people, 
meaning  by  that  term  the  whole  electoral  body  with 
whom  the  right  of  suffrage  is  lodged  by  our  consti- 
tution. The  people,  considered  in  this  sense,  are 
said  to  rule  themselves,  and  our  system  is  therefore 
described  as  one  of  self-government.  Those  who 
are  bound  by  the  laws  are  to  enact  them.  Power  is 
in  the  first  instance  exerted  by  them  and  obedience 
yielded  afterward.  All  rests  upon  their  voluntary 
assent  and  upon  their  free  action.  But,  as  it  is  im- 
possible that  the  whole  mass  of  the  political  commu- 
nity should  assemble  together  for  the  purpose  of 
enacting  or   agreeing  upon  those  rules  of  conduct 

31 


32  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

which  are  to  bind  the  citizens,  and  as  it  would  be 
impossible  for  such  an  enormous  body,  even  if  it 
were  convened,  to  act  with  convenience  or  to  act  at 
all,  we,  like  the  people  of  other  countries  in  former 
times  have  resorted  to  what  is  known  as  the  repre- 
sentative system. 

From  the  impossibility  of  convening  ourselves 
together  to  determine  those  great  questions  which 
pertain  to  the  political  and  social  bodies,  and  about 
which  government  is  employed,  we  have  determined 
to  select  from  among  ourselves  a  certain  number  of 
persons  with  whom  shall  be  lodged  all  our  powers 
connected  with  legislation  and  with  government, 
and  whatsoever  they  shall  determine  shall  be  to  us 
and  to  all  men  within  our  borders  the  law  of  indi- 
vidual conduct. 

Well,  now,  gentlemen,  in  carrying  on  this  system 
of  representative  government  the  manner  in  which 
the  agents  of  the  people  shall  be  selected  becomes 
in  the  highest  degree  important.  Although  by  our 
theory,  although  by  our  fundamental  principle  of 
self-government  by  the  people,  all  the  people  are  to 
be  represented  in  the  making  of  laws  and  in  the 
administration  of  government,  in  point  of  fact  we 
have  not  attained  to  this  result.  We  have  fallen 
short  of  it  in  our  arrangements,  and  hence  it  is  that 
men  of  intelligence  and  of  sagacity,  driven  to  their 
conclusions  by  thorough  examination  and  by  full 
inquiry,  have  been  compelled  to  declare  that  our 
system  is  imperfect,  and  imperfect  to  such  an  extent 
that  the  quality  of  our  government  is  deeply  affected, 
and  many  pernicious  things  have  place  in  its  admin- 
istration. 


PHILADELPHIA    SPEECH.  33 

Instead  of  there  being  under  the  representative 
system,  as  it  is  known  among  us,  a  representation  of 
the  entire  electoral  body,  of  all  the  individuals  who 
compose  it,  there  is  in  fact  a  representation  of  only 
a  part.  In  other  words,  representation  instead  of 
being  complete  and  coextensive  with  all  those  who 
are  to  be  represented  and  who  are  to  be  bound  by 
the  action  of  government,  is  partial  and  restricted 
to  a  part  only  of  the  political  body. 

Well,  gentlemen,  in  the  infancy  or  in  the  early 
stages  of  a  Government  an  imperfection  of  this 
land  may  be  permitted  or  overlooked.  The  affairs 
of  society  when  they  are  not  complicated,  before  the 
community  has  become  rich,  before  its  affairs,  social 
and  political,  become  involved  and  intricate,  may 
admit  of  very  rude  and  imperfect  arrangements, 
and  yet  the  people  may  be  well  governed,  the  laws 
may  be  just  and  wholesome  and  administered  in  a 
proper  spirit  and  with  complete  success.  But,  as 
wealth  accumulates,  as  population  becomes  dense 
and  great  cities  grow  up,  as  vices  are  spread  through 
the  social  body,  and  as  widely  extended  and  compli- 
!  cated  political  action  becomes  necessary,  those  earlier 
and  simpler  arrangements — imperfect  always — be- 
come positively  pernicious  and  hurtful ;  and  the 
necessity  arises  for  their  correction,  and  that  the 
system  of  government  shall  be  purified  and  invigo- 
rated by  amendment. 

In  your  popular  elections  which  are  held  or  taken 
under  the  majority  or  rather  under  the  plurality 
rule,  (which  ordinarily  amounts  to  the  same  thing,) 
at  your  popular  elections  the  smaller  number  of 
voices  which  are  spoken  in  the  election  of  represent- 


34  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

atives  who  are  to  enact  your  laws  are  stricken  from 
the  count.  When  the  officers  charged  with  the 
duty  of  collecting  the  voices  of  the  people  come  to 
make  up  the  count  and  declare  the  result,  they 
strike  from  the  poll  or  the  return  all  those  who 
when  numbered  are  the  smaller  quantity  or  the 
smaller  political  force.  Then  after  your  represent- 
atives selected  in  this  manner  by  a  majority  merely, 
by  a  part  of  the  community,  are  convened  together, 
when  they  come  to  act  in  the  business  of  govern- 
ment, to  enact  laws,  they  again  act  by  a  similar  rule. 
The  majority  in  the  representative  body  pronounce 
the  opinion  and  decree  of  that  body,  and  what  they 
pronounce  becomes  law,  binding  upon  all  the  peo- 
ple. Now,  what  is  observable  in  this  statement  of 
facts?  Why,  that  in  the  first  place,  in  selecting 
representatives  you  strike  off  a  part  of  the  political 
body;  then,  again,  in  representative  action  you 
strike  off  the  minority  of  the  representative  body, 
who  represent  another  portion  or  mass  of  the  popu- 
lar electors.  The  result  is  that  your  laws  may  be 
made  by  men  who  represent  a  minority  of  the  peo- 
ple who  are  to  be  bound  by  the  laws  so  made.  A 
representative  majority  may  not  be,  in  point  of  fact 
—and  often  is  not — a  representative  of  the  majority 
of  the  people. 

When  we  come  to  consider  in  addition  to  this  that 
the  representative  majority,  whether  in  a  State 
Legislature  or  in  Congress,  in  modern  times  or  com- 
paratively corrupt  times,  when  pernicious  and  selfish 
interests  invade  the  halls  of  legislation,  ordinarily 
acts  under  what  is  known  as  the  caucus  system ;  you 
perceive  how  far  we  have  departed  from  those  popu- 


PHILADELPHIA   SPEECH.  35 

lar  principles  upon  which  we  professed  to  found  our 
system  originally,  and  which  we  supposed  would 
give  vitality  and  energy  to  its  action.  A  caucus,  a 
private  consultation  of  majority  members,  rules  the 
action  of  the  representative  majority.  That  major- 
ity rules  the  entire  representative  body,  and  that 
representative  body  is  composed  of  representatives 
of  only  a  part  of  the  political  community.  Is  it 
not  then  established  by  this  inquiry  that  instead  of 
our  representative  system  being  what  we  originally 
intended  it  to  be,  .and  what  Ave  had  supposed  it 
would  be,  it  is  in  its  practical  action  characterized 
by  imperfections  which  must  arrest  universal  atten- 
tion when  the  facts  are  examined  and  provoke  a  cry 
for  some  measure  of  amendment  and  reform  ?  And 
if  a  project  of  reform  and  amendment  can  be 
brought  forward  which  is  practicable,  reasonable 
and  wise,  it  will  be  our  business  to  embrace  it  with 
promptness  and  with  gladness  of  heart. 

PLANS  OF  REFORM. 

Now,  what  do  we  desire  ?  We  may  desire  that 
the  whole  people,  instead  of  a  part  of  them,  shall 
be  represented  in  the  Government,  and  that  is  pre- 
cisely what  I  propose.  In  accomplishing  this  ob- 
ject, differences  of  opinion,  as  in  all  cases  of  new 
investigations,  may  be  expected.  One  may  have 
one  project  and  another  another.  In  a  time  of  in- 
quiry, of  movement  in  the  public  mind,  it  is  not 
well  and  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  all  minds 
should  run  in  the  same  channel,  and  that  out  of 
the  inquiries  which  individuals  enter  upon  the 
same  ultimate   proposition    should    be  evolved   by 


36  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

each.     How  will  we  then  obtain  representation  in 
government  of  the  entire  mass  of  the  people?     Let 
us  come  to  that  question,  and  in  coming  to  it  inquire 
into  the  several  plans  or  projects  which  have  been 
suggested   to   secure    this    object.     They    may   be 
classed  under  three  heads.     In  the  first  place,  it  has 
been  proposed  in  various  forms  that  by  law  there 
should  be  a  restricted  or  limited  mode  of  voting. 
Again,  it  has  been  proposed  that  the  elector  in  all 
elections   of  representatives  and   of  other   officers 
where  more  than  one  are  to  be,  chosen,  may  bestow 
his  votes  upon  a  smaller  number  than  the  whole ; 
in  other  words,  may  exercise  what  is  known  as  the 
cumulative  vote.     Again,  there  has  been  proposed 
in  Great  Britain  and  elaborately  defended  in  that 
country  what  is  called  the  system  of  personal  repre- 
sentation, by  which  an  elector  shall  be  emancipated 
from  the  ordinary  bonds  and  trammels  of  party  or- 
ganization, and  shall  be  as  an  individual  and  not  as 
a  member  of  a  party  represented  in  Parliament  or 
other  body  of  a  similar  constitution. 

THE  LIMITED  VOTE. 

Now,  as  to  the  first  of  these,  that  is,  the  limited 
or  restricted  vote — I  use  these  words  because  I  have 
none  more  expressive  or  convenient  at  hand — as  to 
this  limited  vote :  When  you  pass  to  your  places 
of  election  an cU  proceed  to  choose  for  yourselves  the 
election  officers  who  shall  hold  elections  during 
the  year  in  your  several  election  districts,  what  do 

you  do? 

Each  elector  votes  for  one  inspector,  and  yet  two 
are  chosen.     Here  is  a  limitation  upon  the  voter. 


PHILADELPHIA    SPEECH.  37 

Instead  of  voting  for  both,  the  law  says  that  he 
shall  vote  for  but  one.  What  is  the  practical  re- 
sult throughout  the  State  under  this  law  ?  Why, 
that  one  inspector  belongs  to  the  majority  party  in 
each  election  district,  and  the  other  belongs  to  an 
opposing  one.  In  other  words,  both  the  parties  into 
which  our  political  society  is  ordinarily  divided  are 
represented  in  the  election  boards.  Thus  you  secure 
representation  of  the  entire  mass  of  the  electors,  and 
yet  you  secure  it  by  a  limitation  upon  the  votes  of 
individual  electors. 

What  has  been  the  practical  result  of  this  arrange- 
ment, which  is  found  in  your  State  election  law  of 
1839  ?  Has  the  result  been  good  or  bad  ?  Why, 
there  is  not  a  man  who  hears  me,  or  an  intelligent, 
honorable  citizen  in  this  Commonwealth,  who  would 
not  cry  "  shame  "  if  that  law  were  repealed.  It  is 
a  law  by  which  elections  are  kept  comparatively 
pure,  by  which  fraud  is  prevented  and  fairness  is 
secured  to  the  citizen  in  polling  his  vote. 

I  believe  in  this  city,  when  you  come  to  choose 
assessors  in  your  several  wards,  those  interesting 
persons  who  have  control  over  your  pockets  [laugh- 
ter], who  take  valuations  of  your  property,  whose 
action  as  public  officers  is  most  interesting  to  you, 
each  elector  votes  for  one,  and  yet  two  are  selected. 
In  this  case  you  are  secured,  I  presume,  against  par- 
tiality and  injustice  in  the  administration  of  the  tax 
laws  by  dividing  those  officers  between  political 
parties. 

I  am  told,  also,  that  in  selecting  your  school  direc- 
tors each  school  division  or  ward  has  twelve  directors 
who  have  charge  of  your  school  system — one-third, 


38  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

that  is  four,  elected  in  each  year.  In  voting,  each 
elector  votes  for  but  three,  so  that  it  ordinarily  hap- 
pens that  the  fourth  man  chosen  each  year  will  be 
of  a  different  opinion  politically  from  the  majority 
of  his  fellow-directors ;  will  represent  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  school  district  one  kind  of  opinion, 
while  the  greater  number  of  his  colleagues  will 
represent  another. 

At  the  last  session  of  your  State  Legislature  a  law 
was  passed  which  took  from  the  commissioners  of 
counties  and  sheriffs  the  selection  of  jurors  for  the 
several  courts  throughout  the  Commonwealth. 
Great  complaints  were  made  in  this  matter,  espe- 
cially in  the  interior  of  the  State.  You  had  a  par- 
ticular arrangement  in  the  city  which  has  not  been 
disturbed,  to  wit:  the  selection  of  jurors  by  the 
judges  of  the  several  courts,  in  order  to  insure  im- 
partiality and  fairness  and  prevent  the  intrusion  of 
political  interests  or  passions  in  the  selection  of 
your  jurors.  But  in  the  interior  the  duty  of  select- 
ing jurors,  which  was  formerly  charged  upon  the 
commissioners  and  the  sheriffs  of  the  several  counties, 
was  taken  away  at  the  last  session  of  the  Legislature 
and  confided  to  two  officers  in  each  county,  who  are 
to  be  called  jury  commissioners.  The  president- 
judge  in  each  county  has  some  function  or  duty  in 
connection  with  these  officers — it  is  somewhat  doubt- 
ful what  it  is ;  the  law  was  badly  drawn — but  sub- 
stantially the  power  of  selection  heretofore  exercised 
by  the  ordinary  officers  of  counties  to  whom  I  have 
referred  is  now  to  be  confided  to  these  jury  commis- 
sioners. 

How  are  they  to  be  chosen  ?     As  in  the  case  of 


PHILADELPHIA    SPEECH.  39 

inspectors  of  election,  where  one  candidate  alone  is 
voted  for,  but  two  are  to  be  chosen.  By  this  means 
it  is  to  be  supposed  that  there  will  be  fairness  in  the 
selection  of  jurors  throughout  the  State,  and  the 
abuse  which  has  heretofore  prevailed  will  be  re- 
moved from  our  system — the  abuse  that  in  Repub- 
lican counties  Democratic  citizens  were  excluded  to 
an  unreasonable  extent  from  the  jury-box,  and  that 
on  the  other  hand  in  Democratic  counties  Repub- 
lican jurymen  were  unreasonably  excluded.  Here 
again  is  a  limitation  upon  the  elector.  He  shall 
vote  for  but  one  of  these  officers,  who  are  to  select 
the  men  who  may  sit  upon  questions  which  relate  to 
his  life,  to  his  property,  or  to  his  reputation,  and  yet 
by  this  limitation  fuller  representation  of  the  people 
and  fairness  in  trials  are  secured.  I  think  that  a 
much  wiser  arrangement  might  have  been  made 
than  that.  If  I  had  possessed  power  to  mold  the 
law  upon  this  subject  I  would  have  simply  changed 
the  mode  in  which  county  commissioners  are  chosen. 
I  would  have  had  them  selected  upon  the  plan  of 
the  cumulative  vote  (which  I  will  presently  explain) 
or  upon  the  plan  of  the  limited  vote.  We  would 
have  obtained  substantially  in  that  way  the  same 
result  without  two  additional  officers  and  without 
certain  inconveniences  which  attend  upon  the  exist- 
ing law.  But  the  object  was  laudable  and  the  effect 
which  will  be  produced  by  that  law  will  be  salutary. 
Public  opinion  will  take  hold  of  it  and  uphold  it 
hereafter  as  a  just  and  wise  arrangement,  compared 
with  the  one  it  superseded. 

Let  me  illustrate  this  idea  of  limited  voting  which 
has  obtained  in  our  State  by  a  case  taken  from  the 


40  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

State  of  New  York.  Under  the  constitution  of  that 
State  every  twenty  years  the  question  of  reforming 
the  State  constitution  is  to  be  submitted  to  a  vote  of 
the  people,  and  in  case  they  vote  in  favor  of  a  con- 
vention to  amend  the  constitution  one  is  to  be  called. 
It  happened  last  year  that  a  convention  was  to  be 
called,  and  Governor  Fenton  proposed  to  the  Legis- 
lature that  in  addition  to  the  selection  of  delegates 
from  the  representative  districts  of  the  State  (one 
from  each)  there  should  be  thirty-two  delegates 
selected  at  large,  and  in  selecting  these  thirty-two 
delegates  each  elector  in  the  State  to  vote  for  but 
sixteen.  His  recommendation  was  adopted  by  the 
Legislature,  so  that  the  existing  constitutional  con- 
vention of  New  York  (it  has  not  concluded  the 
performance  of  its  duties)  is  constituted  of  repre- 
sentatives elected  from  the  representative  districts, 
and  of  thirty-two  delegates  from  the  State  at  large. 
Of  the  latter,  sixteen  belong  to  each  political  party* 
for  such  was  the  inevitable  effect  of  the  plan  adopted. 
Many  men  went  into  the  convention  and  are  now 
sitting  in  it  who  could  not  have  been  elected  in  their 
several  local  districts,  because  the  party  with  which 
they  were  associated  was  in  the  minority  therein. 
In  selecting  delegates  from  the  State  at  large  this 
was  possible,  and  able  men  were  selected  on  both 
sides — men  of  great  weight  and  great  wisdom. 
These  cases  of  limited  voting  in  our  own  State  which 
I  have  mentioned  and  this  case  in  New  York  will 
suffice  so  far  as  our  own  country  is  concerned. 

Now,  let  me  carry  you  to  England  for  a  short 
time  to  see  what  has  been  done  there  in  this  same 
direction.      In  1854,  under  the  administration  of 


PHILADELPHIA    SPEECH.  41 

Lord  Aberdeen,  Lord  John  Eassell  introduced  a  re- 
form bill  which  underwent  protracted  discussion  in 
the  House  of  Commons.     One  feature  of  that  bill 
was  that  in  all  constituencies  electing  three  members 
of  Parliament  no  elector  should  vote  for  more  than 
two,  the  result  of  which  would  have  been  to  give  to 
the  minority  class  of  electors  ordinarily  the  third 
member.     That  bill,  however,  did  not  become  a  law  ; 
it  fell,  and  other  reform  bills  introduced  since  into 
Parliament  have  failed.      But  during  the  present 
year  a  bill  was  passed  through  Parliament  to  amend 
and  reform  the  representation  of  the  people  of  Eng- 
land in  the  House  of  Commons.     That  bill  having 
passed  the  House  of  Commons  and  being  under  con- 
sideration in  the  House  of  Lords  on  the  30th  of 
July  last,  Lord  Cairnes  moved  to  amend  clause  8  of 
the  bill  by  adding,  "  at  a  contested  election  for  any 
county  or  borough  represented  by  three  members, 
no  person  shall  vote  for  more  than-  two  candidates." 
This  was  substantially,  if  not  in  exact  terms,  the 
same  as  the  clause  in  the  Eussell  reform  bill  of  1854. 
After  undergoing  debate  this  amendment  was  adopt- 
ed in  the  House  of  Lords  by  the  following  vote : 
contents,  142;  non-contents,  51,  or   by   the    large 
majority  of  91  in  its  favor.     The  bill  being  returned 
with  this  and  other  amendments  to  the  House  of 
Commons   was   again   considered    in   that    House. 
Finally,  upon  the  8th  of  August,  after  prolonged 
and  exhaustive  debate,  in  which  men  whose  names 
are  known  throughout  the  earth  participated,  upon 
motion  to  strike  out  this  amendment  made  by  the 
House  of  Lords  the  vote  stood— ayes  204,  noes  253, 
being  a  majority  of  49  in  favor  of  retaining  the  pro- 


42  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

vision,  and  it  was  retained  by  that  .vote ;  and  the 
bill  subsequently  passing  and  receiving  the  approval 
of  the  Crown  it  became  and  is  now  the  law  of  Great 
Britain,  (from  which  country  we  derive  our  political 
descent  and  many  of  our  principles  of  free  govern- 
ment, including  that  of  representation.)  Hence- 
forth, in  the  election  of  members  of  the  lower  house 
of  Parliament,  where  a  constituency  select  three 
members,  two  shall  be  given  to  the  majority  and  one 
to  the  minority  of  the  electors,  assuming  that  the 
latter  constitute  so  large  a  mass  as  one  third  of  the 
whole  number.  This  is  the  most  notable  instance 
of  the  application  of  the  limited  vote  to  secure  the 
representation  of  the  whole  political  mass ,  of  the 
community  or  of  a  particular  constituency  charged 
with  the  duty  and  power  of  selecting  representatives 
for  the  enactment  of  laws. 

By  these  instances,  selected  in  our  own  country 
and  abroad,  it  is  manifest  that  attention  has  been 
largely  drawn  to  this  question  of  amendment  in 
representation — of  mitigating  the  evils  and  incon- 
veniences which  must  always  arise  under  an  un- 
checked, unmitigated,  unamended  majority  rule. 

THE  CUMULATIVE  VOTE. 

But,  gentlemen,  I  pass  from  the  consideration  of 
this  mode  of  amending  representation  to  the  second 
form  which  propositions  for  that  purpose  have 
assumed;  in  other  wTords,  I  pass  to  the  discussion 
of  the  topic  which  is  most  interesting  at  this  time 
for  our  consideration.  I  mean  the  plan  of  cumu- 
lative voting,  as  it  has  been  named.  This  was  in 
the  first  instance  proposed,  explained,  and  advocated 


PHILADELPHIA    SPEECH.  43 

by  James  Garth  Marshall,  a  subject  of  the  Crown 
of  Great  Britain ;  and,  by  his  proposition  and  his 
advocacy  of  it,  he  has  given  his  name  to  the  politi- 
cal history  of  his  country  and  to  the  political  his- 
tory of  representative  institutions  everywhere  in 
future  times :  for  no  one  previously  had  mastered 
this  subject  with  such  grasp ;  no  one  had  looked 
into  it  with  such  intuitive  perception  of  all  its 
characteristics  and  was  able  to  strike  precisely  the 
point  where  reform  could  be  most  safely  and  effect- 
ually introduced.  It  is  preferable,  infinitely  prefer- 
able, to  all  propositions  for  securing  the  representa- 
tion of  all  interests  in  society  by  any  limitation 
upon  the  elector's  vote  in  the  manner  of  the  various 
propositions  which  I  have  already  described. 

This  system  or  plan  of  cumulative  voting  has 
been  indorsed  by  John  Stuart  Mill  in  his  work  on 
Parliamentary  Reform  and  in  his  work  on  Repre- 
sentative Government,  and  since  supported  by  him 
ably  in  the  House  of  Commons.  It  has  been 
recommended,  also,  by  Earl  Grey  in  his  work  on 
Parliamentary  Reform,  edition  of  1864.  It  was 
proposed  during  the  consideration  of  the  recent 
Reform  bill  in  the  House  of  Commons  by  Mr. 
Lowe,  on  the  fifth  of  July  last,  and  after  debate 
received  the  very  respectable  support  of  173  votes. 
It  is  beginning  to  attract  in  this  country  that  degree 
of  attention  which  it  merits,  and  which  is  naturally 
provoked  by  the  inquiry  which  has  taken  place 
abroad.  I  shall  describe  it  in  a  moment.  For  the 
present  I  will  simply  say  that  the  third  proposition 
of  reform,  known  as  personal  representation,  which 
looks  to  other  objects  and  to  other  consequences,  I 


44  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

shall  not  attempt  to  discuss  to-night.  It  invites  us 
over  too  wide  a  field  of  investigation  for  the  time  at 
our  disposal ;  and  I  may  add  that  it  involves  so 
many  considerations  and  so  much  of  prolonged 
debate  that,  within  the  ordinary  duration  of  a  meet- 
ing, it  would  be  impossible  to  exhaust  the  subject 
or  to  come  to  any  intelligent  conclusion  upon  it.  I 
presume,  also,  speaking  generally  concerning  it,  that 
it  will  be  a  considerable  time  before  we  shall  be  in 
possession  of  that  amount  of  experience  and  of  dis- 
cussion which  are  requisite  to  its  adoption  in  this 
country. 

Now,  what  is  cumulative  voting  ?  I  propose  that 
what  is  known  by  this  term  shall  be  applied  to  the 
election  of  representatives  in  Congress  and  to  the 
choice  of  electors  of  President  and  Vice  President 
of  the  United  States.  It  admits,  also,  of  application 
to  the  selection  of  senators  and  representatives  in  the 
several  State  Legislatures,  and  to  the  selection  of 
county  commissioners,  and  many  other  officers. 
In  what  I  shall  say  at  this  time,  however,  I  shall 
confine  myself,  in  the  discussion  of  this  plan,  mainly 
to  the  election  of  Representatives  in  Congress.  This 
reform  can  be  introduced  by  act  of  Congress  without 
any  constitutional  change ;  and  the  plan  can  be  ap- 
plied to  the  election  of  presidential  electors  by  the 
Legislatures  of  the  several  States,  who,  under  the 
Constitution,  have  committed  to  them  the  power  of 
providing  the  manner  in  which  those  electors  shall 
be  chosen.  What,  then,  is  cumulative  voting  ?  It 
is  that  where  more  than  one  officer  is  to  be  chosen 
the  elector  in  the  first  place  shall  possess  as  many 
votes  as  there  are  persons  to  be  chosen,  and  next,  he 


PHILADELPHIA   SPEECH.  45 

may  bestow  those  votes  at  his  discretion  ujdoii  the 
whole  number  of  persons  to  be  chosen,  giving  one 
vote  to  each,  or  upon  any  less  number,  cumulating 
his  votes  upon  one,  two,  three,  or  any  other  number 
less  than  the  whole.  That  is  simple  in  its  statement, 
although  its  effect,  the  practical  character  of  the 
proposition,  requires  some  reflection  and  prolonged 
experience  to  its  entire  comprehension.  What  is  its 
effect  ?  It  is  that  any  political  interest  in  a  commu- 
nity, whether  in  a  State  or  in  a  division  of  a  State, 
if  it  can  ascertain  about  the  relative  proportion  which 
its  strength  bears  to  the  whole  mass  of  the  vote,  or 
to  the  vote  of  an  opposing  interest,  may  cast  the 
suffrages  of  its  members  in  such  manner  that  they 
will  tell  upon  the  result ;  and  it  will  happen  that 
every  man,  or  about  every  man  who  votes,  will  vote 
for  a  candidate  who  will  be  chosen,  and  there  will 
be  no  such  thing  as  unrepresented  minorities  left. 
They  will  be  wiped  out  of  the  system ;  they  will  no 
longer  exist.  To  speak  of  this  as  a  plan  for  the 
representation  of  minorities  is  an  abuse  of  terms, 
because  it  conveys  no  idea  which  attaches  to  the 
plan.  Far  be  it  from  us  to  arm  a  minority  with 
power  which  we  know  even  majorities  abuse  !  The 
proposition  now  submitted  to  us  is  not  that  there 
shall  be  majorities  and  minorities  known  in  elec- 
tion returns,  but  that  the  men  who  vote  shall  vote  for 
those  who  will  be  chosen,  and  who  will  in  point  of 
fact  represent  them. 

I  cannot  better  illustrate  the  scheme  than  by  the 
case  of  Vermont,  which  I  have  used  on  another  oc- 
casion. There  are  60,000  voters  in  Vermont,  of 
whom  40,000  are  members  of  the  Republican  party 


46  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

and  20,000  of  the  Democratic  party.     I  speak  in 
round  numbers.     By  law  that  State  is  entitled  to 
three    Representatives    in    Congress,   because   her 
population,  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  authorizes  the  allotment  of  that  number  to 
her.     Now,  what  ought  to  take  place  there  ?     The 
majority  should  elect  two  Representatives,  having 
40,000  voters,  and  the  minority  should  elect  one, 
having  20,000  voters ;  but  can  that  be  so  in  point  of 
fact  at  present  ?     If  the  electors  of  that  State  vote 
for  three  Representatives  by  general  ticket  the  major- 
ity would  elect  the  whole  three.    If  the  State  be  divi- 
ded up  into  single  districts,  it"  is  a  matter  of  chance 
how  the  result  will  be,  whether  all  three  districts 
will  have  majorities  of  the  same  political  complexion 
or  not.     I  say  it  is  a  matter  of  chance ;  nay,  more 
than  that,  it  is  a  matter  of  honesty  in  the  Legisla- 
ture of  the  State,  and  any  political  majority  that 
has  control  of  the  Legislature  will  very  likely  form 
the  districts  to  suit  its  own  interests.     We  know 
that  these  things  occur  everywhere.     By  cumula- 
tive  voting,  by  authorizing   the   20,000  minority 
electors  of  that  State  to  give  each  three  votes  to  one 
candidate,  that  candidate  would  receive  60,000  votes, 
and  the  majority  cannot  defeat  him.     The  majority 
voting  for  two  Representatives  can  elect  them,  but 
they  cannot  elect  the  third.     Suppose  they  attempt 
to  vote  for  three  candidates,  they  can  only  give  each 
of  them  40,000  votes,  and  the  minority  candidate 
has  60,000.     If  they  attempt  to  vote  for  two,  as  they 
ought  to  do,  that  being  the  number  they  are  entitled 
to,  they  can  give  them  60,000  votes  each,  the  same 
number  that  the  minority  candidate  has.     If  they 


PHILADELPHIA    SPEECH.  47 

attempted  to  vote  for  one  they  would  give  that  one 
candidate  120,000;  but  of  course  they  would  not 
throw  away  their  votes  in  that  foolish  manner.  The 
practical  result  would  be  that  the  40,000  majority 
electors  in  that  State  would  vote  for  two  candidates 
and  elect  them,  and  the  20,000  minority  electors 
would  vote  for  one  and  elect  him,  and  results  anal- 
ogous to  this  would  occur  all  over  the  United  States 
if  this  system  were  applied.  In  every  State  the 
freemen,  each  possessing  an  equal  right  with  his 
neighbor,  would  each  vote  for  a  Representative  or 
Representatives  in  Congress  who  would  speak  his 
voice  and  obey  his  will,  and  thus  you  would  obtain 
throughout  the  country,  in  each  State,  an  actual 
representation  of  the  whole  mass  of  people  on  both 
sides;  honest  representation  instead  of  a  sham;  a 
government  by  the  majority  in  point  of  fact  in  Con- 
gress instead  of  an  accidental  result,  which  may  be 
one  way  or  the  other,  and  is  just  as  likely  to  be  mi- 
nority rule  as  anything  else,  and  always  and  under 
all  circumstances  unjust  rule. 

Oh  !  gentlemen,  what  would  happen  then  ?  Some 
little  men  in  the  State  Legislature,-  destitute  of  honor 
but  greedy  of  gain  and  of  personal  objects,  would 
no  longer  gerrymander  your  States  [applause], 
would  no  loDger  sit  in  quiet  chambers  concocting 
injustice  by  law,  studying  how  they  can  prevent 
their  neighbors  from  being  represented  in  the  gov- 
ernment and  get  an  undue  share  of  public  power  for 
themselves  and  for  their  friends.  That  iniquity 
would  be  ended,  and  would  be  no  more  heard  of 
among  us.  Why,  gentlemen,  at  this  moment,  from 
the  British  possessions  upon  the  northeast  to  the 


48  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

Golden  Gate  of  the  Pacific,  there  is  probably  not 
one  honest  apportionment  law  for  members  of  Con- 
gress, and  you  will  scarcely  ever  have  one,  unless  in 
an  exceptional  case  where  one  political  interest  shall 
have  control  of  the  upper  branch  of  a  Legislature 
and  another  of  the  lower,  holding  each  other  in 
check,  and  compelling  some  degree  of  fairness  in 
the  formation  of  the  law. 

I  do  not  desire  to  speak  on  any  topic  which  may 
bear  a  partisan  complexion.  I  am  almost  afraid  to 
cite  cases  lest  I  shall  be  thought  to  have  an  object 
or  purpose  not  openly  avowed.  Let  me  tell  you  the 
difficulty  in  this  case  is  in  human  nature,  and  you 
must  frame  your  system  so  that  mischief  will  not 
result.  "It  is  necessary,"  said  a  great  and  wise 
man,  "  that  by  the  very  constitution  of  things  power 
should  be  a  check  to  power."  What  said  Dr. 
Priestly?  "There  is  no  earthly  power  that  has 
not  grown  exorbitant  when  it  has  met  with  no  con- 
trol." Take  these  words  of  men  who  thought 
wisely  and  profoundly,  and  then  look  at  your  exist- 
ing political  action  and  see  whether  it  is  not  a 
struggle  for  power  instead  of  a  struggle  for  justice; 
whether  it  is  not  a  struggle  by  each  interest  to  ob- 
tain all  it  can  and  to  retain  all  it  can,  and  to  keep 
away  from  an  opposing  interest  anything  like  a  fair 
distribution  of  power  or  fair  treatment. 

It  is  necessary,  then,  gentlemen,  that  by  your 
fixed  arrangements  in  your  constitutions  and  laws 
you  shall  curb  the  injustice  of  human  nature  ;  that 
you  shall  so  arrange  your  system  that  evil  and  selfish 
men  cannot  pervert  it  to  their  own  purposes  and 
to  the  injury  of  others.     A  system  of  cumulative 


PHILADELPHIA    SPEECH.  49 

voting  secures  the  government  of  the  real  majority 
of  the  people.  Instead  of  striking  off  a  part  of 
them  in  the  popular  elections,  they  are  all  repre- 
sented in  the  representative  body,  whether  Congress 
or  the  State  Legislature,  and  there  by  a  single 
operation  the  vote  is  taken,  the  majority  pronounced, 
and  a  proposed  law  is  enacted  or  defeated.  Instead 
of  unjust  representation  and  an  eventual  decision  by 
a  representative  majority  moved  and  governed  by  a 
caucus,  you  will  have  fair,  equal,  extended,  complete 
representation  of  the  whole  mass  of  the  people  and 
the  proper  voice  of  the  majority  pronounced  in  the 
representative  body. 

I  repeat,  this  is  no  plan  for  minority  representation 
merely ;  it  is  a  plan  for  the  representation  of  the 
whole  people,  a  device  by  which  the  majority  shall 
rule   and   shall  pronounce  its  voice  in  a  fair  and 
honest   manner.     Again,  a   system   of  cumulative 
voting  would  secure  to  you  in  your  legislative  bodies 
men   of  high   ability,  and   secure   them   for  long 
periods  of  time,  because  elections  would  not  be  sub- 
ject to  the  uncertainties  which  attend  ordinary  elec- 
tions under  the  majority  rule.     A  political  party  in 
Pennsylvania,  constituting  about  or  near  one-half 
its  electors,  assuming  that  the  State  would  be  per- 
manently entitled  say  to  twenty-four  members  (the 
present  number),  can  keep  about  a  dozen  men  con- 
tinuously in  Congress  for  a   long  period  of  time 
Just  as  long  as  they  retain  the  confidence  of  then 
constituents  they  will  be  elected,  because  the  meril 
of  this  plan  is  that  one  part  of  the  community  can- 
not vote  down  another.     Each  will  get  its  due  share 
of  Representatives,  and  can  keep  it  always  simply 


50  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

by  giving  votes  only  to  the  number  which  they  are 
entitled  to  have  and  which  they  can  elect.  This 
system  would  secure  contentment  to  men  constitut- 
ing minorities,  as  they  are  now  known,  because  such 
minorities  would  be  abolished  at  popular  elections, 
and,  although  their  representatives  should  be  voted 
down  in  representative  bodies,  they  would  be  heard 
there,  and  it  is  a  great  satisfaction  for  a  man  to  be 
heard  even  when  judgment  is  pronounced  against 
him.  That  is  what  we  suj3pose  to  be  one  great  ad- 
vantage of  courts  of  justice ;  a  man  has  his  day  in 
court  and  he  is  heard ;  judgment  is  not  pronounced 
in  his  absence  or  without  a  hearing.  Just  so  mi- 
norities in  our  country,  as  they  are  now  constituted, 
are  dissatisfied  and  they  always  will  be  dissatisfied 
under  the  present  system.  Let  them  be  heard,  and 
if  the  decision  is  against  them  in  the  legislative 
body  they  will  acquiesce,  because  they  have  had 
fair  treatment.  This  is  human  nature.  Every  one 
can  see.  that  that  would  be  so.  Would  we  not, 
therefore,  be  less  liable  to  revolt,  to  convulsion,  to 
war?  Content  your  people,  improve  your  system 
so  that  it  will  work  happily  and  properly,  and  you 
crush  out  the  seeds  of  political  convulsion.  [Ap- 
plause.] 

A  CHECK  ON  CORRUPTION. 

I  shall  not  go  over  the  other  heads  of  the  argu- 
ment at  length,  because  time  will  not  permit  me. 
I  insist  as  a  principal  argument,  however,  for  this 
mode  of  taking  the  sense  of  the  electoral  body,  that 
it  would  be  a  great  check  upon  corruption.  Now, 
what  causes  corruption  at  our  elections?  What 
brings  it  into  being?     I  submit  that  question  to 


PHILADELPHIA    SPEECH.  51 

you,   gentlemen,   as   men   of  ordinary  experience. 
What  is  it?     One  candidate  wants  to  get  a  majority 
over  another  candidate.     The  district  may  be  close, 
or  at  least  each  side  may  have  hopes  of  carrying 
it ;  passion  is  aroused ;  to  use  a  common  expression 
the  blood   is   up;   ambition   calls,  private  interest 
prompts.     Here  and  there  we  know,  for  so  the  fact 
stands  revealed  to  us,  a  candidate,  or  the  friends  of 
a  candidate,  will  resort  to  corrupt  means.     For  what 
purpose  ?     To  get  the  balance  of  power,  to  turn  the 
scale ;  not  to  corrupt  the  great  body  of  the  electors, 
but  to  gain  the  tenth,  the  twentieth,  or  the  fiftieth 
man  who  holds  in  his  hands  the  balance  of  power 
between  political  interests.     In  this  manner  these 
contests  for  local  majorities  and  for  State  majorities 
between  parties  call  into  existence  all  the  evil  and 
corrupt  influences  which  attend  our  elections.     A 
man  at  Harrisburg  or  at  Washington  is  expected  to 
distribute  patronage  around  his  district,  so  that  he 
can  get  votes  to  beat  somebody  else  when  he  comes 
before  the  people  again.     A  man  with  his  pocket 
full  of  accumulated  gain,  the  result  of  his  own  thrift 
and  cunning  or  the  accumulation  of  his  ancestors, 
wants  a  few  votes  to  make  a  majority  against  an 
opposing  candidate,  and  he  gives  money  to  election- 
eering agents  and  does  not  inquire  how  it  is  applied. 
After  a  while  great  complaints  are  made  in  your 
community  of  a  corrupt  election.     You  hear  such 
expressions  as   "shocking,"    "horrible,"  "what   is 
the.  country  coming  to ;  what  is  the  social  body  and 
what  is  the  political  body  coming  to  ?"     Corruption 
raises  its  head  in  America ;  it  is  the  danger  in  our 
path ;  it  is  the  giant  we  have  to  fear,  whose  blows 


52  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

will  lay  low  our  republican  system  if  it  shall  ever 
be  prostrated.  Does  not  your  majority  rule  invite 
all  these  evil  influences?  Go  out  and  make 
inquiry  about  your  last  congressional  election  in 
certain  districts,  and  you  will  hear,  "  Oh,  money 
carried  it ;  here  was  a  boss  who  was  bought  up ; 
he  had  control  of  fifty  or  one  hundred  men ;"  in 
another  district  another  had  control  of  fifty  or  one 
hundred  electors,  and  the  election  was  turned.  It 
required  only  a  few  votes  to  win,  and  away  goes  the 
victor  to  his  post  of  duty,  to  make  laws  for  the 
American  people.  I  am  not  talking  of  things 
abroad.  This  cry  comes  to  you  in  this  city.  Yes, 
corruption  is  increasing  in  t  America.  And  what 
invites  it?  I  will  answer  in  a  word — it  is  the 
majority  rule  at  popular  elections  which  invites  it ; 
it  is  because  you  have  an  unjust  or  imperfect  system 
by  which  nearly  one-half  of  the  community  have 
their  voices  stifled;  the  corrupt  man  buys  a  few 
votes,  and  thousands  of  his  fellow-citizens  have  no 
voice  in  the  Government ;  they  are  outvoted ;  five 
votes  will  do  it,  if  they  create  a  majority,  as  well  as 
five  thousand.  Adopt  a  plan  by  which  every  polit- 
ical party  and  every  political  interest,  if  it  choose, 
can  elect  its  men  and  can  elect  as  many  men  as  its 
numbers  entitle  it  to,  and  you  are  done  with  this 
abuse  of  corrupting  votes  to  turn  the  scale,  you  are 
done  with  this  {mrchase  of  majorities,  you  are  done 
with  this  scandal  of  your  system,  and  you  have 
taken  the  most  effectual  guarantee  which,  with  our 
present  information,  it  is  possible  for  us  to  secure 
for  its  integrity  and  perpetuity  hereafter.  [Great 
applause.]     Under  a  system  of  cumulative  voting, 


PHILADELPHIA   SPEECH.  53 

in  the  present  Congress  the  delegation  from  this 
State  would  stand  twelve  Republicans  and  twelve 
Democrats.  Why  ?  Because  each  party  has  three 
hundred  thousand  votes  in  this  State,  and  each  one 
knowing  that  its  strength  was  about  equal  to  the 
other,  would  have  cumulated  its  votes  upon  twelve 
men  and  elected  them,  and  there  would  have  been 
a  fair  representation  of  the  State.  Vermont  would 
have  had  two  majority  and  one  minority  members 
as  I  have  shown.  Kentucky,  which  sends  nine 
Democratic  members,  would  have  sent  at  least  three 
Republicans  in  her  delegation,  under  a  sound  mode 
of  voting ;  and  Maryland,  instead  of  one  Republi- 
can member  out  of  five,  would  have  sent  two ;  in 
Connecticut,  instead  of  three  Democratic  Repre- 
sentatives out  of  four,  there  would  have  been  two, 
because  the  vote  of  the  State  was  about  a  tie ;  and 
so  throughout  the  Union.  You  cannot  take  a  State 
and  examine  the  facts  relating  to  it  in  any  authentic 
publication  without  seeing  this  element  of  injustice 
entering  into  your  system  and  poisoning  it  at  its 
very  fountain. 

I  need  hardly  say — and  this  is,  perhaps,  a  delicate 
branch  of  my  speech — that  if  in  any  part  of  this 
Union  we  are  to  have  two  classes  of  voters,  distin- 
guishable by  race  or  color,  a  very  considerable  part 
of  the  mischief  and  evil  which  the  opponents  of  the 
extension  of  suffrage  apprehend  would  be  prevented 
or  removed  by  the  adoption  of  the  cumulative  vote. 
Instead  of  the  cry  being  raised,  "one  race  votes 
down  another  and  has  its  heel  upon  it " — we  have 
heard  that  all  over  the  North,  and  we  know  how 
powerfully  it  has  influenced  the  elections — instead 


54  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

of  that  cry  it  would  be  announced  that  each  race 
obtained  representation  in  proportion  to  its  numbers, 
without  direct  antagonism  or  collision.  This,  how- 
ever, is  an  argument  for  gentlemen  in  a  different 
position  from  myself.  As  to  them  it  ought  to  be 
decisive  in  favor  of  their  rendering  support  to  the 
plan  of  cumulative  voting  which  I  advocate. 

CHOICE  OF  PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTORS. 

Now,  gentlemen,  a  few  words  as  to  the  application 
of  this  system  to  the  selection  of  presidential  elec- 
tors. General  Jackson  proposed  that  the  people  of 
the  United  States  should  vote  directly  for  President 
and  Vice  President,  instead  of  voting  for  electors  in 
their  several  States,  and  this  proposition,  at  several 
times,  has  been  brought  forward  in  Congress.  At 
the  last  session  it  was  again  introduced  by  Mr. 
Wade,  now  President  of  the  Senate,  and  was  de- 
fended by  him  in  an  argument.  Great  complaint  is 
made  that  the  people  are  not  heard  directly  in  the 
choice  of  President ;  that  the  electoral  colleges  are 
useless  or  inexpedient ;  that  they  should  be  removed 
from  our  system,  and  each  voter  be  permitted  to 
vote  directly  for  the  President  of  his  choice. 

Gentlemen,  a  system  of  cumulative  voting  by  the 
citizens  of  Pennsylvania,  which  can  be  provided  by 
an  act  of  their  Legislature  as  I  understand  the  con- 
stitution, would  secure  to  our  citizens,  if  not  the  pre- 
cise objects  sought  by  the  friends  of  that  reform,  at 
least  greater  advantages  than  it  would  confer.  The 
result  would  be  that  each  of  the  political  interests 
existing  in  this  State  would  select  as  many  electors 
as  they  were  entitled  to  by  their  numbers,  and  each 


if  UN  T7 

PHILADELPHIA   SPEECH^ Cj  T  55 

would  be  felt  proportionally  in  the  presidential 
election.  How  is  it  now  ?  Do  you  not  know  what 
is  coming  on  next  year  in  our  State  ?  Six  hundred 
thousand  votes  are  to  be  polled  for  presidential  elec- 
tors. Each  party  has  about  three  hundred  thou- 
sand. What  is  going  to  take  place  ?  From  Lake 
Erie  to  the  Delaware  this  State  is  to  be  convulsed ; 
a  thousand  disagreeable  circumstances  are  to  attend 
the  election ;  men's  minds  are  to  be  taxed  and  wor- 
ried for  months ;  men  of  property  are  to  have  their 
attention  turned  to  the  security  of  their  investments. 
All  the  unpleasant  and  illegitimate  influences  which 
attend  elections,  and  to  which  I  have  referred,  will 
be  called  into  existence  in  that  great  approaching 
struggle.  And  why  ?  Because  whichever  interest 
obtains  a  majority  in  this  State,  though  it  be  a  ma- 
jority of  but  one  vote,  secures  twenty-six  electoral 
votes  for  President  of  the  United  States,  and  the 
struggle  will  be  for  the  little  majority  which  turns 
the  scale.  Now,  do  we  not  all  see  at  a  glance  what 
the  fact  is  ?  Each  party  is  entitled  to  thirteen  of 
these  electors,  or  about  that  number,  because  they 
are  composed  of  American  freemen  who  are  entitled 
to  an  equal  voice  in  our  common  government.  But 
both  cannot  secure  electors ;  the  whole  twenty-six 
must  be  given  to  one  side,  and  perhaps  that  result 
will  determine  the  government  of  this  country  not 
only  for  four  years  to  come  but  for  four  centuries. 
We  enter  upon  the  canvass  as  a  game  of  chances, 
fearful  that  the  most  adroit  and  unscrupulous  inter- 
est of  the  two  in  the  State  can  command  the  result ; 
that  there  will  not  be  a  fair  struggle  between  the 
men  who  are  honest  and  those  who  are  not.     Let 


56  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

us  have  honest  voting ;  let  each  party  have  the 
presidential  electors  that  its  numbers  entitle  it  to, 
and  let  them  be  felt  upon  the  general  result ;  let 
the  people  in  each  of  the  other  States  vote  as  we 
vote,  and  let  the  majority  of  Americans  decide  the 
contest. 

CONVENIENCE  AND  JUSTICE  OF  NEW  PLAN. 

Finally,  this  plan  of  representative  reform  is 
convenient  in  a  high  degree ;  it  is  both  practicable 
and  convenient.  It  requires  in  this  State  nothing 
of  legislation  except  simply  to  permit  a  citizen  who 
has,  say,  twenty-four  votes  for  members  of  Congress 
and  twenty-six  for  presidential  electors,  to  cast  those 
votes  as  a  freeman,  according  to  his  own  choice  and 
pleasure;  let  him  bestow  them  upon  any  smaller 
number,  for  instance,  giving  two  to  each  of  twelve 
candidates,  or  four  to  each  of  six.  Trust  the  people, 
and  their  common  sense  will  regulate  their  action. 
You  do  not  need  intricate  laws,  constitutions  tink- 
ered, or  a  great  scheme  of  reconstruction.  [Laughter.] 
You  are  simply  asked  to  trust  the  people,  and  per- 
mit them,  when  they  possess  votes,  to  cast  them 
as  they  think  best;  as  their  judgment  may  be 
directed  by  views  of  public  interest  or  public  duty. 
If  we  should  have  that  system  for  electing  members 
of  Congress  and  presidential  electors  next  fall,  we 
could  each  go  to  the  polls  and  vote  for  twelve  Repre- 
sentatives in  Congress  to  sit  for  Pennsylvania,  and 
for  thirteen  electors  of  President  and  Vice-Presi- 
dent ;  or,  if  any  one  should  think  that  the  political 
interest  with  which  he  is  associated  is  flourishing 


PHILADELPHIA   SPEECH.  07 

and  growing  in  strength,  so  that  it  is  entitled  to 
one  additional  member,  he  could  vote  for  thirteen 
Representatives.  If  he  should  be  mistaken  in  his 
calculation,  he  would  fail  as  to  one  of  his  votes ; 
numbers  would  be  counted  exactly,  and  there  would 
be  no  injustice. 

Now,  I  must  point  out  one  additional  special 
injustice  of  the  ordinary  majority  rule  at  elections, 
unmitigated  by  any  such  plan  as  that  proposed. 
Observe  that  the  party  which  prevails  at  the  elec- 
tion does  not  merely  carry  the  day,  does  not  merely 
get  its  votes  counted  and  get  the  result  appropriate 
to  the  counting  of  them ;  but  it  gets  all  the  power 
which  belongs  to  the  other  side  in  addition  to  its 
own.  Suppose  that  the  two  parties  in  Pennsylvania 
are  so  divided  that  one  has  300,000  votes  and  the 
other  301,000.  In  choosing  electors  of  President 
and  Vice-President  the  301,000  who  prevail,  who 
have  1000  majority,  do  not  merely  get  their  votes 
counted  in  the  presidential  election,  do  not  merely 
influence  the  result  in  selecting  our  Chief  Magis- 
trate by  their  own  votes,  but  they  have  in  effect 
counted  into  their  vote  the  votes  of  their  opponents, 
the  other  300,000.  Your  301,000,  constituting  the 
majority  in  the  State,  wield  the  political  power  of 
the  whole  601,000 — wield  not  only  their  own  appro- 
priate power  but  a  power  which  does  not  belong  to 
them  but  belongs  to  the  political  interest  opposed  to 
them. 

That  is  what  sharpens  this  injustice  of  disfran- 
chisement, and  that  is  the  reason  why,  in  legislative 
bodies,  a  little  turning  of  the  popular  scale  gives 
one  party  or  another,  when  in  point  of  fact  parties 


58  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

are   nearly  equal,  such,  a  mass  of  preponderating 
power. 

Take  the  elections  which  occurred  in  1866  in  the 
States  north  and  west,  the  States  formerly  called  the 
free  States.  In  those  elections  2,000,000  voters  (in 
round  numbers)  voted  Republican  tickets  for  mem- 
bers of  Congress  in  the  respective  States.  The 
other  party,  the  Democracy,  polled  in  those  States 
at  those  elections  a  little  over  1,600,000  votes. 
What  was  the  result?  To  Congress  1,600,000 
voters  chose  twenty-eight  Eepresentatives  only,  and 
the  2,000,000  voters  one  hundred  and  forty-three ! 
The  proportion  between  the  two  great  masses  of  our 
electoral  population,  known  by  the  respective  party 
names,  was  twenty  to  sixteen  in  votes  actually 
polled  in  the  States  to  which  I  have  referred.  The 
Eepresentatives  to  Congress  selected  at  those  elec- 
tions from  those  States,  instead  of  standing  as 
twenty  to  sixteen,  stood  one  hundred  and  forty- 
three  to  twenty-eight.  And  why  ?  Because  under 
the  majority  rule  at  elections  in  those  States  the 
majority  not  only  obtained  representation  in  Con- 
gress for  its  own  votes,  but  obtained  the  greater  part 
of  the  representation  that  belonged  to  the  other 
side.  Under  a  system  of  cumulative  voting  repre- 
sentation in  Congress  would  have  stood  about  in  the 
proportion  of  twenty  to  sixteen,  just  as  the  actual 
votes  ran  in  those  States.  Do  you  not  see  how  the 
whole  policy  of  your  Government  can  be  changed ; 
how  the  voice  of  the  people  may  be  stifled;  how 
republican  institutions  may  be  made  a  farce  and  a 
sham,  and  that  under  a  system  which  you  are  falsely 


PHILADELPHIA    SPEECH.  59 

told  secures  the  fair  rule  of  a  majority  as  a  principle 
that  is  sacred  ? 

AN    OBJECTION    ANSWERED. 

Gentlemen,  I  have  already  occupied  so  much  time 
that  I  must  omit  any  detailed  examination  of  the 
arguments  against  cumulative  voting.     I  can  notice 
only  one  or  two  of  them  briefly.     It  is  said  that  a 
system  of  elections  such  as  I  have  described  would 
deprive  particular  localities  of  representation ;  that 
there  would  be  a  combination  of  great  and  powerful 
communities  within  a  State  against  some  particular 
districts,  and  those  districts  which  now  have  Repre- 
sentatives would  be  disfranchised.     This  argument 
has  been  made  in  Great  Britain ;  it  is  likely  to  be 
repeated  here,  and  it  is  perhaps  the  only  one  deserv- 
ing  any   considerable   attention.      Of    course   my 
political  reading  and  political  thought  have   been 
against  the  undue  concentration  of  power  at  any 
particular  point,  whether  Washington,  Harrisburg, 
Philadelphia,  or  elsewhere,  and  I  have  been  in  favor 
of  its  distribution,  as  far  as  possible,  into  all  the 
local  communities  into  which  the  State  or  the  coun- 
try is  divided.     And  this  objection,  from  my  point 
of  view,  deserves  respectful  treatment  and  respectful 
answer.     I  have  to  observe,  then,  that,  in  my  opin- 
ion, particular  localities  within  a  State  would  have 
a  due  voice  and  due  influence  in  the  selection  of 
candidates ;  that  if  they  were  selected  by  a  common 
body,  by  a  State  convention,  any  attempt  to  disfran- 
chise any  particular  section  of  the  State  would  be 
met  by  a  counter  combination  in  the  interest  of  fair 
play,  and  that  the  practical   result  would  be  that 


60  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

there  would  be  on  the  whole  a  fair  distribution  of 
political  power  in  the  different  parts  of  the  State  by 
the  selection  of  candidates.  If,  however,  any  diffi- 
culty were  apprehended  on  this  ground,  there  might 
be  a  rule  adopted  by  which  nominations  should  be 
made  by  districts,  a  thing  very  often  done  in  coun- 
ties and  also  in  States.  It  would  be  a  rule  to  a 
party  in  making  its  selections  that  there  should  be 
a  distribution  of  its  candidates  according  to  district 
divisions,  either  those  established  for  other  purposes 
by  some  general  State  law  or  established  by  the  par- 
ticular party  organization  for  its  own  purposes  of 
selection  or  distribution. 

But  the  conclusive  answer  to  the  objection  is  this, 
that  any  important  locality  would  have  the  power 
to  defend  itself  against  such  injustice ;  and  that  is 
one  of  the  merits  of  this  system  of  cumulative  voting. 
If  there  was  an  attempt  to  disfranchise  the  city  of 
Philadelphia,  to  prevent  her  returning  her  four 
members  to  Congress,  and  the  thing  was  gross  and 
glaring,  what  could  she  do  under  a  system  of  cumu- 
lative voting  ?  Just  combine  her  vote  on  her  four 
men  and  elect  them  in  spite  of  all  the  other  electors 
in  the  State,  and  thus  any  attempt  at  injustice  in 
any  section  of  the  Commonwealth  might  be  resented 
by  the  people  aggrieved  by  cumulating  their  votes 
upon  one  or  more  local  candidates  of  their  own. 
They  could  defeat  any  such  attempt  at  injustice  and 
defend  themselves  against  it,  and  the  fact  that  they 
had  such  power  of  defense  would  always  secure  a 
just  distribution  of  nominations. 

Again,  candidates  being  thus  voted  for  by  the  whole 
State,  there  would  be  opportunities  for  making  bet- 


PHILADELPHIA   SPEECH.  61 

ter  selections  than  are  made  by  the  district  system. 
Let  me  take  an  illustration  on  this  point.  What  a 
misfortune  it  would  have  been  if  the  narrow  intel- 
lectualities of  our  modern  political  reasoners  had 
controlled  in  England  when  Edmund  Burke  was  a 
candidate  before  the  electors  of  Bristol  in  1780 ;  a 
distinguished  member  of  Parliament,  whose  name 
is  given  to  the  literature  of  the  world  for  all  future 
ages.  He  stood  up  in  the  British  Parliament 
defending  the  just  rights  of  the  American  colonies. 
Words  in  our  behalf  which  yet  echo  through  the 
world  were  heard  with  admiration  and  pride  even 
by  those  opposed  to  him  in  the  House  of  Commons. 
But  they  were  heard  with  other  feelings  in  Bristol, 
which  he  represented  in  Parliament ;  and  when  he 
went  down  to  his  constituents,  instead  of  re-electing 
they  rejected  him ;  he  was  voted  down ;  his  own  dis- 
trict had  a  local  majority  against  him  of  men  who 
hated  America,  who  were  with  the  king  in  the  war 
he  waged  against  our  fathers.  Their  passions  and 
prejudices  were  roused  against  their  eloquent  repre- 
sentative who  had  defended  America  in  the  Par- 
liament of  the  empire ;  he  was  defeated  under  the 
majority  rule  and  a  single  district  system.  Fortu- 
nately, he  was  returned  to  Parliament  by  another 
constituency,  who  thought  it  an  honor  to  be  repre- 
sented by  him,  and  he  continued  in  the  House  of 
Commons  as  long  as  he  lived,  adorning  it  by  his 
eloquence  and  his  genius,  and  giving  his  name  to 
his  country  and  to  the  world  as  a  cherished  recol- 
lection for  all  time.  In  our  country,  under  similar 
circumstances,  such  a  man  would  remain  out  of 
Congress  or  out  of  other  legislative  body  upon  a 


62  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

defeat  in  bis  district.  He  would  be  ostracised  from 
tbe  councils  of  bis  country,  his  voice  silenced,  bis 
career  would  be  closed.  What  does  cumulative 
voting  do?  It  enables  the  freemen  of  a  State  to 
select  their  Burkes  and  their  Websters,  their  Clays 
and  Calhouns,  wherever  they  may  be  in  a  State,  and 
to  use  their  abilities  so  long  as  they  please  in  shap- 
ing the  legislation  and  administration  of  the  govern- 
ment of  the  country.  [Applause.]  No  ability,  no 
merit,  no  eminence,  no  greatness,  could  be  stifled  in 
any  of  our  States  under  this  system.  The  majority 
rule,  which  would  seem  to  have  been  invented  to 
submerge  merit  and  to  lift  mediocrity,  would  no 
longer  operate  its  course  unchecked  in  American 
politics ;  the  freemen  of  our  country  would  have  a 
breadth  of  choice  which  they  would  exercise,  I 
doubt  not  wisely,  to  the  advantage  of  themselves 
and  of  future  generations. 

Our  experience  in  this  State  and  in  other  States 
is  not  in  favor  of  carrying  the  idea  of  single  dis- 
tricts very  far.  I  drew  the  amendment  to  the  Con- 
stitution of  our  State  by  which  your  city  is  broken 
into  single  districts.  [Applause.]  What  was  the 
idea  of  that  amendment  ?  It  was  that  one  political 
interest  should  not  absorb  the  whole  sixteen  or 
eighteen  representatives  you  send  to  the  Legislature; 
that  a  little  shifting  majority  one  way  or  the  other 
should  not  cast  that  large  number  of  votes  on  one 
side  or  the  other  at  Harrisburg.  The  idea  was  to 
break  up  the  political  community,  and  allow  the 
different  political  interests  which  compose  it,  by 
choosing  in  single  districts,  to  be  represented  in  the 
Legislature  of  the  State.     Unfortunately,  when  that 


PHILADELPHIA   SPEECH.  63 

arrangement  was  made  for  your  city  (and  for  Pitts- 
burg also,  to  which  it  will  soon  apply),  this  just, 
equal,  almost  perfect  system  of  voting,  which  I  have 
spoken  of  to-night,  was  unknown ;  it  had  not  then 
been  announced  abroad  or  considered  here,  and  we 
did  what  best  we  could.  Now,  however,  if  a  change 
were  to  be  made,  I  suppose  the  same  current  of 
opinion  and  of  sentiment  would  have  course  in  this 
State  which  has  prevailed  in  New  York,  where  the 
system  of  single  districts  throughout  the  State  for 
the  election  of  members  of  the  Assembly  or  lower 
legislative  branch  of  that  State  has  lost  credit.  The 
idea  is  very  generally  abandoned  by  thinking  and 
reflecting  men  in  that  State.  It  is  a  failure ;  it  has 
not  produced  the  results  which  it  was  supj)Osed 
would  flow  from  it.  Cumulative  voting,  however, 
comes  in,  and  it  is  a  principle  which  is  capable  of 
extended  application  to  popular  elections,  where 
more  than  a  single  officer  is  to  be  chosen.  It  can 
be  applied  to  the  election  of  Senators  and  Repre- 
sentatives in  the  Legislature  from  your  city  and 
from  each  of  the  counties  of  the  State,  or  from  dis- 
tricts into  which  the  State  might  be  divided,  and 
you  may  thus  get  in  the  government  of  your  State 
that  fair  and  equal  representation  which  you  ought 
to  claim  and  which  is  your  due  as  citizens  of  a  free 
State. 

After  some  further  remarks,  Mr.  Buckalew  con- 
cluded as  follows : 

Gentlemen,  I  have  said  most  of  what  1  proposed 
to  say  this  evening,  so  far  as  points  of  argument  are 
concerned.  I  omit  some  minor  points,  and  I  omit 
filling  up  the  outline  of  the  argument.     I  have  said 


64  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

what  I  supposed  was  most  essential.  And  now,  in 
conclusion,  let  me  say  that  I  appear  here  to  discuss 
this  subject  before  you  for  no  purpose  of  idle  display 
or  of  amusement,  but  with  a  proper  object;  with  an 
idea  to  its  examination  and  discussion  by  others; 
and  what  I  shall  desire,  and  what  will  repay  me  a 
thousandfold  for  any  inconvenience  in  attending 
here  and  any  effort  in  speaking,  will  be  the  support 
of  the  press  and  people  of  Philadelphia  to  a  new, 
improved,  and  honorable  system  of  electoral  action 
by  which  our  representative  system  in  this  country 
will  be  vastly  improved,  and  by  which  the  future  of 
our  country  will  receive  an  additional  guarantee  and 
security  which  will  not  fail  it  hereafter  in  peace  or 
in  war.     [Great  applause.] 

[The  foregoing  address  was  delivered  before  a  large  and  in- 
telligent audience  at  the  request  of  some  gentlemen  of  Phila- 
delphia, who  desired  the  subject  of  reformed  voting  to  be  pre- 
sented to  the  people  of  that  city.  Hon.  Alexander  Cummings 
presided  over  the  meeting  and  introduced  the  speaker  with 
appropriate  remarks.  The  address  was  reported  by  D.  F. 
Murphy,  the  accomplished  United  States  Senate  Keporter,  and 
was  published  in  the  daily  newspapers  the  following  morning.] 


SENATE  COMMITTEE  REPORT, 

IN  THE  SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 
MARCH    2,  1869. 


Mr.  Buck  A  lew,  from  the  Select  Committee  on  Representative 
Reform,  submitted  the  following 

REPORT/ 

[To  accompany  bill  S.  No.  772.] 


The  bill  referred  to  the  committee,  and  now  re- 
ported by  them,  presents  a  question  which  deserves 
deliberate  examination  both  because  it  is  important 
and  because  it  is  new.  It  proposes  to  secure  fair 
and  complete  representation  to  every  important  po- 
litical interest  in  the  country ;  to  strike  an  effectual 
blow  at  corruption  in  popular  elections ;  to  secure 
more  of  harmony  and  contentment  than  now  exist 
among  the  j)eople,  and  to  improve  the  composition 
of  the  popular  branch  of  Congress  by  facilitating 
the  introduction  and  continuance  of  men  of  ability 
and  merit  in  that  body.  That  these  results  may  to 
a  great  extent  be  secured  by  it  is,  by  the  friends  of 
the  measure,  most  positively  affirmed.  If  the  claim 
made  by  them  on  its  behalf  be  substantially  true, 

*  Congressional  Globe,  3d  Sess.  40th  Cong.,  Appendix,  p.  2G8.     Sen. 
Com.  Keport,  same  sess.,  No.  271. 

5  65 


66  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

or  true  to  any  considerable  extent,  and  the  plan  be 
capable  of  convenient  application,  it  will  merit 
strong  commendation  and  prompt  adoption. 

THE  PLAN. 

Representatives  being  assigned  to  a  State  under 
the  constitutional  rule  of  distribution,  each  elector 
in  the  State  shall  possess  as  many  votes  as  there  are 
representatives  to  be  chosen.  He  shall  possess  his 
due  and  equal  share  of  electoral  power  as  a  member 
of  the  political  body  or  State.  Thus  far  we  deal 
with  familiar  ideas  which  have  heretofore  obtained. 
It  is  next  proposed  that  the  elector  shall  exercise 
his  right  of  suffrage  according  to  his  own  judgment 
and  discretion,  and  without  compulsion  of  law.  He 
shall  bestow  or  distribute  his  votes  upon  or  among 
candidates  with  entire  freedom,  and  shall  be  relieved 
from  that  legal  constraint  to  which  he  has  been 
heretofore  subjected.  He  may  select  his  candidate 
or  candidates  anywhere  within  the  limit  of  his  State 
from  among  all  its  qualified  citizens,  and  he  may 
exert  his  political  power  upon  the  general  represen- 
tation of  his  State  instead  of  the  representation  of  a 
particular  district  within  it.  Here  is  unquestion- 
ably a  large  and  valuable  extension  of  privilege  to 
the  citizen,  a  withdrawal  from  him  of  inconvenient 
and  odious  restraint,  and  a  more  complete  applica- 
tion of  that  principle  of  self-government  upon 
which  our  political  institutions  are  founded.  And 
what  is  material  for  consideration  is,  that  while  all 
the  advantages  of  a  plan  of  election  by  general 
ticket  are  secured,  all  its  inconveniences  and  evils 
are  avoided. 


SENATE   REPORT.  67 

FORMER   PLANS— THEIR    IMPERFECTIONS. 

Formerly  when  elections  of  representatives  in 
Congress  were  had  by  general  ticket,  a  great  incon- 
venience resulted  which  became  at  last  offensive  and 
intolerable.  For  a  political  majority  in  a  State,  or- 
ganized as  a  party,  and  casting  its  votes  under  a  ma- 
jority or  plurality  rule,  secured  in  ordinary  cases 
the  entire  representation  from  the  State  and  the  mi- 
nority were  wholly  excluded  from  representation. 
•To  avoid  this  inconvenience  and  evil  which  had  be- 
come general  throughout  the  country,  Congress  in- 
terposed, and  by  statute  required  the  States  to  select 
their  representatives  by  single  districts,  that  is  to 
divide  their  territory  into  districts,  each  of  which 
should  elect  one  member.  This  contrivance,  dic- 
tated by  Congressional  power,  ameliorated  our  elec- 
toral system,  mitigated  the  evil  of  which  general 
complaint  had  been  made,  and  was  an  unquestion- 
able advance  in  the  art  of  government  amongst  us. 
But  retaining  the  majority  or  plurality  rule  for  elec- 
tions and  restricting  the  power  and  free  action  of 
the  elector,  it  was  imperfect  in  its  design  and  has 
been  unsatisfactory  in  practice.  It  has  not  secured 
fair  representation  of  political  interests,  and  it  has 
continued  in  existence  in  a  somewhat  mitigated  form 
the  evils  of  the  plan  of  election  by  general  ticket 
which  it  superseded.  Still,  one  body  of  organized 
electors  in  a  district  vote  down  another;  electoral 
corruption  is  not  effectually  checked,  and  the  gen- 
eral result  is  unfair  representation  of  political  inter- 
ests in  the  popular  house  of  Congress.  Besides,  the 
single  district  plan  has  called  into  existence  incon- 


68  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

veniences  peculiar  to  itself  and  which  did  not  attach 
to  the  former  plan. 

It  excludes  from  Congress  men  of  ability  and 
merit  whose  election  was  possible  before,  and  thus 
exerts  a  baneful  influence  upon  the  constitution  of 
the  House.  Two  causes  operate  to  this  end.  In 
the  first  place  no  man  who  adheres  to  a  minority 
party  in  any  particular  district  can  be  returned,  and 
next,  great  rapidity  of  change  is  produced  by  fluc- 
tuation of  party  power  in  the  districts. 

Again,  the  single  district  system  gives  rise  to 
gerrymandering  in  the  States  in  the  formation  of 
districts.  Single  districts  will  almost  always  be  un- 
fairly made.  They  will  be  formed  in  the  interest  of 
party  and  to  secure  an  unjust  measure  of  power  to 
their  authors,  and  it  may  be  expected  that  each  suc- 
cessive district  apportionment  will  be  more  unjust 
than  its  predecessor.  Parties  will  retaliate  upon  each 
other  whenever  possible.  The  disfranchisement  suf- 
fered through  one  decade  by  a  political  party  may  be 
repeated  upon  it  in  the  next  with  increased  severity, 
but  if  it  shall  happen  to  have  power  in  the  legislature 
when  the  new  apjDortionment  for  the  State  is  to  be 
made,  it  will  take  signal  vengeance  for  its  wrongs  and 
in  its  turn  indulge  in  the  luxury  of  persecution. 

MODES  OF  VOTING  DESCRIBED. 

The  manner  in  which  the  right  of  suffrage  shall 
be  exercised,  always  a  question  of  high  importance, 
is  one  of  difficulty  also.  It  has  been  regulated  in 
various  ways  in  our  States  and  in  foreign  countries, 
but  must  be  considered  in  many  respects  as  still 
open  to  debate.     We  have  pretty  generally  adopted 


SENATE   EEPOET.  69 

the  vote  by  secret  ballot  for  popular  elections,  but 
whether  votes  be  given  by  secret  or  open  ballot,  or 
by  voice,  a  question  will  remain  as  to  the  manner  in 
which  they  shall  be  bestowed  upon  or  distributed 
among  candidates.  Where  but  one  representative 
or  other  official  is  to  be  chosen  by  a  constituency,  it 
is  readily  understood  that  a  single  vote  is  to  be  given 
by  each  elector  to  the  candidate  of  his  choice,  and 
such  is  the  uniform  regulation.  But  where  more 
than  one  person  is  to  be  chosen  by  a  constituency, 
the  manner  of  bestowing  votes  upon  candidates  is  a 
question  of  more  difficulty,  and  various  regulations 
have  been  made  or  proposed  concerning  it.  Several 
of  these  it  is  necessary  to  mention  and  describe  be- 
fore proceeding  to  the  main  matters  to  be  examined 
in  this  report. 

The  vote  by  general  ticket. — By  the  general  ticket 
plan  of  distributive  voting  the  elector  has  assigned 
to  him  a  number  of  votes  equal  to  the  whole  num- 
ber of  persons  to  be  chosen,  and  is  authorized  to 
bestow  them  singly  upon  a  like  number  of  candi- 
dates. Upon  this  plan  presidential  electors  are 
chosen  in  all  the  States  except  Florida. 

The  vote  by  single  districts. — By  the  single  dis- 
trict plan  the  general  constituency  is  divided  into 
parts  by  territorial  lines  and  each  part  constituted  a 
sub-constituency  to  vote  separately  and  choose  one 
person.  The  voter  casts  a  single  vote  for  his  candi- 
date and  has  no  participation  in  the  action  of  the 
general  constituency  beyond  the  giving  of  his  dis- 
trict vote.  Upon  this  plan,  prescribed  by  statute, 
representatives  in  Congress  are  now  chosen. 

The    limited    vote. — The    limited    vote    obtains 


70  PEOPOETIONAL   KEPRESENTATION. 

where  the  voter  is  forbidden  to  vote  for  the  whole 
number  of  persons  to  be  chosen  by  the  constituency, 
but  is  authorized  to  give  single  votes  to  each  of  a 
less  number  or  a  single  vote  to  one. 

The  cumulative  vote. — The  cumulative  vote  is  the 
concentration  of  two  or  more  votes  upon  one  candi- 
date or  upon  each  of  a  greater  number.  It  may  ob- 
tain whenever  the  voter  has  assigned  to  him  more 
votes  than  one  and  is  permitted  to  cast  them  other- 
wise than  singly  among  candidates. 

The  unrestricted  or  free  vote. — The  unrestricted 
or  free  vote  obtains  where  the  voter  has  assigned  to 
him  a  number  of  votes  equal  to  the  whole  number 
of  persons  to  be  chosen  by  the  constituency,  and  is 
permitted  to  cast  them  according  to  his  own  dis- 
cretion and  choice  without  legal  restraint.  In  such 
case  he  may  bestow  them  all  upon  one  candidate, 
or  distribute  them  singly  among  candidates,  or 
cumulate  them  upon  more  candidates  than  one,  or 
cast  a  part  of  them  singly  and  a  part  of  them 
upon  the  principle  of  cumulation,  precisely  as  his 
judgment  may  direct  him  and  the  possibilities  of 
the  case  may  permit. 

SUPEKIOKITY   OF  THE  FKEE  VOTE. 

The  unrestricted  or  free  vote  is  more  compre- 
hensive and  flexible  than  the  others,  and  it  in- 
cludes many  of  their  features  and  may  be  used  to 
accomplish  their  objects.  It  involves  or  includes 
the  vote  by  general  ticket  without  the  restriction 
that  but  one  vote  shall  in  any  case  be  given  to  a 
candidate.  It  may  be  used  to  accomplish  the  pur- 
poses of  the  limited  vote  and  of  single  district 
voting  in  a  just,  effectual,  and  popular  manner,  and 


SENATE   REPORT.  71 

it  includes  completely  the  cumulative  vote,  with 
which  it  is  in  character  closely  allied.  In  brief,  it 
combines  the  advantages  of  other  plans  without 
their  imperfections,  while  it  is  not  open  to  any 
strong  objection  peculiar  to  itself.  The  ingredient, 
however,  of  greatest  value  and  importance  contained 
in  it,  and  the  one  particularly  fitted  to  regenerate 
and  give  credit  to  elections  is  the  principle  of  the 
concentration  of  votes.  In  fact  for  practical  pur- 
poses in  dissertation  or  argument  upon  the  question 
of  electoral  reform,  the  terms  "cumulative  vote" 
and  "free  vote"  may  be  interchangeably  used, 
though  the  latter  is  most  appropriate  and  accurate 
to  indicate  a  plan  which  commonly  involves  distri- 
bution as  well  as  concentration  of  votes,  and  some- 
times even  the  giving  of  single  votes  to  particular 
candidates. 

HOW  FAR  IT  CAN  BE  APPLIED. 

The  bill  now  reported  by  the  committee  applies 
the  unrestricted  or  free  vote  to  the  selection  of  rep- 
resentatives in  Congress  from  the  several  States,  and 
the  proposed  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  reported  by  the  committee  on  the  29th 
of  January  will,  if  adopted,  empower  Congress  to 
apply  that  vote  (or  some  other  proper  reform)  to  the 
selection  of  electors  of  President  and  Vice-President 
of  the  United  States. 

By  the  fourth  section  of  the  first  article  of  the 
Constitution  power  is  clearly  conferred  upon  Con- 
gress to  pass  a  bill  regulating  the  manner  of  hold- 
ing elections  for  the  choice  of  representatives.  The 
times,  places,  and  manner  of  holding  such  elections 
are  to  be  prescribed  in  each  State  by  the  legislature 


72  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

thereof,  but  the  Congress  may  at  any  time  make  or 
alter  such  regulations.  This  power  was  exercised 
by  the  passage  of  the  act  of  Congress  which  pro- 
vides that  representatives  shall  be  chosen  in  the 
several  States  by  single  districts  instead  of  by 
general  ticket,  which  had  been  the  general  practice 
before,  and  it  is  equally  competent  for  Congress  to 
prescribe  a  still  different  manner  for  choosing  them, 
subject  only  to  such  other  provisions  of  the  Consti- 
tution as  may  relate  to  the  same  subject.  The  free 
or  cumulative  vote  or  other  like  reform  may,  there- 
fore, be  introduced  simply  by  the  enactment  of  a 
statute.  No  constitutional  amendment  will  be  ne- 
cessary for  the  purpose.  But  as  to  the  choice  of 
presidential  electors  the  case  is  different,  as  before 
stated.  The  first  section  of  the  second  article  of  the 
Constitution  provides  that  each  State  shall  appoint 
electors  "  in  such  manner  as  the  legislature  thereof 
may. direct."  Congress  may  determine  the  time  of 
choosing  the  electors  and  fix  a  uniform  day  on  which 
they  shall  give  their  votes,  but  cannot  prescribe  the 
manner  in  which  they  shall  be  chosen.  To  accom- 
plish any  reform  in  the  manner  of  choosing  them 
through  the  instrumentality  of  an  act  of  Congress, 
an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  will  be  necessary. 
That  such  amendment  is  desirable,  and  that  it  is  ne- 
cessary also  to  the  introduction  of  any  reform  what- 
ever in  the  manner  of  choosing  electors,  will  be 
hereafter  shown. 

ARGUMENTS  FOR  ITS  ADOPTION. 

Recurring  now  to  the  question  of  representative 
reform  raised  by  the  bill  reported  by  the  committee^ 


SENATE  REPORT.  73 

we  will  proceed  to  state  those  grounds  of  argument 
which  recommend  the  adoption  of  the  unrestricted 
or  free  vote. 

ITS    SIMPLICITY  AND    CONVENIENCE  OF  APPLICATION. 

The  first  consideration  to  be  taken  into  account  is 
the  simplicity  and  convenience  of  this  plan  of  reform. 
It  is  easily  understood,  convenient  of  application, 
and  will  readily  adapt  itself  to  all  new  or  changed 
conditions  of  political  society.  It  is  self-adjusting, 
and  requires  no  law  whatever  to  enforce  it  or  afford 
it  a  sanction  beyond  the  act  which  shall  simply  call 
it  into  existence.  The  number  of  representatives  to 
which  a  State  shall  be  entitled  being  first  ascertained 
under  the  rule  of  distribution  contained  in  the  Con- 
stitution, the  law  will  simply  declare  that  each  voter 
of  the  State  shall  have  as  many  votes  as  there  are 
representatives  to  be  chosen  from  his  State,  and  at 
that  point  will  stop,  leaving  the  voter  perfectly  free 
to  cast  his  votes  according  to  his  own  judgment  and 
discretion. 

The  voter  may  then  exercise  his  right  according 
to  any  of  the  plans  relating  to  the  distribution  or 
concentration  of  votes  which  have  heretofore  been 
the  subject  of  discussion,  including  those  which 
have  and  those  which  have  not  been  prescribed  by 
legal  enactment.  But  inasmuch  as  our  political 
communities  will  always  be  divided  into  political 
parties,  (or  so  long  as  our  free  institutions  remain 
to  us,)  it  must  happen  that  the  voter  will  exercise 
his  right  with  direct  reference  to  his  party  associa- 
tions— to  the  interests  of  the  party  to  which  he  shall 
belong.     He  will  vote  (as  he  votes  now)  as  a  party 


74  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

man,  and  for  candidates  who  have  been  selected 
by  some  form  of  nomination — by  some  agreement 
or  concert  of  action  among  men  of  common  views 
and  common  interests.  The  inevitable  result  will 
be  that  political  parties  and  the  voters  who  compose 
them  will  obtain  fair  and  complete  representation 
by  distributing  or  concentrating  their  votes  in  such 
manner  as  to  secure  it,  and  nothing  can  be  more 
certain  than  that  they  will  be  better  judges  of 
their  own  interests  than  the  lawmaker  possibly 
can  be.  For  they  will  act  with  a  full  knowledge 
of  all  the  facts  which  pertain  to  an  election — of  the 
relative  strength  of  parties  at  the  time — the  prob- 
able amount  of  the  aggregate  vote  to  be  polled,  and 
generally  of  the  effect  of  their  voting  in  any  par- 
ticular manner.  Of  all  these  matters  the  lawmaker 
must  be  profoundly  ignorant,  or  must  conjecture  or 
assume  them  at  random.  He  cannot  foreknow  the 
future,  nor  adapt  his  arrangements  to  the  ever- 
changing  conditions  of  political  society. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  imperfection  will  always 
attach  to  the  limited  vote  as  a  general  plan  to  be 
applied  to  popular  elections.  The  lawmaker  cannot 
know  that  his  arbitrary  limitation  will  operate  justly 
and  secure  his  object  at  some  future  time.  If  he 
could  know  the  exact  relative  strength  of  parties 
in  future  years,  he  might  apply  his  limitation  to  a 
constituency  with  confidence.  Adjusting  it  to  the 
facts,  he  could  obtain  a  proper  result.  As  this 
cannot  be,  the  limited  vote  can  be  but  partially 
applied  to  elections  and  must  in  most  cases  be  un- 
satisfactory. It  has  rarely  been  applied  to  constit- 
uencies selecting  more  than  three  representatives, 


SENATE   REPORT.  75 

and  can  never  be  accepted  as  a  plan  for  extensive 
use  and  application. 

The  unrestricted  or  free  vote,  however,  is  not 
open  to  these  observations.  It  will  adjust  itself  to 
all  cases,  and  it  will  have  the  most  important  and 
effectual  sanction ;  for  it  will  be  put  under  the  guar- 
dianship of  party  interest,  always  active  and  ener- 
getic, which  will  give  it  direction  and  complete  effect 
to  the  full  and  just  representation  of  the  people. 

ITS  CONFORMITY  TO   REPUBLICAN  PRINCIPLES. 

The  unrestricted  or  free  vote  is  in  strict  conform- 
ity with  democratic  principles,  and  realizes  more 
perfectly  our  ideas  of  popular  government.  For 
by  it  the  whole  mass  of  electors  are  brought  into 
direct  relations  with  government,  and  particularly 
with  that  department  or  branch  of  government  (the 
principal  one  in  power,  if  not  in  dignity)  which 
makes  the  laws.  All  will  participate  really  in 
choosing  representatives,  and  all  will  be  represented 
in  fact.  Now,  the  beaten  body  of  electors  choose 
nothing,  unless  it  be  mortification,  and  are  not  rep- 
resented at  all.  For  the  theory  that  they  are  rep- 
resented by  the  successful  candidates  against  whom 
they  have  voted — that  those  candidates  when  in- 
stalled in  office  represent  them — is  plainly  false. 
An  elected  official  represents  the  opinions  and  the 
will  of  those  who  choose  him,  and  not  of  those  who 
oppose  his  selection.  As  to  the  latter  he  is  an  an- 
tagonist and  not  a  representative ;  for  his  opinions 
are  opposed  to  theirs,  and  their  will  he  will  not 
execute.  And  this  must  always  be  the  case  where 
political  parties  act  upon  elections  and  a  majority  or 


76  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

plurality  rule  assigns  to  one  party  the  whole  repre- 
sentation of  the  constituency.  Our  present  system 
of  representation  is  therefore  essentially  partial  and 
imperfect,  and  our  great  object  in  reforming  it  must 
be  to  make  it  full  and  complete.  If  we  cannot 
secure  this  object  perfectly,  it  will  be  our  duty,  as  it 
should  be  our  pleasure,  to  approach  it  as  nearly  as 
possible. 

Now,  inasmuch  as  by  extending  to  the  elector 
that  freedom  of  choice  and  of  selection  which  the 
law  has  heretofore  forbidden,  we  can  strike  from  our 
system  of  representative  elections  almost  entirely  the 
element  of  disfranchisement  and  bring  the  whole 
electoral  body  into  direct  and  useful  relations  with 
the  representative  body,  we  may  congratulate  our- 
selves that  our  reform,  while  it  will  be  rich  and 
fruitful  of  results  in  the  purification  of  elections,  in 
imparting  energy  and  wisdom  to  government  and 
contentment  to  the  people,  will  also  be  strictly  re- 
publican in  character  and  democratic  in  principle, 
and  will  apply  more  perfectly  than  ever  before  those 
ideas  of  self-government  which  inspired  our  ances- 
tors when  they  established  our  political  institutions. 

THE  FOUR  GREAT  REASONS  FOR  IT. 

But  we  proceed  to  state  the  main  reasons  for  the 
unrestricted  vote,  without  dwelling  upon  introduc- 
tory points  or  upon  those  secondary  reasons  which, 
while  they  may  commend  this  plan  of  reform  to  us, 
will  not  alone  command  its  adoption.  Those  great 
reasons  (which  speak  with  imperative  voice  to  states- 
men and  to  free  constituencies  everywhere)  are  four 


SENATE   REPOET.  77 

in  number,  and  they  will  be  mentioned  in  their 
prefer  order. 

1.  It  is  just. 
The  unrestricted  or  free  vote  should  be  permitted 
because  it  is  just.  That  this  quality  pertains  to  it 
in  a  high  degree  and  constitutes  one  of  its  main 
characteristics  is  beyond  all  question.  It  gives  an 
equal  voice  to  every  elector  of  a  State,  secures  the 
elector  from  the  peril  of  utter  disfranchisement,  and 
affords  to  him  also  that  freedom  of  choice  which  is 
indispensable  to  his  complete  and  useful  exercise  of 
his  right.  A  vote  at  any  point  or  place  in  the  State 
is  precisely  as  valuable  and  as  important  as  at  any 
other  point  or  place  ;  location  of  the  voter  is  imma- 
terial as  affecting  his  right  or  his  consequence  in  the 
electoral  body,  and  no  preference  in  privilege  or 
power  is  given  or  advantage  allowed  to  one  elector 
over  another.  Besides,  (and  this  is  the  great  con- 
sideration,) any  material  disfranchisement  of  elec- 
tors is  rendered  almost  impossible ;  for  every  politi- 
cal interest,  of  any  considerable  magnitude,  in  a 
State,  will  have  the  complete  opportunity  afforded  it 
of  concentrating  its  vote  upon  a  proper  number  of 
candidates  and  those  candidates  will  be  chosen,  not 
merely  because  they  have  more  votes  than  other 
candidates,  (as  under  our  present  system,)  but  be- 
cause they  are  the  recipients  of  an  adequate  support. 
One  mass  of  voters  will  not  vote  clown,  defeat,  or 
disfranchise  another.  One  candidate  will  not  beat 
another  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  that  expression. 
The  full  comprehension  of  this  point  may  require 
reflection  by  those  to  whom  it  is  new,  but  no  reflec- 
tion is  necessary  to  perceive  the  justice  of  a  plan 


78  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

which  will  substantially  strike  disfranchisement  from 
our  electoral  system.  Lastly,  it  is  but  just  that  the 
elector  should  have  a  greater  freedom  of  choice  than 
is  now  allowed  him,  that  his  judgment  should  have 
freer  action,  that  he  should  enjoy  all  possible  facili- 
ties for  performing  his  duty  to  his  country  in  exer- 
cising his  right  of  suffrage.  At  present  he  is  hedged 
about  and  constrained  by  legal  regulations  which, 
while  wholly  unnecessary  to  the  public  order  and 
peace,  cripple  and  impede  him  in  the  performance 
of  his  duty.  He  is  held  responsible  for  the  charac- 
ter and  action  of  the  government,  for  in  theory  he 
controls  it  by  his  vote,  and  yet  he  does  not  possess 
all  those  facilities  and  rights  the  possession  of  which 
will  justify  that  responsibility  and  enable  him  to 
discharge  all  its  obligations. 

In  the  matter  of  selecting  representatives  from 
his  State  to  Congress — perhaps  the  most  important 
of  all  electoral  operations  known  in  our  country — 
he  is  allowed  to  participate  in  the  selection  of  but 
one  out  of  the  whole  number.  The  State  may  be 
entitled  by  6  to  12  or  to  20  representatives,  but  the 
judgment  of  the  elector  can  be  exercised  upon  the 
choice  of  one  only.  As  to  all  the  rest,  he  is  ex- 
cluded from  taking  part  in  their  selection.  Besides, 
his  choice  of  a  single  representative  must  be  exer- 
cised within  and  for  a  particular  district,  arbitrarily 
established  by  law,  with  such  boundaries,  popula- 
tion, interests,  and  political  complexion  as  may  hap- 
pen to  be  convenient  or  agreeable  to  a  majority  in 
the  legislature  of  the  State.  And  practically  he 
must  select  his  candidate  from  among  the  men  of  the 
district  and  is  excluded  from  all  choice  beyond  it. 


SENATE    KEPORT.  79 

And  when  to  all  this  we  add  that  the  elections 
held  in  single  districts  are  necessarily  subjected  to  a 
majority  or  plurality  rule,  which  very  commonly 
renders  a  large  part  of  the  votes  cast  unavailing  for 
the  purpose  for  which  they  are  given,  we  have  the 
case  fully  presented  as  one  of  inconvenience  and 
hardship  upon  the  elector.  The  law  has  been  busy 
where  it  should  have  been  inactive,  and  the  voter  is 
bound  by  inconvenient  and  injurious  restrictions, 
which  he  can  neither  evade  nor  defy.  It  is  time 
that  the.  hand  of  power  be  lifted  from  the  citizen 
and  he  be  permitted  to  perform  his  electoral  duties 
with  all  possible  freedom. 

The  justice  of  the  proposed  reform  is  therefore 
evident.  It  extends  popular  power  upon  a  principle 
of  equality,  limits  disfranchisement,  and  provides 
the  voter  with  necessary  facilities  for  the  exercise  of 
his  right. 

With  good  reason  therefore  did  the  London  Times 
in  speaking  of  clause  9  of  the  reform  bill  of  1867, 
(triumphantly  carried  in  both  houses  of  Parliament 
upon  full  debate,  and  similar  in  principle  to  the 
proposition  before  us,)  declare — "  that  the  idea  of 
modifying  our  electoral  machinery  so  as  to  secure  in 
three-membered  constituencies  the  proportionate 
representation  of  both  the  great  divisions  of  party, 
has  made  its  way  by  its  inherent  justice." 

2.  It  will  check  corruption. 

The  unrestricted  or  free  vote  will  greatly  check 
corruption  at  elections.  It  will  take  away  the  mo- 
tive to  corrupt,  and  thus  strike  an  effectual  blow  at 
the  source  of  a  great  evil. 


80  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

Now,  money  and  patronage  are  usually  expended 
upon  elections  to  secure  a  majority  or  plurality  vote 
to  one  or  more  candidates  over  one  or  more  other 
candidates,  and  are  directed  or  applied  to  the  com- 
paratively small  number  of  electors  in  the  constitu- 
ency who  hold  the  balance  of  power  between  parties. 
Those  persons  being  bought  or  seduced,  victory  is 
secured.  The  importation  of  voters  into  a  State  or 
district,  or  their  fraudulent  creation  within  it,  is 
with  a  like  object.  And  such  corrupt  influence  or 
practice  when  resorted  to  by  one  party,  provokes 
like  conduct  in  an  opposing  one,  until  both  become 
tainted  with  guilt  and  unfitted  for  vindicating  the 
purity  of  elections.  This  evil  grows  in  magnitude 
yearly,  and  it  will  continue  to  increase  until  those 
motives  of  interest  which  produce  it  shall  be  weak- 
ened or  destroyed. 

A  new  right  to  the  elector,  whether  in  the  form 
of  the  free  or  cumulative  vote,  or  of  personal  rep- 
resentation, or  a  new  protection  to  him  in  the  form 
of  the  limited  vote,  will  check  corruption ;  but  of 
these  remedies  the  first  is  most  practicable  and  effect- 
ual. The  limited  vote  (as  will  be  hereafter  shown) 
cannot  have  extensive  application,  and  it  is  but  a 
rude  contrivance.  Personal  representation  is  a 
scheme  of  great  theoretical  merit ;  it  has  been  tried 
partially  in  Denmark,  and  it  has  received  elaborate 
vindication  from  authors  of  distinction  in  England, 
in  Switzerland,  and  in  France.  But  it  may  be  put 
aside  from  the  present  discussion,  because  it  is  com- 
paratively intricate  in  plan  and  cumbrous  in  detail, 
because  it  assails  party  organization,  and  because 
some  of  its  most  important  effects  cannot  be  dis- 


SENATE    REPORT.  81 

tinctly  foreseen.  It  is  so  radical  in  character,  so 
revolutionary  in  its  probable  effects,  that  prudence 
will  dictate  that  it  should  be  very  deliberately  con- 
sidered, and  be  subjected  to  local  experiment  and 
trial  before  it  shall  be  proposed  for  adoption  upon  a 
grand  scale  by  the  government  of  the  United  States. 

But  why  will  the  cumulative  or  unrestricted  vote 
check  corruption  ?  It  will  have  this  certain  effect, 
it  will  operate  efficiently  to  this  end,  because  it  will 
render  any  ordinary  effort  of  corruption  useless  and 
unavailing.  The  corruption  of  voters  ivill  not 
change  the  result  of  an  election:  It  will  elect  no 
candidate  and  defeat  no  candidate  in  contested 
States  or  districts,  unless  indeed  it  be  carried  on  and 
carried  out  upon  a  gigantic  scale,  beyond  any  ordi- 
nary example  of  the  past  or  probable  occurrence  of 
the  future. 

An  average  or  common  ratio  of  votes  for  a  rep- 
resentation in  Congress,  taking  the  whole  country 
together,  is  now  25,000,  and  it  will  be  much  greater 
in  future  times.  Assume  then  that  600,000  votes 
are  to  be  cast  in  Pennsylvania  at  an  election,  of 
which  each  political  party  has  one-half,  and  that  24 
representatives  are  to  be  chosen.  This  is  a  supposi- 
tion very  nearly  conformed  to  actual  numbers  in 
that  State.  Now  it  is  evident  that  either  political 
party,  by  resorting  to  the  cumulative  vote,  can  elect 
12  representatives,  and  thus  secure  to  itself  exact 
and  just  representation,  and  no  art  or  effort  of  the 
opposite  party  can  prevent  it.  But  suppose,  further, 
that  corruption  shall  assail  the  election,  and  that 
some  thousands  of  votes  shall  be  changed  thereby, 
or  that  in  the  interest  of  one  of  the  parties  so  many 


82  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

as  10,000  or  20,000  voters  shall  be  imported  into 
the  State,  or  be  fraudulently  created  or  personated 
within  it,  in  either  case  there  will  be  no  effect  pro- 
duced ;  the  result  will  be  unchanged ;  in  short,  in 
the  case  supposed,  a  fraudulent  increase  of  its  vote 
(and  of  the  total  vote)  by  a  party,  to  the  extent  of 
20,000,  will  not  give  to  it  any  advantage,  nor  will 
its  corrupt  acquisition  of  5000  or  10,000  votes  from 
the  opposite  party.  It  follows  that  corruption  will 
in  no  ordinary  case  be  resorted  to ;  it  will  be  effect- 
ually discouraged  and  prevented.  And  even  in  the 
extreme  case  of  the  corruption  of  a  large  number 
of  voters  in  a  State,  the  resulting  evil  will  be  re- 
duced to  its  minimum. 

What  has  been  said  concerning  the  choice  of  rep- 
resentatives will  apply  with  equal,  if  not  greater, 
force  to  the  choice  of  presidential  electors.  If  the 
representative  presidential  electors  were  chosen  in 
the  several  States  (save  those  which  have  but  one) 
upon  the  plan  of  the  cumulative  vote,  there  would 
be  n s  to  them  due  representation  of  the  people  in  the 
electoral  colleges,  and  the  elections  for  choosing  them 
would  receive  a  much  needed  purification.  Millions 
now  expended  upon  those  elections  would  be  kept 
out  of  the  hands  of  political  agents  and  be  applied 
to  better  and  nobler  uses. 

That  freedom  of  the  vote  will  have  the  effect 
claimed  for  it  will  more  clearly  appear  from  con- 
sidering the  manner  in  which  the  present  plan  of 
elections  operates  to  invite  and  produce  corruption. 
By  considering  the  evil  which  exists  we  will  be 
better  able  to  judge  the  merits  of  the  remedy  pro- 
posed.    Popular  elections  in  the  States  for  federal 


SENATE   REPORT.  83 

or  national  purposes  are  either  by  a  general  ticket 
for  the  whole  State,  or  by  a  single  ticket  in  district 
divisions.  As  before  stated,  the  former  obtains  in 
the  choice  of  presidential  electors ;  the  latter,  in 
the  choice  of  representatives  to  Congress.  But  to 
both  is  applied  the  plurality  rule  and  a  struggle 
invited  between  candidates  and  parties  for  prepon- 
derance of  vote. 

Whichever  can  be  made  to  outnumber  an  oppo- 
sition upon  the  return  will  win  the  whole  result  and 
will  wield  the  entire  power  of  the  constituency  in 
an  electoral  college  or  in  Congress.  Antagonism  is 
thus  made  an  essential  element  of  the  jn'oceeding, 
and  the  result  presents  to  us  the  spectacle  of  victor 
and  vanquished,  the  former  crowned  with  honor 
and  exultant  in  his  strength,  the  latter  humiliated 
and  powerless.  And  it  is  important  to  observe  that 
the  successful  party  does  not  obtain  merely  a  power 
proportioned  to  its  vote,  does  not  merely  obtain  full 
representation  for  itself,  but  obtains  the  whole  power 
of  the  constituency.  The  whole  vote  cast  against  it 
or  withheld  from  it  is  virtually  counted  to  it  and 
added  to  its  true  vote. 

An  issue  thus  made  up  for  popular  elections  must 
be  one  portentous  of  evil ;  and,  so  far  as  it  is 
unnecessary  to  secure  popular  representation,  must 
be  denounced  as  plainly  unjust  as  well  as  injurious. 

3.  It  ivill  be  a  guarantee  of  peace. 
The  free  vote  will  be  a  guarantee  of  peace  to  our 
country,  because  it  will  exclude  many  causes  of  dis- 
cord and  complaint,  and  will  always  secure  to  the 
friends  of  peace  and  union  a  just  measure  of  politi- 


84  PKOPORTIONAL    REPKESENTATIOX. 

cal  power.  The  absence  of  this  vote  in  the  States 
of  the  south  when  rebellion  was  plotted,  and  when 
open  steps  were  taken  to  break  the  Union,  was 
unfortunate,  for  it  would  have  held  the  Union  men 
of  those  States  together  and  have  given  them  voice 
in  the  electoral  colleges  and  in  Congress.  But  they 
were  fearfully  overborne  by  the  plurality  rule  of 
elections  and  were  swept  forward  by  the  course  of 
events  into  impotency  or  open  hostility  to  our  cause. 
By  that  rule  they  were  largely  deprived  of  repre- 
sentation in  Congress.  By  that  rule  they  were  shut 
out  of  the  electoral  colleges.  Dispersed,  unorgan- 
ized, unrepresented,  without  due  voice  and  power, 
they  could  interpose  no  effectual  resistance  to  seces- 
sion and  to  civil  war.  Their  leaders  were  struck 
down  at  unjust  elections  and  could  not  speak  for 
them  or  act  for  them  in  their  own  States  or  at  the 
capital  of  the  nation.  By  facts  well  known  to  us  we 
are  assured  that  the  leaders  of  revolt,  with  much 
difficulty,  carried  their  States  with  them.  Even  in 
Georgia,  the  empire  State  of  the  south,  the  scale 
was  almost  balanced  for  a  time  between  patriotism 
and  dishonor;  and  in  most  of  those  States  it 
required  all  the  machinery  and  influence  of  a 
vicious  electoral  system  to  organize  the  war  against 
us  and  hold  those  communities  compactly  as  our 
foes. 

In  those  same  States  the  free  vote  will  now  allay 
antagonism  of  race,  and  will  substitute  therefor  the 
rivalry  of  parties  formed  with  reference  to  the  policy 
of  the  general  government.  The  tendency  of  party 
is  to  form  upon  national  issues,  and  not  upon  State 
ones,  and  this  tendency  will  operate  more  strongly 


SENATE   REPORT.  85 

if  causes  of  offence  between  races  shall  be  removed 
or  lessened.     And  what  can  accomplish  this  more 
perfectly  than  the  free  vote  ?     For  under  it  one  race 
cannot  vote  down  and  disfranchise  the  other ;  each 
can  obtain  its  due  share  of  j30wer  without  injustice 
to  the  other,  and  there  will  be  no  strong  and  con- 
stant motive  (as  now)  to  struggle  for  the  mastery. 
This  fact  (the  importance  of  which  cannot  be  over- 
estimated) will  allay  animosity  and  prevent  conflict. 
And  because  the  free  vote  will   have  this  certain 
effect  it  will  nationalize  parties  in  the  south  and  will 
be  to  the  whole  country  an  invaluable  guarantee  of 
order  and  peace. 

In  extending  suffrage  largely,  in  extending  it  to 
include  many  hundreds  of  thousands  of  voters  of 
another  race  than  our  own,  it  will  become  us  to  look 
to  our  electoral  machinery  and  to  amend  it  in  those 
parts  which  have  been  found  defective,  or  which  do 
not  seem  well  adapted  to  the  new  strain  to  be  put 
upon  it.  Unquestionably  there  is  a  large  mass  of 
honest  opinion  in  the  country  opposed  to  colored 
suffrage,  and  many  of  those  who  support  it  in  Con- 
gress and  out-  of  Congress,  put  their  support  of  it 
upon  the  ground  of  necessity — upon  the  ground 
that  in  order  to  secure  the  fruits  of  emancipation  it 
is  necessary  that  the  emancipated  be  armed  with  the 
power  of  self-defence.  A  majority  of  this  commit- 
tee hold  that  colored  suffrage  is  allowable  and  expe- 
dient, that  the  objections  to  it  are  to  a  great  extent 
misconceived,  and  that  the  fears  felt  and  expressed 
by  many  as  to  its  results  will  not  be  realized.  But 
all  must  agree  that  this  great  experiment  of  ex- 
tended suffrage,  being  once  determined  upon,  should 


86  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

have  a  fair  trial ;  that  all  the  conditions  proper  to 
its  success  should,  as  far  as  possible,  be  established 
by  the  government.  And  those  who  sincerely  be- 
lieve that  the  experiment  will  have  bad  results  must 
approve  a  plan  of  voting  which  will  certainly  miti- 
gate its  possible  evils.  But  the  salutary  effects  of 
the  free  vote  as  a  guarantee  of  peace,  though  well 
illustrated  by  the  southern  States,  will  not  be  con- 
fined to  them.  Everywhere  it  will  decrease  the 
violence  of  party  contests  and  create  more  amicable 
relations  than  now  exist  among  our  people. 

4.  It  will  improve  the  character  and  ability  of  the 

House. 

The  unrestricted  or  free  vote  will  secure  men  of 
ability  and  experience  in  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives. It  is  believed  that  changes  are  now  too  fre- 
quent in  that  House,  and  that  the  public  interests 
suffer  detriment  from  this  cause.  The  committee 
give  their  unqualified  approval  to  that  provision  of 
the  Constitution  which  assigns  short  terms  of  ser- 
vice to  members  of  the  House.  But  frequency  of 
election  does  not  involve  rapidity  of  change.  Popu- 
lar power  may  be  retained  over  the  House,  and  yet 
the  great  part  of  its  members  be  continued  by  re- 
election for  a  considerable  period  of  time ;  in  other 
words,  frequent  elections  and  permanent  member- 
ship are  not  incompatible. 

But,  in  point  of  fact,  the  members  of  the  House 
are  frequently  changed  so  that  members  of  less  than 
four  years'  service  always  constitute  a  large  majority, 
and  it  is  a  rare  case  that  a  member  continues  beyond 
a  third  term.     Under  such  a  system  or  practice  of 


SENATE   REPOET.  87 

rapid  change,  the  average  character  of  the  House 
for  ability  cannot  be  high.  Two  and  four  year  men 
can  know  but  little  of  the  business  of  government, 
can  be  but  imperfectly  qualified  to  curb  abuses  in 
the  executive  department,  and  to  expose  or  compre- 
hend the  true  character  of  most  questions  of  domes- 
tic and  foreign  policy. 

There  are  several  reasons  which  account  for  fre- 
quent change  in  the  membership  of  the  House,  of 
which  the  single-district  system  is  chief.  The  fluc- 
tuations of  party  power  is  next  in  importance,  but 
is  intimately  connected  with  the  former.  The  sin- 
gle-district system  has  carried  the  idea  of  local 
rejoresentation  to  excess,  and  has  produced  a  class  of 
inconveniences  joeculiar  to  itself.  The  idea  of  as- 
signing a  representative  by  law  to  a  special  district 
within  a  State  is  naturally  supplemented  by  the  idea 
of  rotation  in  the  representative  privilege  among  the 
localities  within  the  district.  Hence,  very  com- 
monly party  nominations  are  made  in  turn  to  the 
several  counties,  parishes,  or  other  municipal  divis- 
ions of  the  district,  which  necessitates  the  frequent 
selection  of  new  men  for  representative  nomination. 
The  claim  of  locality  becomes  more  importunate, 
and  it  is  often  more  regarded  than  the  claims  or  fit- 
ness of  candidates  in  making  party  nominations, 
and  this  although  there  is  no  diversity  of  interest 
among  the  people  in  the  different  parts  of  the  dis- 
trict. The  other  cause  which  we  have  mentioned 
co-operates  with  this,  though  subordinate  to  it  in 
effect.  Changes  of  party  power  in  districts,  where 
one  party  does  not  largely  predominate  over  an- 
other, are  at  all  times  likely  to  occur,  and  to  defeat 


88  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

the  member  of  the  House  from  the  district,  although 
his  own  party  may  desire  to  continue  him  in  the 
public  service.  These  causes  of  change  would  have 
but  slight  operation  if  delegations  from  States  were 
elected  by  general  ticket,  and  would  have  still  less 
if  they  were  selected  upon  the  plan  of  the  cumula- 
tive or  free  vote ;  and  the  general  ticket  system 
being  quite  inadmissible,  upon  the  reasons  which 
apply  to  it,  we  are  driven  to  the  cumulative  or  free 
vote  as  the  practical  and  effectual  measure  of  reform. 
It  will  continue  members  of  merit  for  long  periods 
of  time  in  the  House,  because  it  will  relieve  them 
and  those  who  support  them  from  the  causes  of 
change  above  mentioned.  They  can  be  re-elected 
with  certainty  so  long  as  the  party  whose  represent- 
atives they  are  desire  their  continuance  in  service, 
and  it  may  be  reasonably  expected  that  some  men 
of  distinction  and  intellectual  power  will  always  be 
found  in  the  House  whose  period  of  service  counts 
by  20  or  30  years.  They  will  be  the  great  rej3re- 
sentatives  of  party,  and  will  give  lustre  and  power 
and  usefulness  to  the  House,  while  they  will  be  the 
objects  of  profound  attachment  and  of  honest  pride 
in  the  States  they  represent.  Congress  will  become, 
much  more  than  at  present,  a  theatre  of  statesman- 
ship and  a  fit  representative  of  a  great  people,  whose 
extended  territory,  diverse  populations,  and  varied 
interests  demand  great  ability  and  wisdom  in  the 
enactment  of  the  laws.  Our  present  system,  admir- 
ably calculated  to  repress  merit  and  lift  mediocrity, 
will  be  supplanted  by  one  which  will  produce  pre- 
cisely the  opposite  result. 

At  present  a  member  of  the  House  holding  his 


SENATE   REPORT.  89 

seat  insecurely  cannot  devote  himself  to  public  busi- 
ness with  that  zeal  and  confidence  which  his  posi- 
tion demands.  He  is  involved  all  the  time  in  a 
contest  for  official  existence,  and  his  energies  are 
thereby  absorbed  and  wasted.  If  he  has  a  just  am- 
bition to  serve  the  people  he  must  repress  rivals  at 
home,  must  overcome  a  rule  of  rotation  in  his  dis- 
trict, and  fortify  himself  against  fluctuations  of 
party  power.  It  will  be  exjiectecl  of  him  that  he 
shall  distribute  the  patronage  of  the  government  to 
men  who  will  be  efficient  in  his  support  for  re-elec- 
tion ;  and  thus  appointments  to  office  and  govern- 
ment contracts  are  to  be  his  peculiar  study,  and 
their  distribution  a  leading  object  of  his  labor. 
And  he  must  be  liberal  in  his  expenditure  of  money 
upon  elections  to  retain  his  popularity  and  place ; 
and  the  more  of  political  contribution  from  abroad 
he  can  obtain  to  influence  elections  in  his  district 
the  more  admired  and  the  more  secure  he  will  be. 

In  brief,  his  time  and  his  efforts,  instead  of  being 
expended  for  the  public,  must  be  expended  on  per- 
sonal objects  if  he  desires  to  remain  for  any  consid- 
erable time  a  representative  of  the  people.  Un- 
doubtedly many  of  the  best  men  of  the  country 
must  be  deterred  from  entering  upon  a  congressional 
career,  continuance  in  which  requires  such  sacrifices 
to  an  evil  system,  so  much  of  unpleasant  effort,  at- 
tended with  uncertainty  and  probable  mortification. 

But  freedom  to  the  elector  has  one  special  advan- 
tage, hitherto  unnoticed,  over  single-district  voting. 
Under  the  district  system  a  large  part  of  the  men  of 
a  State  are  absolutely  barred  from  election  to  Con- 
gress.    They  cannot  be  chosen   in  districts  where 


90  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

their  party  lias  not  a  preponderance  of  vote.  The 
difference  in  strength  between  parties  may  be  slight, 
but  it  will  virtually  constitute  a  rule  of  exclusion, 
which  will  always  be  rigidly  enforced.  But  the 
cumulative  or  free  vote  opens  the  doors  of  the  peo- 
ple's house  to  any  citizen  of  a  State  whenever  those 
who  agree  with  him  in  oiDinion  in  his  State  will  give 
him  a  competent  support.  They  can  elect  him  to 
Congress  regardless  of  State  or  district  majorities. 
This  is  an  advantage  of  immense  value  if  republican 
principles  be  true,  and  republican  institutions  be 
worthy  of  being  carried  to  their  utmost  limit  of  per- 
fection as  fit  and  proper  for  the  use  and  enjoyment 
of  mankind. 

.       EXAMPLES  OF  REFORM. 

But  let  us  turn  from  general  argument  upon  elec- 
toral reform  to  particular  cases  which  will  illustrate 
its  application.  And  first  of  cases  in  our  own 
country : 

In  Pennsylvania  and  in  other  States  inspectors  of 
elections  are  chosen  upon  the  plan  of  the  limited 
vote.  Each  voter  is  authorized  to  vote  for  but  one 
inspector,  and  yet  two  are  to  be  chosen.  Thus, 
whenever  the  minority  party  in  an  election  district 
can  poll  one-third  of  the  whole  vote  they  can  secure 
one  of  the  inspectors,  and  obtain  representation  in 
the  election  board  of  the  district.  This  arrange- 
ment protects  elections  from  fraud  and  injustice,  and 
is  everywhere  within  the  States  which  have  adopted 
it  strongly  sustained  by  public  opinion.  In  fact, 
even  in  districts  where  the  majority  has  more  than 
a  two-thirds  vote  the  attemjit  is  rarely  made  by  them 
to  choose  the  second  inspector. 


SENATE   EEPOET.  91 

Iii  Pennsylvania  also  jury  commissioners  in  the 
several  counties  are  chosen  upon  the  same  plan. 
But  one  is  voted  for  by  each  elector,  and  yet  two 
are  'chosen. 

For  selecting  delegates  at  large  to  the  New  York 
constitutional  convention  in  1867  a  similar  plan  was 
adopted.  Upon  the  recommendation  of  Governor 
Fenton  the  legislature  provided  that  thirty-two  del- 
egates at  large  should  be  chosen  by  the  people — in 
addition  to  the  delegates  from  the  representative 
districts — and  that  in  choosing  them  each  voter 
should  vote  for  but  sixteen.  The  consequence  was 
that  each  political  party  obtained  sixteen  of  the  del- 
egates at  large,  many  of  whom  could  not  have  been 
chosen  upon  a  district  plan,  or  upon  a  general  ticket 
devised  in  the  ordinary  way. 

These  instances  in  our  own  country  illustrate  the 
principle  of  reform  now  in  question,  and  many 
others  might  be  cited.  They  show  distinctly  that 
successful  attempts  have  been  made  by  our  people 
to  break  away  from  an  unjust  system  of  voting,  and 
to  secure  to  themselves  those  advantages  which  full 
representation  is  so  well  calculated  to  produce. 

ENGLISH  KEFOEM. 

But  English  authority  and  example  may  be  called 
in  to  aid  the  argument  in  a  still  more  effectual  man- 
ner. The  papers  appended  to  this  report  from 
authors  and  statesmen  of  high  standing  who  have 
in  recent  years  examined  this  subject  of  popular  rep- 
resentation with  great  fullness  and  power,  may  be 
consulted  with  profit  by  any  one  desirous  of  under- 
standing the  general  grounds  of  argument  in  favor 


92  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

of  reform.  And  the  debates  and  proceedings  of 
Parliament  in  1867  upon  the  reform  bill  may  also 
be  examined  in  connection  with  the  returns  of  par- 
liamentary elections  in  1868  for  further  and  most 
valuable  information. 

On  the  4th  of  July,  1867,  Mr.  Lowe  (the  present 
chancellor  of  the  exchequer  in  the  Gladstone  ad- 
ministration) moved  the  following  amendment  to 
the  reform  bill  in  the  House  of  Commons : 

POWER   TO   DISTRIBUTE   VOTES. 

At  any  contested  election  for  a  county  or  borough  repre- 
sented by  more  than  two  members,  and  having  more  than  one 
seat  vacant,  every  voter  shall  be  entitled  to  a  number  of  votes 
equal  to  the  number  of  vacant  seats,  and  may  give  all  such 
votes  to  one  candidate,  or  may  distribute  them  among  the  can- 
didates as  he  thinks  fit. 

This  amendment  (which  was  for  the  free  vote  in- 
cluding the  principle  of  cumulation  and  applicable 
generally  to  elections  where  more  than  one  member 
was  to  be  chosen)  was  debated  on  the  day  when 
offered  and  on  the  day  following,  and  received  the 
very  handsome  support  of  173  votes — a  large  vote 
for  a  new  proposition  upon  its  first  trial  of  strength. 
Mr.  Lowe's  amendment  was  identical  in  principle 
and  almost  identical  in  terms  with  the  bill  now 
reported  by  this  committee.  The  English  proposi- 
tion applied  to  the  election  of  members  of  Parlia- 
ment, the  American  applies  to  the  election  of  mem- 
bers of  Congress,  but  in  both  a  free  vote,  including 
the  right  of  cumulation,  is  the  essential  idea,  and  the 
object  in  view  more  complete  and  just  representation 
of  the  people. 

On  the  30th  July,  1867,  the  reform  bill  being 


SENATE   REPORT.  93 

under  consideration  in  the  House  of  Lords,  Lord 
Cairns  moved  to  insert  the  following  new  clause,  to 
come  in  after  clause  8  of  the  bill : 

At  a  contested  election  for  a  county  or  borough  represented 
by  three  members  no  person  shall  vote  for  more  than  two  can- 
didates. 

This  amendment,  after  an  elaborate  debate,  was 
adopted  by  a  strong  vote :  contents,  142,  not  con- 
tents, 51 ;  and  an  additional  amendment  was  then 
also  adopted  without  a  division  that  "  at  a  contested 
election  for  the  city  of  London"  (which  is  entitled 
to  four  members)  "no  person  shall  vote  for  more 
than  three  candidates." 

The  success  of  those  amendments  (which  were 
concurred  in  by  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  8th 
of  August)  constituted  an  important  event  in  the 
history  of  representative  institutions,  for  they  recog- 
nized and  gave  application  to  a  principle  of  justice 
which  will  endure  the  test  of  trial  and  of  time,  a 
principle  which  will  hereafter  receive  indefinite  ex- 
tension, and  wherever  extended  will  purify  elections, 
insure  contentment  to  constituencies,  and  elevate  the 
character  and  improve  the  action  of  free  govern- 
ment. 

Mr.  Gladstone,  speaking  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  confining  his  attention  to  his  own  country, 
declared  that  the  proposition  or  principle  contained 
in  those  amendments,  if  adopted  at  all,  must  be 
adopted  with  the  certainty  that  "  it  must  unfold  and 
expand  itself  over  the  whole  country  and  completely 
reconstruct  the  system  of  distribution  of  seats." 
And   generally   those   who    supported   it   in   both 


94  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

houses  of  Parliament  foretold  and  rejoiced  in  the 
prospect  of  its  future  expansion. 

Those  amendments  constitute  the  ninth  and  tenth 
clauses  of  the  reform  act  of  15th  of  August,  1867, 
and  their  effect  is  illustrated  by  the  parliamentary 
elections  of  1868.  We  give  the  returns  for  certain 
districts : 

PARLIAMENTARY   ELECTIONS,  1868. 

Herefordshire,  three  members.  Average  tory 
vote,  3360 ;  average  liberal  vote,  2074.  Two  tories 
and  one  liberal  elected. 

Cambridgeshire,  three  members.  Average  tory 
vote,  3924 ;  average  liberal  vote,  3310.  Two  tories 
and  one  liberal  elected. 

The  liberals  also  obtained  the  third  member  in 
each  of  the  tory  counties  of  Oxford,  Bucks  and 
Dorset. 

Liverpool  borough,  three  members.  Average  tory 
vote,  16,404,  average  liberal  vote,  15,198.  Tory 
majority,  1206. 

In  Liverpool  the  second  seat,  previously  held  by 
the  tories,  was  attacked  by  the  liberals ;  the  result 
was  a  failure,  as  shown  by  the  above  vote.  But  the 
third  member  was  most  justly  secured  to  the  liberals 
under  the  certain  operation  of  the  limited  vote,  pro- 
vided by  clause  9  of  the  reform  act. 

Under  the  operation  of  the  same  clause  the  tories 
obtained  the  third  member  for  Leeds,  and  they  car- 
ried members  also  in  Manchester  and  London. 

Blackwood's  Magazine,  a  tory  organ,  (it  has  called 
itself  "  the  oldest  of  the  tories,")  although  it  admits 


SENATE    REPORT.  95 

that  its  party  lias  suffered  loss  to  the  extent  of  at 
least  four  seats  by  the  minority  clause,  says : 

That  to  the  priociple  of  that  clause,  fairly  and  consistently 
worked  out,  it  has  no  objection  whatever. — Blackwood's  Maga- 
zine, January,  1869. 

This  expression  of  opinion  by  a  leading  organ  of 
the  party  which  suffered  somewhat  under  the  mi- 
nority clause,  is  a  valuable  testimony  in  favor  of 
the  principle  of  electoral  reform  which  that  clause 
was  intended  to  promote. 

DIFFICULTIES   OF   ENGLISH   REFORM. 

Mr.  Disraeli  in  debate  on  the  5th  of  July,  1867, 
pointed  out  one  great  practical  obstacle  to  the  adop- 
tion of  the  cumulative  vote  in  England  which  does 
not  exist  in  this  country.  It  happens  that  the 
Scotch  and  Welsh  districts  are  nearly  all  one-mem- 
ber districts  with  liberal  majorities.  The  proposed 
reform  is,  therefore,  inapplicable  to  those  parts  of 
the  kingdom  as  at  present  organized  for  election 
purposes,  and  if  it  were  applied  to  England  alone, 
upon  an  extensive  scale,  it  might  give  undue  influ- 
ence and  power  in  the  House  of  Commons  to  Scotch 
and  Welsh  members.  They  would  control  the 
house  upon  all  party  questions.  Full  representation 
in  England  would  tend  to  equalize  the  strength  of 
parties  in  the  house,  and  then  the  Scotch  vote  cast 
wholly  on  one  side  would  always  turn  the  scale. 

But  putting  this  consideration  aside,  and  taking 
the  English  districts  as  they  stand,  we  find  that 
most  of  them  are  not  adapted  or  well  adapted  to 
the  cumulative  vote.  A  great  part  of  them  are 
boroughs,  electing  one  member  each.     In  Schedule 


96  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

A  of  the  reform  act  are  no  less  than  38  such  bor- 
oughs, added  to  those  which  existed  before,  and  in 
Schedule  B,  nine  additional.  Other  boroughs 
choose  two  members  each,  as  do  divisions  of  coun- 
ties, 35  of  which  are  fixed  in  the  reform  act, 
Schedule  D.  The  triangular  districts,  those  which 
elect  three  members  each,  are  not  numerous,  and  we 
are  not  aware  that  any  district  elects  a  greater  num- 
ber, save  London,  which  elects  four.  The  limited 
vote  is  now,  however,  applied  to  London  and  to  all 
the  triangular  districts,  whether  boroughs  or  coun- 
ties, and  it  is  to  be  expected  that  by  the  reorgani- 
zation and  consolidation  of  districts  hereafter,  reform 
will  be  greatly  extended. 

REFORM  IN   THE   UNITED  STATES. 

But  the  difficulties  and  obstacles  which  exist  in 
Great  Britain  do  not  exist  with  us.  Our  States  are 
well  suited  to  the  application  of  the  free  vote.  There 
are  now  only  six  of  the  whole  number  to  which  it 
will  not  apply  as  a  plan  for  representative  elections, 
to  wit,  Delaware,  Florida,  Kansas,  Nebraska,  Ne- 
vada, and  Oregon.  They  constitute  the  one-mem- 
ber States,  and  would  be  unaffected  by  the  new  plan. 
But  from  this  class  Kansas  will  pass  at  the  next  ap- 
portionment, leaving  but  five  States  out  of  37  to 
compose  this  class ;  and  as  they  would  select  but 
five  representatives  out  of  about  250  who  will  con- 
stitute the  House,  their  influence  upon  general 
results  would  be  unimportant  if  not  inappreciable. 
It  is  to  be  remarked,  also,  that  these  States,  in  com- 
mon with  the  other  States,  might  come  under  the 
operation  of  the  free  vote  if  that  vote  should  be 


SENATE   REPORT.  97 

applied  to  presidential  elections,  because  each  of 
them  will  be  entitled  to  choose  three  electors. 

THE  TWO-MEMBER  STATES. 

The  two-member  States  are  Rhode  Island  and 
Minnesota,  and  both  will  probably  change  their 
position  at  the  next  apportionment  of  rejoresenta- 
tives.  Rhode  Island  will  fall  off  to  one  member 
and  Minnesota  rise  to  three.  Other  States,  how- 
ever, two  or  three  in  number,  may  take  their  place, 
and  hence  it  will  be  worth  while  to  consider  the 
position  of  two-member  States  with  reference  to  the 
plan  of  the  free  vote.  It  has  been  sometimes  said, 
without  due  reflection,  that  the  cumulative  vote  is 
not  suited  to  elections  where  two  persons  are  to  be 
chosen  by  a  constituency,  because  if  it  have  practi- 
cal effect  it  will  give  equal  representation  to  the 
majority  and  minority.  But  the  frequent  applica- 
tion of  the  limited  vote  to  dual  elections — as  in  the 
cases  of  inspectors  of  elections  and  jury  commis- 
sioners in  Pennsylvania — may  cause  us  to  pause  and 
examine  this  objection  with  some  care  before  we 
accept  it  as  a  sound  one.  Carefully  examined,  it 
may  turn  out  to  be  more  specious  than  solid,  and 
we  may  further  discover  that  in  the  case  of  the  rep- 
resentation of  our  States  in  the  Federal  Government 
there  is  an  important  fact  which  bears  upon  this 
objection  and  deprives  it  of  any  appearance  even  of 
strength  or  force.  In  the  first  place  let  us  test  the 
objection  and  illustrate  its  futility  by  a  supposed 
case.  Take  a  constituency  of  32,000  electors, 
20,000  of  whom  are  tories  and  12,000  liberals,  en- 
titled to  elect* two  members  to  Parliament.    As  there 

7 


98  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

are  32,000  voters  and  two  members  to  be  chosen, 
the  full  ratio  or  number  of  voters  for  a  member  is 
16,000.  Assign  now  one  member  to  the  tories  and 
the  just  demand  of  16,000  tory  voters  is  complied 
with  and  exhausted.  They  can  have  no  further 
claim  to  representation.  What  have  we  left  ?  Why, 
on  the  one  hand  4000  tory  voters,  and  on  the  other 
12,000  liberals,  and  the  simple  question  for  us  to 
determine  is  whether  the  4000  or  the  12,000  shall 
have  the  second  member.  The  cumulative  or  the 
free  vote  will  give  that  second  member  to  the  12,000 
liberals ;  unjust  voting  will  give  him  to  the  4000 
tories. 

But  let  us  cite  cases  of  actual  parliamentary  elec- 
tions in  1868,  for  two-member  districts,  in  further 
illustration :  Northeast  Lancashire,  two  members, 
average  tory  vote,  3615;  average  liberal  vote,  3458. 

Two  tories  elected  upon  a  majority  of  157.  The 
ratio  for  a  member  was  3536,  so  that  79  tory  voters 
obtained  the  second  member,  while  3458  liberals 
were  disfranchised. 

Take  next  two  districts  in  Kent.  Middle  Kent, 
two  members ;  average  tory  vote,  3245 ;  average 
liberal  vote,  2873.  West  Kent,  two .  members ; 
average  tory  vote,  3389  ;  average  liberal  vote,  3279. 

Two  tories  were  chosen  from  each  district.  In 
Middle  Kent  186  tory  votes  carried  the  second 
member,  and  in  West  Kent  55 ;  while  in  the  two 
districts  6152  liberals  were  entirely  disfranchised. 

East  Derbyshire,  two  members;  average  liberal 
vote,  2069;  average  tory  vole,  1974.  Yorkshire, 
West  Riding,  (South,)  two  members ;  ^average  libe- 
ral vote,  8032  ;  average  tory  vote,  7935. 


SENATE   REPORT.  99 

In  these  districts  four  liberals  were  elected;  in 
one  the  second  member  was  carried  by  48,  and  in 
the  other  by  49  votes;  while  9909  tories  were 
wholly  disfranchised. 

Where,  then,  a  minority  in  a  two-member  con- 
stituency exceeds  one-third  the  whole  number  of 
voters  therein,  it  does  not  seem  unreasonable  to 
assign  to  them  the  second  member,  and  thus,  in 
fact,  an  equality  of  representation  with  the  major- 
ity. It  is  a  case  where  complete  or  exact  justice  is 
impossible ;  there  must  be  disfranchisement  to  some 
extent ;  but  that  disfranchisement  should  be  reduced 
to  its  minimum,  and  made  to  press  as  lightly  as 
may  be  upon  the  constituency.  What,  then,  can 
be  said  as  to  two-member  constituencies  is  this — 
that  any  rule  of  voting  for  them  must  (in  the  very 
nature  of  the  case)  be  imperfect  in  result,  but  that 
the  cumulative  vote,  or  an  equivalent  plan  applied 
even  to  them,  will  be  one  of  reform  and  improve- 
ment. 

But  an  important  consideration  remains  to  be 
mentioned.  Our  States  are  represented  in  both 
houses  of  Congress,  and  not  merely  in  one ;  a  fact 
which  changes  entirely  the  character  of  this  ques- 
tion in  the  two-member  States.  In  Great  Britain 
there  is  no  representation  of  the  people,  or  even  of 
districts,  in  the  upper  house  of  Parliament.  Com- 
pensation to  a  constituency  for  loss  of  political  power 
in  the  House  of  Commons  cannot  be  obtained  by 
them  in  the  House  of  Lords.  With  us  the  case  is 
widely  different.  The  political  majority  in  a  State 
will  ordinarily  have  both  the  senators  from  the  State ; 
in  other  words,  the  whole  representation  of  the  State 


100  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

in  the  Senate.  If,  then,  in  two-member  States  they 
have  but  one-half  the  representation  of  the  State  in 
the  House,  (as  against  a  minority  of  one-third  or 
upwards,)  the  aggregate  of  their  representation  in 
Congress  will  still  be  many  times  over  what  it  should 
be  upon  any  principle  of  justice  or  of  numbers. 

THE  THREE-MEMBER  STATES. 

It  is  agreed  pretty  generally  that  the  cumulative 
or  free  vote  is  admirably  suited  to  three-member 
constituencies.  The  States  which  now  elect  three 
members  each  are  Arkansas,  California,  New  Hamp- 
shire, Vermont,  and  West  Virginia.  In  such  States 
the  majority  will  always  have  two  members,  and  the 
minority,  if  it  exceed  one-fourth  the  whole  constit- 
uency and  one-third  of  the  majority  vote,  can  ob- 
tain the  third.  Upon  constituencies  or  districts  of 
this  class — called  indiscriminately  "  three-handed," 
"  three-cornered,"  or  triangular — much  of  the  de- 
bate in  Great  Britain  as  to  reform  in  popular  voting 
has  been  expended.  The  question  as  to  them  in 
particular  is  fully  expounded  in  the  papers  (drawn 
from  British  sources)  which  are  appended  to  this 
report. 

THE  GREAT  STATES. 

Having  exhausted  the  list  of  States  which  elect 
less  than  four  members,  we  find  that  24  remain. 
Of  these,  Coimecticut,  South  Carolina,  and  Texas 
each  elect  four  members,  and  the  remainder  various 
numbers,  up  to  New  York,  which  chooses  31.  They 
may  be  taken  together  in  this  examination  as  an 
additional,  though  by  far  the  most  important  class  of 
States.     They  choose  218  out  of  the  243  -members 


SENATE   REPORT.  101 

of  the  House.  In  this  class  all  the  great  States  are 
before  us,  and  all  of  secondary  rank,  challenging 
the  wisdom  of  Congress  to  reform  and  amend  our 
political  system  in  some  effectual  manner.  For  our 
country  has  in  some  respects  outgrown  the  system 
provided  for  us  by  the  care  of  our  ancestors ;  new 
necessities  press  upon  us ;  great  evils  afflict  us,  and 
it  has  become  the  duty  of  statesmen  not  merely  to 
administer  or  to  carry  on  our  plan  of  government, 
but  to  amend  it  also ;  and  to  this  end  we  are  to  in- 
vite and  welcome  the  best  thoughts  of  men  abroad 
and  at  home  upon  political  reform,  and  give  them, 
as  far  as  possible,  application  and  practical  effect. 

Xow  there  can  be  no  question  that  if  parties  in 
the  great  States  obtain  representation  according  to 
the  number  of  their  votes,  one  of  the  greatest  possi- 
ble reforms  in  a  republican  government  will  be 
secured.  All  the  arguments  heretofore  mentioned 
apply  to  those  States  with  special  force,  because  they 
contribute  the  main  body  of  members  to  the  House 
and  a  defective  plan  of  election  operates  within  them 
with  extensive  effect.  As  to  them,  reform  will  be 
most  important  and  useful,  and  no  reasonable  effort 
should  be  spared  in  attempting  to  aj:>ply  it. 

We  have  in  fact  as  to  the  great  States  no  point 
left  for  examination  except  the  single  one  of  practi- 
cability. Will  the  free  vote  work  and  work  well  in 
the  great  States  ?  Those  who  distrust  popular  intel- 
ligence and  judgment  may  deny,  while  those  who 
confide  in  the  people  will  affirm,  the  practicability 
of  the  plan.  But  there  is  one  leading  consideration, 
which  in  the  judgment  of  the  committee  is  decisive 
upon   this  question.     It  is  that  where  free  action 


102  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

shall  be  permitted  each  political  party  will  pursue  its 
own.interests  with  activity,  intelligence,  and  zeal,  and 
will  inevitably  obtain  for  itself  its  due  share  of  rep- 
resentative power.  Thus  where  a  party  shall  have 
one-third  of  the  popular  vote  of  a  State  it  will 
cumulate  its  vote  upon  one-third  the  number  of 
representatives  to  be  chosen.  Where  parties  are 
nearly  equal  in  strength  in  a  State  the  wTeaker  one 
will  cumulate  its  vote  upon  one-half  the  number  of 
persons  to  be  chosen,  or  within  one  of  that  number. 
Where  a  party  has  a  small  majority  in  a  State,  and 
particularly  where  it  is  increasing  in  numbers,  it  will 
cumulate  its  vote  upon  one  or  two  more  than  one- 
half  the  number  of  candidates.  And  finally,  in 
States  with  large  delegations,  a  party  with  so  small 
a  vote  as  one-fourth  or  one-fifth  the  whole  number 
will  cumulate  its  vote  upon  the  small  number  of  one, 
two,  three,  or  more  representatives,  according  to  the 
proportion  which  its  vote  shall  bear  to  the  total  vote 
of  the  State.  The  due  working  of  the  plan  is 
secured  by  the  selfish  interests  with  which  it  deals, 
and  wTe  may  congratulate  ourselves  that  under  the 
plan  the  very  efforts  of  parties  to  secure  power  for 
themselves  will  result  in  justice — that  is,  in  the 
division  of  power  between  them  according  to  their 
respective  numbers. 

Now,  it  is  idle  to  say  that  voting  in  the  great 
States  will  be  confused  and  uncertain.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  will  run  according  to  party  organization  at 
all  times,  and  will  adjust  itself  naturally  and  in- 
evitably to  all  changes  of  opinion  and  organization 
in  the  political  body.  And  as  political  parties  con- 
stantly divide  society  into  parts,  the  relative  strength 


^n^^^ 


103  T  3T 

of  which  can  at  any  time  be  approximately  stated, 
there  need  not  be  uncertainty  or  confusion  in  the 
polling  of  votes.  And  even  in  times  of  transition 
and  change,  when  popular  power  is  departing  from 
one  party  and  attaching  itself  to  another,  or  when 
some  third^  party  takes  ground  upon  a  particular 
issue,  or  faction  diverts  a  fragmentary  vote  from  a 
great  party,  the  amount  of  disturbance  and  conse- 
quent uncertainty  produced  will  not  be  considerable, 
and  can  be  readily  estimated  for  all  practical  pur- 
poses, in  fixing  the  number  of  candidates  which 
any  party  shall  support.  The  merit  or  practicability 
of  a  rule  of  elections  is  not  to  be  judged  upon  a 
supposition  which  is  unlikely  or  exceptional ;  but 
even  in  the  cases  supposed,  the  elements  of  error 
and  mistake  will  be  reduced  to  their  smallest  pos- 
sible quantity.  Where  the  relative  strength  of 
party  is  uncertain — that  is,  cannot  be  exactly  known 
or  estimated,  or  where  the  boundary  of  power  be- 
tween them  is  near  the  dividing  line  between  ratios 
of  representation,  it  will  rarely  happen  that  a  mis- 
take will  be  made  beyond  the  extent  of  one  mem- 
ber, and  the  general  result  for  the  State  will  be  but 
slightly  disturbed. 

THE  CHOICE  OF  PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTORS. 

The  proposed  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  regarding  the  choice  of  electors 
of  President  and  Vice-President  of  the  United 
States,  reported  by  this  committee  on  the  29th  of 
January,  (adopted  by  the  Senate  subsequently,  but 
lost  upon  disagreement  between  the  two  houses,)  de- 
serves distinct  examination,  particularly  as  full  de- 


104  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

bate  upon  it  in  the  two  houses  of  Congress  could 
not  be  had  when  it  came  up  for  consideration,  for 
want  of  time.     That  amendment  is  as  follows  : 

The  second  clause,  first  section,  article  two  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  shall  be  amended  to  read  as  follows : 
Each  State  shall  appoint,  by  a  vote  of  the  people  thereof  qualified 
to  vote  for  representative  in  Congress,  a  number  of  electors 
equal  to  the  whole  number  of  senators  and  representatives  to 
which  the  State  may  be  entitled  in  the  Congress ;  but  no  sena- 
tor or  representative,  or  person  holding  an  office  of  trust  and 
profit  under  the  United  States,  shall  be  appointed  an  elector ; 
and  the  Congress  shall  have  power  to  prescribe  the  manner  in 
which  such  electors  shall  be  chosen  by  the  people. 

The  amendment  has  two  objects :  first,  to  secure 
to  the  people  at  all  times  the  right  of  choosing  elec- 
tors themselves :  and  second,  to  authorize  Congress 
to  prescribe  the  manner  in  which  this  popular  right 
shall  be  exercised.  In  other  respects  the  amend- 
ment follows  the  language  of  the  existing  Constitu- 
tion and  introduces  no  change.  At  present  electors 
are  to  be  appointed  as  the  Legislatures  of  the  several 
States  may  direct,  and  there  is  no  uniform  rule  for 
the  whole  country.  Although  in  most  of  the  States 
the  practice  has  been  to  choose  them  by  a  popular 
vote,  this  has  not  been  a  matter  of  constitutional 
right  in  the  people,  but  of  legislative  permission, 
and  liable  at  any  time  to  be  taken  away.  That  the 
authority  to  appoint  electors  should  be  fixed  in  the 
Constitution  by  a  uniform  rule,  and  not  be  left  to 
legislative  discretion  is,  we  believe,  a  general  opin- 
ion, and  it  rests  upon  good  grounds  of  reason  and 
experience.  South  Carolina  formerly  chose  her 
electors  by  a  vote  of  her  legislature,  and  the  people 
had  no  voice  in  the  proceeding ;   but  by  her  present 


SENATE   REPORT.  105 

constitution,  formed  under  the  reconstruction  laws, 
their  appointment  must  be  directly  by  the  people. 
It  may  be  questioned  whether  a  State  constitution 
can  take  away  the  discretionary  power  vested  in  the 
legislature  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
which  is  "  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,"  but  this 
action  by  South  Carolina  shows  that  popular  right 
requires  a  constitutional  guaranty  against  the  ca- 
price, ambition,  or  corruption  of  legislative  bodies. 
Florida  has  by  law  placed  the  appointment  of  her 
electors  in  her  legislature,  and  a  recent  attempt  in 
Alabama  to  fix  a  similar  arrangement  in  that  State 
was  only  frustrated  by  an  executive  veto.  It  may 
be  apprehended  that  in  some  future  election  of 
President  and  Vice-President  closely  contested,  the 
legislature  of  a  State  or  the  legislatures  of  several 
States  may  take  to  themselves  the  appointment  of 
electors,  prevent  their  choice  by  the  people,  and 
change  the  result  of  the  election.  This  is  a  danger 
to  be  carefully  guarded  against,  to  be  wholly  re- 
moved from  our  electoral  system,  not  only  because 
it  contains  an  element  of  injustice,  but  because  it 
may  provoke  convulsion  and  civil  war. 

The  next  provision  of  the  amendment  that  Con- 
gress may  prescribe  the  manner  in  which  electors 
shall  be  chosen  by  the  people  is  most  important  and 
valuable.  It  is  true  that  this  clause  only  permits 
and  does  not  require  congressional  action,  but  its 
necessity  for  the  introduction  of  any  reform  in  the 
manner  of  choosing  presidential  electors  is  perfectly 
certain,  as  will  be  presently  shown.  The  objection 
that  because  this  clause  will  take  power  from  the 
legislatures  of  the  States  and  vest  it  in  Congress,  or 


106      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

rather  will  authorize  Congress  to  interpose  and  con- 
trol the  action  of  State  legislatures,  it  will  increase 
federal  power  and  tend  to  consolidation,  ought  not 
to  j>revail  against  the  amendment,  and  that  for 
several  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  the  choice  of 
presidential  electors  is  a  federal  question  as  much 
as  the  choice  of  members  of  Congress,  and  may 
properly  be  subjected  to  similar  regulation  as  to  the 
manner  in  which  it  shall  be  performed.  In  the 
next  place,  the  original  design  of  the  electoral  col- 
leges has  wholly  failed.  They  were  intended  to  be 
bodies  for  deliberation  and  free  choice;  in  other 
words,  to  exercise  judgment  and  discretion  in  giving 
their  votes  to  candidates  for  President  and  Vice- 
President.  It  was  expected  that  they  would  not  in 
form  and  theory  merely,  but  in  fact  and  truth  choose 
the  two  principal  executive  officials  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  and  it  is  to  be  noticed 
that  the  "  manner "  in  which  they  shall  choose  is 
carefully  "  prescribed  "  by  the  Constitution.  They 
are  to  meet  on  a  fixed  day  in  their  respective  States 
and  vote  by  ballot  for  President  and' Vice-President, 
(one  of  whom  at  least  shall  not  be  an  inhabitant  of 
the  same  State  with  themselves,)  and  shall  make 
distinct  lists  of  their  votes,  signed  and  certified,  and 
transmit  them  under  seal  to  the  President  of  the 
Senate.  But  the  manner  in  which  the  electors 
themselves  should  be  chosen  was  not  prescribed  (or 
authority  conferred  upon  Congress  to  prescribe  it) 
for  two  reasons :  first,  because  the  convention  did 
not  determine  what  authority  should  ajypoint  them ; 
and  second,  because  the  actual  choice  of  President 
and  Vice-President  was  intended  to  be  in  the  col- 


SENATE    KEPORT.  107 

leges  themselves,  whose  "  manner  "  of  choosing  was 
distinctly"  fixed. 

These  considerations  are  now  of  no  force.  On 
the  contrary,  when  it  is  expressly  provided  that  the 
people  shall  choose  the  electors,  and  it  is  understood 
that  the  colleges  shall  simply  represent  them  and 
execute  their  will,  the  regulation  of  the  manner  in 
which  the  electors  shall  be  chosen  falls,  as  before 
stated,  within  the  same  reason  which  applies  to  the 
regulation  of  the  manner  of  choosing  representatives 
in  Congress ;  and  it  falls,  also,  within  the  reasons 
which  originally  induced  the  regulation  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  electoral  colleges  were  to  exercise 
their  powers.  The  amendment  therefore,  is  in  con- 
formity with  principles  already  contained  in  the 
Constitution,  and  does  not  introduce  any  "  portent- 
ous novelty  "  into  our  system. 

But  the  most  important  reason  in  favor  of  this 
branch  of  the  amendment  remains  to  be  mentioned. 
It  is  absolutely  necessary  to  secure  reform  in  the 
manner  of  choosing  electors.  They  are  now  chosen 
by  general  ticket  in  nearly  all  the  States,  and  the 
only  practical  alternative  to  this  plan  is  legislative 
choice,  which  is  still  worse,  and  struck  at  by  the 
prior  clause  of  the  amendment.  Now,  the  general 
ticket  plan  is  very  objectionable,  as  is  well  known, 
and  yet  the  States  cannot  change  it.  Theoretically, 
by  virtue  of  an  express  clause  of  the  Constitution, 
the  State  legislatures  may  direct  the  manner  in 
which  electors  shall  be  appointed  at  their  pleasure, 
but  practically  they  cannot  or  will  not  exercise  that 
power  in  the  direction  of  reform.  Always,  Avhen- 
ever  they  have  not  taken  to  themselves  the  power 


108  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

of  appointing  electors,  they  have  provided  that  they 
should  be  elected  by  the  people  upon  the  general 
ticket  plan,  and  that  plan,  so  long  as  they  allow  a 
popular  vote  at  all  at  Presidential  elections,  they 
will  not  abolish  or  amend.  The  explanation  of  this 
is  not  difficult,  and  it  will  be  easily  understood  by 
any  one  familiar  with  our  political  history,  and  with 
the  character  of  our  political  parties. 

By  the  general  ticket  a  political  majority  in  a 
State  can  wield  the  whole  power  of  the  State  in  an 
electoral  college — not  merely  a  power  proportioned 
to  their  own  numbers,  but  a  power  proportioned  to 
the  joint  vote  of  their  own  and  of  an  opposing  party. 
They  obtain  not  only  the  power  appropriate  to  them- 
selves, but  also  the  power  appropriate  to  their  oppo- 
nents or  rivals.  Now  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that 
a  party  in  a  State  will  voluntarily  surrender  such 
an  advantage,  though  tainted  with  odium  and  injus- 
tice, or  that  their  representatives  in  the  State  legis- 
lature will  surrender  it ;  for  it  is  a  law  of  party  to 
obtain  all  the  power  possible,  and  to  yield  no  advan- 
tage except  upon  compulsion  or  for  adequate  com- 
pensation. 

But  if  considerations  of  justice  and  the  general 
good  could  have  weight  with  the  State  legislatures, 
and  overrule  with  them  the  suggestions  of  selfish 
interest,  still  reform  could  not  be  secured.  A 
change,  in  order  to  operate  fairly,  should  be  uniform 
throughout  the  whole  country,  and  be  applied  in  all 
the  States  at  the  same  time.  But  State  action  in 
the  way  of  change  must  be  successive,  extending 
over  a  period  of  years,  and  would  not  probably  be 
uniform  or  universal.     And  so  no  State  could  well 


SENATE   REPORT.  109 

venture  to  take  the  initiative,  as  its  political  majority 
would  make  a  certain  sacrifice  for  an  uncertain  or 
imperfect  reform.  If  a  political  majority  in  the 
legislature  of  Indiana  should  desire  to  have  electors 
chosen  by  single  districts,  they  could  not  afford  to 
adopt  the  plan  alone.  For  they  would  discover  at 
a  glance  that  if  other  States  did  not  adopt  it  they 
would  weaken  their  party  without  any  possible  com- 
pensation. While  they  would  divide  power  in  their 
electoral  college  with  an  opposing  party,  that  oppos- 
ing party,  by  holding  on  to  the  general  ticket  plan  in 
another  State,  (Kentucky,  for  instance,)  would  ob- 
tain an  advantage  which  might  determine  the  gen- 
eral result  of  the  Presidential  election.  Upon  the 
whole,  then,  we  must  conclude  that  without  an 
amendment  of  the  Constitution,  any  reform  what- 
ever in  the  manner  of  choosing  Presidential  electors 
is  impossible. 

But  it  is  said  by  many  that  the  electoral  colleges 
should  be  abolished  and  the  people  be  permitted 
to  vote  directly  for  President  and  Vice-President. 
An  amendment  of  the  Constitution  to  effect  this 
purpose  has  been  often  proposed,  but  has  never  been 
submitted  to  the  States  for  adoption,  and  for  a  very 
good  reason,  which  is,  that  they  would  have  rejected 
it.  Nor  is  it  now  possible  to  obtain  the  ratification 
of  such  an  amendment  by  three-fourths  of  the 
States.  The  reason  is  a  plain  one.  All  the  small 
States,  and  all  the  States  of  secondary  rank,  are 
interested  largely  in  retaining  their  representation 
as  States  in  the  electoral  colleges.  They  have  now 
each  two  electors  without  regard  to  population, 
whereas  under  the  plan  proposed  they  would  be 


110  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

confined  to  the  principle  of  numbers  and  would  in- 
fluence the  result  of  an  election  only  in  proportion 
to  their  actual  votes  polled.  No  less  than  24  States 
out  of  37  would  lose  from  about  one-fourth  to  two- 
thirds  of  their  present  political  weight  in  presiden- 
tial elections  by  the  change.  This  fact  is  decisive. 
Instead  of  ratifications  by  three-fourths  of  the 
States  there  would  be  prompt  rejections  by  a  ma- 
jority of  them  if  this  proposition  should  be  sub- 
mitted. 

But  although  the  electoral  colleges  cannot  be 
abolished  by  constitutional  amendment,  they  may 
be  greatly  reformed.  They  may  be  made  to  repre- 
sent more  truly  the  will  of  the  people  and  the  States, 
or  the  people  alone,  by  an  amendment  of  the  Con- 
stitution which  shall  prescribe,  or  shall  authorize 
Congress  to  prescribe,  the  manner  in  which  their 
members  shall  be  chosen.  It  may  be  provided  that 
the  two  electors  of  each  State,  commonly  called 
senatorial  electors,  who  represent  the  principle  of 
State  equality,  shall  be  chosen  in  one  manner,  and 
the  remaining  electors  of  the  State,  who  represent 
the  principle  of  numbers  in  another,  or  that  all  the 
electors  shall  be  chosen  in  the  same  way.  If  the 
former  plan  should  be  preferred,  the  senatorial 
electors  might  be  chosen  by  general  ticket,  and 
then,  as  to  them,  there  would  be  no  change  from 
the  present  practice.  But  it  could  be  provided  that 
the  representative  electors  in  the  one  case,  or  all  the 
electors  in  the  other,  should  be  chosen  by  single 
districts,  or  upon  the  principle  of  the  free  vote.  The 
single  district  plan  would  be  a  very  great  improve- 
ment, and  it  would  be  free  from  some  of  the  objec- 


SENATE   REPORT.  Ill 

tions  which  lie  against  it  when  applied  to  the  choice 
of  representatives  in  Congress;  but  the  free  vote 
would  be  infinitely  preferable  to  it,  because  it  would 
be  more  convenient,  because  it  would  prevent  corrup- 
tion^ and  because  it  would  secure  a  more  full  and  just 
representation  of  the  people  in  the  electoral  colleges. 

It  is  the  opinion  of  the  committee  that  under 
their  amendment,  as  reported,  Congress  would  be 
authorized  only  to  prescribe  uniform  rules  for  choos- 
ing electors ;  rules  applicable  to  the  whole  country, 
and  operating  equally  in  every  State.  But  if  this 
opinion  should  be  questioned,  a  slight  change  of 
phraseology  in  the  amendment  would  remove  all 
doubt. 

To  the  suggestion  that  Congress  might  attempt 
itself  to  district  the  States  in  order  to  perpetrate 
party  injustice,  there  are  several  answers.  In  the 
first  place,  it  is  not  at  all  certain  that  Congress  would 
form  districts  more  unfairly  than  they  would  be 
formed  by  State  Legislatures.  In  the  next  place,  it 
is  not  at  all  likely,  and  hardly  possible,  that  Con- 
gress would  undertake  this  work,  which  would  be  to 
it  both  inconvenient  and  odious.  It  possesses  now 
the  same  power  of  controlling  the  manner  of  choos- 
ing representatives  which  it  is  proposed  to  confer 
upon  it  in  regard  to  choosing  electors,  and  yet  it 
has  never  undertaken  to  district  the  States  for  rep- 
resentative elections,  in  which  it  is  more  directly  in- 
terested than  in  those  for  electors.  But  again,  if 
thought  expedient,  the  amendment  might  be  modi- 
fied so  as  to  exclude  the  direct  action  of  Congress 
in  the  formation  of  districts.  It  is  hardly  necessary 
to  add  that  the  adoption  of  the  free  vote  for  the 


112  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

choice  of  electors  would  avoid  this  and  all  similar 
questions  of  debate. 

CONCLUSION. 

The  committee  must  now  conclude  their  examina- 
tion of  a  most  important  subject.  They  have  not 
been  able,  on  account  of  the  pressure  of  other  duties, 
to  fill  up  completely  the  argument  in  favor  of  the 
free  vote,  or  to  answer  in  form  the  possible  objec- 
tions which  may  be  made  to  its  adoption.  But  they 
have  endeavored  to  present  fairly  the  main  argu- 
ments which  should  weigh  with  Congress  and  with 
the  people  in  its  favor,  and  by  due  explanation  of 
its  purpose  and  character  to  vindicate  it  against 
misconception  and  cavil.  As  to  the  objections  which 
may  be  made  that  it  would  delocalize  representation, 
that  it  would  introduce  some  degree  of  confusion, 
that  it  would  decrease  j)olitical  activity,  and  that  it 
is  opposed  to  the  doctrine  that  the  majority  shall 
rule,  they  must  content  themselves  with  declaring 
that  in  their  opinion  none  of  those  objections  are 
well  taken  or  well  suited  to  undergo  debate,  and 
that  they  were  thoroughly  answered  in  the  two 
Houses  of  Parliament  in  1867.  The  last  one,  in 
particular,  is  preposterous,  for  it  is  one  of  the  main 
merits  of  reformed  voting,  that  it  will  secure  the 
true  rule  of  the  majority,  and  give  to  it  a  sanction 
it  does  not  now  possess.  The  whole  mass  of  the 
electoral  population  being  represented  by  reformed 
voting  in  the  representative  body,  the  vote  will  be 
there  taken  upon  any  question  in  controversy,  and 
the  voice  of  the  majority  duly  pronounced.  But  at 
present  minority  rule  may  obtain.     For  in  the  first 


SENATE   REPORT.  113 

place,  all  minorities  at  popular  elections  are  struck 
out  of  the  returns,  and  next  the  minority  vote  in 
the  representative  body  is  overruled  when  a  decision 
is  there  made,  so  that  we  have,  in  fact,  the  rule  of  a 
majority  of  a  majority,  which  very  likely  represents 
only  a  minority  among  the  people,  particularly  when 
a  plurality  rule  is  applied  to  the  popular  elections. 

The  argument  for  reform  may  be  summed  up  in 
a  few  words.  By  it  we  will  obtain  cheap  elections, 
just  representation,  and  contentment  among  the 
people ;  by  it  we  will  also  secure  able  men  in  the 
people's  House ;  by  it  our  political  system  will  be 
invigorated  and  purified;  by  it  our  country  will 
"  take  a  bond  of  the  future"  that  our  government 
shall  be  a  blessing  and  not  a  curse ;  that  our  pros- 
perity shall  be  enduring ;  that  our  free  institutions 
"  shall  not  perish  from  the  face  of  the  earth." 


SENATE  BILL,  No.  772.— (40th  Congress,  3d  Session.) 
IN  THE  SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

January  13,  1869. 
Mr.  Bugkalew  asked,  and  by  unanimous  consent 
obtained,  leave  to  bring  in  a  bill  entitled  "  A  bill  to 
amend  the  representation  of  the  people  in  Con- 
gress;" which  was  read  twice  and  referred  to  a 
select  committee  consisting  of  Messrs.  Buckalew, 
Anthony,  Ferry,  Morton,  Warner,  Kice,  and  Wade. 

March  2, 1869. 
Mr.  Wade?  from  the  Select  Committee  on  Bepre- 
sentative  Beform,  reported  the  bill  without  amend- 
ment, as  follows : 

8 


114  PKOPORTIONAL   KEPRESENTATION. 

A  BILL  to  amend  the  representation  of  the  people  in  Congress. 

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of 
the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  in 
elections  for  the  choice  of  representatives  to  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States,  whenever  more  than  one  representative  is  to 
be  chosen  from  a  State,  each  elector  of  such  State,  duly  quali- 
fied, shall  be  entitled  to  a  number  of  votes  equal  to  the  number 
of  representatives  to  be  chosen  from  the  State,  and  may  give 
all  such  votes  to  one  candidate,  or  may  distribute  them,  equally 
or  unequally,  among  a  greater  number  of  candidates  ;  and  the 
candidates  highest  in  vote  upon  the  return  shall  be  declared 
elected. 


APPENDIX. 

It  lias  been  thought  proper  and  is  found  conve- 
nient to  place  in  an  appendix  various  citations  of 
authority  in  favor  of  representative  reform  from 
parliamentary  debates  and  from  the  writings  of 
English  authors.  These  evidences  of  the  progress 
of  thought  abroad  upon  one  of  the  most  important 
and  interesting  questions  which  relate  to  represent- 
ative government,  it  is  believed  are  worthy  the  atten- 
tion of  both  statesman  and  citizen  in  this  country — 
of  all  who  desire  the  progress  and  improvement  of 
free  institutions  and  a  satisfactory  issue  to  our  great 
experiment  of  democratic  government. 

A  few  general  observations  may  fitly  precede 
what  follows.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be  re- 
marked that  reform  in  Parliament  as  secured  in 
1867,  in  regard  to  the  mode  of  popular  voting, 
broke  through  the  lines  of  party  and  was  obtained 
independent  of  party  support. 

In  both  houses  of  Parliament  whigs  and  tories, 
liberals  and  conservatives,  independent  and  radical 


SENATE   HEPORT.  115 

members,  were  found  together  in  support  of  an 
amendment  which  was  intended  to  do  justice  to  the 
people  and  improve  the  representative  body.  In 
the  upper  house  of  Parliament  in  fact  the  opposition 
became  at  last  narrowed  almost  to  the  ministry  and 
their  immediate  dependents — a  fact  which  induced 
the  chief  minister  of  the  Crown  in  the  lower  house, 
to  abandon  the  opposition  which  he  had  at  first  pro- 
claimed. In  this  country  also  the  question  of  re- 
form in  the  manner  of  popular  voting  is  not  one 
of  a  party  character,  and  cannot  be  made  such.  It 
appeals  to  all  good  citizens  and  to  all  thoughtful 
men,  in  whatever  political  organization  they  may 
be  found,  and  demands  of  them  an  independent  and 
patriotic  support.  Already  men  of  different  opin- 
ions upon  ordinary  questions  of  party,  and  others 
of  independent  views,  have  stood  forward  among  us 
as  urgent  advocates  of  reform.  Of  these,  outside 
of  Congress,  honorable  mention  is  to  be  made  of 
Mr.  J.  Francis  Fisher,  Mr.  Greeley,  Mr.  D.  G. 
Croly,  and  Mr.  Simon  Stern.  Mr.  Greeley's  prop- 
osition in  the  New  York  constitutional  convention 
of  1867,  for  the  division  of  his  State  into  lo  sena- 
torial districts,  each  of  which  should  elect  three 
senators  upon  the  principle  of  the  cumulative  vote, 
was  one  of  much  merit,  and  will  deserve,  upon  some 
future  occasion,  to  be  revived,  and  will  also  deserve 
to  be  imitated  in  other  States. 


AKGUItfENTS  IN  PARLIAMENT. 

In  the  House  of  Commons,  July  4,  1867,  Rfc. 
Hon.  Robert  Lowe,  on  moving  his  amendment  for 


116  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

the  cumulative  vote  to  the  reform  bill,  addressed  the 
house  at  length.     He  said : 

That  he  must  not  be  understood  as  coming  forward  to  argue 
for  any  protection  to  the  minority  .  .  .  but  between  the 
members  of  the  constituency  there  should  be  absolute  equality  ; 
the  majority  should  have  nothing  given  to  it  because  it  was  a 
majority ;  the  minority  should  have  nothing  taken  away  from 
it.  .  .  .  Let  each  voter  have  an  equal  number  of  votes  not 
dependent  upon  the  use  he  makes  of  them ;  let  him  be  at  lib- 
erty to  dispose  of  them  as  he  likes.  .  .  .  The  tendency  of 
the  present  system  wras  to  make  that  stronger  which  was  al- 
ready strong,  and  that  weaker  which  was  already  weak.  By 
an  arbitrary  and  unreasonable  rule  it  strengthened  the  major- 
ity; by  the  same  arbitrary  and  unreasonable  rule  it  weakened 
the  minority.  On  abstract  justice,  therefore,  the  present  rule 
could  not  be  maintained.  The  proper  way  to  alter  it  was  to 
give  each  elector  as  many  votes  as  there  wrere  vacancies,  and 
leave  him  absolutely  free  to  dispose  of  them  as  he  pleased — to 
give  all  to  one  person,  one  to  each  of  three,  or  two  to  one,  and 
one  to  another.  By  that  means  they  would  be  doing  nothing 
unjust  or  unfair  to  the  majority  or  to  the  minority.  They 
wrould  be  merely  putting  them  on  a  level,  and  leaving  them 
on  perfectly  fair  ground.  That  was  the  abstract  argument. 
There  were  different  ways  by  which  the  end  might  be  accom- 
plished. Some  proposed  to  give  only  a  single  vote  to  each 
elector ;  others  recommended  that  when  there  were  three  can- 
didates each  elector  should  have  two  votes.  He  preferred  to 
give  each  elector  three  votes,  and  allow  him  to  dispose  of  them 
as  he  pleased.  The  objection  to  the  two  first  proposals  was 
that  they  would  operate  in  the  way  of  disfranchisement,  and 
wrould  take  away  something  people  already  possessed  ;  because 
on  the  supposition  that  there  were  three  candidates  they  had 
already  three  votes.  The  system  he  proposed  had  greater  flex- 
ibility and  better  adapts  itself  to  the  general  purposes  of  elec- 
tions. .  .  .  They  would  find  that  in  this  way  opinion  in  con- 
stituencies would  ripen.  Opinion  in  that  house  would  ripen  to 
changes,  and  the  house  would  become  a  more  delicate  reflex 
of  the  opinions  of  the  constituencies.     The  existence  of  such  a 


SENATE   REPOET.  117 

system  of  gradual  growth,  not  only  of  opinion  but  in  the  rep- 
resentation of  opinion,  would,  to  a  great  extent,  prevent  the 
necessity  of  external  agitation,  and  be  a  great  discouragement 
to  it.  There  was  nothing  more  worthy  of  the  attention  of 
statesmen  in  the  new  state  of  affairs  than  anything  which 
would  have  the  tendency  to  prevent  that  violent  oscillation 
which  they  now  witnessed.  What  happened  in  the  United 
States  ?  The  minority  of  thousands  might  as  well  not  exist  at 
all.  It  is  absolutely  ignored.  Was  their  country  (England) 
in  like  manner  to  be  formed  into  two  hostile  camps,  debarred 
from  each  other  in  two  solid  and  compact  bodies  ?  Or  were 
they  to  have  that  shading  off  of  opinion,  that  modulation  of 
extremes,  and  mellowing  and  ripening  of  right  principles, 
which  are  among  the  surest  characteristics  of  a  free  country, 
the  true  secrets  of  political  dynamics,  and  the  true  preserva- 
tives of  a  great  nation  ?  He  said  then  that  what  he  proposed 
to  the  house  was  in  itself  just,  equal,  and  fair,  founded  on  no 
undue  or  unfair  attempt  to  give  a  minority  an  advantage  they 
were  not  entitled  to  exercise,  and  that  it  was  peculiarly  applic- 
able to  the  state  of  things  on  which  they  were  entering. 
...  He  might  justly  add  that  the  principle  of  the  amend- 
ment wTas  large  enough  to  include  boroughs  returning  two 
members,  as  well  as  those  which  had  three,  and  if  it  were 
worth  while  he  was  prepared  to  contend  that  upon  abstract 
principle  it  ought  to  be  applied  to  both  classes  of  boroughs. — 
Hansard,  Pari.  Deb.,  3d  series,  clxxxviii.  pp.  1037-41. 

Iii  the  House  of  Lords,  July  30,  1867,  Lord 
Cairns  spoke  at  length  in  support  of  his  amendment 
for  representation  of  minorities  in  three-membered 
constituencies.  He  said  he  would  state  the  advan- 
tages of  the  system  he  had  proposed : 

These  must  obviously  be  looked  at  from  three  points  of  view 
— the  advantages  to  the  general  legislation  of  the  country,  the 
advantages  to  the  members  who  would  be  selected  under  an 
arrangement  of  this  kind,  and  the  advantages  to  the  consti- 
tuencies themselves.  Now,  with  regard  to  the  legislature,  the 
advantages  which  I  think  would  be  gained  by  this  system 


118  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

would  be  these :  you  would  obtain  in  the  persons  of  those  who 
would  be  the  representatives  of  the  minority  in  these  large  con- 
stituencies a  body  of  men  of  great  intelligence,  and  of  great 
independence ;  you  would  have  those  elements  of  advantage 
which  exist  in  the  representation  of  small  boroughs,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  you  would  be  perfectly  free  from  the  disadvantages 
and  defects  of  the  small  borough  system.  .  .  .  Questions  are 
constantly  arising  which  in  one  aspect  are  questions  of  general 
political  interest,  but  which  are  more  or  less  connected  with 
local  interests,  and  bear  upon  local  claims ;  and  thus  a  question 
which,  in  a  general  point  of  view,  is  of  political  interest  to  the 
whole  country  is  sometimes  colored  and  affected  in  many  wTays 
by  the  way  in  which  it  is  viewed  in  different  localities.  No 
doubt,  in  discussing  general  questions  of  political  interest,  it 
would  be  of  the  greatest  possible  advantage  to  hear  how  those 
questions  were  viewed  not  merely  by  different  localities  but 
by  different  bodies  of  men  in  the  same  locality.  That  result 
you  would  obtain  by  the  plan  which  I  propose.  ...  I  will 
pass  to  the  consideration  of  the  advantages  which  would  be 
gained  by  the  representatives  of  those  large  constituencies 
themselves.  .  .  .  You  would  have  from  the  same  constit- 
uency two  members  representing  the  majority  and  one  repre- 
senting the  minority,  communicating  freely  with  each  other, 
and  without  the  slightest  tinge  of  jealousy  or  apprehension  that 
the  interests  of  one  wTould  jar  or  conflict  with  the  interests  of 
the  other  in  the  constituency.  .  .  .  Again,  writh  regard  to 
the  constituency  itself — and  this  is  one  of  the  most  important 
views  of  the  case — observe  the  advantages  which  wTould  be 
gained :  First,  I  believe  you  would  gain  the  greatest  possible 
local  satisfaction ;  there  is  nothing  so  irksome  to  those  who 
form  the  minority  of  one  of  those  large  constituencies  as  finding 
that  from  the  mere  force  of  numbers  they  are  virtually  ex- 
cluded from  the  exercise  of  any  political  power ;  that  it  is  vain 
for  them  to  attempt  to  take  any  part  in  public  affairs ;  that  the 
elections  must  go  in  one  direction,  and  that  they  have  no  polit- 
ical power  whatever.  On  the  one  hand  the  result  is  great  dis- 
satisfaction, and  on  the  other  it  is  disinclination  on  the  part  of 
those  who  form  the  minority  to  take  any  part  in  affairs  in 
which  it  is  important  they  should  take  a  prominent  and  con- 
spicuous part.  ...  In  addition  to  that,  it  would  do  much  to 


SENATE   REPOET.  119 

soften  the  asperities  of  political  feeling  which  sometimes, 
though  not  often,  prevail  in.  large  constituencies.  ...  Of 
this  I  am  sure,  (and  although  some  treat  it  as  an  objection  I 
think  it  a  great  advantage  of  the  scheme,)  that  contests  would 
be  very  much  diminished  in  large  constituencies  where  contests 
are  most  expensive,  so  expensive  that  the  mind  almost  recoils 
at  hearing  the  sums  which  they  cost.  Contests  practically 
would  come  to  an  end ;  and  as  they  did,  so  would  danger  of 
bribery  and  corruption.  You  would  have  great  constituencies 
divided  into  great  component  parts;  you  would  have  each 
portion  well  represented ;  you  would  have  freedom  from  ex- 
pense, freedom  from  the  irritation  of  political  feeling,  and  from 
the  curse  of  all  elections,  bribery. — Hansard,  3d  series,  clxxxix. 
pp.  433-'41. 

The  views  of  Earl  Eussell  in  favor  of  dividing 
the  representation  of  large  constituencies  between 
parties,  have  been  often  expressed.  In  debate  in 
the  House  of  Commons  upon  the  reform  bill  of 
1854,  he  spoke  as  follows : 

Now  it  appears  to  us  that  many  advantages  would  attend  the 
enabling  the  minority  to  have  a  part  in  these  returns.  In  the 
first  place  there  is  apt  to  be  a  feeling  of  great  soreness  when  a 
very  considerable  number  of  electors,  such  as  I  have  mentioned, 
are  completely  shut  out  from  a  share  in  the  representation  of 
one  place.  .  .  .  But  in  the  next  place  I  think  that  the  more 
you  have  your  representation  confined  to  large  populations,  the 
more  ought  you  to  take  care  that  there  should  be  some  kind 
of  balance,  and  that  the  large  places  sending  members  to  this 
house  should  send  those  who  represent  the  community  at  large. 
But  when  there  is  a  very  large  body  excluded  it  cannot  be  said 
that  the  community  at  large  is  fairly  represented. — 3d  Han- 
sard, clvi.  2062. 

In  his  Essay  on  the  English  Constitution,  (edi- 
tion of  -1865,)  he  wrote  as  follows  : 

If  there  were  to  be  any  deviation  from  our  customary  habits 
and  rooted  ideas  on  the  subject  of  representation,  I  should  like  to 


120  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

see  such  a  change  as  I  ouce  proposed  in  order  to  obtain  repre- 
sentatives of  the  minority  in  large  and  populous  counties  and 
towns.  If,  when  three  members  are  to  be  elected,  each  elector 
were  allowed  to  give  two  votes,  we  might  have  a  liberal  coun- 
try gentleman  sitting  for  Buckinghamshire,  and  a  conservative 
manufacturer  for  Manchester.  The  local  majority  would  have 
two  to  one  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  the  minority  would 
not  feel  itself  disfranchised  and  degraded. 

In  the  House  of  Lords,  in  1867,  he  gave  a  vigor- 
ous and  able  support  to  the  Cairns  amendment, 
which  now  constitutes  clause  nine  of  the  reform 
act  of  that  year.     He  said  : 

I  believe  by  means  of  such  a  plan  you  would  introduce  into 
the  House  of  Commons  men  of  moderate  views,  whose  influ- 
ence would  tend  to  reconcile  parties  on  those  occasions  which 
now  and  then  arise  when  neither  extreme  is  completely  right, 
and  when  the  influence  of  moderate  men  is  of  much  use  in 
allaying  the  heat  of  party  passion.  .  .  .  Suppose  a  town  has 
20,000  voters,  and  that  12,000  are  of  one  side  in  politics  and 
8000  of  the  other,  would  not  that  town  be  better  represented  if 
both  the  12,000  and  the  8000  were  represented  than  if  only 
the  12,000  were  represented?  The  gentleman  who  first  im- 
pressed me  with  those  opinions  as  to  three-cornered  constitu- 
encies, mentioned  to  me  that  in  a  great  manufacturing  town 
where  there  was  a  very  considerable  conservative  minority, 
men  of  the  greatest  respectability,  men  of  wealth,  and  men  of 
education  were  in  such  a  state  of  political  irritation,  from  the 
fact  of  feeling  themselves  reduced  to  the  position  of  mere 
ciphers  at  elections,  that  they  were  sometimes  ready  to  support 
candidates  of  even  extreme  democratic  opinions.  ...  I  can 
well  understand  men  who  are  extremely  intolerant  and  exclu- 
sive in  politics  objecting  to  give  any  voice  to  those  whose  politi- 
cal views  are  distasteful  to  them ;  but  I  cannot  understand  such 
an  objection  being  urged  by  those  who  are  in  favor  of  having 
public  opinion  fairly  represented. — Hansard,  3d  series,  clxxxix. 
pp.  446-'47. 

Upon   the   consideration  of  the   reform  bill  of 


SENATE    REPORT.  121 

1831  in  the  House  of  Commons,  Mr.  Praed,  dis- 
tinguished as  speaker  and  poet,  expressed  himself 
as  follows : 

If  we  desire  that  the  representatives  of  a  numerous  constitu- 
ency should  come  hither  merely  as  witnesses  of  the  fact  that 
certain  opinions  are  entertained  by  the  majority  of  that  con- 
stituency, our  present  system  of  election  is  certainly  rational, 
and  members  are  right  in  their  reprobation  of  a  compromise, 
because  it  would  diminish  the  strength  of  the  evidence  to  a 
fact  we  wish  to  ascertain.  But  if  we  intend,  as  surely  we  do 
intend,  that  not  the  majority  only,  but  the  aggregate  masses  of 
every  numerous  constituency,  should,  so  far  as  is  possible,  be 
seen  in  the  persons  and  heard  in  the  voices  of  their  representa- 
tives— should  be,  in  short,  in  the  obvious  literal  sense  of  the 
word  "  represented,"  in  this  house — then,  sir,  our  present  rule 
of  election  is  in  the  theory  wrong  and  absurd,  and  in  practice 
is  but  partially  corrected  by  the  admission  of  that  compromise 
on  which  so  much  virtuous  indignation  has  been  wasted. — 3d 
Hansard,  v.  1362. 

THE  CUMULATIVE  VOTE. 

BY  EARL  GREY. 

"  The  first  of  the  reforms  of  a  conservative  tend- 
ency which  I  should  suggest,  and  one  which  I 
should  consider  a  great  improvement  under  any  cir- 
cumstances, but  quite  indispensable  if  any  changes 
favorable  to  democratic  power  are  to  be  admitted, 
would  be  the  adoption  of  what  Mr.  James  Marshall 
has  called  the  '  cumulative  vote ' — that  is  to  say,  the 
principle  of  giving  to  every  elector  as  many  votes 
as  there  are  members  to  be  elected  by  the  constitu- 
ency to  which  he  belongs,  with  the  right  of  either 
giving  all  these  votes  to  a  single  candidate,  or  of 
dividing  them,  as  he  may  prefer.  The  object  of 
adopting  this  rule  would  be  to  secure  to  minorities 


122  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

a  fair  opportunity  of  making  their  opinions  and 
wishes  heard  in  the  House  of  Commons.  In  order 
that  it  might  fully  answer  this  purpose,  the  right  of 
returning  members  to  Parliament  ought  to  be  so 
distributed  that  each  constituency  should  not  have 
less  than  three  representatives  to  choose.  Suppo- 
sing that  three  members  were  to  be  elected  together, 
and  that  each  elector  were  entitled  to  three  votes, 
which  he  might  unite  in  favor  of  a  single  candidate, 
it  is  obvious  that  a  minority  exceeding  a  fourth  of 
the  whole  constituency  would  have  the  power  of 
securing  the  election  of  one  member.  It  is  prob- 
able that  in  general  three  members  would  be  thus 
returned,  each  representing  a  different  shade  of 
opinion  among  the  voters. 

"  The  advantages  this  mode  of  voting  would  be 
calculated  to  produce,  and  the. justice  of  making 
some  such  provision  for  the  representation  of  minor- 
ities, or,  rather,  the  flagrant  injustice  of  omitting  to 
do  so,  have  been  so  well  shown  by  Mr.  Marshall  in 
the  pamphlet  I  have  already  referred  to,  and  by 
Mr.  Mill,  in  his  highly  philosophical  treatise  on 
representative  government,  that  it  is  quite  needless 
for  me  to  argue  the  question  as  one  of  principle. 
But  I  may  observe  that,  in  addition  to  its  being 
right  in  principle,  this  measure  would  be  in  strict 
accordance  with  the  lessons  of  experience,  if  read 
in  their  true  spirit.  One  of  the  most  remarkable 
peculiarities  of  the  British  House  of  Commons,  as 
compared  with  other  representative  bodies,  is,  that  it 
has  always  had  within  its  walls  members  represent- 
ing most  of  the  different  classes  of  society,  and  of 
the  various  and  conflicting  opinions  and  interests  to 


SENATE  REPORT.  123 

be  found  in  the  nation.  Much  of  the  acknowledged 
success  with  which  the  House  of  Commons  has 
played  its  part  in  the  government  of  the  country  has 
been  attributed  (I  believe  most  justly)  to  this  pecu- 
liarity. The  changes  made  by  the  reform  act,  and 
especially  the  abolition  of  the  various  rights  of  vot- 
ing formerly  to  be  found  in  different  towns,  and  the 
establishment  of  one  uniform  franchise  in  all  the 
English  boroughs,  (with  only  a  small  exception  in 
favor  of  certain  classes  of  freemen,)  tended  some- 
what to  impair  the  character  of  the  house  in  this 
respect.  The  greatly  increased  intercourse  between 
different  parts  of  the  country,  and  the  rapidity  with 
which  opinions  are  propagated  from  one  extremity 
of  the  kingdom  to  another,  have  had  a  similar  tend- 
ency ;  and  there  is  no  longer  the  same  probability 
as  formerly  that  different  opinions  will  be  found  to 
prevail  in  different  places,  so  as  to  enable  all  parties 
to  find  somewhere  the  means  of  gaining  an  entrance 
to  Parliament  for  at  least  enough  of  their  adherents 
to  give  expression  to  their  feelings. 

"  Hence  there  is  a  danger  that  the  House  of  Com- 
mons may  cease  to  enjoy  to  the  same  extent  as 
formerly  the  great  advantage  of  representing  the 
various  classes  and  opinions  to  be  found  in  the 
nation.  That  danger  wTould  be  greatly  aggravated 
by  rendering  the  constituencies  more  nearly  equal 
than  they  are ;  but  the  simple  change  involved  in 
adopting  the  cumulative  vote  would  do  much  to- 
wards guarding  against  it,  since  wTith  this  mode  of 
voting  it  would  be  impossible  that  any  considerable 
party  in  the  country  should  be  left  unrepresented 
in   Parliament.      The   tendency   of  the   alteration 


124  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

would  be  conservative  in  the  best  sense  of  the  word, 
while  at  the  same  time,  in  many  cases,  it  would  have 
the  effect  of  relieving  liberal  politicians  from  a  dis- 
advantage to  which  they  are  unfairly  subjected.  On 
the  one  side  it  would  prevent  the  representation  of 
the  large  town  constituencies  from  being  monopo- 
lized, as  at  present,  by  candidates  ready  to  pledge 
themselves  to  the  support  of  democratic  measures. 
Even  in  the  metropolitan  boroughs  we  might  rea- 
sonably expect  that  some  members  would  be  returned 
really  representing  the  higher  and  most  educated 
classes  of  their  inhabitants,  who  are  now  practically 
without  any  representation  at  all  except  that  which 
they  obtain  indirectly  by  means  of  members  chosen 
by  other  constituencies.  Thus  in  the  large  towns  it 
would  put  an  end  to  the  unjust  monopoly  on  the 
part  of  radical  politicians ;  and  on  the  other  hand, 
in  those  counties  where  a  conservative  majority  now 
excludes  a  strong  liberal  minority  from  any  share 
in  the  representation,  it  would  correct  a  similar  tend- 
ency in  the  opposite  direction.  In  both  cases  this 
system  of  voting  would  be  calculated  to  give  more 
weight  to  the  independent  electors,  who  are  not 
thorough-going  partisans  on  either  side,  and  to  favor 
the  return  of  candidates  deserving  their  confidence." 
— Parliamentary  Government  Considered  with  ref- 
erence to  Reform,  edition  of  1864,  p.  203. 

LIMITED  AND  CUMULATIVE  VOTING. 

BY  JOHN   STUART  MILL. 

"Assuming  that  each  constituency  elects  three 
representatives,  two  modes  have  been  proposed,  in 
either  of  which  a  minority,  amounting  to  a  third  of 


SENATE   REPORT.  125 

the  constituency,  may,  by  acting  in  concert,  and  de- 
termining to  aim  at  no  more,  return  one  of  the 
members.  One  plan  is,  that  each  elector  should 
only  be  allowed  to  vote  for  two,  or  even  for  one, 
although  three  are  to  be  elected.  The  other  leaves 
to  the  elector  his  three  votes,  but  allows  him  to  give 
all  of  them  to  one  candidate.  The  first  of  these 
plans  was  adopted  in  the  reform  bill  of  Lord  Aber- 
deen's government ;  but  I  do  not  hesitate  most  de- 
cidedly to  prefer  the  second,  which  has  been  advo- 
cated in  an  able  and  conclusive  pamphlet  by  Mr. 
James  Garth  Marshall.  The  former  plan  must  be 
always  and  inevitably  unpopular,  because  it  cuts 
down  the  privileges  of  the  voter,  while  the  latter, 
on  the  contrary,  extends  them ;  and  I  am  prepared 
to  maintain  that  the  permission  of  cumulative  votes, 
that  is,  of  giving  either  one,  two,  or  three  votes  to  a 
single  candidate,  is  in  itself,  even  independently  of 
its  effect  in  giving  a  representation  to  minorities,  the 
mode  of  voting  which  gives  the  most  faithful  ex- 
pression of  the  wishes  of  the  elector.  On  the  exist- 
ing plan,  an  elector  who  votes  for  three  can  give  his 
vote  for  the  three  candidates  whom  he  prefers  to 
their  competitors;  but  among  those  three  he  may 
desire  the  success  of  one  immeasurably  more  than 
that  of  the  other  two,  and  may  be  willing  to  relin- 
quish them  entirely  for  an  increased  chance  of 
attaining  the  greater  object.  This  j>ortion  of  his 
wishes  he  has  now  no  means  of  expressing  by  his 
vote.  He  may  sacrifice  two  of  his  votes  altogether, 
but  in  no  case  can  he  give  more  than  a  single  vote 
to  the  object  of  his  preference.  Why  should  the 
mere  fact  of  preference  be  alone  considered,  and  no 


126  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

account  whatever  be  taken  of  the  degree  of  it? 
The  power  to  give  several  votes  to  a  single  candi- 
date would  be  eminently  favorable  to  those  whose 
claims  to  be  chosen  are  derived  from  personal  quali- 
ties, and  not  from  their  being  the  mere  symbols  of 
an  opinion ;  for  if  the  voter  gives  his  suffrage  to  a 
candidate  in  consideration  of  pledges,  or  because  the 
candidate  is  of  the  same  party  with  himself,  he  will 
not  desire  the  success  of  that  individual  more  than 
that  of  any  other  who  will  take  the  same  pledges,  or 
belongs  to  the  same  party.  When  he  is  especially 
concerned  for  the  election  of  some  one  candidate,  it 
is  on  account  of  something  which  personally  distin- 
guishes that  candidate  from  others  on  the  same  side. 
"Where  there  is  no  overruling  local  influence  in 
favor  of  an  individual,  those  who  would  be  benefited 
as  candidates  by  the  cumulative  vote  would  generally 
be  the  persons  of  greatest  real  or  reputed  virtue  or 
talents." — Thoughts  on  Parliameiitary  Reform,  '2d 
eel,  1859. 

OF  TRUE  AND  FALSE  DEMOCRACY— REPRESENTATION 
OF  ALL,  AND  REPRESENTATION  OF  THE  MAJORITY 
ONLY. 

BY  JOHN   STUART   MILL. 

It  has  been  seen  that  the  dangers  incident  to  a 
representative  democracy  are  of  two  kinds :  danger 
of  a  low  grade  of  intelligence  in  the  representative 
body,  and  in  the  popular  opinion  which  controls  it ; 
and  danger  of  class  legislation  on  the  part  of  the 
numerical  majority,  these  being  all  composed  of  the 
same  class.  We  have  next  to  consider  how  far  it  is 
possible  so  to  organize  the  democracy  as,  without 
interfering  materially  with  the  characteristic  benefits 


SENATE   REPORT.  127 

of  democratic  government,  to  do  away  with  these 
two  great  evils,  or  at  least  to  abate  them  in  the 
utmost  degree  attainable  by  human  contrivance. 

The  common  mode  of  attempting  this  is  by  limit- 
ing the  democratic  character  of  the  representation 
through  a  more  or   less   restricted   suffrage.     But 
there  is  a  previous  consideration  which,  duly  kept 
in   view,  considerably   modifies   the   circumstances 
which   are   supposed   to  render  such  a  restriction 
necessary.     A  completely  equal   democracy,  in   a 
nation  in  which  a  single  class  composes  the  numeri- 
cal majority,  cannot  be  divested  of  certain  evils; 
but  those  evils  are  greatly  aggravated  by  the  fact 
that  the  democracies  which  at  present  exist  are  not 
equal,  but  systematically  unequal  in  favor  of  the 
predominant  class.      Two  very  different  ideas  are 
usually   confounded    under   the    name   democracy. 
The  pure  idea  of  democracy,  according  to  its  defini- 
tion, is  the  government  of  the  whole  people  by  the 
whole  people,  equally  represented.     Democracy,  as 
commonly  conceived  and  hitherto  practiced,  is  the 
government  of  the  whole  people  by  a  mere  majority 
of  the  people,  exclusively  represented.     The  former 
is  synonymous  with  the  equality  of  all  citizens ;  the 
latter,  strangely  confounded  with  it,  is  a  government 
of  privilege  in  favor  of  the  numerical  majority,  who 
alone   possess   practically  any  voice  in   the   State. 
This  is  the  inevitable  consequence  of  the  manner 
in  which  the  votes  are  now  taken,  to  the  complete 
disfranchisement  of  minorities. 

The  confusion  of  ideas  here  is  great,  but  it  is  so 
easily  cleared  up  that  one  would  suppose  the  slightest 
indication  would  be  sufficient  to  place  the  matter  in 


128  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

its  true  light  before  any  mind  of  average  intelli- 
gence. It  would  be  so  but  for  the  power  of  habit, 
owing  to  which,  the  simplest  idea,  if  unfamiliar,  has 
as  great  difficulty  in  making  its  way  to  the  mind  as 
a  far  more  complicated  one.  That  the  minority 
must  yield  to  the  majority,  the  smaller  number  to 
the  greater,  is  a  familiar  idea;  and,  accordingly,  men 
think  there  is  no  necessity  for  using  their  minds  any 
further,  and  it  does  not  occur  to  them  that  there  is 
any  medium  between  allowing  the  smaller  number 
to  be  equally  powerful  with  the  greater,  and  blotting 
out  the  smaller  number  altogether.  In  a  representa- 
tive body  actually  deliberating,  the  minority  must 
of  course  be  overruled ;  and  in  an  equal  democracy 
(since  the  opinions  of  the  constituents,  when  they 
insist  on  them,  determine  those  of  the  representa- 
tive body),  the  majority  of  the  people,  through  their 
representatives,  will  outvote  and  prevail  over  the 
minority  and  their  representatives.  But  does  it 
follow  that  the  minority  should  have  no  representa- 
tives at  all  ?  Because  the  majority  ought  to  prevail 
over  the  minority,  must  the  majority  have  all  the 
votes,  the  minority  none  ?  Is  it  necessary  that  the 
minority  should  not  even  be  heard  ?  Nothing  but 
habit  and  old  association  can  reconcile  any  reasona- 
ble being  to  the  needless  injustice.  In  a  really 
equal  democracy  every  or  any  section  would  be  rep- 
resented, not  disproportionately,  but  proportionately. 
A  majority  of  the  electors  would  always  have  a 
majority  of  the  representatives,  but  a  minority  of 
the  electors  would  always  have  a  minority  of  the 
representatives.  Man  for  man  they  would  be  as 
fully  represented  as  the  majority.     Unless  they  are, 


SENATE   REPORT.  129 

there  is  not  equal  government,  but  a  government  of 
inequality  and  privilege.  One  part  of  the  people 
rule  over  the  rest.  There  is  a  part  whose  fair  and 
equal  share  of  influence  in  the  representation  is 
withheld  from  them,  contrary  to  all  just  government, 
but,  above  all,  contrary  to  the  principle  of  democ- 
racy, which  professes  equality  as  its  very  root  and 
foundation. 

The  injustice  and  violation  of  principle  are  not 
less  flagrant  because  those  who  suffer  by  them  are  a 
minority;  for  there  is  not  equal  suffrage  where 
every  single  individual  does  not  count  for  as  much 
as  any  other  single  individual  in  the  community. 
But  it  is  not  only  the  minority  who  suffer.  De- 
mocracy thus  constituted  does  not  even  attain  its 
ostensible  object — that  of  giving  the  powers  of 
government,  in  all  cases,  to  the  numerical  majority. 
It  does  something  very  different ;  it  gives  them  to  a 
majority  of  the  majority,  who  may  be,  and  often 
are,  but  a  minority  of  the  whole.  All  principles 
are  most  effectually  tested  by  extreme  cases.  Sup- 
pose then  that,  in  a  country  governed  by  equal  and 
universal  suffrage,  there  is  a  contested  election  in 
every  constituency,  and  every  election  is  carried  by 
a  small  majority ;  the  parliament  thus  brought 
together  represents  little  more  than  a  bare  majority 
of  the  people.  This  parliament  proceeds  to  legislate, 
and  adopts  important  measures  by  a  bare  majority 
of  itself;  what  guarantee  is  there  that  these  mea- 
sures accord  with  the  wishes  of  a  majority  of  the 
people  ?  Nearly  half  the  electors,  having  been  out- 
voted at  the  hustings,  have  had  no  influence  at  all 
in  the  decision ;  and  the  whole  of  these  may  be,  a 


130  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

majority  of  them  probably  are,  hostile  to  the  mea- 
sures, having  voted  against  those  by  whom  they 
have  been  carried.  Of  the  remaining  electors, 
nearly  half  have  chosen  representatives  who,  by 
supposition,  have  voted  against  the  measures.  It  is 
possible,  therefore,  and  even  probable,  that  the 
opinion  which  has  prevailed  was  agreeable  only  to 
a  minority  of  the  nation,  though  a  majority  of  that 
portion  of  it  whom  the  institutions  of  the  country 
have  erected  into  a  ruling  class.  If  democracy 
means  the  certain  ascendency  of  the  majority,  there 
are  no  means  of  insuring  that  but  by  allowing  every 
individual  figure  to  tell  equally  in  the  summing  up. 
Any  minority  left  out,  either  purposely  or  by  the 
play  of  the  machinery,  gives  the  power  not  to  a 
majority  but  to  a  minority  in  some  other  part  of 
the  scale. 

The  only  answer  which  can  possibly  be  made  to 
this  reasoning  is,  that  as  different  opinions  predomi- 
nate in  different  localities,  the  opinion  which  is  in  a 
minority  in  some  places  has  a  majority  in  others ; 
and,  on  the  whole,  every  opinion  which  exists  in  the 
constituencies  obtains  its  fair  share  of  voices  in  the 
representation.  And  this  is  roughly  true  in  the 
present  state  of  the  constituency.  If  it  were  not, 
the  discordance  of  the  house  with  the  general  senti- 
ment of  the  country  would  soon  become  evident. 
But  it  would  be  no  longer  true  if  the  present  con- 
stituency were  much  enlarged ;  still  less  if  made  co- 
extensive with  the  whole  population ;  for  in  that 
case  the  majority  in  every  locality  would  consist  of 
manual  laborers ;  and  when  there  was  any  question 
pending  on  which  these  classes  were  at  issue  with 


SENATE   REPORT.  131 

the  rest  of  the  community,  no  other  classes  could 
succeed  in  getting  represented  anywhere.  Even 
now,  is  it  not  a  great  grievance  that  in  every  parlia- 
ment a  very  numerous  portion  of  the  electors,  will- 
ing and  anxious  to  be  represented,  have  no  member 
in  the  house  for  whom  they  have  voted  ?  Is  it  just 
that  every  elector  of  Marylebone  is  obliged  to  be 
represented  by  two  nominees  of  the  vestries,  every 
elector  of  Finsbury  or  Lambeth  by  those  (as  is  gen- 
erally believed)  of  the  publicans  ?  The  constituen- 
cies to  which  most  of  the  highly  educated  and 
public-spirited  persons  in  the  country  belong,  those 
of  the  large  towns,  are  now,  in  great  part,  either  un- 
represented or  misrepresented.  The  electors  who 
are  on  a  different  side  in  party  politics  from  the 
local  majority  are-  unrepresented.  Of  those  who 
are  on  the  same  side,  a  large  proportion  are  misrep- 
resented, having  been  obliged  to  accept  the  man 
who  had  the  greatest  number  of  supporters  in  their 
political  party,  though  his  opinions  may  differ  from 
theirs  on  every  other  point.  The  state  of  things  is, 
in  some  respects,  even  worse  than  if  the  minority 
were  not  allowed  to  vote  at  all ;  for  then,  at  least, 
the  majority  might  have  a  member  who  would  rep- 
resent their  own  best  mind,  while  now  the  necessity 
of  not  dividing  the  party  for  fear  of  letting  in  its 
opponents,  induces  all  to  vote  either  for  the  person 
who  first  presents  himself  wearing  their  colors,  or 
for  the  one  brought  forward  by  their  local  leaders, 
and  these,  if  we  pay  them  the  compliment  which 
they  very  seldom  deserve,  of  supposing  their  choice 
to  be  unbiased  by  their  personal  interests,  are  com- 
pelled, that  they  may  be  sure  of  mustering  their 


132  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

whole  strength,  to  bring  forward  a  candidate  whcm 
none  of  the  party  will  strongly  object  to — that  is,  a 
man  without  any  distinctive  peculiarity,  any  known 
opinions  except  the  shibboleth  of  the  party.  This 
is  strikingly  exemplified  in  the  United  States, 
where,  at  the  election  of  President,  the  strongest 
party  never  dares  put  forward  any  of  its  strongest 
men,  because  every  one  of  these,  from  the  mere  fact 
that  he  has  been  long  in  the  public  eye,  has  made 
himself  objectionable  to  some  portion  or  other  of  the 
party,  and  is  therefore  not  so  sure  a  card  for  rally- 
ing all  their  votes  as  a  person  who  has  never  been 
heard  of  by  the  public  at  all  until  he  is  produced  as 
the  candidate.  Thus  the  man  who  is  chosen,  even 
by  the  strongest  party,  represents  perhaps  the  real 
wishes  only  of  the  narrow  margin  by  which  that 
jmrty  outnumbers  the  other.  Any  section  whose 
support  is  necessary  to  success  possesses  a  veto  on 
the  candidate.  Any  section  which  holds  out  more 
obstinately  than  the  rest  can  compel  all  the  others 
to  adopt  its  nominee ;  and  this  superior  pertinacity 
is,  unhappily,  more  likely  to  be  found  among  those 
who  are  holding  out  for  their  own  interest  than  for 
that  of  the  public.  Speaking  generally,  the  choice 
of  the  majority  is  determined  by  that  portion  of  the 
body  who  are  the  most  timid,  the  most  narrow- 
minded,  and  prejudiced,  or  who  cling  most  tena- 
ciously to  the  exclusive  class  interest,  and  the  elec- 
toral rights  of  the  minority,  while  useless  for  the 
purposes  for  which  votes  are  given,  serve  only  for 
compelling  the  majority  to  accept  the  candidate  of 
the  weakest  or  worst  portion  of  themselves. 

That  while  recognizing  these  evils  many  should 


SENATE   REPORT.  133 

consider  them  as  the  necessary  price  paid  for  a  free 
government  is  in  no  way  surprising.  It  was  the 
opinion  of  all  the  friends  of  freedom  up  to  a  recent 
period;  but  the  habit  of  passing  them  over  as  ir- 
remediable has  become  so  inveterate  that  many  per- 
sons seem  to  have  lost  the  capacity  of  looking  at 
them  as  things  which  they  would  be  glad  to  remedy 
if  they  could.  From  despairing  of  a  cure  there  is 
too  often  but  one  step  to  denying  the  disease,  and 
from  this  follows  dislike  to  having  a  remedy  pro- 
posed, as  if  the  proposer  were  creating  a  mischief 
instead  of  offering  relief  from  one.  People  are  so 
inured  to  the  evils  that  they  feel  as  if  it  were  un- 
reasonable, if  not  wrong,  to  complain  of  them.  Yet, 
avoidable  or  not,  he  must  be  a  purblind  lover  of 
liberty,  on  whose  mind  they  do  not  weigh,  who 
would  not  rejoice  at  the  discovery  that  they  could 
be  dispensed  with.  Now  nothing  is  more  certain 
than  that  the  virtual  blotting  out  of  the  minority  is 
no  necessary  or  natural  consequence  of  freedom ; 
that,  far  from  having  any  connection  with  democ- 
racy, it  is  diametrically  opposed  to  the  first  j^rinciple 
of  democracy — representation  in  proportion  to  num- 
bers. It  is  an  essential  part  of  democracy  that  mi- 
norities should  be  adequately  represented.  No  real 
democracy,  nothing  but  a  false  show  of  democracy, 
is  possible  without  it. 

Those  who  have  seen  and  felt,  in  some  degree, 
the  force  of  these  considerations  have  proposed  va- 
rious expedients  by  which  the  evil  may  be,  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree,  mitigated.  Lord  John  Rus- 
sell, in  one  of  his  reform  bills,  introduced  a  provis- 
ion that  certain  constituencies  should  return  three 


134  PKOPORTIONAL   KEPEESENTATION. 

members,  and  that  in  these  each  elector  should  be 
allowed  to  vote  only  for  two ;  and  Mr.  Disraeli,  in 
the  recent  debates,  revived  the  memory  of  the  fact 
by  reproaching  him  for  it — being  of  opinion,  ap- 
parently, that  it  befits  a  conservative  statesman  to 
regard  only  means,  and  to  disown  scornfully  all  fel- 
low-feeling with  any  one  who  is  betrayed,  even  once, 
into  thinking  of  ends.  Others  have  proposed  that 
each  elector  should  be  allowed  to  vote  only  for  one. 
By  either  of  these  plans  a  minority  equalling  or  ex- 
ceeding a  third  of  the  local  constituency  would  be 
able,  if  it  attempted  no  more,  to  return  one  out  of 
three  members.  The  same  result  might  be  attained 
in  a  still  better  wray  if,  as  proposed  in  an  able  pam- 
phlet by  Mr.  James  Garth  Marshall,  the  elector  re- 
tained his  three  votes,  but  was  at  liberty  to  bestow 
them  all  upon  the  same  candidate. 

[The  author  proceeds  to  state  his  preference  for  the  plan  of 
personal  representation  propounded  by  Mr.  Hare,  over  other 
plans  of  reform,  as  more  effectual  and  complete,  as  securing 
more  fully  the  objects  and  avoiding  the  mischiefs  mentioned  in 
his  preceding  remarks.  He  expresses  regret,  however,  that 
none  of  those  other  plans  had  "  been  carried  into  effect,  as  any 
of  them  would  have  recognized  the  right  principle  and  prepared 
the  way  for  its  more  complete  application." 

His  preference  for  personal  representation  arises  from  the 
fact  that  it  would  provide  for  all  local  minorities  of  less  than  a 
third  in  a  constituency,  and  for  all  minorities  made  up  from 
several  constituencies.  His  views  appear  to  be,  to  some  extent, 
affected  by  the  peculiar  character  of  British  districts,  and  the 
absence  of  great  State  organizations  in  the  kingdom  affording 
free  play  for  the  cumulative  vote.  As  personal  representation 
is  a  question  not  proposed  for  examination  in  the  present 
report,  or  for  exposition  in  the  papers  which  accompany  it,  his 
remarks   upon  it  are  here  omitted.     But  two  additional   ex- 


SENATE   REPORT.  135 

tracts,  relating  to  general  considerations  connected  with  reform 
in  representation,  are  added  below.] 

The  natural  tendency  of  representative  govern- 
ment, as  of  modern  civilization,  is  toward  collective 
mediocrity;  and  this  tendency  is  increased  by  all 
reductions  and  extensions  of  the  franchise,  their 
effect  being  to  place  the  principal  power  in  the 
hands  of  classes  more  and  more  below  the  highest 
level  of  instruction  in  the  community.  But,  though 
the  superior  intellects  and  characters  will  necessarily 
be  outnumbered,  it  makes  a  great  difference  whether 
or  not  they  are  heard.  In  the  false  democracy 
which,  instead  of  giving  representation  to  all,  gives 
it  only  to  the  local  majorities,  the  voice  of  the  in- 
structed minority  may  have  no  organs  at  all  in  the 
representative  body.  ...  In  the  American  democ- 
racy, which  is  constructed  on  this  faulty  model,  the 
highly-cultivated  members  of  the  community,  ex- 
cept such  of  them  as  are  willing  to  sacrifice  their 
own  opinions  and  modes  of  judgment  and  become 
the  servile  mouthpieces  of  their  inferiors  in  know- 
ledge, do  not  even  offer  themselves  for  Congress  or 
the  State  legislatures,  so  certain  is  it  that  they  would 
have  no  chance  of  being  returned.  ...  In  every 
government  there  is  some  power  stronger  than  all 
the  rest,  and  the  power  which  is  strongest  tends 
perpetually  to  become  the  sole  power.  Partly  by 
intention  and  partly  unconsciously  it  is  ever  striv- 
ing to  make  all  other  things  bend  to  itself,  and  is 
not  content  while  there  is  anything  which  makes 
permanent  head  against  it — any  influence  not  in 
agreement  with  its  spirit.  Yet,  if  it  succeeds  in 
suppressing  all  rival  influences,  and  moulding  every- 


136  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

thing  after  its  own  model,  improvement  in  that 
country  is  at  an  end,  and  decline  commences.  Hu- 
man improvement  is  a  product  of  many  factors,  and 
no  power  ever  yet  constituted  among  mankind  in- 
cludes them  all.  Even  the  most  beneficent  power 
only  contains  in  itself  some  of  the  requisites  of 
good,  and  the  remainder,  if  progress  is  to  continue, 
must  be  derived  from  some  other  source.  No  com- 
munity has  ever  long  continued  progressive  but 
while  a  conflict  was  going  on  between  the  strongest 
power  in  the  community  and  some  rival  power — 
between  the  spiritual  and  temporal  authorities,  the 
military  or  territorial  and  the  industrious  classes, 
the  king  and  the  people,  the  orthodox  and  religious 
reformers.  When  the  victory  on  either  side  was  so 
complete  as  to  put  an  end  to  the  strife,  and  no  other 
conflict  took  its  place,  first  stagnation  followed,  and 
then  decay.  The  ascendency  of  the  numerical 
majority  is  less  unjust  and,  on  the  whole,  less  mis- 
chievous than  many  others,  but  it  is  attended  with 
the  very  same  kind  of  dangers,  and  even  more  cer- 
tainly, for  when  the  government  is  in  the  hands  of 
one  or  a  few,  the  many  are  always  existent  as  a  rival 
power  which  may  not  be  strong  enough  ever  to  con- 
trol the  other,  but  whose  opinion  and  sentiment  are 
a  moral  and  even  a  social  support  to  all  who,  either 
from  conviction  or  contrariety  of  interests,  are  op- 
posed to  any  of  the  tendencies  of  the  ruling  author- 
ity. But  when  the  democracy  is  supreme  there  is 
no  one  or  few  strong  enough  for  dissentient  opinions 
and  injured  or  menaced  interests  to  lean  upon.  The 
great  difficulty  of  democratic  government  has  hith- 
erto seemed  to  be  how  to  provide,  in  a  democratic 


SENATE   REPORT.  137 

society,  what  circumstances  have  provided  hitherto 
in  all  the  societies  which  have  maintained  them- 
selves ahead  of  others — a  social  support,  a  point 
dJappui  for  individual  resistance  to  the  tendencies 
of  the  ruling  power,  a  protection,  a  rallying  point 
for  opinions  and  interests  which  the  ascendant  pub- 
lic opinion  views  with  disfavor.  For  want  of  such 
a  point  oVappui  the  older  societies,  and  all  but  a 
few  modern  ones,  either  fell  into  dissolution  or  be- 
came stationary  (which  means  slow  deterioration) 
through  the  exclusive  predominance  of  a  part  only 
of  the  conditions  of  social  and  mental  well-being. 
.  .  .  The  only  quarter  in  which  to  look  for  a  sup- 
plement, or  completing  corrective  to  the  instincts 
of  a  democratic  majority,  is  the  instructed  minority, 
but  in  the  ordinary  mode  of  constituting  democ- 
racy this  minority  has  no  organ. — Considerations  on 
Representative  Government,  chapter  vii.,  Harper's 
Edition,  1862. 

[March  2, 1869,  the  foregoing  Report  (with  Appendix)  upon 
being  presented  to  the  Senate  was  ordered  to  be  printed.  The 
following  day  it  was  further  ordered  that  2000  additional  copies 
should  be  printed  for  the  use  of  the  Senate.  Two  editions  of 
it  were  subsequently  published  by  the  Personal  Representation 
Society  of  Chicago,  for  distribution  at  home  and  abroad.] 


foinv 


AN    ADDRESS 


ON 


PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION  BY  THE  FREE  VOTE. 

DELIVEKED    BEFOKE    THE    SOCIAL    SCIENCE    ASSOCIA- 
TION, PHILADELPHIA, 

TUESDAY   EVENING,  OCT.  25,  1870. 


Gentlemen  of  the  Association : — I  desire  my  re- 
marks to-night  to  be  understood  as  made  in  con- 
tinuation of  what  was  said  and  written  by  me  on 
former  occasions  on  the  subject  of  Electoral  Reform. 
In  a  speech  in  this  city  on  the  19th  of  November, 
1867,  in  a  speech  in  the  Senate  on  the  11th  of  July 
of  the  same  year,  and  in  a  report  from  the  Senate 
Committee  on  representative  reform,  2d  of  March, 
1869,  I  discussed  the  Free  Vote  in  its  proposed  ap- 
plication to  Federal  Elections  and  stated  the  general 
arguments  in  favor  of  its  adoption.  I  do  not  pro- 
pose to  go  over  again  the  ground  covered  by  those 
speeches  and  by  that  report,  but  to  present  addi- 
tional views,  the  product  of  further  reflection  upon 
this  question  of  reform,  and  to  mention  the  steps 
which  have  been  taken  in  this  State  and  in  other 
States,  looking  toward  the  submitting  of  the  plan 
of  reformed  voting  to  practice. 

138 


SOCIAL   SCIENCE   ADDKESS.  139 

THE  FREE  VOTE. 

The  Free  Vote  may  be  applied  to  elections  when- 
ever two  or  more  persons  are  to  be  chosen  together 
to  the  same  office  for  the  same  term  of  service,  and 
it  consists  in  allowing  the  voter  to  distribute  his 
votes  among  candidates  as  he  shall  think  fit,  or  to 
concentrate  them  upon  one.  It  is  here  assumed 
that  the  voter  shall  have  the  same  number  of  votes 
as  the  number  of  persons  to  be  chosen,  and  that  the 
candidates  highest  in  vote  shall  be  declared  elected. 

ITS  EFFECT  ON  SINGLE  ELECTIONS. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  free  vote  is  inappli- 
cable to  the  election  of  a  single  person ;  it  can  be 
applied  only  where  two  or  more  are  to  be  chosen. 
But  it  will  be  a  great  mistake  to  assume  that  it  will 
have  no  effect  upon  single  elections  because  it  can- 
not be  applied  to  them  in  form  and  directly.  Due 
reflection  and  a  careful  examination  of  the  subject 
will  convince  any  intelligent  man — any  man  well 
acquainted  with  the  practical  workings  of  our  politi- 
cal system — that  while  its  direct  operation  must  be 
confined  to  plural  elections  its  indirect  effects  upon 
single  ones  will  be  very  great,  and  very  salutary 
also,  whenever  it  shall  come  to  be  established.  For 
the  advocates  of  the  new  plan  assert  with  confidence 
and  upon  fair  grounds  of  reason,  that  it  will  secure 
absolutely  to  political  parties  their  just  representa- 
tion in  all  ordinary  cases  of  Presidential,  Congres- 
sional, Legislative  and  other  elections  to  which  it 
shall  be  applied,  and  will  therefore  greatly  weaken 
the  tendency  toward  violent  and  corrupt  party  ac- 
tion in  the  elections  to  which  it  shall  not  apply. 


140  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

The  election  of  Governor  in  a  State  is  mainly  in- 
teresting because  of  the  influence  which  the  result 
will  exert  upon  the  next  elections  in  the  State  for 
Presidential  electors,  members  of  Congress  and 
members  of  the  Legislature ;  such  an  election  is 
hotly  contested,  money  is  expended  upon  it  and  all 
possible  means  to  control  it  brought  into  active  play, 
because  elections  which  are  to  follow  will  be  power- 
fully influenced  if  not  determined  by  the  issue  of 
the  contest.  In  like  manner  and  for  the  same  rea- 
son other  elections  of  single  officers  are  assailed  by 
evil  influences  and  become  degraded  and  of  evil  re- 
port. In  my  opinion,  our  remedy,  and  a  very  effect- 
ual one,  will  be  to  make  all  our  Congressional  and 
Legislative  elections  plural  and  then  apply  to  them 
and  to  Presidential  elections  the  free  vote  or  some 
other  device  by  which  just  representation  of  the 
people  shall  be  secured.  Then  Gubernatorial  and 
other  single  elections  will  be  purified  and  improved  ; 
they  will  no  longer  exert  any  considerable,  much 
less  controlling,  influence  upon  Federal  or  Legisla- 
tive elections  and  will  not  therefore  invite  or  pro- 
voke those  corrupt  and  evil  influences  by  which 
they  are  now  assailed. 

ITS  OBJECTS— JUST   REPRESENTATION  ANP  PURE  ELEC- 
TIONS. 

Two  capital  objects  are  sought  to  be  accomplished 
by  the  free  vote  considered  as  an  instrument  of  re- 
form :  First,  the  just  representation  of  the  people 
in  government,  and  Second,  the  purification  of  popu- 
lar elections. 

How  to  secure  the  proportional  representation  of 


SOCIAL   SCIENCE   ADDRESS.  141 

political  parties  or  interests  in  government  is  cer- 
tainly a  question  of  high  importance,  and  we  have 
reason  to  rejoice  that  it  is  now  receiving  earnest  at- 
tention in  our  own  country  and  in  Europe.  We 
must  all  agree  that  the  majority  vote — as  I  shall  call 
the  old  plan  to  which  we  have  been  accustomed — is 
both  insufficient  and  unjust  in  the  case  of  many 
elections  to  which  it  is  applied,  and  that  in  un- 
checked operation  it  is  positively  pernicious  and 
hurtful.  Observe,  I  am  not  speaking  of  the  ma- 
jority or  plurality  rule  of  elections  which  in  its 
proper  application  to  returns  is  a  necessity,  but  of 
the  majority  vote,  of  that  instrument  of  oppression 
by  which  government  is  made  unsatisfactory  because 
it  is  made  unjust.  The  law  has  said  to  the  citizen, 
"  You  shall  distribute  your  votes  singly  among  can- 
didates although  by  doing  so  you  will  lose  them  all 
and  stand  deprived  of  all  voice  in  the  government. 
You  and  your  neighbor  shall  be  made  to  struggle 
constantly,  each  to  deprive  the  other  of  his  equita- 
ble right  in  the  very  attempt  to  maintain  his  own. 
And  if  you  shall  not  choose  to  vote  in  this  exact 
manner  and  to  grasp  at  more  than  belongs  to  you, 
you  shall  not  vote  at  all ;  you  shall  stand  aside  dis- 
franchised and  ignored."  No  wonder  that  our  peo- 
ple, instructed  by  experience  and  scourged  by  many 
evils,  are  beginning  to  complain  of  the  law  and  to 
inquire  whether  there  is  not  some  possible  remedy 
for  electoral  injustice — some  plan  of  amendment  by 
which  all  the  people  can  have  their  votes  counted 
and  obtain  by  them  appropriate  power  and  influence 
in  the  government. 

Yes,  there  are  remedies  for  this  injustice,  and  one 


142      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

of  them  I  advocate  to-night ;  a  remedy  convenient 
of  application  and  effectual  for  all  our  purposes  of 
reform.  But  it  is  not  proposed  in  antagonism  to 
other  plans  of  reform,  nor  as  a  finality  in  the  art  of 
government.  It  may  stand  simply  for  what  it  is — 
a  good,  useful,  workable  plan  for  the  improvement 
of  elections  and  for  securing  justice  to  the  whole 
body  of  our  electoral  population. 

The  second  great  object  of  reformed  voting — the 
purification  of  elections — invites  to  a  more  elaborate 
exposition  of  an  existing  evil  and  of  the  remedial 
character  of  the  new  plan,  than  my  space  and  time 
will  permit ;  but  I  cannot  pass  it  wholly  unnoticed. 
Certainly  when  you  shall  cheapen  elections  by 
taking  away  the  motive  or  the  main  motive  for 
spending  money  upon  them,  you  will  purify  them 
also.  They  will  be  cleansed  and  elevated  in  charac- 
ter by  being  made  cheap  and  inexpensive  to  parties 
and  candidates  who  are  now  compelled  to  expend 
money  upon  them  profusely  as  the  indispensable 
condition  of  success.  Now  beyond  all  question  the 
free  vote  will  cheapen  elections.  It  will  take  away 
from  parties  almost  entirely  two  powerful  motives 
which  now  operate  upon  them — a  greed  for  unjust 
representation  and  a  fear  of  unjust  disfranchisement 
— by  the  conjoint  operation  of  which  desperate  and 
expensive  struggles  are  produced.  When  a  party 
shall  be  made  secure  in  its  just  representation  by  its 
oxen  votes  it  need  not  buy  a  majority  in  the  corrup- 
tion market  as  a  measure  of  necessary  defence. 
When  it  cannot  by  the  aid  of  corrupt  votes  rob  the 
opposite  party  and  take  to  itself  more  than  its  just 


SOCIAL   SCIENCE   ADDRESS.  143 

share  of  representative  power,  it  will  become  frugal 
in  its  expenditures  and  honorable  in  its  conduct. 
Thus  the  free  vote  destroys  or  checks  corruption  by 
taking  away  the  motives  which  produce  it,  and  in 
this  respect  vindicates  itself  as  a  most  powerful  in- 
strument of  moral  improvement  and  progress. 

THE  APPLICATION  OF  THE  FREE  VOTE. 

The  free  vote  is  proposed  for  application  to  the 
following  elections : 

1.  To  the  choice  of  Electors  of  President  and 
Vice-President  of  the  United  States. 

2.  To  the  choice  of  members  of  Congress. 

3.  To  the  choice  of  Senators  and  Representatives 
to  the  Legislatures  of  the  several  States. 

In  Pennsylvania  it  should  be  further  applied  to 
the  election  of  the  following  officers : 

1.  Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court. 

2.  Law  Judges  of  all  Common  Pleas  and  District 
Courts  composed  of  more  than  one  Law  Judge. 

3.  Associate  Judges  of  Counties. 

4.  Aldermen  and  Justices  of  the  Peace  in  wards, 
boroughs,  and  townships. 

5.  County  Commissioners  and  County  Auditors. 

6.  Directors  for  the  Poor  for  counties  or  for  Poor 
districts  whenever  their  election  shall  be  authorized. 

7.  Councilmen  of  cities  and  boroughs. 

8.  Assessors  of  taxes  whenever   two  are   to    be 
chosen,  and  Assistant  Assessors  triennially. 

9.  Constables  whenever  two  are  to  be  chosen. 

10.  Supervisors  of  Roads  and  Overseers  of  the 
Poor  in  townships. 

11.  Borough  and  Township  Auditors. 


144  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

12.  Directors  and  Controllers  of  Common  Schools 
in  all  the  School  Districts  of  the  Commonwealth. 

The  new  plan  should  also  be  applied  throughout 
the  country  to  stockholder  elections  for  the  choice 
of  officers  of  incorporated  companies.  One  of  the 
amendments  to  the  Illinois  constitution,  adopted  in 
July  last,  provides,  that  in  all  elections  in  that  State 
for  directors  or  managers  of  incorporated  com- 
panies the  free  vote  shall  be  allowed,  so  that  stock- 
holder minorities  in  such  companies  may  always  be 
represented  in  their  management,  and  abuse  and 
wrong  be  detected  or  prevented.  And  all  corpora- 
tions require  and  should  have  this  fundamental  and 
most  salutary  check  in  their  constitution. 

But  there  is  still  another  application  of  the  free 
vote,  heretofore  unnoticed,  which  I  believe  to  be  in 
the  highest  degree  important ;  I  mean  its  application 
to  primary  elections  or  to  the  nomination  of  candi- 
dates. In  fact  when  reform  shall  have  accomplished 
its  work  in  the  legal  elections  and  shall  have  invigo- 
rated and  purified  them,  it  will  be  required  more 
than  ever  in  the  primary  ones.  For  as  all  nomi- 
nated candidates  will  commonly  be  elected  under 
the  new  plan,  their  nomination  must  be  made  upon 
sound  principles  and  with  all  possible  guards  against 
corruption  and  abuse.  But  here  it  is  evident  that 
the  same  remedy  which  will  improve  the  one  class 
of  elections  can  be  used  to  improve  the  other  also ; 
in  other  words,  that  the  free  vote  can  often  be 
applied  directly  to  the  nomination  of  candidates 
and  always  to  the  choice  of  delegates  to  nominating 
bodies.  Give  it  such  application  freely,  to  the  full- 
est possible  extent,  and  you  will  find  that  you  have 


SOCIAL   SCIENCE   ADDRESS.  145 

reached  and  mastered  the  ultimate  difficulty  in  the 
way  of  electoral  reform. 

CONCERNING  THE  USE  OF  FRACTIONAL  VOTES— THEIR 
UTILITY  AND  CONVENIENCE. 

In  the  Bloomsburg  act  fractional  votes  are  allowed 
when  three,  four,  or  six  persons  are  to  be  chosen, 
and  they  may  be  allowed  with  advantage  in  other 
cases.  Most  commonly  they  will  be  convenient  and 
desirable  to  majorities  rather  than  minorities,  and 
there  can  be  no  question  that  their  allowance  will 
popularize  the  free  vote,  render  its  reformatory  ac- 
tion more  effectual  and  facilitate  its  extension  gene- 
rally to  popular  and  corporate  elections.  Fractional 
votes  have  been  used  with  approval  many  times  in 
recent  local  elections  in  Pennsylvania,  they  have 
also  been  used  in  national  political  conventions  for 
the  nomination  of  candidates  for  President  and 
Vice-President  of  the  United  States,  and  their  use 
will  be  found  essential  to  the  smooth  working  of 
representative  elections  under  the  amended  constitu- 
tion of  Illinois.  It  is  evident  that  when  a  voter  has 
three  votes  and  shall  desire  to  bestow  them  equally 
upon  two  candidates,  he  must  divide  one  of  his 
votes ;  in  other  words,  in  order  to  give  one  vote  and 
a  half  to  each  of  two  candidates  he  must  break  one 
of  his  votes  into  two  equal  fractions.  When  four 
persons  are  to  be  chosen  and  the  majority  of  the 
voters  shall  desire  to  vote  for  three  candidates,  (giv- 
ing an  equal  support  to  each,)  fractions  of  one-third 
should  be  created;  that  is,  each  majority  voter 
should   divide  one   of  his  votes  into   three   equal 

parts,  so  that  he  can  give  one  vote  and  one-third  to 
10 


146  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

each  of  the  three  candidates.  And  when  six  per- 
sons are  to  be  chosen  and  the  voter  shall  desire  to 
vote  for  four,  he  must  (in  order  to  render  them  an 
equal  support)  divide  two  of  his  votes  into  four 
halves  and  give  one  vote  and  a  half  to  each  of  the 
four  candidates  he  votes  for. 

Some  other  numbers  involved  in  elections  are 
less  adapted  than  the  numbers  three,  four,  and  six 
for  the  application  of  fractional  voting ;  but  many 
others  are  as  much  so,  and  nearly  all  admit  of  such 
application  to  a  useful  extent.  For  instance,  the 
number  five  admits  of  the  giving  of  two  and  a  half 
votes  to  each  of  two  candidates,  or  one  and  one- 
fourth  to  each  of  four ;  and  the  number  nine  admits 
of  one  and  a  half  votes  to  each  of  six  candidates,  or 
two  and  one-fourth  to  each  of  four.  But  as  it  seems 
necessary  or  highly  desirable  on  grounds  of  conve- 
nience to  avoid  fractions  of  which  the  numerator 
exceeds  unity  or  one,  we  cannot  very  well  divide 
five  votes  equally  among  three  candidates,  nor  seven 
among  five,  etc.  There  is,  however,  more  than  one 
resource  in  such  cases  of  difficulty.  Terms  of  offi- 
cial service  may  be  arranged  with  reference  to  the 
new  plan  of  voting,  or  the  body  of  electors  in  a 
State  or  district,  united  by  party  association,  may 
divide  themselves  for  the  purpose  of  casting  votes. 
Take  the  case  of  a  court  of  five  judges,  chosen  for 
ten-year  terms :  Instead  of  electing  them  all  together 
it  would  be  well  to  elect  a  part  of  tfiem  every  fifth 
year,  say  two  at  one  time  and  three  at  another,  and 
so  on  at  successive  quinquennial  elections.  And  so 
to  a  court  of  seven  judges,  four  might  be  chosen  at 
one  time  and  three  at  another.     Again,  take  the 


SOCIAL   SCIENCE    ADDRESS.  147 

case  of  a  State  entitled  to  eight  members  of  Con- 
gress in  which  the  political  majority  is  entitled,  by 
its  numbers,  to  elect  five.  In  a  party  convention  or 
by  a  State  committee  it  might  be  easily  arranged 
that  while  the  great  mass  or  principal  part  of  the 
majority  voters  of  the  State  should  vote  for  four 
candidates,  (giving  two  votes  to  each,)  a  district  con- 
taining one-fifth  of  their  strength  should  be  set  off 
or  set  apart  in  which  the  voters  of  the  party  should 
give  all  their  votes  to  one  candidate.  And  so  in 
Pennsylvania,  entitled  to  twenty-four  members  of 
Congress,  and  where  political  parties  are  nearly 
equal  in  strength,  either  party  that  supposed  itself 
in  the  majority  could  vote  for  a  thirteenth  member 
by  a  district  vote,  while  the  general  mass  of  its 
voters  in  the  State  would  vote  for  twelve.  No  law 
would  be  necessary  to  authorize  these  and  other  like 
arrangements ;  they  would  be  made  by  the  volun- 
tary action  of  parties  whenever  their  expediency 
became  evident. 

In  fact,  by  the  means  mentioned,  and  by  others, 
the  use  of  fractional  votes  can  be  dispensed  with 
altogether  in  our  plan  of  electoral  reform,  and  whole 
votes  alone  retained.  But  I  would  not  dispense 
with  them  in  all  cases,  but  would  authorize  them 
whenever  their  utility  should  be  evident  and  their 
inconvenience  slight.  At  present  I  am  prepared  to 
say  that  I  would  allow  fractional  votes  of  one-half, 
one-third,  or  one-fourth,  whenever  their  use  shall 
be  necessary  to  enable  voters  to  give  an  equal  sup- 
port to  the  candidates  they  vote  for  under  the  new 
plan. 

The  counting  of  fractions  in  making  up  election 


148  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

returns  is  a  very  simple  performance  as  shown  at 
recent  elections  in  this  State.  Fractions  being  al- 
ways attached  to  whole  votes  on  the  tickets  may 
even  be  disregarded  in  scoring  down  votes  upon  the 
tally-paper  and  be  added  at  the  end  of  the  score. 
For  instance,  when  two  candidates  have  been  voted 
for  as  follows : 

John  Jones,  1$  votes, 
William  Brown,  lh  votes, 
the  first  ticket  drawn  from  the  box  may  be  copied 
upon  the  tally-paper,  (omitting  the  word  "  votes,") 
and  then  that  and  succeeding  tickets  marked  down 
in  scores  of  five  toward  the  right  according  to  the 
common  practice.  To  the  sum  of  the  scores  for  a 
candidate  fifty  per  centum  will  be  added  at  the  end 
of  the  line.  Thus  if  80  such  tickets  have  been 
voted,  the  count  for  each  candidate  will  be  carried 
out — 80  +  40  =  120  votes.  In  this  case  the 
figures  "  1  h  "  attached  to  a  candidate's  name  become 
a  sign  of  value  for  the  strokes  which  follow,  and 
may  be  conveniently  enclosed  in  a  circle  with  a  pen. 
If  whole  votes  alone  shall  be  voted  on  other  tickets 
for  the  same  candidate,  they  should  be  scored  on  a 
separate  line  above  or  below  the  other  and  be  car- 
ried out  and  added  at  the  proper  place  on  the  right. 

THE  FILLING  OF  VACANCIES. 

Upon  a  careful  reading  of  speeches  made  by  John 
Bright  in  1867,  at  Manchester,  at  Birmingham,  and 
in  the  House  of  Commons,  in  hostility  to  cumula- 
tive voting  and  to  the  limited  vote  as  embodied  in 
the  Cairns  amendment  to  the  Keform  Bill,  I  became 
thoroughly  convinced  of  the  utter  weakness  of  all 


SOCIAL   SCIENCE   ADDRESS.  149 

possible  objections  to  minority  representation,  (as  it 
was  then  called.)  A  first-class  man,  laboring  with 
great  earnestness  on  repeated  occasions,  was  unable 
to  make  good  a  single  objection  to  reform,  and  was 
compelled  in  the  final  debate  on  the  8th  of  August, 
to  plant  himself  upon  purely  conservative  ground 
and  insist  upon  the  novelty  of  the  proposition  before 
the  House.  So  far  as  I  can  remember,  there  was 
but  one  point  made  by  him  which  reached  the  dig- 
nity of  appearing  plausible,  or  which  seemed  to  call 
for  explanation  or  reply.  That  was  that  the  new 
plans  were  defective  in  regard  to  the  filling  of  va- 
cancies that  might  happen  pending  terms  of  official 
service.  Supposing,  for  instance,  that  the  seat  of  a 
member  of  Parliament  from  a  triangular  district — 
a  district  of  three  members — should  become  vacant 
from  any  cause  pending  his  term,  neither  the  cumu- 
lative or  limited  vote  could  be  applied  at  a  special 
election  to  the  choice  of  his  successor.  I  admit  the 
fact  in  the  case  supposed,  but  I  deny  the  objection 
based  upon  it.  That  objection  is  wholly  miscon- 
ceived and  will  disappear  upon  being  submitted  to 
examination.  Mr.  Bright  did  not  desire  the  third 
member  for  Birmingham  to  be  taken  by  the  Tories, 
and  therefore  opposed  reform ;  but  his  best  point, 
like  all  his  others,  was  unworthy  of  his  genius  and 
his  fame.  Party  interest  misled  him  as  it  has  often 
misled  other  men  of  equal  distinction  and  mental 
power. 

Now  as  the  question  of  filling  casual  vacancies, 
under  reformed  voting,  has  never  been  discussed  in 
this  country,  nor,  so  far  as  I  know,  been  examined 
abroad,  (unless  in  connection  with  schemes  of  repre- 


150  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

sentation  which  do  not  come  within  the  scope  of  my 
present  discourse,)  I  shall  proceed  to  speak  upon  it 
briefly,  and  shall  incidentally  dispose  of  the  Bright 
objection  just  mentioned. 

In  the  first  place  I  have  to  remark  that  if  here- 
after casual  vacancies  shall  be  filled  by  popular  elec- 
tion and  by  the  majority  vote,  we  shall  be  in  no 
worse  condition  than  we  are  now ;  we  shall  simply 
continue,  as  to  such  occasional  election,  the  existing 
rule.  In  the  next  place  it  is  to  be  considered  that 
whenever  two  or  more  vacancies  shall  exist  at  the 
same  time,  the  free  or  limited  vote  can  be  applied  to 
an  election  held  for  the  purpose  of  filling  them. 
Again,  it  is  evident  that  most  vacancies  that  will 
happen,  will  be  of  majority  members  or  officers,  and 
that  the  application  of  the  majority  vote  to  the 
choice  of  successors  will  be  perfectly  proper  and  in 
complete  harmony  with  our  plan  of  reform.  But  I 
will  take  the  comparatively  rare  or  unusual  case  of 
a  minority  vacancy  standing  alone,  or  the  still  rarer 
case  of  two  or  more  such  vacancies  (without  ma- 
jority ones)  existing  at  the  same  time.  How  shall 
such  minority  vacancies  be  filled  ?  I  answer,  they 
can  be  filled  and  filled  properly  either  by  election 
or  appointment.  In  many  if  not  most  cases  ap- 
pointments may  be  made  for  unexjDired  terms,  but 
whenever  possible  in  any  case  an  appointment 
should  be  made  from  among  the  voters  who  shall 
have  voted  for  the  officer  or  person  whose  place  is 
to  be  filled.  As  an  illustration  I  will  read  the  pro- 
vision concerning  the  filling  of  vacancies  contained 
in  the  County  Commissioner  bill  introduced  into  the 
Senate  of  Pennsylvania  at  its  last  session.     After 


SOCIAL   SCIENCE   ADBKESS.  151 

providing  for  the  election  of  three  County  Commis- 
sioners and  three  County  Auditors,  respectively,  for 
three  year  terms,  the  fourth  section  provides  as 
follows : 

"  Sec.  4.  Vacancies  in  the  office  of  County  Com- 
missioner or  County  Auditor  occurring  otherwise 
than  by  the  expiration  of  a  regular  term  of  service, 
or  occasioned  or  continued  by  a  failure  to  elect  under 
this  act,  shall  be  filled  by  appointments  to  be  made 
by  the  Courts  of  Quarter  Sessions  of  the  Peace  of 
the  several  counties  in  which  such  vacancies  shall 
occur,  which  appointments  shall  be  for  the  remain- 
ing part  or  time  of  any  unexpired  term  to  be  filled. 
In  the  filling  of  any  such  vacancy  the  following 
rules  of  selection  shall  be  observed,  to  wit :  First, 
The  appointment  shall  be  made  from  among  the 
qualified  electors  of  the  county  who  shall  have  voted 
for  the  Commissioner  or  Auditor  whose  place  is  to 
be  filled,  and  Second,  The  Judges  of  the  Court  by 
whom  the  appointment  is  to  be  made  shall  receive 
and  consider  any  respectful  petition  from  qualified 
electors  of  the  county  who  shall  have  voted  for  the 
Commissioner  or  Auditor  whose  place  is  to  be  filled, 
and  shall  appoint  such  fit  persons  so  recommended 
as  shall,  in  their  opinion,  be  most  acceptable  to  the 
greater  part  of  the  electors  by  whom  the  Commis- 
sioner or  Auditor  whose  place  is  to  be  filled  was 
chosen.'  ■ 

The  power  of  appointment  for  the  filling  of  va- 
cancies may  be  variously  lodged  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  case  or  the  character  of  the  office  to 
be  filled,  but  no  matter  where  lodged  it  should  al- 
ways be  exercised  under  a  rule  of  selection  similar 


152  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

to  that  contained  in  the  bill  just  cited,  so  that  the 
just  division  of  offices  between  parties  shall  be  at 
all  times  maintained. 

But  when  an  appointment  cannot  well  be  made 
to  fill  a  vacancy  on  account  of  the  magnitude  of 
the  office,  the  long  duration  of  the  unexpired  term, 
or  because  it  is  difficult  in  the  given  case  to  select  a 
proper  appointing  power,  a  popular  election  to  fill 
the  vacancy  may  be  provided  for.  In  such  case  I 
would  call  only  upon  the  voters  who  had  previously 
voted  for  the  officer  or  person  whose  place  is  to  be 
filled  and  would  confine  the  right  of  choice  to  them. 
The  other  voters  of  the  constituency  or  district 
ought  not  to  participate  in  such  election  for  evident 
reasons  and  should  be  excluded.  But  at  this  point 
an  objector  may  say  that  it  will  be  difficult  to  dis- 
tinguish the  proper  voters  from  others  and  to  con- 
fine the  electoral  privilege  to  them.  I  do  not 
think  so.  The  party  position  of  most  men  is  fully 
known  in  their  own  election  districts,  and  in  doubt- 
ful cases  the  right  of  challenge  will  guard  against 
improper  votes.  The  official  lists  of  voters  taken 
down  at  a  former  election  can  be  referred  to  for  the 
prevention  of  fraud,  and  any  one  offering  to  vote 
may  be  called  upon  to  prove  by  his  own  oath  or  by 
other  testimony  that  he  voted  at  such  former  elec- 
tion for  the  officer  or  person  whose  place  is  to  be 
filled.  Besides,  as  there  will  be  no  struggle  be- 
tween political  parties  for  a  majority  at  such  elec- 
tions, the  most  fertile  of  all  causes  of  fraud  will  be 
wholly  excluded  from  them.  In  fact  where  there 
shall  be  but  one  candidate  at  such  an  election, 
(which  will  be  the  ordinary  case,)  there  will  be  no 


SOCIAL   SCIENCE   ADDKESS.  153 

motive  at  all  for  fraud  and  its  existence  will  be  ren- 
dered impossible. 

But  I  am  quite  certain  that  when  the  free  vote  or 
some  similar  plan  of  reform  shall  come  into  general 
use,  secret  voting  will  be  entirely  dispensed  with 
because  it  will  no  longer  be  necessary  to  the  pro- 
tection of  the  voter  against  intimidation  and  other 
forms  of  improper  influence.  The  ballot  may  re- 
main to  us,  but  it  will  be  an  open  one — probably  in 
the  slip-ticket  form — and  a  large  amount  of  mys- 
tery, intrigue,  deception  and  meanness  will  be  ex- 
pelled from  elections.  And,  by  numbering  the 
ballots  when  voted,  or  by  other  means  easily  ap- 
plied, it  will  be  possible  to  prove  afterwards  beyond 
dispute  for  whom  any  voter  cast  his  votes.  Pos- 
sibly we  may  come  at  last  to  a  plan  of  register- 
ing votes  which  will  still  more  completely  or  con- 
veniently enable  us  to  classify  voters  and  determine 
for  whom  they  voted.  At  all  events,  by  dispensing 
with  the  secret  vote  we  shall  possess  greater  facilities 
than  now  for  the  proper  polling  of  votes  at  special 
elections. 

LOCAL  USE  OF  KEFOKMED  VOTING. 

The  free  vote  w^as  first  used  in  an  election  at 
Bloomsburg,  in  this  State,  on  the  12th  of  April  last, 
when  six  persons  wTere  to  be  chosen  members  of  the 
town  Council  for  the  ensuing  year.  The  result  was 
that  three  Democrats  and  three  Republicans  were 
elected.  It  was  again  used  in  the  same  town  on  the 
second  Tuesday  of  the  present  month  in  the  choice 
of  Constables,  Assessors,  Assistant  Assessors,  School 
Directors,  and  Town  Auditors.     Altogether,  at  the 


154  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

two  town  elections,  seventeen  officers  have  been 
chosen  under  the  new  plan,  and  they  are  all  good 
men  and  are  fairly  divided  between  parties.  Not 
one  person  among  the  whole  six  hundred  voters  of 
the  town  is  known  to  have  expressed  himself  against 
the  change,  or  is  believed  to  be  desirous  of  return- 
ing to  the  old  and  unfair  majority  vote.  In  short, 
the  change  has  been  completely  satisfactory  and  is 
strongly  endorsed  by  public  opinion. 

Directors  of  the  Poor  for  the  Bloom  Poor  Dis- 
trict in  Columbia  county  (the  district  containing 
one  thousand  two  hundred  voters)  were  also  chosen 
at  the  October  election  under  the  new  plan  and  in  a 
satisfactory  manner.  The  majority  elected  two  and 
the  minority  one. 

In  the  county  of  Northumberland,  in  Sunbury, 
Northumberland  and  other  boroughs,  the  new  plan 
was  also  tried  at  the  recent  election  (principally  in 
the  choice  of  Council  men)  and  with  good  and  sat- 
isfactory results. 

Certain  advantages  of  the  new  plan  not  foreseen 
or  not  foreseen  distinctly,  appeared  in  these  local 
elections.  In  the  first  place,  they  showed  that  the 
number  of  candidates  at  an  election  will  be  greatly 
reduced  by  the  new  plan ;  that  in  most  cases  no 
more  persons  will  run  than  can  be  elected,  because 
each  party  will  nominate  only  the  number  it  has 
votes  to  elect.  Next,  it  was  shown  that  blunders  in 
nomination,  either  as  to  the  number  of  candidates 
to  be  supported  or  as  to  individual  nominations, 
could  be  readily  and  certainly  corrected  by  the 
voters  at  the  legal  election.  Also,  that  bolting  (as 
it  is  called)  is  deprived  to  a  great  extent  of  its  mis- 


SOCIAL    SCIENCE   ADDEESS.  155 

chievous  character,  bolters  being  only  able  to  rep- 
resent themselves  by  their  own  votes  when  their 
number  is  adequate,  without  being  able  to  turn  an 
election  upside  down  or  prevent  a  just  division  of  the 
offices  between  parties.  It  was  also  clearly  shown 
at  those  elections  that  the  preparation,  polling, 
counting,  and  return  of  fractional  votes,  in  cases 
where  their  use  was  found  desirable,  was  quite  sim- 
ple and  convenient,  occasioning  no  difficulty,  uncer- 
tainty or  confusion. 

PEOGEESS  OF  EEFOEM. 

The  State  of  New  York  a  few  years  since  used 
the  limited  vote  in  choosing  thirty-two  delegates  at 
large  to  her  Constitutional  Convention.  No  voter 
was  allowed  to  vote  for  more  than  sixteen.  More 
recently  she  chose  the  six  Associate  Judges  of  her 
highest  court  on  the  same  principle ;  no  voter  was 
allowed  to  vote  for  more  than  four.  But  though 
these  were  steps  in  the  right  direction  and  resulted 
in  fuller  representation  of  the  people,  it  must  be  ac- 
knowledged that  the  limited  vote  is  an  imperfect 
contrivance  and  not  fitted  for  extensive  use.  More 
wisely  instructed,  the  State  of  Illinois  the  present 
year  has  adopted  the  free  vote,  not  only  for  the 
election  of  directors  or  managers  of  incorporated 
companies,  as  before  mentioned,  but  also  for  the  elec- 
tion of  Representatives  in  her  Legislature.  They 
will  be  chosen  biennially,  commencing  with  the 
year  1872,  three  being  elected  together  from  each 
senatorial  district.  In  this  State,  in  August  last,  a 
respectable  convention  in  favor  of  minority  repre- 
sentation was  held  at  Reading.     It  adopted  proper 


156  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

resolutions  and  organized  committees  for  future  work. 
The  men  concerned  in  that  convention  and  the 
friends  of  reform  generally  in  this  State,  look  for- 
ward to  a  Constitutional  Convention  as  the  means 
for  securing  the  main  objects  they  have  in  view. 
And  they  particularly  desire  that  the  members  of 
such  convention,  if  one  should  be  called,  shall  be 
elected  upon  a  plan  of  reformed  voting,  so  that  the 
whole  people  shall  be  represented  in  the  convention. 

Without  a  convention,  however,  much  can  be 
done.  The  Legislature  has  complete  power  over 
municipal  elections  and  can  reform  them  at  pleasure, 
and  it  can  also  largely  improve  the  representation 
of   the  people  in  the  Legislature  itself. 

In  conclusion  I  will  say  to  all  friends  of  reform, 
be  confident  and  hopeful  of  the  future.  It  is  well 
for  us  "  to  labor  and  to  wait."  Great  changes  are- 
best  made  when  made  deliberately  and  with  due 
caution ;  not  in  passionate  heat,  but  upon  cool  con- 
viction. Electoral  reforms  may  come  slowly,  but 
they  are  sure  to  come,  for  their  necessity  grows 
every  year  more  evident. 


A    SPEECH 

DELIVERED  IN  THE  SENATE  OF  PENNSYLVANIA,  ON 

MONDAY  EVENING,  MARCH  27,  1871,  UPON 

THE  BILL  ENTITLED 

"AN  ACT  FOE  THE  FURTHER  REGULATION  0!  BOROUGHS."* 


Mr.  Speaker: — I  came  to  this  Senate  to  serve 
during  my  present  term  with  the  intention  of  de- 
voting myself  particularly  to  the  subject  of  Electoral 
Reform.  I  thought  that  the  attention  of  the  Rep- 
resentatives of  the  people  assembled  in  the  Legisla- 
ture should  be  directed  to  some  fundamental  and 
searching  changes  in  our  electoral  system,  by  which 
existing  abuses  shall  be  checked  or  prevented  in 
future. 

Now,  sir,  in  the  first  place,  I  propose  to  call  at- 
tention to  what  has  been  done  heretofore  in  this 
State  upon  this  subject  of  reform,  in  the  direction 
indicated  by  the  present  bill. 

INSPECTORS  OF  ELECTION. 

In  the  Constitutional  Convention  of  1837-8,  Mr. 
Thomas  Earle,  of  the  county  of  Philadelphia,  sub- 

*  The  bill  upon  which  the  above  speech  was  delivered  passed  and  be- 
came a  law.  Those  sections  of  it  which  relate  to  the  election  of  Coun- 
cilmen,  in  boroughs,  to  the  support  of  which  the  argument  of  the  speech 
was  directed,  will  be  found  at  page  229  of  this  volume. 

157 


158  PKOPORTIONAL    EEPKESENTATION. 

mitted  propositions  on  two  occasions,  with  reference 
to  the  choice  of  election  officers  by  the  people,  upon 
the  plan  of  what  is  now  known  as  the  limited  vote. 
On  the  27th  of  June,  1837,*  he  addressed  that  Con- 
vention at  some  length  in  support  of  his  second 
proposition.  It  was  then  submitted  to  a  vote  and 
rejected  very  strongly ;  by  a  vote  of,  I  think,  over 
three  to  one,  and  the  majority  comprised  most  of  the 
strong  men  of  the  Convention — such  men  as  Wood- 
ward, Sergeant,  Forward  and  others.  The  Conven- 
tion passed  off  and  nothing  was  done.  At  the  ses- 
sion of  the  Legislature  in  1839,  the  Governor  of  the 
Commonwealth  called  attention  in  his  message  to 
the  subject  of  electoral  reform.  He  pointed  out  to 
the  two  Houses  that  extensive  changes  had  become 
necessary  in  our  election  laws  by  reason  of  the 
amendments  to  the  Constitution.  He  pointed  out 
the  fact  that  great  frauds  had  taken  place  at  elec- 
tions in  various  parts  of  the  Commonwealth,  and,  in 
short,  that  our  electoral  system  had  fallen  under  re- 
proach and  needed  amendment.  During  the  course 
of  the  session,  Mr.  Senator  Brown,  of  Philadelphia 
county,  turned  his  attention  to  this  subject,  and,  in 
a  Committee  of  Conference  upon  the  General  Elec- 
tion bill  of  that  year,  obtained  the  insertion  sub- 
stantially of  the  proposition  which  had  been  advo- 
cated by  Mr.  Earle,  in  the  Constitutional  Convention 
the  year  before,  and  for  which  Mr.  Brown  himself 
had  voted,  he  being  a  member  of  that  Convention. 
Well,  sir,  that  proposition  will  be  found  among  our 
statutes  as  one  of  the  most  important  and  useful  pro- 
visions of  the  election  act  of  1839.     It  provides  that 

*  3  Convention  Debates,  173. 


THE  BOROUGH  SUPPLEMENT.        159 

each,  voter,  at  the  time  when  election  officers  are  to 
be  chosen,  shall  vote  for  but  one  person  for  Inspect- 
or of  elections  during  the  coming  year,  and  that  the 
two  candidates  highest  in  vote  shall  be  declared 
elected.  Then  follows  a  provision  that  each  Inspect- 
or, so  chosen,  shall  appoint  a  clerk.  The  Judge  of 
the  election^  the  only  additional  officer,  is  chosen 
under  the  old  plan  of  the  majority  vote.  That  was 
in  1839,  and  it  is  to  be  noted  that  upon  debate,  this 
reform  was  carried  in  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  only 
fifteen  to  eleven. 

But  this  law  as  to  the  manner  of  choosing  election 
officers  has  continued  to  the  present  time,  a  period 
of  over  thirty  years,  and  it  is  well  known  that  it  is 
most  salutary  in  operation  .and  most  satisfactory  to 
the  people.  I  do  not  know  what  the  whole  number 
of  election  districts  in  the  State  is  at  the  present 
time;  in  1838  the  number  a  little  exceeded  one 
thousand.  I  suppose  the  number  now  exceeds  two 
thousand,  and  it  happens  under  this  law  that  in 
nineteen-twentieths  of  the  election  districts  of  the 
Commonwealth,  each  of  the  two  political  parties  into 
which  our  people  are  ordinarily  divided,  has  an  In- 
spector in  the  Election  Board,  and  also  a  Clerk,  and 
that  the  majority  has  the  Judge.  Sir,  it  is  this  pro- 
vision of  the  law  that  has  preserved  our  elections 
from  degeneracy  and  disgrace.  If  it  were  recalled 
from  our  statute  book,  and  we  should  apply  to  the 
choice  of  election  officers  our  ordinary  plan  of  voting, 
we  might  expect  an  enormous  increase  of  fraudulent 
voting  throughout  the  State,  with  consequent  de- 
generacy of  our  political  system,  and  to  a  great  ex- 


160  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

tent   discredit   would    be   cast   upon   the   political 
institutions  under  which  we  live. 

JURY  COMMISSIONERS. 

Some  years  since,  complaint  began  to  be  made  in 
various  parts  of  the  State  that  jurymen  were  not 
fairly  selected  by  County  Commissioners  and  Sher- 
iffs to  whom  the  law  committed  their  selection.  In 
some  counties  they  were  taken,  it  was  alleged,  ex- 
clusively from  the  majority  party  in  the  county — 
the  County  Commissioners  and  Sheriffs  representing 
the  majority  and  selecting  their  political  friends  al- 
most exclusively,  from  year  to  year.  Appeals  were 
made  to  the  Legislature,  and  several  local  acts  were 
passed  for  particular  counties,  providing  a  new  ar- 
rangement, an  election  by  the  people  of  two  Jury 
Commissioners  in  the  same  manner  in  which  In- 
spectors of  Election  are  chosen  under  the  election 
act  of  1839.  Finally  the  Governor  recommended 
the  extension  of  this  plan  to  the  whole  Common- 
wealth. This  recommendation  was  made,  I  believe, 
by  Governor  Curtin.  A  general  statute  was  passed 
and  approved  by  Governor  Geary  in  April,  1867, 
applying  this  plan  of  Jury  Commissioners  to  the 
whole  State,  and  every  Senator  present  is  familiar 
with  it.  Since  that  time  throughout  the  State  we 
have  had  elections  for  those  officers  upon  the  plan 
of  the  limited  vote.  The  statute  assigns  to  Presi- 
dent Judges  some  duties  in  connection  with  the 
Jury  Commissioners.  In  many  of  the  judicial  dis- 
tricts, the  President  Judges  declined  to  act,  or  did 
not  act  for  some  time  after  the  law  was  passed. 
They   thought,  and   I   suppose  thought   properly, 


THE  BOKOUGH  SUPPLEMENT.        161 

that  they  ought  to  have  no  part  in  the  selection  of 
men  who  were  to  serve  in  their  courts  as  jury- 
men ;  that  it  was  a  duty  which  ought  not  to  be 
charged  upon  them,  because  it  was  to  some  extent 
inconsistent  with  their  judicial  duties  and  with  that 
entire  independence  which  ought  to  exist  between 
the  Judges  and  jury  who  are  to  try  the  disputes  and 
differences  of  the  citizen.  But  presently  it  came  to 
be  understood  that  in  all  cases  under  that  law  jury- 
men would  be  divided  equally  between  political 
parties ;  that  in  a  county  where  there  was  nearly  a 
two-thirds  majority  the  minority  would  have  an 
equal  number,  which  seemed  unfair ;  and  so,  from 
time  to  time  appeals  have  been  made  to  President 
Judges  to  take  part  and  assist  their  political  friends 
to  get  their  full  share,  or  perhaps  more  than  their 
share  of  jurymen. 

One  of  the  President  Judges  described  to  me  the 
performance  on  one  occasion  when  he  first  attended 
to  select  jurors.  It  was  in  a  county  with  the  inhab- 
itants of  which  he  was  not  very  familiar,  he  having 
previously  resided  in  an  adjoining  county ;  but  he 
was  told  that  he  must  assist  in  filling  the  wheel  and 
he  did  so.  He  found  a  Democratic  and  a  Repub- 
lican Jury  Commissioner  sitting  on  each  side  of  a 
table,  and  each  of  them  with  a  hat  full  of  names. 
The  proceeding  was  after  this  fashion :  The  Demo- 
cratic Commissioner  reached  into  his  hat  and  took 
out  a  name,  and  put  it  into  the  box  or  wheel ;  the 
Republican  Commissioner  did  the  same  from  his  hat, 
and  then  the  Judge,  who  happened  to  be  a  Repub- 
lican, reached  into  the  Republican's  hat  and  took 
out  a  name  and  put  it  into  the  wheel ;  and  at  the  end 
11 


162  PROPORTIONAL   PvEPKESENTATION. 

of  the  proceeding  the  Judge  did  not  know  a  single 
name  that  he  had  put  into  the  wheel,  but  the  duty 
charged  upon  him  under  the  law  had  been,  after  a 
fashion,  discharged. 

What  ought  to  have  been  done  in  1867?  Why, 
I  insist  that  the  bill  which  is  lying  upon  your  table, 
introduced  early  in  the  session,  ought  to  have  passed 
instead  of  the  Jury  Commissioner  act.  That  pro- 
vides that  in  the  election  of  County  Commissioners 
all  the  voters  of  a  county  shall  be  enabled  to  repre- 
sent themselves  by  their  own  votes ;  that  in  all  or- 
dinary cases  the  majority  shall  be  enabled  to  elect 
two  Commissioners  and  the  minority  one,  and  then 
that  the  board,  so  made  up,  shall  be  charged  with 
this  duty  of  selecting  jurymen,  as  formerly.  We 
would,  by  that  arrangement,  be  enabled  to  dispense 
with  two  unnecessary  officers — the  Jury  Commis- 
sioners— and  we  Avould  also  be  enabled  to  dispense 
with  this  clumsy  provision  in  relation  to  the  partici- 
pation of  President  Judges  in  the  selection  of  jury- 
men. We  would  have  the  people  fairly  represented 
in  courts  of  justice  whenever  issues  of  fact  were  to 
be  tried,  and  every  object  designed  to  be  obtained 
by  the  act  of  1867  would  be  fully  accomplished. 
That,  by  the  way,  is  only  one  of  the  advantages,  as 
I  think,  of  this  County  Commissioner  bill  which  is 
upon  your  files.     But  I  proceed  : 

LOCAL  ACTS. 

At  the  last  session  the  two  houses  of  the  Legisla- 
ture passed  ten  or  twelve  local  bills,  at  my  instance, 
applying  reformed  voting  to  certain  municipal  elec- 
tions in  the  counties  of  Columbia  and  Northumber- 


THE  BOROUGH  SUPPLEMENT.        163 

land.  A  proposition  and  arrangement  which  yon 
have  in  the  third  section  of  the  pending  bill  in  re- 
lation to  boroughs,  was  applied  to  the  eight  boroughs 
in  Northumberland  county,  to  the  town  of  Blooms- 
burg  and  the  borough  of  Berwick  in  Columbia 
county,  and  to  two  poor  districts  in  those  counties. 
Substantially  the  free  vote  was  applied  to  them,  and 
it  has  had  successful  operation. 

BILLS  PROPOSED. 

This  constitutes  the  legislation  which  has  hereto- 
fore  been  had  in  this  particular  line  of  reform.  At 
this  session  the  Senate  has  passed  a  bill  applying 
the  free  vote  to  the  choice  of  Directors  of  Common 
Schools,  and  now  it  is  asked  to  pass  this  bill  in  rela- 
tion to  the  election  of  Councilmen  of  boroughs 
throughout  the  Commonwealth.  The  provision  is 
that  in  all  boroughs  incorporated  under  or  pursuant 
to  general  laws,  and  in  all  boroughs  heretofore  es- 
tablished by  special  acts  which  may  come  under  the 
general  laws,  there  shall  be  six  Councilmen,  and  in 
selecting  them  each  voter  may  distribute  or  concen- 
trate his  six  votes  according  to  his  own  judgment, 
without  legal  restraint.  Now,  comparatively  de- 
scribed, this  provision  amounts  to  this  :  That,  where- 
as, the  existing  law,  after  assigning  to  the  voter 
his  six  votes,  compels  him  to  distribute  them  singly 
among  six  candidates,  this  bill  will  withdraw  that 
limitation,  and  allow  him  to  distribute  them  accord- 
ing to  his  own  judgment,  without  legal  compulsion. 
Now,  sir,  the  fundamental  principle  of  our  govern- 
ment is  that  men,  or  at  least  American  men,  are 
competent  to  self-government.     Our  system  is  said 


364  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

to  be  a  system  of  self-government — that  the  citizen 
is  able  to  choose  and  determine  for  himself  in  all 
matters  of  discretion  where  strong  reasons  of  public 
interest  do  not  interpose  to  demand  legal  regulation. 
What  the  supporters  of  this  bill  ask  is,  not  that  the 
law  shall  be  extended,  not  that  legal  regulation 
shall  be  increased,  not  that  the  law-making  power 
shall  interfere,  and  do  more  than  it  has  heretofore 
done,  but  that  it  shall  withdraw  itself  from  the  citi- 
zen, and  allow  him  a  larger  measure  of  freedom  and 
of  choice,  in  strict  accordance  with  the  fundamental 
principles  of  our  government. 

OBJECTIONS  CONSIDERED— CHOICE  OF  MEMBERS  OF 
CONGRESS. 

Now,  sir,  what  objections  are  there  to  this  plan 
of  voting?  Why  the  Senator  from  Greene  [Mr. 
Purman]  the  other  day  went  over  some  of  those  that 
may  naturally  occur  to  a  candid  and  reasonable 
mind  upon  first  approaching  this  subject.  He 
stated  them,  and  he  stated  them  in  a  fair  and  pro- 
per manner,  suggesting  the  line  of  argument  which 
it  is  necessary  for  me  to  pursue  in  vindication  of  this 
bill.  He  suggests  that  if  this  plan  of  voting  were 
applied  to  the  choice  of  members  of  Congress  there 
would  be  no  districting  of  this  or  any  other  State ; 
that  the  members  would  be  elected  by  general  ticket 
throughout  the  whole  Commonwealth ;  and  he 
seemed  to  apprehend  that  there  would  be  some  dif- 
ficulty in  executing  such  a  plan.  To  this  I  make 
two  replies :  I  say,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  dis- 
tricting of  States  is  not  at  all  incompatible  with  this 
plan  of  voting;  it  comports  with  it  perfectly.     You 


THE   BOKOUGH   SUPPLEMENT.  165 

might  have  a  plan  of  plural  though  not  of  single 
districts.  But  there  would  be  no  difficulty  if  mem- 
bers were  elected  by  general  ticket  in  the  whole 
State.  Representation  of  different  localities  in  the 
State  even  could  be  easily  secured.  The  reasons  for 
this  opinion  I  have  stated  upon  another  occasion. 

CHOICE  OF  MEMBERS  OF  THE  LEGISLATURE. 

Again,  the  Senator  seems  to  suppose  that  it  would 
be  necessary,  if  this  plan  of  voting  were  applied  to 
the  choice  of  members  of  the  Legislature,  that  the 
State  should  be  divided  into  four  Senatorial  districts 
for  the  choice  of  Senators,  and  into  four  Representa- 
tive districts  for  the  choice  of  Representatives. 
Well,  sir,  I  never  heard  that  suggested  before.  It 
never  occurred  to  me  that  such  arrangement  would 
be  selected  if  this  plan  were  applied.  The  Senator 
will  find,  by  referring  to  the  present  constitution  of 
the  State  of  Illinois,  that  it  provides  that  each  Sena- 
torial District  in  that  State  shall  select  three  Repre- 
sentatives upon  the  plan  of  the  free  vote.  The  re- 
sult is  that  in  that  State  the  Legislature  will  form 
fifty-one  Senatorial  districts,  and  then  their  duty  of 
apportioning  members  of  the  Legislature  will  be 
concluded.  By  the  Constitution,  while  each  Sena- 
torial District  chooses  one  member  of  the  Senate,  it 
also  chooses  three  members  of  the  House,  and  each 
voter  may  give  his  three  votes  to  one,  two  or  three 
candidates  for  representative,  so  that  the  majority 
will  have  two  and  the  minority  one.  Probably,  as 
the  result,  the  Democratic  representation  in  Northern 
Illinois  will  be  largely  increased,  while  in  Southern 
Illinois  the  Republican  voters  will  be  emancipated ; 


166  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

they  will  send  their  share  of  members  to  the  Legis- 
lature. That  case  illustrates  the  manner  in  which 
a  State  may  be  districted,  or  in  which  representatives 
to  the  Legislature  may  be  chosen  by  districts  under 
this  plan  of  voting. 

If  the  Senator  had  referred  to  Mr.  MedilPs 
amendment,  introduced  into  the  convention  of  Il- 
linois, with  reference  to  the  election  of  Senators,  he 
would  have  ascertained  that  a  very  convenient 
method  could  have  been  applied  to  their  election  by 
the  free  vote.  The  Senator's  suggestion  of  this  dif- 
ficulty about  districts  reminds  me  of  what  occurred 
in  1869.  About  the  month  of  October,  of  that  year, 
I  had  occasion  to  address  a  gentleman  in  the  State 
of  Illinois,  and  mentioned  to  him  this  subject  of  re- 
formed voting  as  one  that  would  possess  interest  for 
their  convention  which  was  soon  to  meet.  He  an- 
swered by  saying  that  he  did  not  see  how  they  could 
possibly  apply  such  a  plan  to  the  election  of  mem- 
bers of  the  Legislature.  [Their  Legislature  was  to 
be  composed  of  a  large  number  of  members ;  as  it 
meets  only  every  second  year,  they  can  very  well 
afford  to  have  large  numbers  in  each  House ;  there 
are  advantages,  or  supposed  advantages,  in  large 
numbers  of  members  in  legislative  bodies.]  He 
did  not  see,  he  could  not  understand  how  a  plan  of 
reformed  voting  could  be  applied  to  the  choice  of 
fifty-one  Senators,  and  to  the  choice  of  one  hundred 
and  fifty-three  Representatives.  He  was  at  that 
time  laboring  under  the  same  doubts  which  occurred 
to  the  Senator  from  Greene  [Mr.  Purman].  Now, 
sir,  that  same  gentleman  went  down  to  the  conven- 
tion in  Springfield  shortly  afterwards,  and  made  a 


THE  BOROUGH  SUPPLEMENT.        167 

motion  to  appoint  a  Committee  on  Electoral  and 
Representative  Reform,  of  which  he  was  made 
Chairman ;  and  he  was  the  leading  man  concerned 
in  putting  into  the  constitution  of  the  State  the  very 
provision  in  reference  to  the  choice  of  Representa- 
tives to  which  I  have  referred,  and  also  other  im- 
portant provisions  applying  the  same  plan  to  the 
election  of  directors  of  incorporated  companies,  and 
to  the  election  of  judges  in  the  city  of  Chicago. 
This  supposed  difficulty  of  districting  a  State  for  the 
purpose  of  applying  a  reformed  plan  of  voting  in 
Legislative  elections  is  quite  illusory.  Districts  to 
which  this  plan  shall  be  applicable  are  more  easily 
made  than  districts  in  ordinary  apportionment  laws, 
and  if  we  were  compelled,  under  the  constitution,  to 
so  district  our  State  that  all  the  people  should  have 
representation  by  this  plan  of  voting,  we  would  not 
have  as  much  difficulty  as  we  have  now  under  our 
present  system  of  gerrymandering  and  disfranchise- 
ment. Let  me  say  to  the  Senator  that  we  get  rid  of 
the  great  difficulty  and  evil  of  gerrymandering  by  the 
free  vote ;  we  cut  it  up  by  the  roots,  or,  at  least,  we 
reduce  it  to  its  smallest  dimensions. 

THE  MAJORITY  SHOULD  RULE. 

The  Senator  says  the  majority  should  rule.  Well, 
that  is  true.  Mr.  Jefferson  said  so — that  absolute 
acquiescence  in  the  will  of  the  majority,  fairly  pro- 
nounced, was  a  vital  principle  of  our  system,  or  one, 
at  least,  which  must  be  applied  and  carried  out  con- 
stantly, or  our  experiment  of  free  government  would 
end  in  failure.  To  that  I  assent  most  fully.  But 
Mr.  Mill  long  ago  pointed  out  the  fact  that  the 


168  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

majority  vote,  as  heretofore  existing  in  Great  Brit- 
ain and  in  the  United  States,  does  not  secure  the 
will  of  the  majority — that,  in  point  of  fact,  the  rule 
which  we  get  from  it,  as  we  apply  it,  is  a  rule  of  the 
majority  of  the  majority,  or  often  of  a  small  portion 
only  of  the  people.  Id  the  first  place,  at  the  popu- 
lar elections  you  count  out  all  the  minority  voters ; 
you  count  or  allow  only  majority  votes  and  put 
aside  the  rest.  A  large  part  of  the  people,  then,  are 
virtually  disfranchised ;  they  have  no  further  voice 
in  the  government  beyond  the  giving  of  fruitless 
votes,  which,  after  being  scored  down,  are  in  effect 
scored  out  again.  Then  the  representatives  so 
chosen,  meet  in  a  legislative  body,  and  when  any 
measure  of  policy  is  to  be  voted  upon,  the  majority 
rule  is  applied  again,  and  the  minority  of  the  legisla- 
tive body  ignored ;  so  that  the  majority  of  the  legisla- 
tive body  pronounces  the  rule  of  law  for  the  citizen. 
Besides,  in  practice  in  this  country,  legislative 
majorities,  upon  all  measures  of  a  political  charac- 
ter at  least,  and  many  others,  act  under  a  system 
of  consultation — that  is,  under  what  we  call  the 
caucus  rule.  The  representatives  of  the  majority 
in  the  representative  body  meet  together,  and  subject 
their  wills  to  the  decision  of  a  majority  of  them- 
selves ;  and  that  caucus  decision,  concocted  and  set- 
tled in  secret,  becomes  the  law  of  the  State.  The 
caucus  is  in  the  third  degree  removed  from  the  peo- 
ple, and  there  are  three  eliminations  of  popular 
power  before  the  law  is  enacted.  Therefore  I 
say  you  do  not  necessarily  secure  the  rule  of  the 
majority  under  your  majority  vote,  because  the 
majority  of  the  legislative  body,  made  up  as  I  have 


THE  BOROUGH  SUPPLEMENT.        169 

described  it,  and  acting  as  it  does,  may  very  likely 
represent  only  a  minority  of  the  people  out  of 
doors,  and  such,  in  point  of  fact,  is  frequently 
the  case. 

Under  reformed  voting  what  do  you  do  ?  You 
do  not  destroy  votes  given  at  the  popular  elections ; 
you  count  them  all ;  you  take  them  and  respect 
them ;  you  consider  them  as  sacred  and  inviolate 
and  give  to  them  full  and  complete  effect.  And 
what  is  the  result  ?  Substantially  that  all  the  elect- 
ors are  represented  and  obtain  due  voice  and  influ- 
ence in  the  enactment  of  the  laws.  Then,  in  the 
legislative  body  you  have  all  the  people  represented. 
Each  voter,  except  in  rare  cases,  has  his  representa- 
tive in  place  on  whose  attention  he  has  a  claim  and 
to  whom  he  can  speak  as  to  a  friend.  There  is 
thorough  representation ;  all  your  people  are  heard. 
How  widely  different  is  the  case  now !  and  because 
it  is  different  this  evil  of  local  or  j)rivate  legislation 
is  beginning  to  be  exclaimed  against  all  over  the 
State ;  and  if  you  do  not  take  steps  to  correct  it, 
there  will  be  a  movement  of  popular  power  that 
will  reach  over  you  and  beyond  you,  and  through  a 
change  of  the  fundamental  law  will  effectuallv  cor- 
rect  the  evil. 

The  rule  of  the  majority!  I  agree  to  the  prin- 
ciple ;  we  propose  to  apply  it  in  this  bill.  We  take 
the  vote  in  the  legislative  body,  and  there,  the  will 
of  the  majority  is  appropriately  pronounced,  and  it 
can  be  properly  pronounced  nowhere  else.  It  will 
take  effect  with  a  sanction  that  it  does  not  now  pos- 
sess, because  when  all  the  people  have  been  heard 
in  the  enactment  of  a  law  or  regulation,  they  will 


170  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

very  likely  be  satisfied  with  it ;  and  besides,  there 
will  be  greater  security  for  the  fairness  and  wisdom 
of  such  law  or  regulation  in  the  fuller  consideration 
to  which  it  will  be  subjected. 

BALANCE-OF-POWER  PARTIES. 

The  Senator  says  that  under  this  plan  of  voting 
all  the  little  side  parties  of  the  country  would  be 
represented  and  heard.  As  it  is  now  under  the  old 
majority  vote  they  are  kept  out  of  Congress,  out  of 
Legislatures,  and  out  of  other  positions  in  the  Gov- 
ernment. Because  they  are  a  small  number  in  any 
given  constituency,  you  apply  to  them  the  maj  dirty 
vote,  and  you  extinguish  them  or  push  them  away 
from  the  high  places  of  power,  and  do  not  allow 
their  voices  to  be  heard  there.  The  Senator  seems 
to  think  that  this  is  an  advantage;  he  seems  to 
think  it  was  proper  in  the  case  of  the  Abolitionists, 
who  were  continually  repressed  by  the  control  and 
discipline  of  the  old  political  parties,  and  were  kept 
down  in  that  way.  He  might  have  extended  his 
remark  to  the  South  and  have  said  that  Union  men 
there  were  kept  out  of  the  local  Legislatures  and 
kept  out  of  Congress,  by  the  discreet  handling  of 
the  majority  vote  in  the  hands  of  the  extreme  lead- 
ers of  the  South.  The  minority  elements  in  the 
North  and  South  were  kept  down  by  the  majority 
vote ;  but,  sir,  you  did  not  destroy  the  fire  of  sec- 
tionalism by  your  repression ;  it  burned  and  glowed 
underneath  the  hollow  system  of  your  majorit}^ 
until  it  burst  out  into  an  uncontrollable  flame  in 
which  we  were  all  involved.  How  would  it  have 
been,  if,  instead  of  repressing  them,  you  had  allowed 


^ 


THE    BOKOUGH    SUPPLEMEN' 

them  to  be  represented  in  proportion  to 
bers,  and  allowed  everybody  in  the  country  to  see 
the  growth  of  opinion,  and  your  statesmen  to  pre- 
pare securities  against  it?  But  you  pushed  that 
danger  out  of  sight  as  much  as  possible,  and  shut 
your  eyes  to  it  as  long  as  you  could.  Nevertheless 
it  was  irrepressible ;  in  spite  of  your  majority  vote, 
the  war  came  and  ran  its  terrific  course  for  four  years. 

How  is  it  ?  Here  you  have  a  small  body  of  men 
in  a  State,  whose  single  issue,  whose  single  object  is 
very  important  to  them,  so  that  they  will  vote  with 
reference  to  it  as  the  Abolitionists  did.  They  make 
their  single  issue  superior  to  all  others  that  engage 
the  public  mind.  After  a  time  they  get  strength 
enough  to  hold  the  balance  of  power  between  par- 
ties, as  the  Abolitionists  did  in  many  States.  When 
they  get  to  that  stage  of  growth  what  do  they  do  ? 
They  say  to  a  political  party,  "do  our  work  and  we 
will  give  you  power;  affiliate  yourselves  with  us 
and  you  shall  triumph ;  repel  us,  reject  us,  and  you 
go  into  a  minority  or  remain  in  a  minority  in  the 
State ;  your  leading  men  will  be  struck  down  at  all 
elections."  Why,  in  Massachusetts,  the  Democrats 
allied  themselves  with  the  free  soil  element  and 
elected  Charles  Sumner  to  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States ;  that  element  held  the  balance  of  power,  and 
the  Democracy  were  seduced  into  that  act  of  folly. 

The  Whig  party  in  State  after  State  was  seduced 
into  a  similar  kind  of  alliance  subsequently,  until  it 
became  utterly  debauched  and  eventually  gave  up 
its  own  organization  and  took  a  creed  in  which  this 
balance-of-power  party  had  its  choice  principles  in- 
serted, and  thus  the  movement  went  forward  until 


172  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

war  came.  I  insist  then,  that  the  best  thing  you 
can  do  in  order  to  secure  the  peace  of  the  country, 
is  to  give  all  your  citizens  just  representation  in  the 
government.  If  I  had  time  I  would  go  on  and 
prove,  as  I  think  I  could,  that  our  late  war  would 
never  have  occurred  if  there  had  been  an  honest, 
fair,  and  wise  system  of  electoral  action  in  this 
country — if  all  the  people  had  been  enabled  to  rep- 
resent themselves  thoroughly  in  government  by 
their  own  votes,  after  the  fashion  or  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  a  free-handed  and  just  exercise  of  their 
electoral  power. 

CORRUPTION  OF  ELECTIONS. 

There  was  one  other  point  of  objection  mentioned 
by  the  Senator  from  Greene  [Mr.  Purman]  to  which 
I  must  refer.  It  was  that  in  cases  that  might  arise 
under  this  bill,  there  would  be  greater  opportunities 
or  facilities  for  corruption  than  under  the  old  plan 
of  voting ;  that  a  corrupt  man  or  one  desirous  of 
corrupting  electors,  when  he  purchased  a  voter, 
would  get  his  whole  six  votes  instead  of  getting  but 
one  vote,  and  that  the  tendency  of  this  new  plan 
would  be  to  increase  corruption  instead  of  diminish- 
ing it.     Let  me  answer  this  point  by  a  few  figures. 

The  town  of  Bloomsburg  polled  in  1868  six  hun- 
dred and  forty-six  votes  for  President,  of  which 
Seymour  had  three  hundred  and  twenty-nine,  and 
Grant  three  hundred  and  seventeen,  being  a  Demo- 
cratic majority  of  twelve  votes.  That  town  elects 
six  members  of  a  town  Council  under  the  plan  of 
reformed  voting.  Upon  the  vote  of  1868  three 
Democratic    town   Councilmen   would   be   elected. 


THE  BOROUGH  SUPPLEMENT.        173 

each  receiving  six  hundred  and  fifty-eight  votes, 
and  three  Republican  Councilmen  would  be  elected, 
each  receiving  six  hundred  and  thirty-four  votes — 
that  is,  each  party  can  obtain  three  of  the  six  as  a 
matter  of  course  under  this  plan  of  voting,  and 
voting  as  the  people  do  in  that  town,  the  political 
candidates  would  have  the  respective  numbers 
which  I  have  mentioned.  Suppose  a  volunteer  can- 
didate desires  to  interrupt  the  regular  course  of  an 
election  in  that  town,  and  proceeds  to  debauch  voters 
in  order  to  appropriate  their  votes  to  himself.  If 
he  takes  his  votes  from  the  majority  or  the  De- 
mocracy of  the  town,  he  is  required,  in  order  to 
succeed,  to  purchase  eighty-three  voters ;  if  from 
the  minority,  he  must  obtain  eighty ;  if  he  obtain 
his  votes  equally  from  both  parties,  it  would  be 
necessary  for  him  to  get  ninety-two  voters ;  if  he  is 
to  obtain  his  votes  in  that  corrupt  manner  as  against 
the  regular  parties  running  a  joint  ticket,  he  must 
obtain  ninety-three  voters.  Now,  observe  two 
things.  In  the  first  place,  the  supposed  corruption 
of  the  voters  can  only  extend  to  the  election  of  one 
Councilman  out  of  six.  The  man  who  buys  these 
voters  can  only  affect  the  election  to  the  extent  of 
one-sixth  of  the  general  result.  Again,  in  no  ordinary 
case,  and  hardly  in  any  case,  can  he  be  expected  to 
obtain  so  many  voters  by  corrupt  or  improper  means. 
The  number  is  too  great  to  be  seduced,  particularly  as 
they  are  to  be  taken  away  from  their  party  allegiance 
and  party  associations.  They  must  break  over  party 
lines  and  desert  party  nominations  in  order  to  prosti- 
tute themselves  to  the  purpose  of  the  volunteer. 
When  you  come  to  look  into  this  point  you  must  per- 


174  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

eeive  that  the  clanger  of  seduction  is  infinitely  small 
and  worthy  of  but  little  consideration.  What  I  have 
always  said  and  now  say  is,  that  reformed  voting 
reduces  the  evil  of  corruption  at  elections  to  its 
minimum.  Of  course  it  will  not  take  hold  of 
human  nature  and  change  it ;  it  will  not  reorganize 
the  hearts  or  intellects  of  the  people.  I  assign  to  it 
no  such  complete  renovating  power ;  but  what  I  do 
insist  upon  is  that  it  will  reduce  this  evil  of  cornrpt- 
ing  voters  to  its  lowest  possible  quantity,  or  to  use 
the  scientific  term,  to  its  minimum. 

Now  take  the  old  plan  of  voting  in  the  same  town 
and  with  the  same  vote  given  to  each  party  respect- 
ively. Suppose  this  volunteer  desires  to  defeat  some 
man  nominated  by  the  majority ;  he  has  some  pri- 
vate job  of  his  own ;  he  wants  a  street  laid  out 
through  his  property  or  wants  a  street  closed,  or 
water- works  established ;  he  desires  something  done 
that  will  promote  his  interests,  and  aims  to  defeat  a 
certain  candidate  to  that  end.  What  has  he  to  do  ? 
Buy  thirteen  majority  voters  and  it  is  done  !  There 
is  a  majority  of  twelve  in  this  case — in  the  case 
taken.  He  has  only  to  corrupt  thirteen  men  and 
his  object  will  be  accomplished.  Under  the  ma- 
jority vote  thirteen  taken  from  the  majority  will 
change  the  result  of  the  election,  and  he  may  easily 
draw  off  that  small  number  as  a  volunteer.  Suppose 
again,  that  this  man  is  a  member  of  the  minority  in 
the  town,  and  he  desires  to  be  elected  to  the  Council 
for  some  selfish  purpose ;  he  says  to  his  party 
friends,  "nominate  me  and  I  will  spend  money 
enough  on  this  election  to  secure  my  success,  and 
not  only  my  own  but  also  the  success  of  five  other 


THE  BOROUGH  SUPPLEMENT.        175 

candidates  to  be  placed  on  our  ticket,  and  we  will 
take  away  from  the  opposite  party  their  whole  rep- 
resentation in  the  local  legislature  of  the  town." 
His  party  friends  assent ;  the  ticket  of  six  is  made 
up   as   proposed,  the  proposer  himself  being   one. 
What  has  he  to  do  under  the  majority  vote  in  order 
to  elect  himself  and  his  colleagues?     Buy  seven 
votes  only !     The  democratic  majority  in  the  town 
is  but  twelve.     Cannot  seven  or  more  loose  voters 
be  found  in  any  party  out  of  a  total  of  two  or  three 
hundred  ?     He  seduces  seven  voters,  and  he  puts 
himself  into  the  council,  with  colleagues  to  assist  him 
in  his  ulterior  designs.     If  they  put  the  town  in 
debt,  you  cannot  help  it ;  if  they  persecute  their  po- 
litical enemies  in  the  town,  the  injustice  must   be 
borne ;  a  little  money  in  the  hands  of  a  base  man 
has  secured  immunity  to  the  evil.     Such  elections 
as  this  are  occurring  continually  throughout  the 
State  in  boroughs  and  other  municipalities,  under 
the  majority  vote.     Under  the  free  vote  in  Blooms- 
burg  you  must  seduce  eighty  to  a  hundred  men,  in 
order  to  affect  the  choice  of  councilmen  to  the  extent 
of  one  member  in  six !     Under  the  old  plan  seven 
corrupted  voters  may  change  the  whole  election. 

But  there  is  an  additional  consideration.  The 
party  assailed  by  the  corrupt  scheme  just  mentioned 
come  together  and  say,  "Are  we  to  be  cheated? 
No !  We  have  money  also.  We  must  '  fight  fire 
with  fire.'  '  And  so  both  parties  spend  money  on 
the  election.  Year  by  year  this  evil  goes  on  and 
increases.  Your  political  system  is  becoming  cank- 
ered at  the  very  core,  and  gentlemen  stand  here 
hesitating  and  doubting  whether  electoral  reform  is 


176      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

necessary,  and  whether  a  man  who  talks  for  it  and 
works  for  it  is  not  a  little  visionary  or  at  least  some- 
what ahead  of  the  times. 

There  is  another  thing  that  is  sometimes  done. 
Coalitions  are  common ;  we  have  what  are  called 
"  Citizens',"  "  People's  "  or  "  Union  "  tickets  set  up. 
They  are  very  well  in  some  cases,  but  are  often  set 
up  in  the  interest  of  some  man,  or  of  a  few.  A  man 
of  the  majority  is  offended  at  what  his  party  has 
done ;  perhaps  they  have  done  him  nothing  but 
sheer  justice ;  they  have  declined  to  put  him  into 
office,  and  he  has  a  dozen  men  subject  to  his  in- 
fluence, or  he  has  money,  and  he  goes  to  the  oppo- 
site party — the  minority — and  he  says  to  them, 
"  Put  me  on  your  ticket,  and  I  will  elect  it."  Or 
if  he  does  not  ask  to  be  put  upon  the  ticket  himself, 
he  asks  that  some  personal  friend  of  his  shall  be  put 
on,  and  that  j)ledges  shall  be  given  in  favor  of  some- 
thing he  wants  done.  Then  by  turning  over  a  small 
number  of  voters  from  his  own  party  to  the  other, 
the  coalition  is  made  to  succeed. 

I  insist,  therefore,  that  these  points  of  objection, 
or  of  doubt  rather,  in  reference  to  this  new  plan,  do 
not  condemn  it  or  render  its  adoption  unwise  or 
improper. 

REFORM  IN  NOMINATIONS. 

[Mr.  B.  proceeded  to  speak  upon  the  application  of  reformed 
voting  in  the  choice  of  delegates  to  nominating  bodies,  and 
particularly  to  County  Conventions,  describing  the  various 
plans  upon  which  such  bodies  were  chosen,  and  insisted  that 
the  same  remedy  which  would  purify  and  improve  the  legal 
elections  should  be  extended  to  the  voluntary  or  primary  ones 
also.  He  strongly  condemned  the  Crawford  County  plan  of 
nomination,  and   expressed   his   preference  for  that  recently 


THE  BOROUGH  SUPPLEMENT.        177 

adopted  in  the  County  of  Columbia,  under  which  there  was 
representation  of  election  districts  in  proportion  to  their  party 
vote,  and  complete  freedom  to  the  electors  in  casting  their 
votes  for  delegates.  He  concluded  by  stating  that  he  regarded 
the  bill  under  consideration  as  a  step  in  the  course  of  reform — 
as  one  well  calculated  to  have  a  considerable  effect  in  the  im- 
provement of  municipal  government  and  to  familiarize  the 
people  with  a  new  but  effectual  and  necessary  plan  for  the 
renovation  of  popular  elections.] 

CONCLUDING  DEBATE. 

In  Senate,  March  29, 1871. — Agreeably  to  order 
the  Senate  resumed  the  third  reading  and  considera- 
tion of  Senate  bill  entitled  "  An  act  for  the  further 
regulations  of  boroughs." 

Mr.  Buckalew.  Mr.  Speaker,  if  any  gentleman 
desires  to  make  remarks  upon  this  bill  I  will  give 
place  to  him ;  if  not,  I  desire  to  say  a  few  words  and 
then  have  the  vote  taken.  I  desire  to  explain  that 
this  bill  does  not  apply  to  any  borough  in  the  State 
established  by  special  law.  It  only  applies  to  those 
that  have  been  or  may  be  incorporated  under  the 
act  of  1851,  or  the  prior  act  of  1834.  Nor  does  it 
apply  in  many  cases  where,  by  special  legislation, 
particular  arrangements  have  been  made  in  boroughs 
for  the  selection  of  Councilmen.  There  are  a  large 
number  of  laws  which  provide,  for  instance,  that 
where  there  are  one,  two,  three  or  more  wards,  each 
ward  shall  be  entitled  to  elect  a  member  of  Council, 
or  more  members  than  one,  for  one,  two  or  three 
year  terms ;  so  that  it  often  happens  that  only  one 
Councilman  is  voted  for  by  the  same  body  of  elect- 
ors. This  bill  does  not  disturb  such  arrangements 
or  affect  the  manner  of  voting  in  such  cases.     It 

12 


178      PKOPOKTIONAL  KEPRESENTATION. 

applies  only  to  those  boroughs  which  exist  under 
general  laws,  and  to  those  hereafter  established  or 
brought  under  those  laws. 

I  desire  to  add  another  explanation,  and  that  is, 
that  this  plan  of  voting  is  very  different  from  that 
proposed  by  Mr.  Hare,  in  a  work  of  some  celebrity. 
He  proposes  a  plan  of  personal  representation  by 
means  of  preferential  voting,  as  it  is  called,  and  he 
announces  his  leading  object  to  be  to  emancipate 
voters   from   the   domination   or   control  of   party 
organization ;  to  enable  them  to  vote  without  refer- 
ence to  those  associations  heretofore  known  in  Great 
Britain  and  in  this  country  as  political  parties.     I 
am'  not  for  his  plan ;  and  I  desire  it  to  be  distinctly 
understood  that  the  free  vote  points  to  an  object 
quite  different  from  his.     This  plan  now  before  us, 
assumes  the  existence  in  political  society  of  political 
parties,  and  it  assumes  that  they  will  exist  hereafter. 
It  is  simply  a  proposition  by  which  political  parties 
can  represent  themselves  conveniently  and  justly  by 
their  own  votes.     It  does  not  strike  at  party  organi- 
zation.    In  fact,  Mr.  Speaker,  I  agree  entirely  with 
the  main   portion  of  the  argument  submitted  by 
yourself   [Mr.  "Wallace]   to   the   Senate  the  other 
evening,  in  which  it  was  insisted  that  political  par- 
ties were  a  necessity  in  free  governments — at  least 
that  they  were  inevitable  wherever  free  play  was 
permitted  to  the  political  activity  of  the  citizen. 
This  doctrine  was  laid  down  by  Mr.  Madison  per- 
haps as  briefly  and  clearly  as  it  ever  was,  in  the 
forty-ninth  number  of  the  Federalist,  in  which  he 
said  that  "  an  extinction  of  parties  necessarily  im- 
plies either  a  universal  alarm  for  the  public  safety, 


THE  BOROUGH  SUPPLEMENT.        179 

or  an  absolute  extinction  of  liberty."     Now,  sir,  I 
think  that  reformers  who,  in  the  present  stage  of 
civilization,  look  to  political  arrangements  independ- 
ent of  party  organization,  must  necessarily  be  vis- 
ionary and  their  schemes  impracticable ;  and  I  am 
one  of  the  last  men  who  would  assent  to  the  adop- 
tion of  any  new  system  based  upon  their  ideas.     I 
take  political  parties  as  I  find  them ;  I  take  political 
society,  divided  fundamentally  upon  great  govern- 
ment issues,  and  I  assume  that  so  long  as  free  play 
is  permitted  to  the  human  mind  in  political  affairs 
there  will  be  parties,  and  government  must  be  or- 
ganized and  administered  with  reference  to  them, 
and  that  all  attempts  based  upon  an  assumption  that 
it  is  possible  to  conduct  public  affairs  without  par- 
ties, are  idle  and  vain ;  in  fine,  that  all  attempts  based 
on  that  idea  must  result  in  complete  and  disastrous 
failure.     No  such  object  has  been  proposed  by  per- 
sons in  this  country,  or  beyond  the  ocean,  who  have 
supported  this  plan  of  the  free  vote  or  cumulative 
voting.     All  they  propose  is  to  put  into  the  hands 
of  political  parties  an  instrument  by  which  they 
can  act  justly  at  elections,  by  which  they  can  ob- 
tain for  themselves  a  fair  share  of  power  by  their 
own  votes  and  by  which  it  will  be  impossible  for 
them  to  take  from  their  fellow-citizens  any  portion 
of  political  power  which  belongs  to  them  ;  by  which 
the  principle  of  gambling  (as  I  call  it)  shall  be  ex- 
tracted from  elections,  and  by  which  the  motive  for 
spending  money  in  order  to  obtain  the  majority  at 
elections  shall  be  taken  away. 

I  think  this  explanation  was  due  to  the  Senate, 
and  to  those  who  pay  attention  to  our  debates,  be- 


180  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

cause  some  distrust  or  question  has  been  created  in 
the  minds  of  gentlemen  who  imagine  that  the  new 
plan  proposed  here  is  identical  with  or  similar  in 
principle  to  the  reform  proposed  by  Mr.  Hare,  which 
is  so  complicated,  and  so  far  beyond  the  convenience 
of  political  society  that  there  is  good  reason  for  op- 
position to  it ;  or  at  least  for  distrusting  it  as  an  ex- 
pedient in  the  management  of  elections. 

Mr.  Speaker,  I  shall  not  pursue  the  discussion  of 
this  subject  any  further,  as  it  seems  to  be  admitted 
that  this  particular  bill  is  but  a  reasonable  experi- 
ment— a  reasonable  experiment  by  which  the  merits 
and  true  character  of  this  plan  of  voting  can  be  as- 
certained and  settled  before  the  people. 

[Note:  Upon  the  conclusion  of  Mr.  Buckalew's  remarks, 
Mr.  White  and  Mr.  Osterhout  addressed  the  Senate  in  support 
of  the  bill,  which  then  passed  the  Senate  without  a  call  of  the 
yeas  and  nays. 

Subsequently,  upon  its  consideration  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, the  following  letter  in  stroug  indorsement  of  the 
change  proposed  to  be  made  by  it  in  the  manner  of  electing 
Councilmen  in  boroughs,  was  presented  by  Mr.  Strang,  a  lead- 
ing member  of  the  House,  and  read  by  the  Clerk : 

BL003ISBURG,  May  8,  1871. 
Hon.  B.  B.  Strang  : — Dear  Sir  :  Observing  that  on  your 
motion  the  session  of  the  House  on  Wednesday  evening  of  this 
week  is  to  be  devoted  to  the  consideration  of  the  Borough  Sup- 
plement bill,  which  among  other  useful  changes  provides  for 
the  introduction  to  a  certain  extent  of  the  free  vote  into  bor- 
ough elections,  we  are  induced  to  address  to  you  a  few  earnest 
words  recommendatory  of  the  bill.  In  our  judgment  the  pas- 
sage of  that  bill  will  secure  more  of  reform  and  improvement 
in  boroughs  than  any  other  measure  which  the  Legislature  can 
enact,  while  it  will  familiarize  the  people  with  the  new  plan  of 
voting,  which  has  been  so  successful  and  satisfactory  in  our  re- 


THE  BOEOUGH  SUPPLEMENT.        181 

cent  Bloomsbarg  elections.  After  having  carefully  observed 
the  working  of  the  new  plan  when  put  into  practical  operation, 
as  it  has  been  here  at  three  elections,  we  are  ready  to  approve 
it  and  to  declare  our  opinion  that  it  possesses  great  merit. 
It  is  readily  comprehended  by  voters  when  they  come  to  de- 
posit ballots.  It  is  of  complete  convenience  in  all  cases,  and  it 
is  just  in  its  operation,  giving  to  every  considerable  interest 
representation  according  to  its  relative  strength.  In  addition 
to  these  valuable  qualities  possessed  by  no  other  system  ever 
adopted  in  this  State,  the  tendency  of  the  new  plan  is  to  check, 
if  not  wholly  prevent,  improper  combinations  and  corrupt 
practices  at  elections,  and  its  certain  effect  must  be  to  produce 
reformed  administration  in  municipal  affairs.  These,  with 
many  other  considerations  which  have,  no  doubt,  suggested 
themselves  to  your  mind,  induce  us  to  hope  that  your  efforts  to 
procure  the  passage  of  the  bill  through  the  House  will  be 
crowned  with  success. 

With  great  respect  yours,  &c, 

William  Elwell, 

President  Judge. 

D.  A.  Beckley, 

Editor  Republican. 

H.    L.    DlEFFENBACII, 

Editor  Columbian.'] 


LETTER  TO  SECRETARY  JORDAN. 


THE  REPRESENTATION  OF  SUCCESSIVE  MAJORITIES. 

To  Francis  Jordan,  Secretary  of  the  Commonwealth  of 
Pennsylvania. 

Sir  : — In  a  letter  of  yours  recently  published  you 
enumerate  the  several  subjects  which  will  be  proper 
for  consideration  in  the  approaching  Constitutional 
Convention  of  this  State,  and  among  others  "  Minor- 
ity Representation"  as  one.  This  term  "Minority 
Representation "  is  inaccurate  and  misleading  as 
applied  to  the  several  plans  of  electoral  reform 
which  have  been  proposed  in  this  country  and 
partially  applied  by  statutory  enactments  in  this  and 
in  other  States  and  notably  by  Constitutional  amend- 
ment in  the  State  of  Illinois.  No  one  proposes  the 
representation  of  minorities  by  the  limited,  cumula- 
tive, or  free  vote,  or  by  list  or  preferential  voting, 
as  those  several  plans  have  been  explained,  advo- 
cated, and  partially  applied  in  Europe  and  in  the 
United  States.  They  are  all  plans  for  the .  repre- 
sentation of  successive  majorities  in  plural  elections, 
and  all  of  them  are  intended  to  apply  the  majority 
principle  of  government  more  completely  and  justly 
than  ever  before.  Let  us  not  be  misled  by  words 
ill  understood,  or  perverted  from  their  true  signifi- 

1S2 


THE   JORDAN    LETTER.  183 

cation,  nor  by  reasoning  which  while  pertinent  to 
the  election  of  a  single  person  may  be  quite  inap- 
plicable to  the  election  of  several  or  many. 

It  is  said,  and  the  remark  is  quite  true  in  a  gene- 
ral sense,  that  ours  is  a  system  of  self-government, 
but  no  plan  of  representation  ever  devised  can  make 
it  such  completely  and  beyond  the  possibility  of  a 
disfranchisement  of  some  members  of  the  electoral 
population.  We  must  content  ourselves  with  an  ap- 
proach to  a  standard  of  absolute  perfection,  without 
indulging  hopes  of  ever  reaching  it  by  the  utmost 
exertion  of  our  powers.  But  we  must  approach  it 
as  nearly  as  we  can,  or  we  will  be  false  to  the  prin- 
ciples we  profess  and  subject  ourselves  to  just  re- 
proach from  the  friends  of  free  government  in  all 
lands.  Our  country  is  new  and  our  experiment  and 
trial  of  free  institutions  is  being  made  not  only  upon 
a  grand  scale,  but  under  conditions  more  favorable 
for  success  than  ever  before  existed  in  the  whole 
history  of  the  human  race. 

The  more  complete  representation  of  the  people 
in  government  is,  simply  stated,  the  object  of  those 
who  advocate  electoral  reform  upon  either  of  the 
plans  before  mentioned ;  but  it'Ms  an  entire  mistake 
to  assume  that  they  intend  to  subordinate  the  greater 
to  the  less  in  any  of  the  arrangements  they  propose, 
or  to  subvert  or  impair  any  principle  heretofore 
accepted  as  sound  and  just  in  republican  govern- 
ment. On  the  contrary,  they  adhere  to  the  princi- 
ple of  majority  government  with  admirable-  fidelity 
and  give  to  it  new,  useful,  and  extended  operation 
and  effect.  They  represent  more  persons — disfran- 
chise fewer  ones — and  cut  off  the  main  source  of 


184  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

electoral  corruption,  by  carrying  the  majority  prin- 
ciple further  than  it  has  ever  been  carried  and 
placing  a  power  for  its  effectual  enforcement  in  the 
hands  of  the  people  themselves. 

The  force  of  these  general  remarks  will  be  best 
exhibited  by  an  illustration  of  the  principle  of  ex- 
tended representation  to  which  they  refer,  and  for 
such  illustration  I  will  take  the  case  of  Blooms- 
burg — my  own  town — where  four  elections  have 
been  held  under  the  plan  of  the  free  vote.  The 
town  contains,  say,  612  voters,  312  of  whom  are 
Democrats  and  300  Republicans.  (These  are  not 
far  from  the  exact  numbers  as  shown  at  recent 
elections.) 

A  President  of  the  town  Council  is  to  be  elected 
annually  who  is  the  principal  executive  officer  of 
the  town  as  well  as  President  of  the  Council.  If 
the  312  Democratic  voters  unite  in  support  of  a 
candidate  he  will  be  elected,  and  properly  elected, 
upon  the  sound  principle  that  a  greater  number 
shall  be  preferred  to  a  less  in  the  assignment  of 
representation.  A  very  few  voters  in  this  case  turn 
the  scale,  but  the  result  is  perfectly  just.  There  is 
but  one  majority  to  be  considered  and  that  in  favor 
of  the  successful  candidate. 

Next,  two  Assessors  of  taxes  are  to  be  elected  an- 
nually, and  here  the  free  vote  comes  into  play  and 
secures  their  division  between  parties.  Each  voter 
is  permitted  to  give  one  vote  to  each  of  two  candi- 
dates, or  two  votes  to  one.  Each  party,  of  course, 
will  run  but  one  candidate,  because  they  can  elect 
no  more,  and  the  second  majority  in  the  town  is  rep- 
resented as  well  as  the  first.     The  figures  are  as  fol- 


THE   JORDAN    LETTER.  185 

lows :  Divide  612  (the  whole  vote)  by  2,  (the  num- 
ber of  assessors,)  and  we  obtain  a  ratio,  or  number 
of  voters  for  an  assessor,  of  306.  Give  the  first 
assessor  to  the  first  majority  of  312  Democrats  and 
deduct  the  ratio ;  we  have  then  left,  unrepresented, 
but  6  Democrats  to  300  Republicans,  and  the  free 
vote  carries  the  second  assessor  to  this  second,  or 
Republican  majority.  How  much  better  this  is  than 
giving  both  the  assessors  to  the  first  majority ! 
Here  but  6  voters  are  unrepresented  instead  of  300. 
And  in  practical  government  a  clear  advantage  is 
gained ;  for  the  possible  spite,  partiality  or  incom- 
petency of  one  assessor  is  checked  or  corrected  by 
the  other,  and  the  chances  of  fair  play  in  the  valua- 
tions of  property  in  the  town  are  increased. 

A  similar  and  salutary  division  of  officers  takes 
place  annually  in  the  choice  of  two  school  directors 
and  two  constables,  and  triennially  in  the  choice  of 
two  assistant  assessors. 

But  in  the  election  of  three  persons  the  improve- 
ment introduced  by  the  new  plan  is  still  more  evi- 
dent than  in  the  case  of  two.  The  numbers  will 
run :  Ratio,  204 ;  first  Dem.  majority  312 ;  second 
Rep.  maj.  300;  third  Dem.  maj.  108,  and  the  gene- 
ral result  will  stand  2  to  1  in  favor  of  the  party 
having  the  preponderance  upon  the  total  vote.  The 
disfranchisement  of  Republican  voters  will  be  re- 
duced from  300  to  96,  and  this  by  simply  permit- 
ting each  voter  to  cast  his  three  votes  for  one,  two 
or  three  candidates  as  he  shall  think  fit.  In  Blooms- 
burg  three  town  Auditors  are  elected  together  every 
third  year. 

Take  next  the  case  of  the  annual  election  of  six 


186  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

Councilmen.  The  ratio  for  a  Councilman  will  be 
102  and  the  five  successive  majorities  after  the  first 
will  all  be  represented  by  the  free  vote.  Although 
no  calculation  of  them  will  be  made  at  the  election 
such  will  be  the  inevitable  result ;  for  as  each  voter 
may  bestow  his  six  votes  upon  any  number  of  can- 
didates less  than  six,  each  party  will  run  but  three, 
all  of  whom  will  be  elected  and  but  six  voters  in 
the  whole  population  will  be  unrepresented  instead 
of  300.  Here  we  have  a  very  nearly  complete  rep- 
resentation of  all  the  voters  of  the  town  by  follow- 
ing the  majority  principle  at  each  successive  stage 
of  the  distribution. 

The  exclusive  representation  of  first  majorities  at 
plural  elections  is  a  stupid  misapplication  of  a  just 
principle — a  crude,  unjust  and  pernicious  rule,  the 
inevitable  effect  of  which,  if  continued,  will  be 
the  destruction  of  republican  government.  For  it 
produces  violent  struggles  between  parties  and  can- 
didates for  a  preponderance  of  vote,  with  constantly 
increasing  corruption  at  elections  and  demoralization 
of  the  people.  These  evils  cannot  be  cured  or  cor- 
rected by  mere  preachment  while  their  cause  is  left 
in  full  operation.  We  must  take  away  or  greatly 
reduce  the  motive  for  corrupting  voters  in  order  to 
introduce  reform  which  shall  be  effectual  and  last- 
ing, and  this  will  be  accomplished  when  wre  provide 
that  all  interests  in  political  society,  of  any  con- 
siderable magnitude,  may  represent  themselves  in 
government  by  their  own  votes  and  in  proportion  to 
their  numbers,  without  resort  to  corruption  or  other 
means  of  undue  influence. 

Nov.  30,  1871. 


THE   CHOICE 


OF 


Presidential  Electors 


A  SPEECH  DELIVERED  IN  THE  SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES,  FEBRUARY  17,  1869.* 


[In  Senate,  January  28,  1869,  Mr.  Buekalew,  by  unanimous 
consent,  introduced  a  Joint  Resolution  (Sen.  Res.  No.  209) 
proposing  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  in  relation  to  the  manner  of  choosing  electors  of  Presi- 
dent and  Vice-President  of  the  United  States,  which  on  his 
motion  was  referred  to  the  select  Committee  on  Representative 
Reform.  On  the  following  day  Mr.  Morton  reported  the  Joint 
Resolution  without  amendment,  stating  that  the  report  of  the 
Committee  in  its  favor  was  unanimous.  {Globe,  674-704.) 
That  Resolution  will  be  found  at  length  in  this  volume,  ante, 
page  104,  in  the  general  report  of  the  Committee  on  Represen- 
tative Reform  as  made  to  the  Senate  on  the  second  of  March 
following.  February  9,  House  Joint  Resolution  No.  402, 
proposing  the  Fifteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  in  relation  to  colored  suffrage  being  under  con- 
sideration in  the  Senate  in  Committee  of  the  Whole,  Mr. 
Morton  moved  to  amend  by  adding  the  above  amendment,  re- 
ported by  him  as  an  additional  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
to  be  numbered  xvi.  His  motion  was  lost,  yeas  27,  nays  29. 
Afterward,  however,  the  same  day,  the  House  Resolution 
having  been  reported  to  the  Senate  and  being  under  further 
consideration,  he  renewed  his  amendment  and  it  was  carried 
after  debate  by  a  vote  of  37  to  19.     A  motion  to  reconsider  it 

*  Congressional  Globe,  3d  Sess.  40th  Cong.,  1287. 

187 


188  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

was  lost,  and  the  Joint  Resolution  was  returned  to  the  House 
with  that  and  other  amendments.  (Gkfoe,  pp.  1041  to  1044.) 
Subsequently,  on  the  17th  February,  the  House  having  non- 
concurred  in  the  Senate  Amendments,  those  amendments 
underwent  further  consideration  and  debate,  when  the  follow- 
ing speech  was  delivered  by  Mr.  Buckalew  against  receding 
from  the  Morton  amendment  ] 

Mr.  Buckalew.  The  Senator  from  Massachu- 
setts [Mr.  Sumner]  on  a  former  occasion  pro- 
nounced a  strong  denunciation  of  electoral  colleges 
for  the  choice  of  President  and  Vice  President  of 
the  United  States.  In  that  he  uttered  the  voice  of 
public  opinion  everywhere,  long  formed,  about 
which  there  is  no  dispute.  These  colleges  are  badly 
constituted ;  they  do  not  operate  wTell  nor  to  accom- 
plish the  purpose  of  their  original  institution. 
With  reference  to  all  that  I  think  there  is  a  general 
agreement.  But  the  Senator  went  on  to  make  an- 
other remark,  and  that  was  that  he  preferred  a  di- 
rect vote  by  the  people  of  the  United  States  for 
candidates  for  these  great  offices  of  President  and 
Vice  President. 

Sir,  he  followed  the  lead  of  great  men  in  express- 
ing that  opinion  or  desire.  President  Jackson  made 
a  recommendation  of  a  change  of  the  Constitution 
to  secure  such  a  popular  vote,  I  think,  in  six  annual 
messages.  It  was  a  favorite  question  of  reform  with 
the  late  Senator  Benton.  I  believe  you,  sir,  [Mr. 
Wade,]  also  a  few  years  ago  introduced  the  question 
in  the  Senate,  and  had  a  formal  proposition  for 
amending  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  con- 
sidered here. 

Now,  Mr.  President,  theoretically  it  is  understood 


CHOICE   OF   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTORS.  189 

through  the  country  that  the  people  do  choose  their 
President  themselves,  that  they  vote  for  him,  and 
the  machinery  of  the  Electoral  College  is  looked 
upon  as  surplusage,  unnecessary — as  the  Senator 
from  Massachusetts  expresses  it,  "a  sham."  It  is 
thought  to  be  a  thing  superfluous,  a  piece  of  machin- 
ery established  by  the  Constitution  which  the  people 
have  outgrown ;  that  it  is  in  point  of  fact  obsolete, 
and  that  the  people  themselves  do,  after  a  fashion, 
vote  for  the  candidates  for  President  and  Vice 
President  of  the  United  States. 

Sir,  this  is  a  very  incorrect  opinion.  The  people 
do  not  vote  for  President  and  Vice  President  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  votes  they  cast  for  electors  to 
perform  that  function  to  cast  actual  votes  for  the 
election  of  President  and  Vice  President  do  not  ac- 
complish necessarily  the  object  for  which  they  are 
given.  I  showed  some  days  since,  when  this  sub- 
ject was  before  the  Senate,  some  startling  statistics 
to  prove  this.  Among  other  facts  then  shown  were 
the  facts  that  in  1860  it  required  114,596  popular 
votes  to  obtain  an  elector  for  Mr.  Douglas,  who  was 
one  of  the  candidates  for  President,  while  it  required 
only  15,144  to  obtain  an  elector  for  Mr.  Bell,  one 
of  the  other  candidates.  The  figures  also  show  that 
Mr.  Douglas,  who  was  the  second  candidate  before 
the  people,  who  received  1,375,157  votes,  was  the 
lowest  of  all  the  four  candidates  in  the  electoral 
colleges,  so  that  if  there  had  been  a  slight  disturb- 
ance of  the  actual  vote  as  it  was  given  in  a  few 
States,  by  which  the  election  would  have  been  sent 
to  the  House  of  Representatives — it  came  nearly 
going  there  anyhow — Mr.  Douglas,  the  second  can- 


190      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

didate  before  the  people  in  the  number  of  votes 
polled,  would  have  been  ruled  out  of  the  House  al- 
together, and  the  choice  of  that  House  would  have 
been  between  Mr.  Lincoln,  Mr.  Breckinridge,  and 
Mr.  Bell ;  Breckinridge  receiving  847,953  popular 
votes,  (independent  of  South  Carolina,)  Bell 
590,631,  and  Douglas  1,375,157.  What  would 
have  been  the  result  ?  Why,  sir,  that  House  would 
have  chosen — 

Mr.  Wilson.  Will  the  Senator  explain  how  it 
would  be  that  Mr.  Douglas  would  have  been  ruled 
out  ?  The  Constitution,  if  I  understand  it,  requires 
the  House  to  choose  from  the  four  highest  candi- 
dates. 

Mr.  Buckalew.     The  three  highest  candidates. 

Mr.  Wilson.     Four. 

Mr.  Buckalew.  Three.  So,  in  1824,  Mr.  Clay 
was  ruled  out  of  the  House  because  Jackson,  Adams, 
and  Crawford  were  above  him ;  he  was  the  fourth 
man.  Infallibly  that  House  in  1860,  if  by  a  mere 
accident  there  had  been  a  few  votes  changed  in  a 
few  States,  would  have  made  John  Bell  or  John  C. 
Breckinridge  President  of  the  United  States.  They 
could  not  have  elected  Mr.  Douglas  if  they  had 
desired. 

Mr.  Edmunds.  Will  the  Senator  permit  me  to 
ask  him,  for  information,  a  question  ? 

Mr.  Buckalew.  If  it  relates  to  this  precise 
point. 

Mr.  Edmunds.  I  should  like  to  have  him  ex- 
plain how  that  happened — whether  it  was  in  con- 
nection with  the  fact  that  in  the  slave  States  a  much 
fewer  number  of  votes,  on  account  of  the  slaves  being 


CHOICE  OF   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTORS.  191 

represented  in  the  result,  accomplished  the  election 
of  an  elector,  and  whether,  therefore,  Bell  and 
Breckinridge,  carrying  more  of  the  slave  States  than 
Douglas  got  votes  in  the  Northern  States,  did  not 
come  in  on  that  theory  ? 

Mr.  Buckalew.  Undoubtedly  that  affected  the 
question  to  a  certain  extent,  but  it  does  not  account 
for  the  great  part  of  the  discrepancy. 

Mr.  Edmunds.  It  accounts  for  just  what  would 
make  the  difference. 

Mr.  Buckalew.  Just  for  the  difference  it  caused ; 
and  I  will  say  to  the  Senator  that  it  is  not  a  very 
considerable  element  in  the  calculation,  although  it 
is  a  just  one  to  be  considered.  And  it  did  not  affect 
the  vote  between  Lincoln  and  Douglas. 

How  did  the  electoral  vote  run  in  1864  ?  The 
result  was  right  that  year ;  the  voice  of  the  people 
was  executed,  but  not  by  any  necessary  operation 
of  our  system.  Mr.  Lincoln's  electors  were  chosen 
of  a  ratio  of  10,292 ;  those  of  McClellan  by  a  ratio 
of  86,274.  I  repeat,  the  result  was  right,  but  that 
was  not  the  merit  of  the  system,  it  was  a  mere  acci- 
dent. So  in  1824,  when  Jackson  had  one-half  more 
votes  than  Mr.  Adams  from  the  people.  The  re- 
turn does  not  show  his  full  popular  vote,  because 
South  Carolina  chose  by  her  Legislature.  He  had 
one-half  more  than  Mr.  Adams ;  he  had  more  than 
Mr.  Adams  and  Mr.  Crawford  combined  before  the 
people  ;  and  what  was  the  result  ?  Why,  sir,  he  was 
left  in  a  large  minority  in  the  electoral  colleges. 
Adams  and  Crawford  together  obtained  26  more 
electors  than  belonged  to  them,  changing  the  result 
bv  52  electoral  votes.     The  election  was  thrown  into 


192  PKOPOKTIONAL    KEPKESENTATION. 

the  House  of  Representatives,  and  there  a  great 
mistake  was  made,  an  affront  was  given  to  the 
American  people — or  at  least  they  accepted  it  as 
such — and  it  had  an  effect  to  a  large  extent  upon 
subsequent  elections. 

I  will  not  dwell  upon  this  point  further  than 
simply  to  refer  to  the  numbers  at  two  other  elections. 
Take  the  election  of  1832.  The  Jackson  electors 
had  a  ratio  of  3139;  the  Clay  electors  11,228.  In 
1852  the  Pierce  electors  had  a  ratio  of  6242 ;  the 
Scott  electors  of  32,846.  In  1824  the  plurality 
candidate  for  President  was  beaten  because  of  the 
machinery  of  the  electoral  colleges.  In  1860,  that 
great  election  which  touched  the  depths  of  the 
popular  heart  throughout  the  country,  the  candi- 
date second  in  the  choice  and  hearts  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  by  the  machinery  of  the  electoral  col- 
leges had  no  possibility  of  ever  entering  the  House 
of  Eepresentatives  as  a  competitor  for  the  result.  It 
required  one  hundred  and  fourteen  thousand  Ameri- 
can freemen  to  give  him  one  vote  in  the  electoral 
colleges,  when  twelve  thousand  could  give  Breckin- 
ridge one  vote ;  and  if  you  made  all  allowance  for 
the  counting  of  the  three-fifths  of  slaves  in  the  South, 
it  would  not  have  disturbed  the  ratio  more  than  a 
few  thousands. 

You  see,  sir,  that  this  old  machinery,  then,  is  not 
a  mere  sham  ;  it  is  an  instrument  of  injustice,  and, 
I  will  add,  of  peril  also  to  the  future  of  this  coun- 
try. Any  time  at  the  next  presidential  election,  in 
1872,  or  at  any  other  future  election,  a  large  ma- 
jority of  the  American  people  may  vote  without 
avail  and  without  result  for  their   choice  for   the 


CHOICE   OF   PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTORS.  193 

office  of  President;  and  a  minority  man,  a  man 
largely  in  the  minority  before  the  people,  may  ob- 
tain a  majority  of  presidential  electors.  It  depends 
upon  the  accident  of  how  majorities  happen  to  run 
in  particular  States. 

Mr.  President,  during  three  years  that  I  resided 
in  one  of  the  Spanish  American  republics  there 
were  revolutions  in  thirteen  out  of  fourteen  of 
those  republics..  Those  republics  are  scourged  and 
desolated  by  revolutions,  beginning  with  Mexico 
and  going  south  to  the  Argentine  Confederation 
and  to  Chili.  What  produces  these  revolutions  or- 
dinarily? A  disputed  presidential  election.  That 
is  the  cause  three  times  out  of  four,  and  has  been 
ever  since  1825,  when  those  republics  began  to  take 
their  present  organizations.  Three  times  out  of 
four,  and  perhaps  oftener,  a  dispute  about  a  presi- 
dential election  causes  revolt  and  civil  war,  and 
desolates  all  those  portions  of  the  New  World. 

Mr.  President,  the  very  point  upon  which  I  am 
now  speaking  is  a  tender  and  delicate  point  of  our 
Constitution,  and  it  has  contained  in  it  perhaps 
more  danger  to  our  country  than  all  other  political 
causes  combined.  You  have  ho  mode  of  deciding  a 
contested  election  of  President  and  Vice-President, 
no  machinery  provided,  no  clear  grant  of  power  in 
your  Constitution.  It  is  not  even  positively  certain 
how  you  shall  count  electoral  votes  in  case  of  dis- 
pute. A  surging  and  rampant  House  of  Represent- 
atives turns  itself  into  a  mob  even  now  when  your 
Constitution  is  about  being  executed  by  the  presid- 
ing officer  of  the  Senate,  and  it  requires  days  of 
heat — I  had  almost  said  of  indecorous  debate — in 

13 


194  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

that  House  to  compose  the  waves  of  passion  which 
are  roused  upon  a  mere  technicality,  with  no  actual 
change  of  the  result  of  the  election  depending  upon 
the  decision. 

It  is  the  point  of  danger  in  our  political  institu- 
tions, this  point  of  presidential  elections.  Will  you 
wait  until  the  danger  is  upon  you ;  will  you  wait 
until  civil  war  is  again  let  loose ;  will  you  continue 
the  old  and  defective  machinery,  always  unjust, 
always  full  of  peril  and  danger,  until  the  crisis 
shall  come?  Slavery  is  gone — the  great  question 
which  divided  our  communities  of  the  North  and 
South.  It  is  buried  in  the  tomb  of  the  past;  no 
voice  will  be  sufficiently  loud  or  powerful  in  all  the 
centuries  of  the  future  to  wake  it  or  to  speak  it 
again  into  life.  It  will  no  more  return  to  vex  the 
councils  of  this  Government  or  to  inflame  the  hearts 
of  our  people ;  no  blood  will  be  shed  to  settle  the 
great  issues  which  it  raises  and  which  it  inflames. 
But  here  in  the  very  heart  of  your  Constitution  is  a 
defective  and  weak  point.  I  call  your  attention  to 
it.  I  ask  you  to  consider  it,  and  now,  in  the  days  of 
quiet  and  of  peace,  before  trouble  has  come,  fortify 
yourselves  against  future  danger;  take  hold  upon 
these  electoral  colleges,  which  are  not  merely  shams, 
as  the  Senator  from  Massachusetts  says,  but  boxes 
of  Pandora  from  which  may  issue  demons  of  dis- 
cord and  violence  to  trouble  and  scourge  your 
country  and  your  people  in  future  years.  Give  the 
opportunity  to  men  of  statesmanship  and  of  wisdom 
to  reform  these  colleges  by  regulating  the  manner  in 
which  the  electors  shall  be  chosen.  That  is  one 
proposition   contained    in   the   Senate   amendment 


CHOICE   OF    PEESIDENTIAL   ELECTORS.  195 

which  went  to  the  House,  which  that  House  will 
adopt  if  you  insist  upon  it. 

Mr.  President,  why  is  it  that  the  recommenda- 
tions of  President  Jackson  were  unheeded,  and  that 
other  men  having  the  ear  of  Congress  and  having 
the  ear  of  the  country  since  have  been  unable  to 
secure  the  adoption  of  a  proposition  for  the  amend- 
ment of  our  Constitution  to  dispense  with  our  elec- 
toral colleges  ?  Why  is  it  ?  Why  cannot  you  sub- 
mit at  once  a  proposition  that  the  people  shall  vote 
directly  for  President  and  Vice-President  and  ex- 
pect its  adoption  ?  It  is  my  business  to  answer  that, 
and  I  have  a  complete  and  satisfactory  answer. 

Under  the  scheme  of  electoral  colleges  each  State 
has  two  senatorial  electors,  as  they  are  called — that 
is,  has  two  electors  as  a  State ;  and  then  it  has  an  ad- 
ditional number  equal  to  the  number  of  Represent- 
atives from  the  State.  When  you  provide  that  the 
people  shall  vote  directly  for  President  and  Vice 
President  you  virtually  strike  off  from  each  of  the 
States  the  equal  power  which  they  now  have  in 
choosing  senatorial  electors.  You  give  to  each  State, 
then,  in  point  of  fact,  in  substance,  a  power  propor- 
tioned to  the  number  of  Representatives  which  they 
select  to  the  lower  House  of  Congress.  What  is  the 
effect  ?  Why,  that  Rhode  Island  and  other  of  the 
small  States  lose  a  large  portion  of  their  political 
power  in  the  presidential  election.  Draw  an  amend- 
ment and  send  it  down  to  the  States  to-morrow  pro- 
posing this  change,  and  how  would  it  present  itself 
to  their  reflections  ?  Here  are  Delaware,  Florida, 
Kansas,  Nevada,  Nebraska,  and  Oregon,  six  States 
with  three  electors  each,  two  senatorial  and  one  rep- 


196  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

resentative.  Your  amendment  would  mean  that 
each  of  these  States  should  give  up  two-thirds  of  its 
political  power  in  the  election  of  President  and  Vice 
President.  Instead  of  having  three  electors  as  at 
present  to  count  in  an  electoral  college,  they  would 
have  a  popular  vote,  equivalent  to  only  one  to  count 
upon  the  general  result.  Then  take  the  States 
which  elect  two  members,  Ehode  Island  and  Min- 
nesota. Each  of  these  has  four  electors,  and  under 
the  amendment  suggested  they  would  have  what 
would  be  equal  to  two ;  they  would  lose  one-half  of 
their  power.  The  State  selecting  three  Represent- 
atives and  having  five  electors  are  New  Hampshire, 
Vermont,  California,  and  West  Virginia.  They 
would  lose  two-fifths  of  their  political  power  in  a 
presidential  election.  Connecticut,  South  Carolina, 
and  Texas  each  elect  four  Representatives  and  have 
six  electors.  They  would  lose  one-third  of  their 
power.  Louisiana,  Maine,  Maryland,  Mississippi, 
and  New  Jersey  would  lose  two-sevenths.  Alabama, 
Iowa,  Michigan,  and  Wisconsin  would  lose  one- 
fourth,  as  they  are  now  entitled  to  eight  electors 
each. 

Here  are  twenty-four  States  which  would  each 
lose  one-fourth  of  their  political  power  or  more  up 
to  two-thirds  by  adopting  such  an  amendment  to  the 
Constitution.  Twenty-four  States  out  of  thirty-seven 
interested  by  that  large  percentage  of  power  against 
the  adoption  of  such  a  change  to  the  Constitution ! 
Ten  States  can  defeat  an  amendment  when  all  the 
States  are  counted.  These  figures  are  exactly  ac- 
curate, except  we  are  to  take  into  account  that  the 
large  States  would  lose  their  senatorial  electors,  al- 


CHOICE   OF   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTORS.  197 

though  the  percentage  of  loss  to  them  would  be  very 
small ;  it  would  affect  the  result  only  to  a  very  small 
extent.  That  is,  the  loss  of  power  to  the  States  I 
have  enumerated  would  not  be  quite  as  large  as 
these  figures  make  it,  although  it  would  be  nearly 
that.  If,  then,  you  have  twenty-four  out  of  the 
thirty-seven  States  largely  interested  in  rejecting 
such  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution,  nobody  can 
doubt  that,  instead  of  such  an  amendment  receiving 
the  three-fourths  vote  of  the  States  necessary  to  its 
ratification,  it  would  be  rejected  by  a  majority  of  the 
whole  number,  and  that  whenever  submitted.  In 
other  words,  it  is  impossible  to  procure  an  amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  by 
which  the  people  of  our  country  shall  vote  directly 
for  President  and  Vice  President.  It  is  against  the 
interests  of  too  many  States,  it  is  against  the  inter- 
est of  too  many  State  interests,  to  permit  it  to  take 
place  at  all,  and  therefore  it  will  never  be  accom- 
plished. 

This  reform,  then,  of  a  direct  choice  by  the  people 
being  out  of  the  question,  what  can  be  done  ?  Why, 
sir,  you  can  do  what  this  amendment  proposes :  you 
can  give  to  Congress  the  power  to  prescribe  the  man- 
ner in  which  electors  shall  be  chosen,  and  thus  you 
can  introduce  reform,  and  in  no  other  way  whatever. 
At  present  the  power  to  prescribe  the  manner  in 
which  electors  shall  be  chosen  rests  with  the  Legis- 
latures of  the  several  States.  In  former  times  in 
South  Carolina  the  Legislature  prescribed  that  they 
themselves  should  choose  electors,  and  that  arrange- 
ment continued  until  recently.  The  new  Constitu- 
tion of  South   Carolina,  formed  under  the  recon- 


198  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

struction  laws,  provides  that  the  people  shall  select 
them  by  popular  vote.  That  provision  in  that  Con- 
stitution is  a  nullity  undoubtedly.  It  is  impossible 
for  South  Carolina  by  an  amendment  of  her  Con- 
stitution to  take  away  from  her  Legislature  a  power 
imposed  upon  it  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  The  provision  therefore  is  a  mere  nullity. 
The  Legislature  of  South  Carolina  wTill  be  at  any 
time  competent  to  resume  her  former  practice  of 
choosing  electors  of  President  and  Vice  President. 
The  Legislature  of  Alabama  recently  proposed  to 
take  this  power  into  its  own  hands,  and  it  was  only 
checked  by  an  executive  veto.  Hereafter  this  mode 
of  choosing  electors  may  be  resorted  to  by  Legisla- 
tures of  other  States,  and  thus  great  trouble  and 
difficulty  may  be  introduced.  It  is  a  thing  which 
ought  not  to  be  permitted.  Now,  Mr.  President,  in 
point  of  fact,  if  the  Legislatures  of  the  States  do  not 
assume  to  themselves  the  power  to  choose  electors, 
they  cannot  reform  the  present  system  of  choosing 
by  general  ticket,  and  that  will  be  seen  in  a  moment 
by  any  one  who  will  bestow  due  reflection  upon  this 
subject.  In  all  the  States,  Florida  alone  excepted, 
and  perhaps  Louisiana  also,  electors  are  chosen  by 
general  ticket — that  is,  each  voter  of  the  State  votes 
for  as  many  electors  as  the  State  is  entitled  to  in  her 
electoral  college,  and  the  majority  obtain  the  whole 
number  for  that  State. 

It  is  impossible  to  change  this  system  as  the 
power  is  now  located ;  and  why  ?  Take  the  case  of 
the  State  of  New  York ;  you  propose  in  the  State 
of  New  York  that  electors  shall  be  chosen  by  single 
districts  or  according  to  some  other  plan  of  reform, 


CHOICE    OF    PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTORS.  199 

and  what  will  be  the  answer?   "  Why,wecannot  afford 
to  do  that  in  this  State ;  we  shall  only  break  up  our 
own  political  power ;  our  party  will  lose  nearly  one- 
half  its  strength  in  this  State;  therefore  we  cannot 
afford  to  do  it,  and  will  not  do  it.     Besides  that,  if 
we  were  inclined  to  do  it,  we  could  not,  because 
other  States  not  doing  the  same  thing  we  should 
lose  a  portion  of  our  political  strength  in  this  State, 
while  the  opposite   party  to  us   in   another   State 
electing  by  general  ticket  would  hold  the  whole  of 
its  power,  and  thus  we  should  inflict  injury  on  our- 
selves as  a  political  organization  without  any  com- 
pensation whatever." 

The  political  majority  in  any  Legislature  any- 
where in  the  United  States  would  say  this  to  itself 
and  to  you  if  you  proposed  to  it  any  reform  what- 
ever in  the  mode  of  choosing  presidential  electors. 
They  would  give  the  conclusive  answer,  "  We  can- 
not afford  to  do  it  and  weaken  our  own  power ;  we 
cannot  control  other  States ;  and  as  long  as  they  do 
not  adopt  the  same  mode  of  choosing  electors  you 
simply  ask  us  to  make  a  sacrifice ;  we  cannot  do  it, 
and  we  will  not  do  it."  The  result  is  that  although 
the  old  general  ticket  system  for  choosing  repre- 
sentatives was  changed  twenty  or  thirty  years  ago 
because  it  was  intolerable,  the  choice  of  presidential 
electors  is  still  according  to  the  old  plan,  because 
there  is  no  power  here  in  Congress  to  amend  it. 
The  power  which  does  exist  in  the  State  Legislatures 
cannot  be  exercised,  and  I  venture  to  say  it  never 
will  be.  Therefore  you  have  fixed  in  the  Consti- 
tution the  electoral  colleges,  an  institution  which 
three-fourths  of  the  States  will  not  change,  which 


200  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

is  imbedded  in  the  Constitution  firmly,  and  then 
you  have  a  system  of  election  by  general  ticket  of 
the  members  of  those   colleges   in  the  respective 
States    which    cannot    be    changed    and    will    not 
be  changed  by  the   Legislatures,  who   have   theo- 
retically the   power   to   do  it.     There  will   be  no 
change,  and  what  is  the  result?     Here  I  come  to 
the  point  which  touches  us  to  the  quick ;   which 
should  make  our  blood  bound  through  our  veins 
when  we  think  of  it.     By  general  ticket  your  presi- 
dential election  is  poised  upon  the  vote  of  two  or 
three  of  the  larger   States,  Pennsylvania   particu- 
larly :  and  the  year  of  a  presidential  election  into 
those  States  are  poured  all  the  corrupt  influences 
which  elections  can  invite.     We  are  deluged  with 
evils  because  oar  large  States  have  an  unjust  or 
badly-arranged    power    in    the    electoral    colleges. 
Money  is  poured  into  our  States  in  a  profuse  stream 
to  corrupt  and  to  degrade  the  elections  held  among 
our  people.     It  was  because  the  voice  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, under  an  electoral  college  system,  was  likely 
to   rule   or    influence   the   result    throughout    the 
country  that  half  a  million  of  dollars  perhaps  were 
poured  out  in  that  State  in  1868. 

On  behalf  of  my  people ;  on  behalf  of  our 
republican  institutions  put  in  peril;  on  behalf  of 
justice  and  honesty  in  elections ;  on  behalf  of  the 
American  people,  whose  voices  ought  to  be  heard 
and  counted  fairly,  I  appeal  to  you  to  support  this 
amendment,  which  will  permit  reform  and  will 
secure  it.  The  road  of  reform  is  now  closed  up. 
The  patriot  and  the  honest  man  must  now  work  and 
labor  in  vain.     They  can  do  nothing.     Here  is  the 


CHOICE   OF    PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTORS.  201 

golden  opportunity.  An  amendment  relating  to 
suffrage  is  sent  here  from  the  House  respecting  the 
persons  who  shall  vote  in  the  United  States,  and 
here  is  an  amendment  proposing  that  the  people 
shall  have  secured  to  themselves  the  right  of  choos- 
ing presidential  electors ;  that  it  shall  not  be  taken 
or  snatched  from  them  by  intrigue  or  corruption 
in  the  Legislatures ;  that  their  honest  voices  shall 
always  be  heard  in  the  choice  of  electors ;  and  next, 
that  reform  in  the  manner  in  which  elections  shall 
be  held  may  be  introduced  by  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  upon  due  cause  shown.  Congress 
can  introduce  reform,  and  will  do  it.  It  did  intro- 
duce reform  in  electing  Representatives  to  the  lowTer 
House.  It  ordered  the  States  to  break  themselves 
up  into  single  districts ;  and  when  New  Hampshire 
and  one  or  two  other  States  resisted  enforced  its 
will,  because  it  spoke  by  virtue  of  the  power  of  this 
Federal  Constitution  of  ours.  Give  to  Congress 
identically  the  same  power  over  the  choice  of  presi- 
dential electors ;  say,  as  this  amendment  says,  that 
Congress  may  prescribe  the  manner  in  which  they 
shall  be  chosen.  Congress  is  not  obliged  to  do  it ;  it 
only  permits  it ;  and  by  a  simple  statute  here  you  can 
divide  the  States,  or  order  the  Legislatures  to  divide 
the  States,  into  single  districts  for  choosing  presiden- 
tial electors,  or  you  can  provide  what  far-sighted  and 
just  men  now  contemplate,  and  which  eventually 
all  will  seize  upon  as  a  measure  of  more  complete 
and  perfect  justice,  that  the  people  in  each  State, 
according  to  their  party  divisions,  may  so  vote  that 
each  shall  get  a  due  share  of  powder  in  the  electo- 
ral  college,  by  simply  voting  for  the  number  of 


202  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

men  for  which  they  have  an  adequate  number  of 
votes ;  that  in  my  State,  with  six  hundred  thousand 
voters,  each  party  holding  three  hundred  thousand 
of  them,  each  or  either  may  vote  for  twelve  instead 
of  twenty-four  electors,  and  by  uniting  their  vote 
upon  that  smaller  number  elect  them.  This  is  what 
I  hope  may  eventually  be  reached.  But  nothing  is 
commanded ;  the  future  is  left  open ;  and  the  men 
who  represent  the  people  of  the  United  States,  and 
who  represent  the  States  of  this  Union  here  assem- 
bled in  council  in  these  two  Houses,  may  reach  out 
their  hands  to  this  system  of  election  and  reform  it 
so  as  to  secure  popular  rights,  so  as  to  secure  honest 
elections  and  a  just  voice  and  expression  by  the 
American  people  in  these  great  elections  of  Presi- 
dent ;  and  thus  you  will  have  a  guarantee  of  ines- 
timable value  against  future  disturbance,  difficulty, 
and  possibly  revolution  and  war  in  this  country 
from  a  disputed  presidential  election.  Justice  and 
public  safety  appeal  to  you, 

Is  there  any  objection  to  this?  None  at  all,  ex- 
cept a  mere  prejudice.  Some  men  say,  "  Why,  you 
are  giving  more  power  to  Congress ;  you  are  taking 
power  away  from  the  States;  you  are  increasing 
Federal  power,  and  the  tendency  of  this  measure  is 
toward  consolidation."  Now,  sir,  of  all  the  people 
in  the  world  with  whom  I  have  least  patience,  give 
me  the  man  of  stupidity ;  the  man  who  is  fighting 
against  his  own  purpose  and  object  without  knowing 
it ;  the  man  who  with  good  and  sincere  motives  is 
doing  bad  and  evil  work  and  does  not  know  it. 
Those  people  who  are  shouting  State  rights  and 
State  privilege  and  State  immunity  and  authority, 


CHOICE   OF    PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTORS.  203 

and  doing  the  work  of  mischief  at  the  same  time,  are 
persons  with  whom  we  should  have  least  patience ; 
perhaps  no  patience  at  all. 

The  choice  of  presidential  electors  is  properly  a 
Federal  question,  rather  than  a  State  question.  It 
relates  to  this  Government,  and  not  to  the  govern- 
ment of  the  States.  It  will  therefore  be  properly 
lodged  in  this  Government,  because  it  belongs  and 
pertains  to  it  legitimately.  In  the  next  place,  as  I 
have  already  shown  to  you,  the  location  of  this 
power  in  Congress  is  a  necessity.  Located  as  it  is 
now  it  will  never  be  exercised ;  you  can  introduce 
no  reform.  Being,  therefore,  Federal  in  its  nature, 
being  necessary  to  the  introducing  of  any  reform 
in  the  regulation  of  the  choice  of  presidential  elect- 
ors, it  should  be  located  in  the  two  Houses  of  Con- 
gress, where,  if  it  should  at  any  time  be  exercised 
improperly,  you  can  introduce  change  and  amend- 
ments afterward. 

Mr.  President,  I  will  read  one  single  passage  from 
one  of  the  best  printed  and  best  edited  newspapers 
in  the  United  States,  although  my  opinions  are  as 
wide  from  it  as  the  poles  are  asunder.  In  speaking 
of  this  proposed  amendment  it  says  : 

"  It  will  prevent  the  entire  vote  of  such  a  State  as  New  York, 
for  instance,  being  cast  for  a  particular  candidate  through  the 
rascality  of  its  chief  city." 

I  am  not  indorsing  that  statement.  I  am  reading 
what  this  paper  says : 

"  It  will  give  more  nearly  than  now  the  sense  of  the  people 
for  President  in  the  electoral  colleges,  because  each  district  will 
have  its  own  representative.  If  anything  was  to  be  done  at  all 
with  the  electoral  vote,  we  should  prefer  to  have  had  the  col- 


204      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

leges  abolished,  that  the  untrammeled  will  of  the  people  should 
be  expressed  directly  upon  the  question  of  the  fitness  of  the 
candidate  for  President." 

I  have  already  spoken  to  that  point  and  shown 
that  it  is  impracticable.  This  article  concludes  by- 
saying  : 

"However,  this  question  will  not  embarrass  the  suffrage 
proposition,  as  the  two  articles  are  to  be  voted  on  separately." 

Mr.  Edmunds.     What  paper  is  that  ? 

Mr.  Buckalew.     The  Boston  Commonwealth. 

From  what  I  have  said,  Mr.  President,  it  will  be 
discovered  that  I  have  very  strong  opinions,  possibly 
strong  feelings  also,  in  favor  of  this  proposition  for 
amending  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  in 
regard  to  the  choice  of  presidential  electors.  I  have 
imperfectly,  and  without  much  preparation,  stated 
to  the  Senate  a  few  of  the  leading  considerations 
which,  in  my  judgment,  demand  this  reform.  It  is 
now  within  our  reach.  We  can  seize  upon  it ;  we 
can  secure  it ;  we  can  appropriate  it,  not  to  ourselves 
only,  but  to  the  whole  American  people,  and  all 
this  can  be  done  without  embarrassment  in  regard 
to  the  other  proposition  of  amendment  of  suffrage. 
It  is  distinct  in  its  nature  and  it  is  to  be  submitted 
distinctly  for  the  action  of  the  several  States.  One 
proposition  can  be  acted  upon  without  embarrassing 
the  other  in  any  way  whatever.  We  have  now  a 
golden  opportunity  for  presenting  this  proposition, 
and  presenting  it  in  connection  with  an  amendment 
which  invites  it,  because  it  is  an  amendment  for  the 
extension  of  suffrage,  while  this  is  for  the  regulation 
of  suffrage. 


CHOICE   OF    PEESIDENTIAL   ELECTORS.  205 

One  point  more,  sir,  and  I  will  leave  the  subject. 
Can  anything  be  more  evident  than  that  now,  when 
we  are  extending  suffrage  in  the  United  States,  and 
extending  it  largely,  extending  it  as  it  was  not  con- 
templated it  ever  could  be  extended  until  within  a 
few  years  past,  it  becomes  us  to  improve  our 
machinery,  to  improve  our  constitutional  arrange- 
ments by  which  suffrage  is  to  be  worked  in  future  ? 
In  calling  upon  the  people  of  the  United  States  to 
adopt  an  amendment  which  shall  make  this  exten- 
sion, which  shall  allow  the  casting  into  the  ballot- 
boxes,  North,  South,  and  West,  of  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  votes  from  a  new  and  hitherto  disfran- 
chised class,  will  you  not  present  to  them  some 
proposition  of  reform  with  regard  to  the  manner  in 
which  this  suffrage  shall  be  exercised,  so  that  it  shall 
have  just  operation  and  fair  effect,  so  that  the  cor- 
ruption of  a  few  votes  in  a  State  shall  not  turn  the 
whole  scale  and  change  elections  ?  In  my  judgment, 
therefore,  in  addition  to  all  the  other  considerations, 
this  proposition  is  most  timely.  It  never  could  have 
been  presented  at  a  juncture  when  in  poin^  of  time 
it  was  more  appropriate  and  more  deserving  of 
adoption  by  Congress  and  by  the  American  people. 

[Eventually  the  Senate,  with  some  reluctance,  receded  from 
its  amendments  by  a  vote  of  33  to  24,  Mr.  Morton  accom- 
panying his  concession  to  the  House  with  the  declaration  that 
his  amendment  could  not  at  that  time  receive  due  considera- 
tion in  the  House,  but  that  it  was  not  of  a  party  character,  and 
he  believed  it  would  be  submitted  and  adopted  at  a  future 
time.  It  commended  itself  to  the  good  judgment  of  the 
American  people,  and  he  believed  that  hereafter  men  of  all 
parties  would  support  it.     (Globe,  1295.) 

On  a  prior  occasion,  on  the  9  th  of  February,  when  the  Mor- 


206  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

ton  Amendment  was  under  consideration  in  the  Senate,  Mr. 
Buckalew  submitted  some  statistics  of  Presidential  elections, 
the  republication  of  which,  in  connection  with  the  foregoing 
speech,  appears  necessary  or  proper  to  a  full  view  of  the  im- 
portant question  discussed.  We  quote  below  a  liberal  extract 
from  his  remarks  as  contained  in  the  Globe,  p.  1043.] 

UNEQUAL  REPRESENTATION  OF  THE  PEOPLE  IN 
PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTIONS. 

Iii  the  Presidential  election  of  1824,  between 
Jackson  and  Adams,  Jackson,  with,  a  popular  vote 
one-half  greater  than  Adams,  received  fourteen 
electoral  votes  less  than  his  due  share,  making  a 
difference  or  change  of  twenty-eight  in  the  electoral 
colleges  between  them.  He  received  more  votes 
from  the  people  than  Adams  and  Crawford  com- 
bined, and  yet  they  outnumbered  him  twenty-six 
in  electoral  votes. 

In  the  Presidential  election  of  1828  the  Jackson 
electors  were  chosen  by  an  average  of  3652  votes 
each,  and  the  Adams  electors  by  6170  votes. 

In  1832  the  result  was : 

Popular  voto.     Electors.         Ratio. 

Jackson 687.502  219           3,139 

Clay 550,189  49        11,228 

Wirt 7 

Floyd 11 

The  total  popular  vote  of  Jackson  and  Clay  was 
1,237,691,  and  their  electoral  votes  combined  268. 
A  common  ratio  for  them  therefore  was  4618,  from 
which  it  results  that  Clay  should  have  had  119  and 
Jackson  149  electoral  votes.  Clay  lost  70  electors, 
making  a  change  of  140  in  the  result  as  between 
them.  Jackson  should  have  had  30  electoral  ma- 
jority, but  he  had  170,  or  more  than  five  times  his 
true  majority. 


CHOICE   OF    PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTORS.  207 

I  will  now  cite  more  recent  cases. 

PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTION  1852. 

Popular  vote.    Electors.        Ratios. 

Pierce 1,585,545  254  6,242 

Scott 1,383,537  42  32,846 

Hale 157.296 

3,126,378  296 

Six  thousand  Pierce  voters  obtained  an  elector, 
while  32,000  were  required  for  a  Scott  elector! 
Now,  dividing  the  whole  popular  vote  by  the  whole 
number  of  electors  we  obtain  the  average  or  com- 
mon ratio  of  votes  to  each  elector  of  10,562.  If 
electors  then  had  been  obtained  by  the  several  can- 
didates in  proportion  to  the  reported  popular  vote 
for  each,  the  result  would  have  been :  Pierce  150 ; 
Scott  131 ;  and  Hale  15.  By  the  defective  plan 
upon  which  electors  were  chosen,  it  appears  then 
that  Pierce  had  104  more  electoral  votes  than  his 
due  share,  that  Scott  had  89  less  than  his  share, 
and  that  Hale  was  deprived  entirely  of  electors. 
And  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  104  electoral 
votes  to  Pierce  in  excess  of  his  due  share  really 
count  208  upon  the  result  in  the  electoral  colleges, 
because  they  are  deducted  from  the  other  candidates. 

Take  next  the  Presidential  election  of  1860. 

Popular  vote.    Electors.        Ratios. 

Lincoln  1,866,452  180  10,369 

Douglas 1,375,157  12  114,596 

Breckinridge 847,953  72  11,777 

Bell 590,631  _39  15,144 

Total , 4,680,193  303 

Common  ratio,  15,446.  Lincoln  should  have  had 
121  electors,  Douglas  89,  Breckinridge  55,  and  Bell 
38.     Douglas  obtained  less  than  one-seventh  of  the 


208  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

electoral  vote  which  belonged  to  him  upon  the  pop- 
ular vote.  Though  second  in  choice  with  the  peo- 
ple, he  was  the  lowest  in  the  electoral  vote  of  the 
four  candidates.  If,  by  a  slight  change  of  votes  in 
a  few  States,  the  election  had  gone  to  the  House  of 
Representatives,  he  would  have  been  ruled  out,  as 
the  House  must  choose  from  the  three  candidates 
highest  in  electoral  vote,  and  Breckinridge  or  Bell 
would  probably  have  been  elected  by  the  House. 

I  might  refer  to  several  other  Presidential  elec- 
tions. For  instance,  in  1864,  the  ratio  of  the  Lincoln 
electors  was  10,292,  and  for  the  McClellan  electors 
86,274.  In  1868  the  difference  between  the  ratios 
of  Grant  and  Seymour  electors  was  somewhat  less, 
but  still  very  remarkable.  In  both  these  elections 
the  popular  majority  secured  the  result  they  desired. 
But  this  was  fortunate  or  accidental  rather  than  a 
certain  result  under  our  electoral  system  as  now 
constituted. .  The  election  of  1824  proves  that  a 
plurality  as  well  as  a  minority  candidate  may  suffer 
heavy  loss  of  electoral  votes,  and  in  fact  be  defeated. 
And  the  subsequent  cases  must  convince  us  that 
there  is  danger  of  defeat  in  future  elections  even  to 
majority  candidates. 

The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  facts  in  our 
political  history  is  that  at  any  time  a  candidate 
with  a  minority  of  votes  given  to  him  by  the  £>eople 
of  the  United  States  may  have  a  majority  in  the 
electoral  colleges."  * 

*  In  the  figures  given  above  of  popular  votes  at  Presidential  elec- 
tions, no  vote  for  South  Carolina  is  included,  as  her  electors  were  chosen 
by  the  Legislature.  But  the  unavoidable  omission  of  any  popular  vote 
from  that  State  does  not  materially  affect  the  exhibit  or  argument.  A 
single  remark  may  be  added  in  this  place.     Can  any  one  doubt,  in  view 


CHOICE   OF    PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTORS.  209 

THE    ELECTORAL    COLLEGES,  THEIR    DEFECTS    AND 
FAILURE,   AND  REMEDIES  PROPOSED  * 

BY  COL.  JOHN  II.  WHEELER,  STATISTICAL  BUHEAU,  TREASURY  DEPARTMENT. 

This  nation  lias  recently  passed  through  an  exciting  election 
for  President,  and  the  electors  have  met  at  the  capitals  of  each 
State  and  cast  their  votes. 

We  propose  to  show  that  the  present  mode  of  election  of 
President  and  Vice  President  does  not  guarantee  "  a  republi- 
can form  of  government,"  or  carry  out  the  intentions  of  the 
framers  of  the  Constitution,  or  the  will  of  the  people,  which  is 
the  foundation  of  our  form  of  government. 

We  are  aware  of  the  reluctance  which  exists  to  disturb  the 
provisions  of  the  'Constitution  or  the  customs  of  the  nation. 
But  this  very  Constitution  has  been  amended  again  and  again, 
and  once  in  regard  to  this  very  question. 

Under  the  second  article  of  the  Constitution,  the  electors, 
appointed  in  such  manner  as  the  Legislatures  of  the  States  may 
direct,  meet  in  their  respective  States  and  vote  by  ballot  for 
two  persons;  the  person  having  the  majority  of  the  whole 
number  of  electors  appointed  shall  be  President,  and  the  per- 
son having  the  next  greatest  number  of  votes  shall  be  Vice 
President. 

By  this  mode  the  first  President  (Washington)  was  elected 
twice,  (1788  and  1792,)  and  John  Adams  (in  1796)  once. 

In  consequence  of  the  violence  to  the  popular  will  attempted 
to  be  done  through  this  mode,  this  article  was  amended  in  1804, 
(Sept.  25,)  and  the  electors  required  to  name  in  their  ballots 
the  person  voted  for  as  President,  and  in  distinct  ballots  the 

of  the  facts  shown,  that  reformed  voting  is  imperatively  demanded  in 
Presidential  elections  to  secure  the  just  representation  of  the  people,  to 
check  political  corruption,  and  to  avoid  the  fearful  danger  of  a  disputed 
Presidential  succession  ?  Doubtless  the  electoral  colleges  are  admirably 
adapted  to  the  workings  of  a  plan  of  electoral  reform.  Useless  or  worse 
than  useless  at  present,  they  may  be  made  available  and  efficient  in  im- 
proving our  political  system  and  securing  to  us  the  just  ends  of  popular 
government,  whenever  the  free  vote  or  some  other  appropriate  instru- 
ment of  reform  shall  be  applied  to  utilize  and  invigorate  them. 

*  This  Essay  by  Col.  Wheeler  was  contained   in  the  Appendix   to 
Senate  Report  on  Representative  Reform,  of  2d  March,  18G9,  {ante,)  but 
is  now  inserted  here  as  its  proper  position  in  this  work. 
14 


210  PKOPORTIONAL   EEPKESENTATION. 

person  voted  for  as  Vice  President.  They  are  to  make  a  list 
of  all  the  persons  voted  for,  and  the  number  of  votes  for  each, 
■which  they  are  to  transmit  to  the  President  of  the  Senate,  who, 
in  the  presence  of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives, 
shall  count  the  votes  and  declare  who  is  chosen.  Thus  the 
matter  now  stands.  We  propose  to  show,  as  previously  stated, 
that  this  mode  as  now  used  does  not  carry  out  the  intention  of 
the  framers  of  the  Constitution ;  that  it  is  not  a  faithful  indi- 
cation of  popular  will,  and,  therefore,  is  subversive  of  the 
principle  that  lies  at  the  foundation  of  our  government — that 
the  will  of  the  people  lawfully  expressed  should  be  inviolate. 
If  this  is  so,  this  mode  should  be  abolished. 

As  to  the  intent  of  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  we  are 
not  left  in  doubt.  Alexander  Hamilton,  of  New  York,  a 
member  of  the  convention  which  formed  the  Constitution,  in 
No.  68  of  the  Federalist,  acknowledged  that  the  mode  as  pre- 
scribed for  the  election  of  the  President  by  electors  chosen  by 
the  people  was  objectionable.     He  says : 

The  convention  which  formed  the  Constitution  did  not  desire  the 
appointment  of  President  to  depend  on  pre-existing  bodies  of  men,  who 
might  be  tampered  with  beforehand  to  prostitute  their  votes. 

The  mode  was  suggested  by  the  practice  of  the  Germanic 
Confederation  ;  and  this  was  that  the  electors  or  people  should 
choose  as  their  representatives  or  electors  men  of  high  •charac- 
ter, capable  and  honest,  above  influences  of  place  or  power, 
(for  no  person  holding  an  office  of  trust  or  profit  under  the 
United  States  can  be  an  elector,)  and  these  electors,  unbiased 
by  party  partialities  and  prejudices,  unawed  by  power,  imper- 
vious to  the  seductions  of  place,  but  guided  only  by  patriot- 
ism and  virtue,  should  select  some  citizen  of  the  nation,  emi- 
nent for  his  services,  virtues,  and  talents,  as  Chief  Magistrate. 

If  this  be  the  true  intent  of  the  framers  of  the  Constitution, 
how  widely  does  the  practice  differ  from  the  intent !  Any  one 
who  has  ever  witnessed  the  assembling  of  the  electors  of  any 
State  can  but  have  felt  the  ridiculous  mockery  with  which,  as 
mere  automatons,  they  carry  out  the  edict  which  a  caucus  or 
convention  has  already  dictated ;  and  for  any  elector  to  vary 
therefrom,  or  dare  to  follow  the  convictions  of  his  judgment, 
would   be   political   suicide,  although  it  is  his   constitutional 


CHOICE  OF   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTORS.  211 

right  so  to  do.  One  case  only  occurs  to  our  memory  in  the 
history  of  our  government  where  an  elector  has  ventured  to 
exercise  this  unquestioned  right.  In  1820  Mr.  William  Plum- 
mer,  elected  in  New  Hampshire  as  an  elector  to  choose  a  Presi- 
dent, voted  for  John  Quincy  Adams  (who  was  not  then  a  can- 
didate or  the  nominee  of  any  party)  against  James  Monroe. 

He  was  doomed  to  political  death.  This  incident  was  the 
more  singular  as  it  was  the  only  vote  cast  in  any  electoral  col- 
lege against  Mr.  Monroe.  This  gave  occasion  to  the  caustic 
remark  of  John  Randolph,  of  Virginia,  in  Congress,  that  "Mr. 
Monroe  came  in  by  unanimous  consent  and  went  out  of  office 
by  unanimous  consent" 

That  the  mode  now  used  may  be  no  indication  of  the  wishes 
of  the  people,  may  fail  in  many  instances  to  carry  out  their 
will,  and,  in  fact,  be  at  variance  with  and  in  opposition  thereto, 
the  examples  in  our  political  history,  as  we  will  presently  show, 
abundantly  prove. 

In  1800  this  mode  had  nearly  placed  in  the  Presidential 
chair  Aaron  Burr,  for  which  high  position  it  is  well  known  he 
did  not  receive  a  single  electoral  or  popular  vote. 

In  1824,  under  this  mode,  John  Quincy  Adams  was  placed 
in  the  Presidential  chair  against  the  declared  wishes  of  a  ma- 
jority of  the  people,  for  he  was  in  a  minority  in  both  the  elec- 
toral and  popular  vote.  We  have  prepared  a  table  of  the 
popular  and  electoral  vote.  The  electoral  vote  is  given  from 
the  organization  of  the  government ;  the  popular  vote  is  only 
from  1824.  This  vote  has  no  constitutional  existence,  and  no 
federal  record  officially  presents  it.  Prior  to  the  adoption  of 
the  amendment  in  1804  the  mode  of  choosing  electors  was  so 
heterogeneous,  by  the  legislatures,  by  districts,  and  by  the  peo- 
ple, that  no  accurate  or  perfect  compilation  concerning  it  is 
extant  worthy  of  confidence.  Even  after  the  adoption  of  this 
amendment  very  many  States  continued  to  choose  electors  by 
the  legislature,  (notably  New  Jersey,  North  Carolina,  South 
Carolina,  and  occasionally  Connecticut,  Massachusetts,  New 
York,  and  Vermont.)  In  the  election  of  1824  the  electors  for 
President  and  Vice  President  in  Delaware,  Georgia,  Louisiana, 
South  Carolina,  New  York,  and  Vermont  were  chosen  by  the 
Legislatures  of  those  States.  Of  the  election  of  1820,  back  to 
which  the  table  of  popular  vote  extends,  Niles's  Register,  of 


212  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

18th  November,  1820,  has  this  item  :  "  In  Maryland  and  Vir- 
ginia the  election  of  electors  excites  so  little  interest  because 
there  was  no  thought  of  opposition  that  very  few  votes  were 
cast,  only  17  at  Richmond."  Hence  of  the  popular  vote,  as 
before  stated,  no  complete  record  is  extant.  The  table  on  the 
next  page  is  as  complete  as  possible  and  worthy  of  careful 
study. 

(It  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  State  of  South  Carolina 
continued  to  choose  electors  by  her  Legislature  down  to  the 
time  of  the  late  rebellion  in  1861 ;  so  that  no  popular  vote 
from  her  is  included  in  the  above  returns.  As  she  is,  however, 
a  State  of  the  third  or  fourth  rank  in  population,  the  absence 
of  her  votes  does  not  greatly  affect  the  completeness  or  accu- 
racy of  our  exhibit.) 

An  examination  and  analysis  of  this  table,  and  a  compari- 
son of  the  electoral  with  the  popular  vote,  will  prove  the  posi- 
tions we  have  laid  down,  that  the  mode  of  the  electoral  vote, 
as  now  used,  does  not  carry  out  the  popular  vote,  and  is  not  a 
faithful  reflex  of  public  opinion ;  and  that  therefore  it  should 
be  modified  or  discontinued. 

Take  the  first  case  that  occurs  in  this  table,  where  the  popu- 
lar vote  appears — the  vote  in  the  election  of  1824:  General 
Jackson  received  152,899  reported  votes,  and  John  Quincy 
Adams  only  105,321 ;  yet  by  this  mode  of  machinery  the  pub- 
lic will  was  violated  and  Adams  chosen. 

The  next  election  (1828)  while  the  popular  majority  for 
Jackson  was  137,870,  in  a  total  vote  of  1,162,180,  his  electoral 
majority  was  95,  in  a  total  of  261 ;  that  is,  the  popular  ratio  was 
as  1  to  8;  the  electoral  majority  was  as  1  to  2f,  a  ratio  three 
times  greater. 

In  the  next  election  (1832)  this  disparity  appears  still  more 
glaring.  While  Jackson's  popular  majority  was  137,313,  in  a 
total  vote  of  1,237,691,  or  as  1  to  9,  his  electoral  majority  was 
170,  a  ratio  seven  times  greater. 

In  the  next  election  (1836)  the  popular  majority  for  Van 
Buren  was  but  2608,  in  a  total  vote  of  1,541,318,  while  the 
electoral  majority  was  124,  in  a  total  vote  of  294 ;  that  is  to 
say,  the  ratio  of  the  majority  of  the  popular  votes  was  but  as 
1  to  600,  while  the  ratio  of  the  electoral  majority  was  less  than 
1  to  6,  a  ratio  100  times  as  great. 


CHOICE   OP   PKESIDENTIAL   ELECTORS. 


213 


Popular  and  electoral  vote  of  the  United  States  from  1788  to  1869. 


1788 
1792 
1796 

1800 

1804 

1808 

1812 
1816 
1820 
1824 

1828 
1832 

1836 


1840 
1844 

1848 
1852 
1856 
1860 

1864 
1868 


Candidates. 


George  Washington., 


John  Adams 

Thomas  Jefferson. 


John  Adams 

Thomas  Jefferson 

C.  C.  Pinckney 

James  Madison 

C.  C.  Pinckney 

George  Clinton 

James  Madison 

De  Witt  Clinton 

James  Monroe 

Rufus  King 

James  Monroe 

John  Quincy  Adams 

Andrew  Jackson 

John  Quincy  Adams 

William  II.  Crawford 

Henry  Clay 

Andrew  Jackson 

John  Quincy  Adams 

Andrew  Jackson 

Henry  Clay 

William  Wirt 

John  Floyd 

Martin  Van  Buren 

William  Henry  Harrison.. 

Hugh  L.  White 

Daniel  Webster 

Willie  P.  Mangum 

William  II.  Harrison 

Martin  Van  Buren 

James  G.  Birney 

James  K.  Polk 

Henry  Clay 

James  G.  Birney 

Zachary  Taylor. 

Lewis  Cass 

Martin  Van  Buren 

Franklin  Pierce 

Winfield  Scott 

John  P.  Hale 

James  Buchanan 

John  C.  Fremont , 

Millard  Fillmore , 

Abraham  Lincoln 

Stephen  A.  Douglas , 

John  C.  Breckinridge 

John  Bell 

Abraham  Lincoln , 

George  B.  McClellan. 

Ulysses  S.Grant 

Horatio  Seymour 


Party. 


Federalist... 
Republican , 

Federalist... 
Republican 
Federalist... 
Republican 
Federalist- 


Republican  . 


Federalist... 
Republican . 


Democrat 

Federalist 

Caucus 

Whig 

Democrat 

Federalist 

Democrat 

National  Republican. 

Anti-Mason 

Anti-Jackson 

Democrat 

Whig 


Democrat 

Abolitionist. 

Democrat 

Whig 

Abolitionist . 

Whig 

Democrat.... 

Free-soil 

Democrat 

Whig 

Free-soil 

Democrat .... 

Free-soil 

Whig , 

Republican.. 
Democrat ... . 


Whig 

Republican . 
Democrat..., 
Republican. 
Democrat.... 


69 

132 
71 
68 
73 
65 

162 
14 

122 

47 

6 

128 
89 

183 
34 

231 
1 
99 
84 
41 
37 

178 
83 

219 

49 

7 

11 

170 
73 
26 
14 
11 

234 
60 

17(7 
105 

163*' 
127 

254" 
42 

Hi" 

114 

8 

180 

12 

72 

39 
212 

21 
214 

80 


176- 


261- 


303  i 


152,899 
105,321 
47,265 
47,087 
650,028 
512,158 
687,502 
550,189 


771,968 

I    769,350 

1,274,203 
1,128,303 
7,609 
1,329,023 
1.231,643 

'  66,304 
1,362,242 
1,223,795 

291,878 
1,585,545 
1,383,537 

157,296 
1,838,229 
1,342,864 

874.625 
1,866,452 
1,375,057 

847,953 

590,631 
2,223,035 
1,811,754 
3,016,353 
2.706.637 


*  In  this  election  (9th  term)  Pennsylvania,  Mississippi,  and  Tennessee  did  not  cast  their 
full  electoral  vote. 

f  In  this  election  (12th  term)  Maryland  did  not  cast  her  full  vote. 

X  In  this  election  (20th  term)  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Florida,  Georgia,  Louisiana,  Mississippi, 
North  Carolina,  Tennessee,  Texas,  South  Carolina,  and  Virginia  cast  no  electoral  votes.  J 

\  In  this  election  (21st  term)  Mississippi,  Texas,  and  Virginia  did  not  vote,  and  in  Florida 
electors  were  chosen  by  the  Legislature,  and  not  by  popular  vote. 


214  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

In  the  election  of  1840  Harrison's  popular  majority  was 
145,900,  in  a  total  poll  of  2,402,506,  a  ratio  of  1  to  16,  while 
his  electoral  majority  was  174,  in  a  vote  of  294,  or  nearly  ten 
times  greater  than  the  popular  majority. 

In  the  next  election  (1844)  Polk  received  but  31,000  major- 
ity in  a  total  of  2,626,950,  or  1  in  900,  while  his  electoral  vote 
was  170  out  of  275,  or  1  to  4 ;  200  times  the  popular  vote. 

In  1848  General  Taylor  was  in  a  minority  of  the  popular 
vote ;  his  vote  being  1,362,242,  and  Cass  and  Van  Buren  had 
1,515,173;  and  yet  he  received  a  majority  of  the  electoral 
votes. 

In  1852  Pierce's  popular  majority  was  202,008,  in  a  total  vote 
of  over  3,000,000,  a  ratio  of  1  to  15,  while  his  electoral  major- 
ity was  192,  out  of  296  votes,  a  ratio  ten  times  as  great. 

In  1856  Mr.  Buchanan  was  in  a  minority  of  the  popular 
vote ;  he  received  1,838,229,  while  the  vote  of  Fremont  and 
Fillmore  was  2,216,789  ;  and  yet  he  received  a  majority  of 
the  electoral  votes. 

In  1860  Mr.  Lincoln  was  in  a  minority  of  nearly  a  mil- 
lion of  popular  votes.  He  received  a  total  vote  of  1,866,452, 
while  the  vote  of  Douglas,  Breckinridge,  and  Bell  combined 
was  2,813,741 ;  and  yet  Mr.  Lincoln  received  a  majority  of 
123  in  an  electoral  vote  of  303.  This  election  demonstrates  in 
a  most  conclusive  manner  the  fallacy  of  the  electoral  mode, 
and  the  possible  misrepresentation  under  it  of  the  popular  will. 
Lincoln  received  180  votes,  and  Douglas  only  12,  out  of  303 
electoral  votes.  In  the  popular  vote  Lincoln  received  1,866,452, 
while  Douglas  received  1,375,157  votes. 

In  1864  Lincoln  received  2,223,035  and  McClellan  received 
1,811,754  of  the  popular  vote,  while  in  the  electoral  college 
Lincoln  received  212  votes,  and  McClellan  received  21.  A 
ratio  of  22  to  18  in  one  case  to  10  to  1  in  the  other. 

In  the  last  Presidential  election  (1868)  Grant  received  a 
popular  majority  of  309,716  in  a  total  of  5,722,990,  a  ratio  of 
about  10  to  9,  while  his  majority  of  electoral  vote  was  134  in 
in  a  total  of  294,  a  ratio  of  13  to  5. 

This  analysis,  carefully  made,  proves  beyond  all  cavil  and 
error  that  there  is  no  analogy  or  community  between  the  vote 
as  expressed  by  the  electoral  college  and  the  will  of  the  people 
as  expressed  at  the  polls.     In  every  case  they  differ.     Hence, 


CHOICE   OF  PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTORS. 


215 


the  mode  by  electors  is  unfair,  since  it  misrepresents  the  popu- 
lar will.  Justice  and  truth  demand  its  modification  or  aboli- 
tion. By  this  cumbersome  and  circumlocutory  process  the 
electors  may  be  compelled  to  elect  a  candidate  rejected  by  the 
people,  or  reject  a  candidate  accepted  by  the  people.  The  de- 
feat of  General  McClellan  was  complete,  for  he  carried  only 
three  States — Delaware,  Kentucky,  and  New  Jersey.  The 
whole  electoral  vote  was  233,  of  which  a  majority  necessary  for 
a  choice  was  117.  Now  a  change  in  the  popular  vote  of 
35,000  from  Lincoln's  would  have  changed  the  vote  of  every 
State  mentioned  below,  and  carried  their  full  electoral  vote. 
These  added  to  the  vote  he  had  received  would  have  elected 
General  McClellan. 


States. 

Lincoln's 
popular 
majority. 

Electoral 
vote. 

New  Hampshire 

3,530 
5,632 

3,407 
6,750 

20,076 
7,415 

20,190 
1,432 
3,236 

5 

Rhode  Island 

4 

Connecticut 

6 

New  York 

33 

Pennsylvania 

26 

Maryland 

7 

Indiana 

13 

Oregon 

3 

Nevada 

3 

Kentucky ^ 

New  Jersev >- 

21 

Delaware J 

Total 

70.665 

121 

The  change  of  50,000  popular  votes  in  New  York  in  1848 
from  Taylor  to  Cass,  or  giving  one-half  of  the  votes  thrown 
away  upon  Van  Buren  to  Cass,  would  have  thrown  the  36 
electoral  votes  of  New  York  to  Cass,  and  elected  him. 

We  have  shown  that,  by  the  present  electoral  system,  a  per- 
son may  be  made  President  by  receiving  a  majority  of  the 
electoral  votes,  who  is  in  a  minority  before  the  people.  We 
have  shown  that  Lincoln,  in  1860,  in  a  popular  minority  of 
more  than  a  million  of  votes,  swept  the  electoral  college  by  an 
overwhelming  majority ;  that  Douglas,  who  received  a  popular 
vote  equal  to  two-thirds  of  Lincoln's,  received  only  one-fifteenth 
of  his  electoral  vote;  that  Breckinridge,  who  was  500,000 
votes  behind  Douglas,  received  six  times  as  many  votes  in  the 


216  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

electoral  college,  and  Bell,  who  was  800,000  votes  of  the  peo- 
ple behind  Douglas,  received  thrice  his  number  of  electoral 
votes. 

Can  any  demonstration  be  more  complete  and  satisfactory  as 
to  the  utter  uselessness  and  impolicy,  if  not  injustice  and  iniq- 
uity, of  the  present  mode  of  election  by  electoral  colleges  ? 

This  defect  in  the  machinery  of  our  government  has  been 
long  seen  by  the  statesmen  of  the  nation.  General  Hamilton, 
one  of  the  framers  of  the  Constitution,  acknowledges  of  this 
mode  that  it  was  objectionable,  and  when  the  amendment  of 

1804  was  adopted,  he  proposed  another,  as  follows : 

f 
To  divide  each  State  into  districts  equal  to  the  whole  number  of  sena- 
tors and  representatives  from  each  State  in  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  and  said  districts  to  be  as  equal  in  population  as  possible,  and,  if 
necessary,  of  parts  of  counties  contiguous  to  each  other,  except  where 
there  may  be  some  detached  portion  of  territory  not  sufficient  of  itself 
to  form  a  district,  which  then  shall  be  annexed  to  some  other  district. 

Thomas  H.  Benton,  during  his  30  years  in  the  Senate,  again 
and  again  brought  this  subject  before  Congress. 

General  Jackson,  in  his  first  annual  message,  urged  an 
amendment  to  the  Constitution,  to  secure  the  election  of  the 
President  by  a  direct  and  immediate  vote  of  the  people.  This 
he  repeated  in  five  subsequent  messages.  In  his  message  of 
1829,  he  says:  "To  the  people  belongs  the  right  of  electing  their 
Chief  Magistrate.  It  never  was  designed  that  their  choice  in 
any  case  should  be  defeated,  either  by  the  intervention  of  elec- 
torial  colleges,  or  by  the  agency  confided  in  certain  contingen- 
cies to  the  House  of  Representatives.  I,  therefore,  would  rec- 
ommend such  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  as  may  remove 
all  intermediate  agency  in  the  election  of  President  and  Vice 
President." 

President  Johnson,  in  1845,  when  a  member  of  the  House, 
and  in  1860,  when  a  Senator  in  Congress,  urged  similar  views. 
As  President,  in  a  message  to  Congress,  dated  July  18,  1868, 
he  fully  sets  forth  the  injustice  and  inequality  of  the  present 
mode,  "as  virtually  denying  the  right  of  every  citizen  of  the 
United  States  possessing  the  constitutional  qualification  to  be- 
come a  candidate  for  high  office,  and  also  denying  the  right  of 
each  qualified  voter  in  the  nation  to  vote  for  the  person  he 
deems  most  worthy  and  well  qualified." 


CHOICE   OF   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTORS.         217 

Senator  "Wade,  of  Ohio,  now  President  of  the  Senate,  at  a 
recent  session  brought  this  question  as  to  a  direct  vote  of  the 
people  for  President  before  the  Senate,  and  defended  the  posi- 
tion by  an  able  argument.  In  a  recent  debate  on  Senator 
Buckalew's  amendment,  the  present  mode  of  electors  was  de- 
nounced by  Senator  Sumner  and  others  "  as  cumbersome,  effete, 
and  inconvenient."  The  scene  which  occurred  recently  in  the 
counting  of  the  electoral  votes  in  the  joint  convention  of  both 
houses  of  Congress  shows  that  the  system  must  be  altered. 
Mr.  Miller,  of  Pennsylvania,  introduced  recently  (February  8, 
1869)  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  to  allow  the  qualified 
voters  of  the  respective  States  to  vote  directly  for  President. 
The  amendment  to  the  Constitution  (Article  XVI.)  of  Senator 
Morton,  adopted  by  the  Senate  February  9,  1869,  is  a  proposi- 
tion in  the  right  direction — that  the  people  shall  select  electors, 
(and  not  the  Legislatures,)  and  that  Congress  shall  have  the 
power  to  prescribe  the  manner  in  which  such  electors  shall  be 
chosen  by  the  people. 

Connected  intimately  with  this  subject,  as  a  useful  remedy 
for  the  evils  of  the  present  system,  is  the  reform  proposed  by 
Senator  Buckalew,  of  cumulative  voting ;  which  is,  that  where 
there  are  more  persons  than  one  to  be  chosen,  the  voter  shall 
possess  as  many  votes  as  there  are  persons  to  be  chosen,  and 
the  voter  may  bestow  his  votes  at  his  discretion  upon  the  whole 
number  of  persons  to  be  chosen,  or  upon  a  less  number,  cumu- 
lating his  votes  upon  one,  two,  three,  or  any  number  less  than 
the  whole.  The  plan  introduced  into  Parliament  as  early  as 
1854,  by  Lord  John  Russell,  is  nearly  similar;  that  in  certain 
constituencies  which  return  three  members  to  Parliament,  each 
voter  should  be  allowed  only  to  vote  for  two.  This  plan  was 
adopted  in  1867,  and  is  now  the  law  of  England.  Still  another 
plan  is  urged  by  John  Stuart  Mill  in  his  work  on  "  Represent- 
ative Government,"  (proposed  originally  by  James  Garth  Mar- 
shall,) that  the  elector,  having  his  three  votes,  should  be  at 
liberty  to  give  all  to  one  candidate,  or  two  to  one  and  one  to 
another.  This  is  similar  to  the  plan  introduced  in  the  Senate 
(January  13,  1869)  by  Senator  Buckalew,  and  commended  by 
Earl  Grey  in  his  work  on  "  Parliamentary  Reform."  The 
more  these  works  are  studied,  the  more  clearly  will  appear  the 
perfect  feasibility  of  the  plan  and  its  transcendent  advantages. 


218  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

The  allied  plan  of  personal  representation  has  also  been  highly 
commended.  As  presented  by  Mr.  Hare  in  an  elaborate  work, 
it  contains  another  great  idea  ;  that  those  who  did  not  like  the 
local  candidates  may  fill  up  their  ticket  by  voting  for  persons 
of  national  reputation.  This  is  sometimes  done  in  our  country 
on  important  occasions  of  deep  interest.  In  1835,  a  conven- 
tion was  called  in  North  Carolina  to  reform  her  constitution. 
It  was  the  first  convention  for  this  purpose  since  1776,  and 
deeply  excited  the  public  mind.  The  ablest  men  of  the  State 
were  chosen  without  regard  to  their  location  or  politics. 

The  natural  tendency  of  representative  governments,  in  the 
opinion  of  Mr.  Mill,  is  to  collective  mediocrity.  This  will  be 
increased  the  more  the  elective  franchise  is  extended.  Ed- 
mund Burke  was  repudiated  by  the  electors  of  Bristol,  in  1780, 
for  Parliament,  for  his  advocacy  of  the  cause  of  the  American 
colonies.  He  was,  however,  returned  by  another  constituency, 
and  continued  during  life  in  Parliament,  contributing  to  its 
debates  and  to  the  glory  of  the,  nation.  In  contrast  to  this, 
"William  R.  Davie,  who  had  been  a  gallant  and  successful 
officer  in  the  war,  governor  of  the  State,  (1798,)  envoy  extra- 
ordinary to  France,  (1799,)  was  defeated  in  popular  elections 
in  North  Carolina,  when  a  candidate  for  Congress  and  for  the 
Legislature,  by  individuals  without  extraordinary  merit  or 
talent. 

There  is  hardly  a  State  of  our  Union  in  which  the  congres- 
sional districts  are  not  gerrymandered  in  the  interest  of  party. 
This  adds  to  the  deterioration  of  our  public  service,  so  that 
Mr.  Mill  declares  "  it  is  an  admitted  fact  that  in  the  American 
democracy,  which  is  constructed  on  this  faulty  model,  the 
highly  cultivated  members  of  the  community,  except  such  as 
are  willing  to  sacrifice  their  own  judgment  and  conscience  to 
the  behests  of  party  and  become  the  servile  echo  of  those  who 
are  inferiors  in  knowledge,  do  not  allow  their  names  as  candi- 
dates for  Congress  or  the  Legislature,  so  certain  it  is  they  would 
be  defeated." 

February,  1869. 


Constitutional  Amendment  in  Illinois. 


A  Convention  authorized  to  frame  and  submit  to 
the  people,  amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  Illi- 
nois, met  at  Springfield  in  December,  1869,  and  con- 
cluded the  performance  of  its  duties  and  adjourned 
finally  on  the  13th  of  May,  1870.  The  amended 
constitution  for  the  State,  as  formed  by  the  conven- 
tion, was  submitted  to  a  popular  vote  for  adoption 
or  rejection  on  the  first  Saturday  in  July  following, 
at  which  time  also  eight  additional  propositions  of 
amendment  were  submitted  severally  to  a  like  vote. 
An  ingenious  and  convenient  plan  was  provided  by 
the  Convention  for  taking  the  sense  of  the  people 
upon  all  the  questions  submitted,  by  means  of  a 
single  ticket.  The  tickets  or  ballots  properly  pre- 
pared were  to  be  distributed  by  the  Secretary  of 
State  through  the  County  Clerks,  and  upon  their 
face  were  to  indicate  clearly  and  separately  an  affirm- 
ative vote  for  each  of  the  propositions  to  be  passed 
upon — first,  the  new  or  amended  Constitution,  and 
next,  in  their  order,  the  several  separate  amend- 
ments proposed.  Whenever  the  voter  should  strike 
off  or  erase  from  his  ballot  either  one  of  the  propo- 
sitions, his  vote  was  to  be  counted  as  given  against 
it,  otherwise  in  its  favor.  Thus  nine  distinct  ques- 
tions were  passed  upon  by  the  people,  though  pre- 

219 


220      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

cisely  the  same  form  of  ticket  was  furnished  to  each 
voter. 

The  work  of  the  Convention  is  of  peculiar  interest 
outside  of  Illinois,  because  it  included  several  pro- 
visions well  calculated  to  secure  electoral  reform  in 
that  State,  which  were  by  strong  majorities  adopted 
by  the  people.  These  will  now  be  given  in  the 
order  in  which  they  appear  in  the  amended  Con- 
stitution, accompanied  by  some  observations  which 
they  respectively  invite. 

Election  of  Representatives  in  the  Legisla- 
ture.— The  Seventh  Section  of  the  Fourth  Article 
of  the  amended  Constitution  is  as  follows : 

"  The  House  of  Kepresentatives  shall  consist  of  three  times 
the  number  of  the  members  of  the  Senate,  and  the  term  of  office 
shall  be  two  years.  Three  Kepresentatives  shall  be  elected  in 
each  senatorial  district  at  the  general  election  in  the  year 
A.  D.  1872,  and  every  two  years  thereafter.  In  all  elections  of 
Representatives  aforesaid,  each  qualified  voter  may  cast  as 
many  votes  for  one  candidate  as  there  are  Representatives  to 
be  elected,  or  may  distribute  the  same  or  equal  parts  thereof 
among  the  candidates  as  he  shall  see  fit,  and  the  candidates 
highest  in  votes  shall  be  declared  elected." 

Under  this  amendment  a  minority  of  voters  in  a 
district  exceeding  in  number  one-fourth  of  the 
whole  vote,  can  elect  one  of  the  three  Representa- 
tives from  a  district.  The  principle  applied  is 
simply  this :  that  each  voter  shall  be  allowed  to  dis- 
tribute or  concentrate  his  three  votes  as  he  shall 
think  proper,  and  that  candidates  highest  in  vote 
shall  be  declared  elected.  Practically,  whenever 
one  party  is  clearly  in  a  majority  in  a  district,  but 
not  able  to  poll  a  three-fourths  vote,  its  members 


ILLINOIS    AMENDMENTS.  221 

will  nominate  and  vote  for  two  candidates  only,  and 
the  minority  will  nominate  and  vote  for  one,  and  all 
the  candidates  voted  for  will  be  elected.  No  can- 
didate will  be  beaten  and  both  classes  of  voters  will 
be  fairly  represented.  This  will  be  the  ordinary 
case,  but  exceptional  cases  are  fully  provided  for. 
When  the  majority  shall  be  strong  enough  to  poll  a 
three-fourths  vote  they  will  vote  for  and  elect  three 
candidates,  or  the  whole  number  to  be  chosen. 
When  parties  are  about  equal  in  strength,  or  each 
may  indulge  the  expectation  of  obtaining  a  majority 
vote,  each  will  nominate  and  support  two  candidates 
and  whichever  one  shall  poll  a  majority  of  votes  will 
elect  both  its  candidates,  while  the  minority  will 
elect  but  one.  In  this  case  it  will  be  certain  from 
the  outset  that  each  party  will  carry  one  of  its  can- 
didates, and  there  will  be  a  fair  test  of  strength  be- 
tween them  upon  the  election  of  a  second  one. 
Only  one  candidate  will  be  beaten  and  both  parties 
will  be  represented  as  nearly  as  may  be  in  propor- 
tion to  their  respective  numbers.  Again,  when 
there  shall  be  three  parties  or  interests  in  a  district 
struggling  for  representation,  it  will  probably  hap- 
pen that  each  will  obtain  one  Representative,  or  that 
one  of  them  will  obtain  two  and  another  one  Repre- 
sentative, whereas  under  the  old  plan  of  voting  one 
party  or  interest  would  be  likely  to  obtain  the  whole 
three  upon  a  mere  plurality  vote  ;  in  other  words,  a 
minority  of  voters  might,  in  many  cases,  elect  their 
whole  ticket  and  the  majority  of  voters  be  left  with- 
out any  Representative  whatever.  Finally,  the  new 
plan  allows  the  voter  to  discriminate  between  candi- 
dates in  giving  them  his  support.     He  can  in  voting 


222  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

for  two  candidates  express  the  relative  strength  of 
his  desire  for  the  election  of  each,  by  giving  one  of 
them  two  votes  and  the  other  one.  In  some  cases 
this  will  be  a  valuable  and  convenient  privilege,  and 
its  exercise  will  tend-  to  the  certain  success  of  the 
best  men  among  candidates  where  all  cannot  be 
elected. 

The  allowance  of  half-votes  in  the  new  plan  is 
one  of  its  best  features,  and  will  secure  its  conve- 
nient working  and  promote  its  ultimate  popularity. 
This  feature,  however,  is  rather  for  the  convenience 
of  the  majority  than  of  the  minority,  and  is  not  in- 
dispensable to  the  new  plan.  The  majority  can 
vote  in  either  one  of  three  ways : 

1st.  Give  single  votes  to  each  of  three  candidates, 
which  is  the  old  plan ; 

2d.  Give  one  and  a  half  votes  to  each  of  two ;  or, 

3d.  Have  one-half  their  voters  give  two  votes  to 
A  and  one  to  B,  and  the  other  half  two  votes  to  B 
and  one  to  A. 

Whenever  their  vote  shall  not  exceed  three- 
fourths  of  the  whole  vote  of  the  district,  they  can- 
not reasonably  or  safely  support  three  candidates. 
If  with  a  weaker  vote  than  three-fourths  they  shall 
attempt  to  elect  the  whole  three  Representatives,  the 
minority  may  take  advantage  of  the  dispersion  of 
their  vote  and  carry  a  second  Representative.  In  all 
ordinary  cases,  therefore,  the  majority  will  support 
but  two  candidates.  They  will  not  run  a  third  can- 
didate simply  that  he  may  be  beaten,  and  incur  at 
the  same  time  the  clanger  of  losing  one  of  the  two 
Representatives  to  which  they  are  entitled  and  have 
power  to  elect. 


ILLINOIS    AMENDMENTS.  223 

Assuming,  then,  that  in  all  ordinary  cases,  guided 
by  reason  and  self-interest,  the  majority  will  sup- 
port but  two  candidates,  the  question  remains,  In 
which  one  of  the  two  ways  above  mentioned  shall 
they  vote  for  them  ?  It  will  be  quite  possible  for 
the  majority  to  divide  their  votes  territorially  or 
otherwise  into  two  equal  or  nearly  equal  divisions 
and  use  two  forms  of  ticket  at  the  election.  Half 
their  voters  giving  A  two  votes  and  B  one,  and  the 
other  half  giving  B  two  and  A  one,  the  whole 
strength  of  the  party  will  be  economized  and  dis- 
tributed equally  to  the  two  candidates.  No  strength 
will  be  wasted  or  misapplied.  But  this  plan  will  be 
inconvenient  to  the  majority  even  when  the  proper 
result  shall  be  secured,  which  will  not  always  be 
entirely  certain.  We  think,  therefore,  that  this 
particular  mode  of  majority  voting  will  be  found 
much  less  satisfactory  in  practice  than  the  other, 
above  referred  to,  which  involves  the  use  of  half- 
votes.  When  every  majority  voter  shall  divide  his 
three  votes  equally  between  two  candidates,  giving 
a  vote  and  a  half  to  each,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  object  aimed  at — the  full  and  economical  use  of 
party  power  in  the  election — will  be  reached,  and 
reached  too  without  trouble  or  inconvenience.  The 
preparation  of  a  ticket  reading  as  follows : 

John  Jones,  I2  votes, 

William  Brown,  lh  votes, 
will  be  within  the  competency  of  any  person  who 
can  read  and  write,  and  its  intelligent  use  by  voters 
a  matter  of  course.  As  to  counting  such  votes,  (as 
elsewhere  explained  in  the  present  volume,)  the 
question  of  convenience  is  equally  clear.     The  elec- 


224      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

tion  officers  can  copy  upon  their  tally-papers  from 
the  first  ticket  drawn  from  the  box,  the  names  of 
the  candidates  with  the  figures  attached  (it  will  be 
convenient  to  enclose  the  latter  in  small  circles  with 
a  pen)  and  will  then  take  down  that  and  successive 
tickets  in  scores  of  five  towards  the  right  according 
to  the  common  practice.  The  figures  1£  will  thus 
constitute  a  sign  of  value  for  the  strokes  which  fol- 
low, and  after  summing  up  the  latter,  fifty  per  cent, 
will  be  added  to  make  up  the  true  total  of  votes. 
Thus,  if  eighty  such  tickets  are  counted  to  a  candi- 
date, the  score  will  be  carried  out — 80  +  40  =  120 
votes,  which  will  be  placed  to  the  credit  of  such  can- 
didate upon  the  return. 

Choice  of  Directors  and  Managers  of  In- 
corporated Companies. —  The  Third  Section  of 
the  Eleventh  Article  is  one  of  the  most  important 
ever  introduced  into  a  constitution,  and  is  as  follows: 

"  The  General  Assembly  shall  provide  by  law,  that  in  all 
elections  for  directors  or  managers  of  incorporated  companies, 
every  stockholder  shall  have  the  right  to  vote,  in  person  or  by 
proxy,  for  the  number  of  shares  of  stock  owned  by  him,  for  as 
many  persons  as  there  are  directors  or  managers  to  be  elected, 
or  to  cumulate  said  shares  and  give  one  candidate  as  many 
votes  as  the  number  of  directors  multiplied  by  his  number  of 
shares  shall  equal,  or  to  distribute  them  on  the  same  principle 
among  as  many  candidates  as  he  shall  think  fit;  and  such 
directors  or  managers  shall  not  be  elected  in  any  other  man- 
ner." 

There  are,  probably,  several  thousand  corporate 
companies  in  Illinois  to  the  elections  of  which  this 
important  amendment  will  apply;  for  it  searches 
out  all  such  bodies  in  the  State,  without  exception, 


ILLINOIS    AMENDMENTS.  225 

and  applies  to  them  the  hand  of  reform.  Hereafter, 
a  mere  majority,  a  clique  or  a  combination  of  stock- 
holders in  an  Illinois  corporation,  will  not  be  allowed 
to  exclude  their  co-stockholders  from  all  voice  in  the 
management  of  the  corporation,  nor  will  a  minority 
of  stockholders  holding  a  majority  of  stock  be  al- 
lowed to  do  so.  The  mismanagement  of  corporate 
bodies,  and  secresy,  intrigue  or  corruption  in  the 
proceedings  of  their  officers,  will  receive  an  import- 
ant and  necessary  check.  All  the  stockholders  will 
be  able  to  represent  themselves  in  the  board  of 
managers,  thus  securing  to  themselves  at  all  times 
full  knowledge  of  the  corporate  proceedings  and  of 
the  administration  of  the  funds  which  they  have 
invested.  They  will  be  enabled  more  perfectly  to 
protect  their  own  interests  in  the  corporations  and 
to  prevent  the  growth  of  abuses. 

Election  of  Judges  in  Cook  County. — By 
the  twenty-third  section  of  the  sixth  article  of  the 
Constitution,  as  amended,  the  Circuit  Court  of  Cook 
County  (in  which  Chicago  is  situate)  was  made  to 
consist  of  five  Judges,  who  are  to  hold  their  offices 
for  six -year  terms.  This  provision  required  the 
election  of  three  new  Judges,  and  their  first  election 
was  provided  for  in  the  seventh  section  of  the  sched- 
ule to  the  amendments,  upon  the  plan  of  the  limited 
vote.  That  section  contained  the  injunction  "  That 
at  said  election  in  the  County  of  Cook  no  elector 
shall  vote  for  more  than  two  candidates  for  Circuit 
Judge."  The  election  held  under  this  provision  on 
the  first  Saturday  in  July,  1870,  resulted  in  the 
choice  of  two  Judges  by  the  political  majority  and 
one  by  the  political  minority  of  Cook  County.     The 

15 


226  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

provision  was  found  to  be  satisfactory  on  trial,  and 
the  Judges  elected  under  it  were  all  competent  and 
fit  men. 

The  men  of  the  Illinois  Convention  and  the  peo- 
ple of  Illinois  deserve  the  thanks  of  the  whole 
country  for  their  action  in  behalf  of  electoral  re- 
form. But  special  credit  is  due  to  Mr.  Medill, 
(formerly  of  the  Chicago  Tribune  and  now  Mayor 
of  Chicago,)  who,  as  Chairman  of  the  Committee 
on  Electoral  and  Representative  Eeform  in  the 
Convention,  took  the  lead  in  argument  and  labor  to 
secure  the  passage  of  those  propositions  of  amend- 
ment to  which  we  have  referred.  He  had  the  cor- 
dial assistance  of  Mr.  Browning,  former  Secretary 
of  the  Interior  in  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  and  of  other  able  and  worthy  colleagues  in 
the  Convention  ;  but  to  him  above  others  the  princi- 
pal honor  is  due  of  the  good  and  timely  work  ac- 
complished in  his  State. 


WEST  VIRGINIA  AMENDMENTS. 

The  Constitutional  Convention  of  West  Virginia, 
which  met  January  16,  1872,  agreed  upon  two 
amendments  for  the  introduction  of  electoral  reform 
into  that  State,  which  were  subsequently  adopted  by 
the  people,  along  with  other  amendments  of  the 
Convention.  One  of  these  was  borrowed  from 
Illinois,  and  constitutes  section  four  of  article  eleven 
of  the  new  Constitution  of  the  State.  It  is  exactly 
like  the  Illinois  provision,  already  given,  for  the 


WEST   VIRGINIA    AMENDMENTS.  227 

free  vote  in  all  elections  of  directors  or  managers 
of  incorporated  companies. 

The  other  amendment  referred  to  is  section  fifty 
of  article  six  of  the  new  Constitution,  and  is  as 
follows : 

"  The  Legislature  may  provide  for  submitting  to  a  vote  of  the 
people  at  the  general  election  to  be  held  in  1876,  or  at  any 
general  election  thereafter,  a  plan  or  scheme  of  proportional 
representation  in  the  Senate  of  this  State,  and  if  a  majority  of 
the  votes  cast  at  such  election  be  in  favor  of  the  plan  submit- 
ted to  them,  the  Legislature  shall  at  its  session  succeeding  such 
election  rearrange  the  Senatorial  Districts  in  accordance  with 
the  plan  so  approved  by  the  people." 


Utah  Amendment. — In  the  new  Constitution  of 
Utah,  adopted  March  18,  1872,  (preparatory  to  her 
application  for  admission  into  the  Union  as  a  State,) 
appears  the  following  provision  : 

Art.  iv.,  Sec.  25  :  "At  all  elections  for  representatives  each 
qualified  elector  may  cast  as  many  votes  for  one  candidate  as 
there  are  Representatives  to  be  elected  in  the  county  or  district, 
or  may  distribute  the  same  among  any  or  all  the  candidates, 
and  the  candidates  receiving  the  highest  number  of  votes  shall 
be  declared  elected." 


y~  op  tup, 

'university; 


PENNSYLVANIA   STATUTES 


FOR 


REFORMED    VOTING 


I.    GENERAL  LAWS. 


Choice  of  Inspectors  of  Election  :  Act  of  2d 
July,  1839,  entitled  "An  Act  relating  to  the  Elec- 
tions of  this  Commonwealth" — Pamphlet  Laws, 
519,  sections  3  and  4. 

"  Sec.  3.  The  qualified  citizens  of  the  several 
wards,  districts,  and  townships,  shall  meet  in  every 
year,  at  the  time  and  place  of  holding  the  election 
for  Constable  of  such  ward,  district,  or  township, 
and  then  and  there  elect,  as  hereinafter  provided, 
two  Inspectors  and  one  Judge  of  Elections. 

"  Sec.  4.  Each  of  such  qualified  citizens  shall  vote 
for  one  person  as  Judge,  and  also  for  one  person  as 
Inspector  of  Elections,  and  the  person  having  the 
greatest  number  of  votes  for  Judge  shall  be  publicly 
declared  to  be  elected  Judge ;  and  the  two  persons 
having  the  greatest  number  of  votes  for  Inspectors, 
shall,  in  like  manner,  be  declared  to  be  elected  In- 
spectors of  Elections." 


228 


PENNSYLVANIA  STATUTES.         229 

Election  of  Juky  Commissioners  :  "An  act  for  the 
letter  and  more  impartial  selection  of  persons  to 
serve  as  Jurors  in  each  of  the  Counties  of  this 
Commonwealth"  section  1 ;  passed  10th  April, 
1867.— P.  Laivs,  62. 

"  Sec.  1.  That  at  the  general  election  to  be  held 
on  the  second  Tuesday  of  October,  A.  D.  1867,  and 
triennially  thereafter,  at  such  election,  the  qualified 
electors  of  the  several  counties  of  this  Common- 
wealth shall  elect,  in  the  manner  now  provided  by 
law  for  the  election  of  other  county  officers,  two 
sober,  intelligent,  and  judicious  persons  to  serve  as 
Jury  Commissioners  in  each  of  said  counties,  for  the 
period  of  three  years  ensuing  their  election  ;  but  the 
same  person  or  persons  shall  not  be  eligible  for  re- 
election more  than  once  in  any  period  of  six  years : 
Provided,  That  each  of  said  qualified  electors  shall 
vote  for  one  person  only  as  Jury  Commissioner,  and 
the  two  persons  having  the  greatest  number  of  votes 
for  Jury  Commissioner  shall  be  duly  elected  Jury 
Commissioners  for  such  county." 

Borough  Supplement:  By  an  Act,  entitled  "An 
Act  for  the  further  regulation  of  Boroughs,"  ap- 
proved 2d  June,  1871,  (P.  Laws,  283,)  it  ivas  pro- 
vided as  follows : 

"  Sec.  2.  The  number  of  members  of  any  town 
council  of  a  borough  where  the  number  is  now  fixed 
at  five  shall  be  hereafter  six,  and  in  boroughs  here- 
after incorporated  under  general  laws  the  number 
of  such  councilmen  shall  be  six;  but  the  several 
courts  of  the  Commonwealth  having  jurisdiction  to 


230  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

incorporate  boroughs  may,  on  granting  an  incorpo- 
ration or  upon  application  made  to  them  for  the  pur- 
pose, fix  or  change  the  charter  of  any  borough  so  as 
to  authorize  the  burgess  or  chief  executive  officer 
thereof  to  serve  as  a  member  of  the  town  council, 
with  full  power  as  such,  and  to  preside  at  the  meet- 
ings thereof. 

"Sec.  3.  In  elections  for  members  of  town  councils 
each  voter  may  at  his  option  bestow  his  votes  singly 
upon  six  candidates,  or  cumulate  them  upon  any  less 
number,  in  the  manner  authorized  by  the  fourth 
section  of  the  act  to  define  the  limits  and  to  organ- 
ize the  town  of  Bloomsburg,  approved  March  fourth, 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  seventy ;  and  va- 
cancies in  any  council  shall  be  filled  in  the  manner 
provided  in  the  fifth  section  of  the  same  act;  but 
nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  held  to  regulate 
or  affect  the  manner  of  choosing  the  burgess  or 
other  principal  executive  officer  of  a  borough  even 
where  he  shall  be  authorized  to  serve  as  a  member 
of  town  council." 

Constitutional  Convention  Act  of  1872:  "An 
act  to  provide  for  calling  a  convention  to  amend 
the  Constitution;"  approved  11th  April,  1872. — P. 
Laivs,  53. 

"Sec.  1.  That  at  the  general  election,  to  be  held 
on  the  second  Tuesday  of  October  next,  there  shall 
be  elected  by  the  qualified  electors  of  this  Common- 
wealth delegates  to  a  convention  to  revise  and 
amend  the  Constitution  of  this  State ;  the  said  con- 
vention shall  consist  of  one  hundred   and   thirty- 


PENNSYLVANIA   STATUTES.  231 

three  members,  to  be  elected  in  the  manner  follow- 
ing :  Twenty-eight  members  thereof  shall  be  elected 
in  the  State  at  large,  as  follows :  Each  voter  of  the 
State  shall  vote  for  not  more  than  fourteen  candi- 
dates, and  the  twenty-eight  highest  in  vote  shall  be 
declared  elected ;  ninety-nine  delegates  shall  be 
apportioned  to  and  elected  from  the  different  sena- 
torial districts  of  the  State,  three  delegates  to  be 
elected  for  each  Senator  therefrom  ;  and  in  choosing 
all  district  delegates,  each  voter  shall  be  entitled  to 
vote  for  not  more  than  two  of  the  members  to  be 
chosen  from  his  district,  and  the  three  candidates 
highest  in  vote  shall  be  declared  elected,  except  in 
the  county  of  Alleghany,  forming  the  twenty-third 
senatorial  district,  where  no  voter  shall  vote  for 
more  than  six  candidates,  and  the  nine  highest  in 
vote  shall  be  elected,  and  in  the  counties  of  Luzerne, 
Monroe,  and  Pike,  forming  the  thirteenth  senatorial 
district,  where  no  voter  shall  vote  for  more  than  four 
candidates,  and  the  six  highest  in  vote  shall  be 
elected ;  and  six  additional  delegates  shall  be  chosen 
from  the  city  of  Philadelphia,  by  a  vote  at  large  in 
said  city,  and  in  their  election  no  voter  shall  vote 
for  more  than  three  candidates,  and  the  six  highest 
in  vote  shall  be  declared  elected. 

"  Sec.  2.  The  following  regulations  shall  apply  to 
the  aforesaid  election  to  be  held  on  the  second  Tues- 
day of  October  next.  .  .  . 

"  First.  The  said  election  shall  be  held  and  con- 
ducted by  the  proper  election  officers  of  the  several 
election  districts  of  the  Commonwealth,  and  shall 
be  governed  and  regulated  in  all  respects  by  the 
general  election  laws  of  the  Commonwealth,  so  far 


232  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

as  the  same  shall  be  applicable  thereto,  and   not 
inconsistent  with  the  provisions  of  this  act. 

"  Second,  The  tickets  to  be  voted  for  members  at 
large  of  the  convention  shall  have  on  the  outside 
the  words,  '  delegates  at  large/  and  on  the  inside" 
the  names  of  the  candidates  to  be  voted  for,  not 
exceeding  fourteen  in  number. 

"  Third,  The  tickets  to  be  voted  for  district  mem- 
bers of  the  convention  shall  have  on  the  outside  the 
words,  'district  delegates/  and  on  the  inside  the 
name  or  names  of  the  candidates  voted  for,  not 
exceeding  the  proper  number,  limited  as  aforesaid ; 
but  any  ticket  which  shall  contain  a  greater  number 
of  names  than  the  number  for  which  the  voter  shall 
be  entitled  to  vote,  shall  be  rejected;  and  in  the 
case  of  the  delegates  to  be  chosen  at  large  in  Phila- 
delphia, the  words,  '  city  delegates/  shall  be  on  the 
outside  of  the  ticket.  .  .  . 

"  Sec.  8.  That  in  case  of  vacancies  in  the  mem- 
bership of  said  convention,  the  same  shall  be  filled 
as  follows :  If  such  vacancy  shall  be  of  a  member 
at  large  of  the  convention,  those  members  at  large 
who  shall  have  been  voted  for  by  the  same  voters, 
or  by  a  majority  of  the  same  voters  who  shall  have 
voted  for  and  elected  the  member  whose  place  is  to 
be  filled,  shall  fill  such  vacancy ;  if  such  vacancy 
shall  be  of  a  district  or  city  member  of  the  con- 
vention, those  members  at  large  of  the  convention 
who  shall  have  been  voted  for  by  the  same  or  by  a 
majority  of  the  same  voters  who  shall  have  voted 
for  such  district  or  city  member,  shall  fill  such 
vacancy ;  in  either  case,  the  appointment  to  fill  a 
vacancy  shall  be   made  by  the   members  at  large 


PENNSYLVANIA  STATUTES.         233 

aforesaid,  or  by  a  majority  of  them,  in  writing; 
and  all  such  written  appointments  shall  be  filed 
among  the  convention  records." 

Among  the  other  additional  provisions  of  the  Convention 
Act  appears  the  following  proviso  in  the  fourth  section : 

"Provided,  That  one-third  of  all  the  members 
of  the  convention  shall  have  the  right  to  require 
the  separate  and  distinct  submission  to  a  popular 
vote  of  any  change  or  amendment  proposed  by  the 
convention." 

II.  LOCAL  LAWS. 

The  Bloomsbtirg  Act  :  "  An  act  to  define  the 
limits  and  to  organize  the  town  of  Bloomsburg ;" 
passed  4th  March,  1870.— P.  Laws,  343. 

"  Sec.  4.  To  the  end  that  the  electors  of  Blooms- 
burg may  exercise  their  right  of  suffrage  freely  and 
without  undue  constraint,  and  may  obtain  for  them- 
selves complete  representation  in  their  local  govern- 
ment, the  plan  of  the  free  vote  shall  be  lawful,  and 
is  hereby  authorized  in  the  elections  for  officers  of 
said  town  and  for  all  officers  to  be  chosen  by  them 
exclusively :  In  any  case  where  more  persons  than 
one  are  to  be  chosen  in  said  town  to  the  same  office, 
for  the  same  time  or  term  of  service,  each  voter 
duly  qualified  shall  be  entitled  to  as  many  votes  as 
the  number  of  persons  to  be  so  chosen,  and  may  poll 
his  votes  as  follows,  to  wit : 

"First.  When  two  persons  are  to  be  chosen,  he 
may  give  one  vote  to  each  of  two  candidates  or  two 
votes  to  one. 

"  Second.  When  three  persons  are  to  be  chosen,  he 
may  give  one  vote  to  each  of  three  candidates,  two 


234  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

votes  to  one  candidate  and  one  to  another,  one  vote 
and  a  half  to  each  of  two  candidates  or  three  votes 
to  one. 

"Third.  When  four  persons  are  to  be  chosen,  he 
may  give  one  vote  to  each  of  four  candidates,  one 
vote  and  one-third  to  each  of  three,  two  votes  to 
each  of  two  or  four  votes  to  one. 

"Fourth.  When  six  persons  are  to  be  chosen,  he 
may  give  one  vote  to  each  of  six  candidates,  one 
vote  and  a  half  to  each  of  four,  two  votes  to  each 
of  three,  three  votes  to  each  of  two  or  six  votes  to 
one. 

"  In  every  case  the  candidates  highest  in  vote  shall 
be  declared  elected.  Whenever  a  voter  shall  intend 
to  give  more  votes  than  one  or  to  give  a  fraction  of 
a  vote  to  any  candidate,  he  shall  express  his  inten- 
tion distinctly  and  clearly  upon  the  face  of  his 
ballot,  otherwise  but  one  vote  shall  be  counted  and 
allowed  to  such  candidate.  This  section  shall  ap- 
ply to  the  choice  of  School  Directors  and  of  all 
officers  to  be  chosen  exclusively  by  the  electors 
of  said  town,  whenever  its  application  shall  be  pos- 
sible. 

"  Sec.  5.  Vacancies  in  any  of  the  offices  of  said 
town  may  be  filled  by  appointments  to  be  made  by 
the  Court  of  Quarter  Sessions  of  the  Peace  of  Co- 
lumbia County,  except  as  herein  otherwise  provided  ; 
but  any  appointment  so  made  shall  be  of  an  elector 
of  the  said  town  who  shall  have  voted  for  the  officer 
or  person  whose  place  is  to  be  filled.  .  .  .  This 
section  shall  apply  to  vacancies  in  all  the  offices 
before  mentioned  except  those  of  Justice  of  the 
Peace  and  Director  of  Common  Schools." 


PENNSYLVANIA  STATUTES.         235 

By  the  second  section  of  the  same  act  a  Town 
Council  is  to  be  elected  annually,  consisting  of  six 
members  chosen  by  the  free  vote,  and  a  President 
chosen  by  a  majority  vote  ;  and  by  the  third  section 
two  Constables  and  two  Assessors  of  Taxes  annu- 
ally, and  three  town  Auditors  every  third  year. 
By  general  laws  two  Assistant  Assessors  of  taxes 
are  to  be  chosen  triennially,  and  two  Directors  of 
Common  Schools  each  year  for  three  year  terms. 
To  the  choice  of  all  the  foregoing  officers,  except 
the  President  of  the  Town  Council,  the  new  plan  of 
voting  applies,  and  it  will  also  apply  to  the  election 
of  Justices  of  the  Peace  of  the  town  whenever  the 
two  authorized  by  law  shall  happen  to  be  electable 
at  the  same  time  for  the  constitutional  term  of  five 
years. 

Borough  Councilmen  in  Northumberland 
County:  "An  Act  relating  to  the  extension  of 
borough  limits  in  Northumberland  County;" 
passed  6th  April,  1870.— P.  Laws,  1000. 

"  Sec.  1.  That  the  number  of  town  councilmen 
in  each  of  the  several  boroughs  of  Northumberland 
County,  to  be  hereafter  chosen,  except  in  the  bor- 
ough of  Sunbury,  shall  be  six ;  and  they  shall  be 
chosen  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  fourth 
section  of  the  act  to  define  the  limits  and  to  organ- 
ize the  town  of  Bloomsburg,  approved  March  4th, 
1870  ;  and  vacancies  in  their  number  shall  be  filled 
by  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas  of  Northumberland 
County  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
fifth  section  of  the  same  act." 


236      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

Councilmen  in  Borough  of  Milton  :  "An  Act 
relative  to  elections  in  the  borough  of  Milton  ;"  ap- 
proved 14th  April,  1870. — P.  Laws,  1177. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  the  members  of  the  town  council  of 
said  borough  shall  be  chosen  annually,  commencing 
with  the  next  election,  and  three  thereof  shall  be 
chosen  from  each  ward  upon  the  principle  of  the 
free  vote  as  denned  and  fixed  in  the  fourth  section  of 
the  act  to  define  the  limits  and  to  organize  the  town 
of  Bloomsburg,  approved  March  4th,  A.  D.  1870, 
and  all  acts  and  parts  of  acts  inconsistent  herewith 
are  hereby  repealed." 

Officers  in  Borough  Sunbury  :  "An  Act  relating 
to  elections  in  the  borough  of  Sunbury  ;"  approved 
Uth  April,  1870.— P.  Laws,  1178. 

"  Sec.  1.  That  in  elections  hereafter  held  in  the 
borough  of  Sunbury  for  borough  or  ward  officers, 
whenever  two  or  more  persons  are  to  be  chosen  to 
the  same  office  for  the  same  term  of  service,  each 
voter  may  at  his  discretion  bestow  his  votes  upon 
one  or  more  candidates  less  in  number  than  the 
whole  number  of  persons  to  be  chosen  in  the  man- 
ner provided  in  the  fourth  section  of  the  act  to  de- 
fine the  limits  and  to  organize  the  town  of  Blooms- 
burg, passed  at  the  present  session,  and  the  candi- 
dates highest  in  vote  shall  be  declared  elected : 
Provided,  That  inspectors  of  election  shall  be  chosen 
as  heretofore,  and  that  directors  of  common  schools 
shall  be  considered  and  held  to  be  borough  officers 
within  the  meaning  of  this  act." 


PENNSYLVANIA  STATUTES.  237 

Boeough  Officers  in  Berwick:  "An  Act  sup- 
plementary to  the  several  acts  relating  to  the  bor- 
ough of  Berwick  in  the  County  of  Columbia  ;" 
approved  13^A  Hay,  1870. 

"Sec.  1.  That  the  number  of  town  councilmen  to 
be  hereafter  chosen  at  elections  in  the  borough  of 
Berwick,  Columbia  County,  shall  be  six ;  and  that 
all  elections  in  said  borough  for  the  choice  of  bor- 
ough officers  and  for  the  choice  of  directors  of  com- 
mon schools,  and  all  appointments  and  elections  to 
fill  vacancies  in  the  offices  of  said  borough,  shall  be 
according  to  the  fourth  and  fifth  sections  of  the  act 
to  define  the  limits  and  to  organize  the  town  of 
Bloomsburg,  approved  4th  March,  1870  :  Provided, 
however,  That  this  section  shall  not  apply  to  the 
choice  of  inspectors  of  election  for  said  borough." 

Directors  for  the  Bloom  Poor  District  :  "An 
Act  to  regulate  the  election  of  directors  of  the 
poor  for  the  Bloom  district  in  Columbia  County  ;" 
approved  28th  March,  1870. — P.  Laws,  611. 

"Sec.  1.  That  on  the  second  Tuesday  of  October 
next,  and  every  third  year  thereafter  at  the  time  of 
township  elections  under  general  laws,  the  qualified 
electors  of  Bloomsburg  and  of  the  several  townships 
which  shall  have  become  a  part  of  the  Bloom  district 
for  the  support  and  maintenance  of  the  poor,  shall 
elect  three  persons  to  be  directors  of  the  poor  for  said 
district,  whose  terms  of  service  shall  commence  upon 
the  first  day  of  April  next  following  their  election, 
and  continue  for  three  years. 

"  Sec.  2.  In  all  elections  of  said  directors,  whether 


238  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

for  regular  terms  or  to  fill  vacancies,  each  voter  may 
distribute  his  votes  to  and  among  candidates  as  he 
shall  think  fit,  or  may  bestow  them  all  upon  one 
candidate;  and  where  three  directors  are  to  be 
chosen  he  may  give  one  vote  and  a  half  to  each  of 
two  candidates ;  in  all  cases  the  candidates  highest 
in  vote  shall  be  chosen.  .  .  . 

"  Sec.  3.  Whenever  a  single  vacancy  shall  occur 
or  exist  in  said  board  of  directors,  the  Court  of  Quar- 
ter Sessions  of  the  Peace  of  Columbia  County  shall 
fill  the  same  for  the  whole  remaining  part  of  the  un- 
expired term  in  question,  by  appointing  some  fit  and 
competent  person  from  among  the  electors  of  said 
poor  district  who  shall  have  voted  for  the  director 
whose  place  is  to  be  filled." 

School  Directors  in  Certain  Districts. — By 
an  act  approved  10th  February,  1871,  (P.  Laws,  41,) 
it  was  provided,  "  That  hereafter  in  the  election  of 
School  Directors  in  the  Twenty-second,  Twenty- 
fourth,  and  Twenty-seventh  Wards  of  the  City  of 
Philadelphia,  each  elector  shall  vote  for  four  per- 
sons, and  the  six  having  the  highest  number  of  votes 
shall  be  declared  duly  elected  to  serve  for  three 
years  from  the  first  day  of  January  next  succeeding 
their  election." 

By  another  act,  approved  2d  June,  1871,  (P. 
Laws,  1351,)  entitled,  "  An  Act  to  change  the  mode 
of  electing  school  directors  in  certain  townships  in 
the  counties  of  Bradford  and  Susquehanna/'  it  was 
provided — 

"That  from  and  after  the  passage  of  this  act, 
school    directors   in   Smithfield    township,   in    the 


PENNSYLVANIA  STATUTES.         239 

county  of  Bradford,  and  Apolorous  and  Franklin 
townships,  Susquehanna  County,  shall  be  chosen  by 
the  electors  of  said  districts  in  the  manner  follow- 
ing :  Whenever  an  even  number  is  to  be  chosen, 
each  elector  shall  have  the  right  to  vote  for  one-half 
the  number  to  be  elected,  and  whenever  an  odd 
number  is  to  be  chosen,  each  elector  may  vote  for  a 
majority  of  the  number  to  be  elected,  and  the  per- 
sons who  shall  receive  the  highest  number  of  votes 
to  the  number  to  be  chosen,  shall  be  declared  elected, 
and  of  those  persons  elected,  the  ones  receiving  the 
highest  number  of  votes  shall  hold  their  office  for 
the  longest  term  of  years." 

Riverside  Borough:  "An<J.ct  to  incorporate  the 
village  of  Riverside,  in  the  County  of  Northum- 
berland, into  a  borough;"  approved  4th  May, 
1871.— P.  Laws,  1120. 

"  Sec.  10.  The  election  of  councilmen  and  other 
officers  of  said  borough,  including  school  directors 
and  justices  of  the  peace,  shall  be  upon  the  plan  of 
the  free  vote,  and  according  to  the  provisions  of  the 
fourth  section  of  the  Bloomsburg  act  of  4th  of 
March,  1870,  so  far  as  the  same  can  be  applied ;  and 
the  filling  of  vacancies  in  the  offices  of  said  borough 
shall  be,  according  to  the  fifth  section  of  the  same 
act,  by  the  court  of  common  pleas  of  Northumber- 
land county.'' 

Uniontown  Borough  :  ".A  supplement  to  the  several 
acts  relating  to  the  borough  of  Uniontown,  Fayette 
County;"  approved  11th  May,  1871.— P.  Laws,  748. 

"Sec.  2.  That  at  the  next  election  in  said  borough, 


240  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

and  annually  thereafter,  there  shall  be  chosen  by 
vote  at  large  in  said  borough,  six  members  of  coun- 
cil, two  assessors  of  taxes  and  two  constables ;  and 
the  said  councilmen,  assessors,  and  constables  shal] 
be  elected  under  the  provisions  and  in  the  manner 
prescribed  by  the  fourth  section  of  the  act  of  March 
fourth,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  seventy, 
entitled  "  An  Act  to  define  the  limits  and  to  organize 
the  town  of  Bloomsburg ;"  and  vacancies  in  said 
offices  shall  be  filled,  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of 
the  fifth  section  of  the  same  act,  by  the  court  of 
quarter  sessions  of  Fayette  County. 

"  Sec.  3.  At  the  next  election,  and  annually  there- 
after, the  voters  of  said  borough  shall  also  elect  at 
large  two  school  directors,  who  shall  hold  their  of- 
fices for  three-year  terms ;  and  at  said  next  election, 
and  every  third  year  thereafter,  there  shall  be  elect- 
ed three  auditors  who  shall  annually  settle  and  ad- 
just all  accounts  of  said  borough ;  and  the  said 
school  directors  and  auditors  shall  be  voted  for  and 
chosen  in  the  same  manner  as  the  officers  mentioned 
in  the  second  section  of  this  act." 

Snydertown  Borough:  "An  Act  to  erect  Snyder- 
town,  in  the  county  of  Northumberland,  into  a 
borough;"  approved  26th  May,  1871. — P.  Laws, 
1225. 

"  Sec.  5.  That  whenever  two  or  more  persons  are 
to  be  chosen  to  the  same  office  in  said  borough,  for 
the  same  term  of  service,  they  shall  be  voted  for 
and  chosen  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  fourth 
section  of  the  Bloomsburg  act  of  4th  of  March, 


PENNSYLVANIA  STATUTES.  241 

1870 :  Provided,  however,  That  this  section  shall  not 
apply  to  the  choice  of  inspectors  of  election." 

Shamokin  Borough  :  "An  Act  for  the  division  of 
the  borough  of  Shamokin  into  two  wards,  and  for 
the  better  government  of  the  same  ;"  approved  19th 
of  Hag,  1871.— P.  Laws,  958. 

"  Sec.  7.  In  the  election  of  all  borough  and  ward 
officers  in  said  borough,  (except  inspectors  of  elec- 
tion,) whenever  two  or  more  persons  are  to  be  elected 
to  the  same  office,  for  the  same  term  of  service,  they 
shall  be  voted  for  and  chosen  under  the  provision 
of  the  4th  section  of  the  Bloomsburg  act  of  fourth 
of  March,  Anno  Domini  one  thousand  eight  hun- 
dred and  seventy ;  and  vacancies  in  said  offices,  when 
the  manner  of  filling  them  shall  not  be  otherwise 
provided  for  by  law,  shall  be  according  to  the  fifth 
section  of  the  same  act  by  the  court  of  quarter  ses- 
sions of  Northumberland  County ;  the  manner  of  vo- 
ting herein  provided  for  shall  apply  to  the  election 
of  justices  of  the  peace  and  directors  of  common 
schools." 

Hulmeville  Borough  :  " An  Act  to  incorporate  the 
borough  of  Hulmeville,  in  Bucks  Countg ;"  ap- 
proved 8th  March,  1872. 

"Sec.  6.  That  all  elections  in  said  borough  for 
the  choice  of  councilmen,  town  auditors,  assistant 
assessors  and  justices  of  the  peace  whenever  two  or 
more  are  to  be  chosen  at  the  same  time  and  for  the 
same  term  of  service,  shall  be  according  to  the  pro- 
visions of  the  4th  section  of  the  Bloomsburg  act  of 
4th  March,  1870,  and  vacancies  in  the  said  offices, 

16 


242  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

except  that  of  justice  of  the  peace,  shall  be  ac- 
cording to  the  5th  section  of  the  same  act ;  and  all 
elections  held  in  said  school  district  of  Middletown 
township  and  said  borough  of  Hulmeville  for  the 
choice  of  school  directors  shall  also  be  subject  to 
and  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  aforesaid 
fourth  section  of  the  Bloomburg  act." 

School  Directors  in  Conyngham  Township,  Co- 
lumbia County  :  "An  Act  relating  to  the  election 
of  school  directors  in  Conyngham  township,  Co- 
lumbia County  ;"  approved  8th  Mapch,  1872. 

"  Sec.  1.  That  the  provisions  of  the  fourth  section 
of  an  act,  entitled  '  An  Act  to  define  the  limits  and 
to  organize  the  town  of  Bloom sburg,'  approved  4th 
March,  1870,  be  and  the  same  are  hereby  extended 
to  the  township  of  Conyngham  in  the  county  of 
Columbia,  so  far  as  the  same  relates  to  the  election 
of  school  directors,  from  and  after  the  passage  of 
this  act." 

Borough  of  Chambersburg  :  By  an  act  ap- 
proved 9th  April,  1872,  (P.  Laws,  1011,)  Chambers- 
burg was  divided  into  lour  wards,  and  the  second 
section  of  the  act  makes  provision  for  the  election 
of  councilmen  therefrom  as  follows : 

"  Sec.  2.  The  town  council  shall  consist  of  two 
members  from  each  ward,  who  shall  hold  their  of- 
fices for  the  term  of  two  years ;  and  in  their  elec- 
tion each  voter  may  give  his  two  votes  to  one  candi- 
date, and  candidates  highest  in  vote  shall  be  de- 
clared elected.  ..." 


PENNSYLVANIA  STATUTES.         243 

III.  A  SPECIAL  STATUTE. 

A  CONTESTED   ELECTION  COMMITTEE. 

A  remarkable  case  occurred  of  the  application  of 
the  limited  vote  to  the  choice  of  an  election  com- 
mittee, at  the  legislative  session  of  1872.  By  an  act 
approved  21st  February,  of  that  year,  supplement- 
ary to  the  general  election  act  of  2d  July,  1839, 
provision  was  made  for  selecting  in  a  new  manner  a 
committee  of  seven  members  of  the  Senate  to  try 
the  important  contested  election  case  of  McClure  vs. 
Gray.  The  act  was  as  follows,  omitting  matter 
irrelevant  to  the  present  purpose  : 

"  Sec.  1.  .  .  c  That  in  any  case  of  contested  elec- 
tion now  pending  in  the  Senate  the  committee  for 
the  trial  of  the  contest  shall  be  selected  and  formed 
by  the  Senate  ...  by  choosing  six  members  thereof 
viva  voce,  each  Senator  voting  for  no  more  than 
three  members,  and  the  six  highest  in  vote  shall  be 
declared  selected;  the  remaining  member  of  the 
committee  shall  be  chosen  by  lot  in  manner  follow- 
ing, to  wit :  The  names  of  all  the  remaining  Sena- 
tors present  except  those  of  the  Speaker  and  sitting 
member  shall  be  written  on  distinct  pieces  of  paper 
as  nearly  alike  as  may  be,  each  of  which  shall  be 
rolled  up  and  put  into  a  box  or  urn  by  the  Clerk  of 
the  Senate  or  some  person  appointed  by  the  Senate 
to  act  in  his  stead,  and  the  box  or  urn  shall  be 
placed  on  the  Speaker's  desk  ;  the  Clerk  of  the  Sen- 
ate, or  person  appointed  to  act  in  his  stead,  having 
thoroughly  shaken  and  intermixed  said  papers,  shall 
draw  them  out  one  by  one,  and  the  names  of  the 
Senators  so  drawn  shall  be  written  down  on  a  sepa- 
rate list  by  one  of  the  clerks  until  thirteen  names 


244  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

shall  have  been  drawn ;  a  separate  list  of  the  thir- 
teen Senators  so  drawn  shall  be  given  to  each  of 
the  parties  to  the  contest,  who  shall,  accompanied 
by  the  Clerk  or  other  person  appointed  to  act  in  his 
stead,  immediately  withdraw  to  some  adjoining 
room,  where  they  shall  proceed  to  strike  off  al- 
ternately the  names  upon  said  list  until  but  one 
name  shall  be  left  thereon ;  and  the  Senator  whose 
name  shall  remain  shall  be  the  seventh  member  of 
the  committee. 

"Sec.  3.  Any  vacancy  occurring  in  said  com- 
mittee shall  be  filled  as  follows :  If  such  vacancy 
shall  be  of  a  member  chosen  by  the  votes  of  Sena- 
tors, it  shall  be  filled  by  a  new  appointment  made 
in  open  Senate,  by  the  same  or  by  a  majority  of  the 
same  Senators  who  shall  have  voted  for  the  member 
whose  place  is  to  be  filled ;  if  such  vacancy  shall  be 
of  the  seventh  member  of  the' committee  chosen  as 
aforesaid  by  lot  and  challenge,  his  place  shall  be 
filled  in  the  same  manner  as  that  in  which  the  said 
seventh  member  shall  have  been  chosen,  all  the 
names  of  the  qualified  members  present  being  first 
placed  in  the  box  or  urn  for  the  purpose  of  selec- 
tion ;  and  any  member  chosen  to  fill  a  vacancy  shall 
be  duly  sworn,  and  shall  perform  all  the  duties  and 
possess  all  the  poAvers  of  an  original  member  of  the 
committee  from  the  time  of  his  selection :  In  no 
case  of  the  selection  of  a  committee  or  of  the  filling 
of  a  vacancy  shall  the  sitting  member  be  permitted 
to  vote,  and  in  case  of  the  absence  or  refusal  to  act 
of  the  contestant  or  of  the  sitting  member,  the 
Senate  shall  appoint  some  proper  person  to  act  in 
his  stead." 


PENNSYLVANIA  STATUTES.         245 

The  foregoing  plan  for  selecting  an  election  committee  is 
believed  to  be  much  superior  to  the  Grenville  plan,  borrowed 
from  parliamentary  practice,  which  has  heretofore  obtained  in 
Pennsylvania,  and  is  prescribed  by  the  general  election  law  of 
1839.  By  the  latter,  all  the  members  of  a  committee  are 
drawn  by  lot  and  challenge,  and  it  may  happen  that  all  of 
them  will  be  members  of  one  political  party,  thus  exclud- 
ing all  certainty  of  thorough  investigation  in  the  trial,  as 
well  as  an  impartial  decision.  So,  too,  the  very  extended 
allowance  of  challenge  by  the  old  plan  makes  it  probable  in 
any  given  case  that  the  ablest  members  of  the  body  upon  both 
sides  will  be  excluded  from  service  on  the  committee,  leaving 
the  committee  to  be  composed  of  weaker  and  less  independent 
members. 


LOCAL  ELECTIONS  IN  PENNSYLVANIA 
UNDER  REFORMED  VOTING. 

Undeb,  the  Pennsylvania  statutes  for  reformed 
voting,  just  given,  there  have  been  numerous  elec- 
tions held  within  the  last  two  or  three  years.  From 
among  these  a  few  are  selected  to  illustrate  the 
practical  working  of  the  new  plan.  They  are  cases 
in  which  there  were  disturbing  influences,  interfer- 
ing with  regular  party  action,  but  yet  all  of  which 
resulted  in  fair  representation  of  the  people.  They 
furnish  evidence  of  the  practicability  of  the  new 
plan  under  any  combination  of  circumstances  likely 
to  occur,  and  they  further  prove  that  not  only  does 
the  new  plan  give  to  every  respectable  interest  its 
due  representation,  but  it  also  eliminates  from  elec- 
tion contests  most  of  the  soreness  and  bad  blood 
which  commonly  attend  them.  It  has  this  latter 
effect,  because  under  it  there  are  but  few  beaten 
candidates,  no  party  or  interest  usually  putting  up 


246  PKOPOKTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

more  persons  to  be  voted  for  than  it  has  votes  to 
elect. 

If  the  subjoined  cases  prove  that  the  new  plan 
works  justly  and  well  in  the  turmoil  and  excitement 
of  irregular  or  exceptional  election  contests,  it  is 
manifest  that  its  operation  in  all  ordinary  cases  must 
be  still  more  satisfactory  and  complete. 

Bloomsbueg  Town  Election  for  Councilmen  : 
The  first  election  held  in  Bloomsburg  under  the 
new  plan  of  voting  was  on  April  12,  1870,  and  the 
following  was  the  result : 

For  President  of  the  Council  : 

Votes. 

Elias  Mendenhall 213 

Robert  F,  Clark 202 

Majority 11 

For  Councilmen : 

William  B.  Koons 393} 

Frederick  C.  Eyer 362} 

Stephen  Knorr 297 

Joseph  Sharpless 392 

Caleb  Barton 364 

Charles  G.  Bark  ley 429 

Simon  C.  Shive 260} 

Scattering 353 

Republicans  in  italic.  The  regular  Democratic 
ticket  had  upon  it  the  names  of  Koons,  Eyer  and 
Knorr,  with  two  votes  to  each,  and  was  successful, 
although  votes  were  diverted  from  the  two  latter  to 
Shive  and  Barkley,  Democrats,  originally  named 
upon  the  Opposition  People's  ticket.  For  originally 
the  People's  ticket  was  formed  with  the  four  names 


PENNSYLVANIA    LOCAL    ELECTIONS.  247 

upon  it  of  Sharpless,  Barton,  Barkley  and  Shive,  or 
two  from  each  party. 

But  as  in  the  course  of  the  voting  it  appeared 
probable  that  a  fourth  man  could  not  be  carried 
upon  the  People's  ticket,  there  was  a  partial  drop- 
ping of  Shive  and  concentration  upon  Barkley, 
which  accounts  mostly  for  the  ultimate  disparity  of 
votes  between  those  two  candidates.  The  formation 
of  a  people's  ticket  in  the  manner  above  mentioned, 
with  Mendenhall  for  President  of  the  Council,  no 
doubt  resulted  in  the  election  of  the  latter,  although 
it  was  unsuccessful  in  defeating  any  of  the  regular 
candidates  for  Councilmen  nominated  by  the  Demo- 
cratic majority  in  the  town ;  but  as  the  President  is 
a  member  of  the  Council,  the  general  result  was  ex- 
actly right  as  between  parties,  the  political  majority 
in  the  town  having  four  and  the  minority  three  in 
the  Council,  representing  fairly  the  political  opinions 
as  well  as  the  personal  preferences  of  the  citizens. 
In  the  case  of  this  election  the  new  plan  was  sub- 
jected to  a  severe  test  by  reason  of  irregular  party 
action  in  the  formation  of  a  combined  or  people's 
ticket,  but  it  vindicated  itself  in  a  just  and  proper 
result.  The  weakest  candidate  only  upon  the  com- 
bined ticket  was  beaten,  and  each  party  obtained 
ultimately  its  appropriate  measure  of  representation 
in  the  government  of  the  town. 

A  Second  Election  in  Bloomsbukg  :  A  second 
election  in  the  town  for  the  choice  of  other  town  offi- 
cers beside  Councilmen,  was  held  on  the  second  Tues- 
day of  October,  1870,  in  connection  with  the  general 
election.     There  were  to  be  chosen  two  Constables ; 


248  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

two  Assessors  of  taxes ;  two  assistant  Assessors ; 
two  School  Directors  and  three  Town  Auditors,  be- 
side the  usual  officers  of  election  for  the  two  dis- 
tricts of  East  and  West  Bloomsburg,  and  a  Justice 
of  the  Peace  to  fill  a  vacancy.  Omitting  the  latter 
officers  from  further  notice,  as  they  were  electable 
under  former  laws,  we  proceed  to  explain  how  those 
chosen  under  the  Bloomsburg  Act  were  voted  for 
and  elected. 

Each  party  nominated  a  ticket  in  the  same  form. 
The  Democratic  ticket  was  as  follows : 

Constable— Martin  C.  Woodward,  2  votes. 
Assessor — John  K.  Grotz,  2  votes. 
Assistant  Assessor— Frederick  C.  Eyer,  2  votes. 
School  Director— Charles  W.  Miller,  2  votes. 
Town   Auditors— John   B.   Casey,   li   votes,  B. 
Frank  Zarr,  li  votes. 

The  Republican  ticket  being  arranged  in  the 
same  manner,  with  other  names,  it  was  certain  from 
the  outset  that  all  the  candidates  of  both  parties 
would  be  elected  except  one  of  those  for  Auditor. 
The  majority  w^oulcl  carry  two  Auditors  and  the 
minority  but  one.  There  was,  therefore,  very 
smooth  work  in  the  election  of  local  officers  ;  an  ab- 
sence of  animosity  and  sharp  management;  no 
trading  of  votes  and  no  necessity  to  struggle  for  a 
majority  in  order  to  avoid  defeat  and  virtual  dis- 
franchisement. Each  party  obtained  its  share  of 
the  town  offices  by  its  own  votes. 

We  append  the  vote  for  the  several  candidates. 

Constables. 

Martin  C.Woodward 753 

BaltzerT.  Laycock 368 


PENNSYLVANIA   LOCAL   ELECTIONS.  249 

Assessors. 

JolmK.Grotz 498 

Joseph  Sharpless 654 

Assistant  Assessors. 

Frederick  C.  Eyer , 494 

Samuel  Shaffer,  Sr 640 

School  Directors. 

Charles  W.  Miller 502 

Jacob  K.  Edgar 628 

Town  Auditors. 

John  B.  Casey 367* 

B.  Frank  Zarr 366 

F.  P.  Drinker 490* 

Ephraim  P.  Lutz 48H 

All  the  above  were  elected  except  the  one  lowest 
in  vote  for  Auditor ;  the  Republicans  in  italic. 

The  very  large  vote  given  to  Mr.  Woodward  for 
re-election  as  Constable  was  intended  as  a  compli- 
ment to  an  officer  of  unusual  merit,  whose  vigilance 
in  the  preservation  of  order  in  the  town,  and  fidelity 
in  the  performance  of  his  other  duties,  had  attracted 
to  him  a  large  measure  of  public  confidence  and  ap- 
proval. It  will  be  observed  that  at  the  foregoing 
election  the  ordinary  political  minority  of  the  town 
had  in  fact  the  majority  of  the  votes  polled,  as  the 
general  election  which  accompanied  the  town  elec- 
tion at  that  time  was  not  an  exciting  one,  and  there 
was  a  sluggish  vote  of  the  majority  party.  It  is 
evident  therefore  that  under  the  old  plan  of  voting 
the  party  ordinarily  in  the  minority  in  the  town 
would  have  swept  all  the  offices  voted  for  except  one 


250  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

constable,  and  would  have  deprived  their  opponents 
almost  entirely  of  representation,  so  far  as  represen- 
tation was  dependent  upon  that  election.  But  at 
the  very  next  election,  on  the  old  plan  of  voting,  a 
similar  injustice  would  have  been  inflicted,  though 
in  exactly  the  opposite  direction ;  the  Republican 
minority  would  have  lost  every  office  voted  for,  and 
the  majority  have  seized  them  all,  whereas  under 
the  new  plan,  at  both  elections,  each  party  obtained 
its  just  share. 

Sunbury  Election  of  October,  1870 :  At  that 
election  most  of  the  borough  and  ward  officers  be- 
ing electable  under  the  new  plan  of  voting,  there 
was  a  partial  division  of  them  between  parties.  The 
Chief  Burgess  and  the  Second  Burgess  were  re- 
spectively voted  for  at  large,  under  the  majority  rule, 
and  were  of  course  carried  by  the  Republican  ma- 
jority of  the  town.  But  to  most  of  the  other  offi- 
cers the  new  rule  applied.  Each  of  the  two  wards 
elect  annually  two  assistant  Burgesses  and  four 
members  of  the  Town  Council,  beside  their  proper 
Ward  officers.  We  give  some  results  in  the  West 
Ward  from  the  election  returns,  which  show,  how- 
ever, only  the  votes  given  to  candidates  who  were 
elected  ;  (Republicans  in  italic :) 

WEST   WARD. 

Republican,  247;  Democratic,  110. 
Assistant  Burgesses,  (2) . — John  Bourne,  277 ; 
George  Hill,  217. 

Councilmen,  (4).— K  F.  Lightner,  306;  J.  W. 


PENNSYLVANIA    LOCAL    ELECTIONS.  251 

F  riling,  293 ;  Jacob  Renn,  273 ;  Thomas  M.  Pur- 
sell,  219. 

Overseers  of  the  Poor,  (2). — Fred.  Merrill, 
237  ;  P.  F.  Zimmerman,  210. 

Street  Commissioners,  (2). — Chas.  Gossler,  252 
Charles  F.  Martin,  236. 

In  the  East  Ward,  (Republican,  210,  Democratic, 
107,)  the  minority  carried  one  of  the  four  Council- 
men  and  one  or  two  of  the  other  officers. 

In  the  voting  given  above,  the  Democrats  in  each 
case  generally  gave  two  votes  to  one  candidate,  but 
in  the  case  of  four  Councilmen,  the  Republicans 
gave  one  vote  and  one-third  to  each  of  three,  and 
the  Democrats  four  votes  to  one. 

Election  of  Councilmen  in  Northumberland 
Borough. — In  Northumberland  Borough,  at  the 
October  election,  1870,  there  was  a  Republican  ma- 
jority of  10  for  Burgess.  Very  properly  each  party 
nominated  only  three  Councilmen,  although  six 
were  to  be  chosen,  because  the  free  vote  applied  to 
the  election  of  those  officers.  The  result  was  that 
the  Democrats,  giving  each  two  votes  to  each  of 
their  three  candidates,  elected  them,  but  one  of  the 
Republican  candidates  wras  beaten  by  a  Republican 
Volunteer.  As  this  case  illustrates  the  working  of 
the  free  vote,  the  facts  will  be  stated  as  they  are 
understood  to  have  occurred.  At  the  Republican 
meeting  to  nominate  Councilmen,  a  gentleman  who 
expected  to  be  nominated  was  defeated  by  the  arts 
or  influence  of  a  personal  enemy,  who  immediately 
afterwards  boasted  of  the  achievement.  The  friends 
of  the  beaten  man  became  indignant  and  concluded 


252      PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION. 

to  rectify  the  injustice  done,  by  electing  him  as  an 
independent  candidate.  The  free  vote  afforded 
them  the  ready  means  of  accomplishing  their  pur- 
pose, and  they  proceeded  at  the  election  to  vote 
plumpers  of  six  votes  for  their  friend  and  carried 
him  through  the  contest  triumphantly.  Without 
disturbing  the  results  of  the  election  generally, 
they  carried  their  man  and  secured  representation 
for  themselves  in  the  council  according  to  their 
desire. 

Bolting  a  nomination  under  the  new  plan  means, 
then,  that  commonly  the  bolters  can  obtain  their  due 
share  of  power  and  no  more,  and  that  the  whole 
election  cannot  be  turned  upside  down  or  changed 
throughout  by  them.  One-sixth  of  the  voters  of 
Northumberland  can  elect  one  Councilman,  but  they 
cannot  disturb  the  other  voters  of  the  town  in 
choosing  the  remaining  five.  Under  the  old  ma- 
jority rule  the  bolters  would  have  been  compelled 
to  form  a  combination  with  the  opposite  party,  or  to 
trade  or  buy  votes,  in  order  to  succeed ;  the  whole 
election  wrould  probably  have  been  muddled  or 
disgraced,  and  one  party  or  the  other  would  have 
carried  more  than  its  share  of  the  officers  to  be 
elected.  The  new  plan  insures  justice  to  all,  pre- 
vents intrigue  and  corruption,  preserves  the  orderly 
action  of  parties,  cuts  off  the  main  mischiefs  of 
bolting,  and  encourages  the  selection  of  good  men 
as  candidates. 

We  append  the  vote  for  Councilmen  in  full : 

Wm.  T.  Forsyth 328 

James  Tool 301 

A.  H.  Stone 291 


PENNSYLVANIA   LOCAL   ELECTIONS.  253 

Win.  H.  Leighow 319 

Benj.  Heckert 224 

James  McClure 207 

Hiram  Young,  Ind 561 

Eepublicans  in  italic.  McClure  being  the  lowest, 
was  the  defeated  candidate. 

Election  of  Directors  of  the  Poor  for  the 
Bloom  Poor  District. — At  the  election  held  in 
October,  1870,  for  three  Directors  of  the  Poor,  under 
the  special  act  of  March  28th  of  that  year,  the  voting 
was  as  follows : 

Miller.       Kramer.  Tkeler.       Schuyler. 

Bloomsburg,  East... 232*  222  2261  163* 

Bloonisburg,  West...  132  123  223 }  180 

Greenwood 227  235*  346}  127i 

Sugarloaf. 180  180  12  10* 

Scott 115}  145}  3642  12 

923  906         1173  493} 

Stephen  H.  Miller  and  William  Kramer,  Demo- 
crats, and  Johnson  H.  Ikeler,  Republican,  were 
therefore  elected  for  three -year  terms  commencing 
on  the  first  day  of  April  following.  These  officers 
being  chosen  on  the  plan  of  the  free  vote,  it  was 
inevitable  that  they  would  be  divided  between  the 
two  political  parties  according  to  a  just  principle  of 
representation ;  the  majority  in  the  district  would 
be  able  to  elect  two  and  the  minority  one.  The 
Democrats  therefore  voted  tickets  in  the  following 
form : 

"  Stephen  H.  Miller,  li  votes ; 
William  Kramer,  li  votes." 


254  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

The  Republicans  nominated  two  candidates  also, 
and  tickets  for  them  were  prepared  in  the  same 
form ;  but  as  they  had  not  votes  enough  to  elect 
both  they  finally  concentrated  their  vote  mainly 
upon  Ikeler,  as  shown  in  the  above  return.  The 
election  at  last  became  to  them  a  question  of  choice 
or  preference  between  their  own  candidates,  and  the 
result  proved  that  they  preferred  Ikeler.  It  is  here 
shown  that  the  free  vote  not  only  divides  offices 
fairly  between  parties,  but  enables  voters  of  either 
party,  in  certain  cases,  to  choose  between  their  own 
nominees  and  to  correct  any  blunder  made  in  their 
nomination.  The  truth  is,  that  the  new  plan  of 
voting  is  so  flexible  as  well  as  just  that  it  readily 
adapts  itself  to  any  state  of  facts  at  an  election,  and 
gives  to  the  voter  that  complete  freedom  of  action 
which  is  necessary  to  his  judicious  exercise  of  the 
right  of  suffrage.  In  this  case,  where  three  Direct- 
ors of  the  Poor  were  to  be  chosen,  allowing  each 
voter  to  give  his  three  votes  to  one,  two,  or  three 
candidates,  as  he  might  think  fit,  enabled  each 
party  to  take  what  belonged  to  it  and  to  handle  its 
votes  in  the  most  convenient  and  effectual  manner 
to  that  end ;  and  it  also  afforded  the  ready  means 
of  correcting  a  blunder  made  in  the  selection  of 
candidates.  This  election  also  furnishes  evidence 
of  the  convenience  and  accuracy  with  which  frac- 
tional votes  may  be  joolled,  counted,  and  returned  in 
all  cases  where  their  use  shall  be  found  desirable. 

Scoring  of  Fractional  Votes. — An  ordinary 
and  convenient  mode  of  tallying  or  counting  tickets 
containing  fractional  votes  which  has  obtained  in 


PENNSYLVANIA    LOCAL    ELECTIONS.  255 

the  local  elections  above  referred  to,  and  in  others, 
may  here  be  properly  presented. 

When  tickets  containing  one  and  a  half  votes  to 
each  of  two  candidates  are  to  be  counted  by  election 
officers,  the  fraction  may  be  disregarded  in  the  first 
instance,  and  the  tickets  only  scored  upon  the  tally 
lists,  the  sum  of  the  fractions  being  added  at  the 
end  of  the  score,  as  already  explained  in  another 
place.  In  a  given  case  of  forty  such  tickets  polled, 
the  score  will  stand  as  follows : 

John  Jones,         (5)  W.  M.  §&  M  . .  =40+20=60  votes. 

w    ml  Tm  rW  Till 

William  Brown,  @  ^^^^^r4^2^60  votes« 

If  in  addition  to  tickets  containing  fractional 
votes,  a  candidate  shall  have  polled  for  him  tickets 
containing  whole  votes  alone,  the  latter  may  be 
scored  separately  above  the  line  containing  the 
fractional  votes,  and  be  carried  out  and  added  at 
the  right.  Thus  if  he  shall  receive,  in  addition  to 
votes  scored  as  above,  twenty  whole  votes  uncon- 
nected with  fractions,  the  score  or  tally  may  be 
made  as  follows  : 

TrU  W  >><2o 


ml 

til  TH1  THJL  W 


John  Jones,  ®  ^j^^  I  =40+20=60=80  votes. 


Other  modes  of  keeping  the  tally  lists  may  be 
resorted  to  at  the  discretion  of  election  officers,  but 
those  above  are  given  because  they  have  some  sanc- 
tion from  practice,  and  because  by  their  use  economy 
of  space  is  consulted  in  the  making  up  of  returns. 


256     PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION, 


NOMINATIONS  TO  OFFICE. 

Good  plans  for  nominating  candidates  to  office  are 
almost  as  important,  and  deserve  consideration  almost 
as  much,  as  good  plans  for  electing  them.  In  this 
place  it  is  therefore  proposed  to  notice  two  recent 
plans  of  nomination  which  have  been  applied  in 
Pennsylvania  to  the  selection  of  nominees  for 
county  offices.  They  are  both  popular-vote  plans, 
and  the  purpose  of  both  is  to  avoid  the  evils  which 
ordinarily  attend  upon  representative  conventions. 
The  one  is  known  as  the  "Crawford  County 
System,"  and  the  other  as  the  "  Columbia  County 
Plan ;"  so  named  from  the  counties  in  which  they 
respectively  originated  and  were  first  put  in  force. 

By  the  Crawford  County  plan,  the  voters  at 
primary  elections  vote  directly  for  candidates  for 
nomination ;  from  each  election  district  a  return 
judge  conveys  the  return  of  his  district  to  a  joint 
meeting  of  return  judges  for  the  county;  in  the 
joint  meeting  of  those  judges  the  returns  are  cast 
up  and  candidates  highest  in  vote  for  each  office  are 
declared  the  nominees.  Of  all  bad  plans,  accepted 
in  recent  practice,  this  is  unquestionably  the  worst, 
and  yet  to  men  of  little  reflection  and  narrow  expe- 
rience, it  seems  fair,  reasonable,  judicious  and  just. 
Hence  it  has  been  adopted  in  many  counties  in 
place  of  the  old  convention  plan.  The  main  objec- 
tions to  it  are  these :  That  it  produces,  inevitably, 
expensive  contests  for  nomination;  that  it  tends 
strongly  to  fraudulent  voting  and  fraudulent  returns ; 
that  it  makes  success  very  often  dependent  upon 


NOMINATIONS   TO   OFFICE.  257 

intrigue  between  candidates  whereby  voters  are 
deceived;  that  it  shamefully  disregards  and  puts 
ojDen  contempt  upon  the  doctrine  that  the  majority 
shall  rule ;  that  it  leads  to  embarrassment  of  voters 
and  to  blunders  in  voting  by  reason  of  ignorance 
among  voters  of  the  relative  strength  of  candidates, 
and  lastly,  that  it  substitutes  a  feeble  body  of 
return  judges  (who  hardly  bear  a  representative 
character)  for  a  regular,  strong  convention,  for  the 
transaction  of  other  party  business  beside  the 
making  of  nominations.  Of  course  it  multiplies 
candidates,  exasperates  popular  j)assions,  and  de- 
grades the  whole  tone  of  party  action. :|: 

But  the  Columbia  County  plan  of  nomination  is 
a  popular-vote  plan  of  a  different  character,  and 
challenges  attention  and  respect,  because  it  retains 

*  The  -working  of  the  "Crawford  County  system"  as  a  nominating 
plan  was  well  shown  in  the  Democratic  nominations  for  Northumberland 
County,  in  1871.  It  was  in  force  there,  at  that  time,  and  exhibited  some 
of  its  worst  features.  Hundreds  of  false  or  unpolled  votes  were  reported 
to  control  results,  and  were,  almost  of  necessity,  received  and  counted  at 
the  meeting  of  the  return  judges ;  for  one  imperfection  of  the  plan  is 
that  it  provides  no  means  for  the  investigation  and  correction  of  the 
frauds  which  it  invites.  Upon  the  face  of  the  returns  of  votes  for  the 
respective  candidates  for  the  several  offices,  at  the  primary  elections,  it 
further  appeared  that  each  of  the  nominees  (save  one)  had  less  than  one- 
half  the  total  vote  and  one  of  them  less  than  one-third. 

Analyzing  the  vote  we  get  the  following  exhibit : 

President  Judge. — For  nominee,  1408,  for  other  candidates,  2399. 

Representative. — For  nominee,  1585,  for  other  candidates,  2275. 

Associate  Judge. — For  nominee,  1349,  for  other  candidates,  2219. 

Treasurer. — For  nominee,  983,  for  other  candidates,  2461. 

Commissioner. — For  nominee,  1273,  for  other  candidates,  2074. 

This  is  indeed  minority  representation  with  a  vengeance !  But  it  was 
unavoidable  under  the  plurality  rule. 

It  only  remains  to  state,  that  the  whole  ticket  set  up  in  this  very 
objectionable  way  was  beaten,  and  that  the  plan  of  nomination  which 
produced  the  disaster  was  forthwith  abolished,  and  the  convention  plan 
restored  with  proportional  representation  of  districts. 
17 


258  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

the  feature  of  a  convention  well  constituted  for 
work,  and  because  it  applies  the  principle  of 
reformed  voting  very  thoroughly  to  the  nomination 
of  candidates.  The  rules  which  embody  and  give 
form  to  this  plan  are  not  supposed  to  be  perfect — in 
fact,  it  is  evident  that  they  might  be  improved  in 
construction,  and  made  much  more  comprehensive 
and  complete — but  as  the  first  formal  attempt  to 
secure  proportional  representation  in  a  nominating 
body  chosen  by  popular  votes,  they  may  claim  a 
place  in  this  volume,  and  justify  the  comments  and 
exposition  which  will  follow  them. 

Eules   of   Nomination  in  Columbia  County: — 

Adopted  Dec.  26,  1870. 

"  I.  The  annual  county  convention  shall  be  held 
at  the  Court  House  in  Bloomsburg  on  the  second 
Tuesday  of  August,  at  one  o'clock,  P.  M.,  and  the 
delegate  elections  shall  be  held  on  the  Saturday 
before  at  the  places  of  holding  the  general  elections 
in  the  several  election  districts,  between  the  hours 
of  three  and  seven  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 

"II.  The  representation  of  districts  in  county 
convention  shall  be  in  proportion  to  the  party  vote 
of  each,  as  cast  at  the  most  recent  election  for 
Governor,  but  the  whole  number  of  delegates  shall 
not  exceed  seventy  nor  be  less  than  fifty-four,  and 
no  district  shall  be  allowed  less  than  two  or  more 
than  four  delegates. 

"  III.  Until  the  next  election  for  Governor,  dele- 
gates shall  be  allowed  to  districts  upon  a  ratio  of 
sixty  voters  for  a  delegate,  allowance  being  made 
for  the  largest  fractions  of  a  ratio. 


COLUMBIA   CO.  KULES   CF   NOMINATION.        259 

"IV.  The  Standing  Committee  shall,  whenever 
necessary,  make  an  apportionment  of  delegates  to 
the  several  districts  under  these  rules,  and  publish 
it,  together  with  the  rules,  in  the  party  newspapers 
of  the  County,  at  least  two  weeks  before  each 
annual  convention. 

"  V.  Voters  at  delegate  elections  may  give  their 
votes  to  a  smaller  number  of  candidates  than  the 
wdiole  number  to  be  elected  in  the  manner  pro- 
vided in  the  fourth  section  of  the  Bloomsburg  act 
of  4th  of  March,  1870. 

"VI.  The  delegate  elections  shall  be  by  ballot, 
and  shall  be  held  and  conducted  by  a  judge  and 
clerk,  .  .  .  and  the  said  officers  shall  keep  a  list 
of  voters,  and  tally  of  votes  counted,  to  be  sent  by 
them  to  the  Convention  with  their  certificate  of  the 
result  of  the  election. 

"  VII.  All  cases  of  disputed  seats  in  Convention 
shall  be  disposed  of  openly  by  vote  after  hearing 
the  respective  claimants  and  their  evidence. 

"  VIII.  All  delegates  must  reside  in  the  districts 
they  represent.  In  case  of  an  absent  delegate  he 
may  depute  another  to  serve  in  his  stead.  .  .  . 

"IX.  The  voting  in  Convention  shall  be  open, 
and  any  two  members  may  require  the  yeas  and 
nays  on  any  question  pending." 

Kule  10  authorizes  special  Conventions  to  be  called  by  the 
Standing  Committee.  Kule  11  provides  that  all  County  nomi- 
nations and  appointments  of  district  conferees  and  delegates  to 
State  conventions  shall  be  made  in  County  Convention. 

"  XII.  The  Standing  Committee  shall  consist  of 
one  member  from  each  election  district,  who  shall 
be  elected  by  the  people  at  the  delegate  elections, 


260  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

who  shall  choose  their  own  Chairman,  and  any  five 
of  them  shall  be  a  quorum  when  called  together  by 
the  Chairman. 

"XIII.  No  member  of  the  Legislature  shall  be 
chosen  by  this  county  as  a  delegate  to  a  State  Con- 
vention during  his  term  of  office. 

"  XIV.  In  Convention  a  majority  of  all  the  votes 
given  shall  be  necessary  to  a  nomination,  and  no 
person  named  shall  be  peremptorily  struck  from  the 
list  of  candidates  until  after  the  fourth  vote,  when 
the  lowest  name  shall  be  struck  off,  and  so  on  at  each 
successive  vote  until  a  nomination  shall  be  effected. 

"  XV.  Delegates  instructed  by  the  voters  who  select 
them  shall  obey  their  instructions  in  Convention, 
and  votes  given  by  them  in  violation  of  their  in- 
structions shall  be  disallowed  by  the  Convention. 
All  instructions  shall  be  reported  by  the  election 
officers. 

"XVI.  Conventions  shall  be  called  to  order  by 
the  Chairman  of  the  Standing  Committee,  or  in  his 
absence  by  some  other  member  thereof,  who  shall 
entertain  and  put  to  vote  motions  for  the  election 
of  a  President  and  two  Secretaries  for  purposes  of 
temporary  organ ization." 

Rule  17.  No  person  shall  be  eligible  to  a  nomination  who 
has  opposed  the  ticket  of  his  party  at  the  next  preceding  elec- 
tion. Rule  18.  Any  voter  may  be  challenged  who  has  voted 
against  his  party  at  a  Federal  or  State  election  within  two  years, 
or  opposed  his  party  ticket  at  the  last  preceding  election,  or 
has  taken  or  agreed  to  take  money  or  any  valuable  considera- 
tion for  his  vote  at  the  delegate  election,  or  has  corrupted  or 
attempted  to  corrupt  any  voter  of  the  district  at  such  election. 
Rule  19.  If  it  shall  be  made  to  appear  that  any  candidate  for 
nomination  has   paid  or  promised  any  consideration  to  any 


COLUMBIA    CO.  EULES    OF    NOMINATION.         261 

delegate  to  influence  his  vote,  or  that  the  same  has  been  done 
by  another  with  his  approbation,  the  name  of  such  candidate 
shall  be  struck  from  the  list  of  candidates,  or  if  already  nomi- 
nated his  name  shall  be  struck  from  the  ticket  and  another 
nomination  be  made,  and  he  shall  be  ineligible  as  a  candidate 
or  delegate  for  two  years.  Rule  20.  Any  delegate  who  shall 
receive,  or  accept  the  promise  of,  any  consideration  for  him- 
self or  for  another  for  his  vote  or  influence  in  Convention, 
shall  on  proof  of  the  fact  be  forthwith  expelled  from  the  Con- 
vention (by  a  majority  vote),  and  shall  be  ineligible  for  any 
nomination  or  to  serve  as  a  delegate  for  two  years.  Rule  21. 
A  two-thirds  vote  in  a  regular  annual  Convention  is  required 
to  alter  or  amend  any  of  the  Rules. 

In  Convention,  August  8,  1871,  the  following 
additional  Rule  was  unanimously  adopted  : — 

"  XXII.  Candidates  for  nomination  may  be  voted 
for  directly  at  the  Delegate  Elections,  and  shall  re- 
ceive delegate  or  district  votes  in  Convention  in  pro- 
portion to  their  popular  vote  in  the  several  districts, 
upon  the  same  principle  on  which  delegates  are 
electable  under  the  5th  rule." 


OBSERVATIONS    ON    THE    COLUMBIA 
COUNTY  RULES  OF  NOMINATION. 

Representation  of  Districts. — The  maximum 
of  four  and  minimum  of  two  delegates  to  each  dis- 
trict, are  judiciously  fixed  for  several  reasons.  First, 
The  number  of  districts  to  be  represented  being 
twenty-seven,  the  result  is  a  representative  body  of 
convenient  size :  Second,  The  numbers  two,  three 
and  four  are  convenient  ones  for  the  application  of 


262  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

the  new  plan  of  voting  in  the  selection  of  delegates : 
Third,  Liberal  representation  of  the  smallest  dis- 
tricts, and  a  limitation  upon  the  representation  of 
the  largest  ones,  gives  play  to  the  principle  of  terri- 
torial representation,  (as  distinguished  from  that  of 
mere  numbers,)  without  carrying  it  to  excess,  and 
in  the  particular  case  in  hand  avoided  the  dissatis- 
faction which  would  have  been  produced  in  the 
smaller  districts  by  a  reduction  of  their  representa- 
tion in  Convention.  (Before  the  new  rules  were 
adopted  in  1870,  each  district,  without  regard  to  the 
magnitude  of  its  vote,  was  entitled  to  two  delegates.) 
But  in  the  case  of  a  county  much  larger  or  much 
smaller  than  Columbia,  good  reasons  may  exist  for 
adopting  a  different  scale  of  representative  numbers. 
Where  the  districts  to  be  represented  are  but  few  in 
number,  as  many  as  six  or  eight  delegates  might  be 
allowed  to  some  of  the  largest  ones ;  while  in  the 
case  of  a  great  county,  with  numerous  electoral  di- 
visions, the  smallest  districts  might  be  limited  to  one 
delegate  each.  It  is  true  that  in  such  case  propor- 
tional representation  could  not  be  secured  for  such 
small  districts  along  with  separate  representation, 
but  the  evil  of  over- representation  in  convention — 
of  an  unwieldy  representative  body — may  be 
greater  than  that  of  partial  disfranchisement  of  dis- 
trict electors  by  the  majority  vote.  Besides,  it  is 
evident  that  in  the  case  of  single  districts,  (i.  e.  dis- 
tricts with  but  one  delegate,)  the  evils  of  the  major- 
ity vote  are  at  their  minimum  ;  the  disfranchise- 
ment is  always  likely  to  be  much  less  in  such  than 
in  plural  districts  where  the  total  number  of  voters 
must  be  greater.     And,  practically,  in  any  ordinary 


COLUMBIA    CO.  RULES    OF    NOMINATION.  263 

case,  it  will  be  found  that  delegates  in  convention 
from  single  districts  will  constitute  but  a  small  per- 
centage of  the  whole  Convention  membership,  and 
will  not  constitute  a  great  disturbing  force  opposed 
to  the  reformatory  action  of  the  new  plan. 

That  proportional  representation  of  districts  in 
nominating  conventions  is  a  great  improvement 
over  equal  district  representation  therein,  will  not 
be  questioned  by  any  one  when  the  objection  of 
minority  disfranchisement  in  large  districts  has  been 
removed.  For  if  the  representation  of  large  dis- 
tricts is  broken  up,  or  divided  between  parties  or 
candidates  by  the  free  vote,  the  vote  of  those  dis- 
tricts will  not  ordinarily  overwhelm  or  swamp  the 
smaller  ones  in  Convention  and  give  to  the  former 
absolute  control  of  the  nominations  to  be  made. 

The  Free  Vote  for  Delegates. — The  5th  Rule 
given  above  is  the  first  application  ever  made  of  the 
free  vote  to  primary  elections  connected  with  nomi- 
nations for  public  office,  and  it  has  been  found  to  be 
most  satisfactory  upon  trial.  The  scale  of  represen- 
tation under  it  is  not  difficult  of  ascertainment  or 
remembrance.  In  a  district  entitled  to  two  dele- 
gates, any  number  of  voters  exceeding  one-third  of 
the  whole  can  elect  one  delegate,  and,  exceeding  two- 
thirds,  both.  In  a  district  of  three  delegates,  any 
number  of  voters  exceeding  one-fourth  can  elect  one 
delegate,  exceeding  two-fourths  (or  one-half)  two, 
and  exceeding  three-fourths,  all  three.  In  a  dis- 
trict" of  four  delegates,  any  number  of  voters' ex- 
ceeding one-fifth  can  elect  one,  exceeding  two-fifths, 
two,  exceeding  three-fifths,  three,  and  exceeding 
four-fifths,  all  four.     In  each  case  the  denominator 


264  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

of  the  fraction  is  one  number  above  the  total  dele- 
gate number.  For  the  plan  upon  which  votes  may 
be  actually  cast  to  realize  these  results,  reference 
may  be  had  to  the  4th  section  of  the  Bloomsburg 
act  to  be  found  at  a  prior  page  of  this  volume. 

It  is  to  be  remembered  constantly  that  the  new 
plan  of  voting  is  not  compulsory.  It  is  permissive 
merely,  and  need  not  be  resorted  to  in  all  cases. 
Whenever  there  is  an  understanding  between  can- 
didates, or  among  the  voters  of  a  district,  as  to  the 
persons  who  shall  be  elected  delegates,  a  common 
ticket  may  be  used  by  all  the  voters,  and  cumula- 
tion of  votes  be  dispensed  with.  The  right  to 
cumulate  must  however  exist  with  the  voter  in 
order  to  his  certain  obtainment  in  any  case  of  just 
representation  by  the  concession  or  agreement  of 
his  co-electors  of  the  district. 

Instruction  of  Delegates. — The  15th  rule  is 
superseded  in  part  by  the  new  or  22d  rule,  but  yet 
invites  examination  because  it  presents  a  clear  case 
of  unwisdom  in  stopping  short  of  the  ultimate  point 
to  which  a  sound  principle  of  reform  would  lead  us. 
The  5th  rule  having  provided  a  just  plan  for  the 
selection  of  delegates,  it  was  seen  that  the  old  prac- 
tice of  voting  district  instructions  by  a  majority 
would  no  longer  work.  It  would  not  do,  for  in- 
stance, to  allow  a  minority  in  a  district  to  elect  a 
delegate  and  then  permit  the  majority  to  instruct 
him.  Thereupon,  the  attempt  was  made  to  har- 
monize the  old  practice  of  instruction' with  the'new 
voting  rule  by  a  modification  of  the  former,  ex- 
pressed by  the  words  italicized  by  us  in  the  15th 
Rule.     "  Delegates  instructed  by  the  voters  who  select 


COLUMBIA   CO.  KULES   OF   NOMINATION.         265 

them  shall  obey  their  instructions  in  Convention," 
&c.  By  this  clause  it  was  intended  that  election 
officers  should  report  separately  instructions  voted 
by  majority  and  minority  voters  to  the  delegates 
elected  by  them  respectively  and  not  combine  them 
in  the  return.  But  by  this  device  simplicity  was 
sacrificed  to  some  extent,  while  questions  of  difficulty 
connected  with  the  old  plan  of  voting  instructions 
remained  uncorrected. 

The  Popular  Vote  for  Candidates. — By  the 
new  or  22d  rule,  authorizing  a  direct  vote  by  the 
people  for  candidates,  all  the  advantages  of  the  old 
plan  of  voting  instructions  are  retained,  while  its 
inconveniences  are  wholly  avoided.  It  is  perhaps 
the  most  perfect  rule  ever  devised  for  taking  the 
sense  of  the  people  upon  nominations  for  office ;  for 
it  is  convenient,  effectual,  popular  and  just,  and 
stands  free  from  all  the  objections  which  condemn 
other  plans  of  popular-vote  nomination,  and  espe- 
cially the  plan  known  as  the  "  Crawford  County 
System." 

But  here  a  brief  explanation  of  its  practical 
working — or  of  the  manner  in  which  it  is  applied — 
is  necessary  to  its  full  comprehension ;  and  such 
explanation  can  be  best  made  by  tracing  the  pro- 
ceeding of  nomination  under  the  rules  in  its  suc- 
cessive stages  from  its  commencement  at  the  elec- 
tion of  delegates  to  its  consummation  in  county 
Convention. 

1.  The  officers  who  hold  a  delegate  election  in 
any  district  are  provided  with  election  blanks  or 
papers  on  which  they  keep  a  list  of  the  persons  who 
vote,  and  score  tallies  or  counts  at  the  close  of  the 


266  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

election  of  all  votes  polled,  whether  for  delegates  or 
candidates  for  nomination,  and  these  papers,  with 
returns  certified,  are  transmitted  by  the  election  of- 
ficers to  the  county  Convention. 

2.  The  voters  at  such  election  vote  sheet  or  slip 
tickets  (ordinarily  printed  or  partly  printed)  for 
delegates,  and  for  candidates  for  nomination  to  the 
several  offices  to  be  filled ;  but  as  the  free  vote  ap- 
plies to  the  choice  of  delegates  by  virtue  of  Rule  5, 
any  voter  may  cumulate  his  delegate  votes  on  one 
or  more  delegate  candidates  in  the  manner  provided 
in  the  4th  section  of  the  Bloomsburg  act. 

3.  Returns  of  the  votes  cast  in  each  district  for 
candidates  for  nomination  being  produced  before  the 
county  Convention  when  it  meets,  it  can  be  readily 
ascertained  how  many  district  or  delegate  votes  in 
Convention  each  candidate  is  entitled  to,  and  in  fact 
the  record  can  be  made  up  from  the  returns  by  a 
Secretary  or  Clerk  and  announced  by  the  presiding 
officer.  But  if  the  districts  be  called  over  the  vote 
of  each  must  be  reported  correctly  by  the  Delegates 
and  recorded  by  the  Convention  officers,  for  the  for- 
mer are  bound  by  the  loth  rule  to  obey  the  virtual 
instructions  of  the  home-voting,  and  the  22nd  rule 
is  imperative  as  to  the  principle  on  which  district  or 
delegate  votes  shall  be  assigned  to  candidates  by  the 
convention. 

What  is  material  to  observe  here,  is,  that  the 
popular  vote  polled  in  any  district  is  not  reported  in 
order  to  be  itself  counted  upon  the  result  in  Con- 
vention ;  it  is  simply  reported  to  direct  and  control 
the  casting  of  the  Convention  votes  to  which  the 
district  is  entitled.     There  is,  therefore,  no  motive 


COLUMBIA   CO.  EULES   OF   NOMINATION.         267 

to  swell  the  popular  vote  in  a  district  in  order  to  in- 
crease its  power  or  influence  in  nominations,  and 
hence  a  fertile  cause  of  fraud  inherent  in  other 
plans  of  popular-vote  nomination  is  entirely  ex- 
cluded. 

4.  If  upon  a  report  of  the  district  voting  through- 
out the  county  it  shall  appear  that  any  candidate 
is  entitled  to  a  majority  of  Convention  votes,  his 
nomination  will  of  course  be  forthwith  recorded  and 
announced. 

0.  If  no  candidate  shall  be  entitled  to  a  Conven- 
tion majority  by  virtue  of  the  district  voting  re- 
ported, the  Convention  will  proceed  to  make  or  per- 
fect a  nomination.  This  is  most  conveniently  done 
by  calling  over  the  districts  in  alphabetical  order 
and  receiving  the  vote  of  each  from  its  delegates; 
in  other  words,  the  vote  is  taken  by  districts,  as  it 
is  taken  in  national  conventions  by  States.  But 
still  the  delegates  from  any  district  must  report  or 
give  their  votes  according  to  the  home-vote  in  their 
district ;  they  must  still  obey  their  home  instructions 
and  execute  the  twenty-second  rule.  But  from  this 
obligation  as  to  some  of  the  candidates,  they  will  be 
at  once  or  presently  discharged  by  the  declination 
or  withdrawal  of  candidates,  or  by  the  striking  off 
of  names  lowest  on  the  list  of  candidates,  under  the 
fourteenth  rule.  By  one  or  the  other,  or  both  of 
these  means,  delegates  from  districts  will  have  some 
of  their  votes  freed,  and  can  bestow  them  according 
to  their  best  judgment,  thus  securing  a  nomination 
within  a  reasonable  time.  The  idea  is,  that  a  can- 
didate shall  be  entitled  to  all  the  Convention  votes 
which  the  people  have  ordered  to  be  given  to  him, 


268  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

so  long  as  he  remains  before  the  Convention;  but 
when  he  is  no  longer  before  it,  the  vote  pledged  to 
him  may  be  cast  freely  for  others. 

6.  Necessarily  the  delegates  from  a  district  must 
cast  the  freed  vote  or  votes  of  their  district  accord- 
ing to  the  decision  of  a  majority  of  their  number, 
except  in  one  case,  to  wit :  when  all  the  votes  of  the 
district  become  free,  when  each  delegate  may  cast  a 
single  or  separate  vote.  The  only  alternative  to  this 
would  be  the  allowance  of  fractional  votes  to  be  cast 
by  delegates  or  reported,  which  would  require  a 
special  or  additional  rule.  But  mostly  nominations 
will  be  made  before  this  question  can  arise. 

Having  now  traced  out  the  successive  stages  in 
the  proceeding  of  nomination,  it  only  remains  to 
remark,  under  this  head,  that  upon  the  popular- vote 
plan,  contained  in  the  rules,  the  principle  of  the  free 
vote  is  substantially  applied  in  the  nomination  for 
each  office  to  be  filled;  for  the  same  popular  vote 
which  would  carry  a  delegate  for  a  candidate,  if  used 
for  that  purpose,  will  carry  for  him  a  Convention 
vote  when  given  to  him  directly.  In  a  district  of 
two  delegates  a  popular  vote  exceeding  one-third  of 
the  vote  polled  will  entitle  him  to  one  Convention 
vote ;  in  a  district  of  three  delegates  a  popular  vote 
exceeding  one-fourth  of  the  vote  polled  will  entitle 
him  to  one  Convention  vote,  and  a  like  result  will 
follow  in  a  district  of  four  delegates  when  he  obtains 
over  one-fifth  of  the  total  vote.  In  other  words, 
the  same  number  of  popular  votes  is  required  to 
secure  a  Convention  vote  that  is  required  for  the 
election  of  a  delegate,  under  the  fifth  rule. 

The  Convention. — This  body,  when  assembled, 


COLUMBIA   CO.  RULES   OF    NOMINATION.         269 

represents  truly  the  whole  mass  of  voters  in  the  coun- 
ty who  have  taken  part  in  the  primary  elections, 
and  is  well  constituted  for  the  transaction  of  business, 
for  the  selection  of  district  conferees  and  delegates 
to  State  Conventions,  etc.,  as  well  as  for  perfecting 
nominations  which  have  not  been  determined  by 
the  people ;  and  in  practice  it  has  been  found  that 
conventional  action  under  the  new  rules  (and  par- 
ticularly since  the  adoption  of  the  twenty-second 
one)  has  been  fair  and  satisfactory. 

THE  PLAN  IN  AMENDED  FORM. 

For  general  adoption  and  use  the  Columbia  County  plan 
might  be  expressed  in  a  series  of  Rules  somewhat  as  follows : 

RULES. 

A. — Voters  at  the  primary  elections  may  cast  their  delegate 
votes  for  any  less  number  of  candidates  than  the  whole  num- 
ber of  delegates  to  be  chosen  from  their  respective  districts,  in 
the  manner  authorized  by  the  fourth  section  of  the  Blooms- 
burg  act  of  4th  of  March,  1870,  and  delegate  candidates  high- 
est in  vote  shall  be  declared  elected. 

B. — Each  voter  at  a  primary  election  may  vote  directly  for 
one  candidate  for  each  of  the  offices  for  which  nominations  are 
to  be  declared  or  made  in  Convention,  and  all  votes  so  given 
shall  be  duly  counted  and  returned  by  the  election  officers,  to 
the  Convention. 

C. — Any  candidate  for  nomination  who  shall  receive  popu- 
lar votes  cast  as  aforesaid  at  a  primary  election  in  any  district 
shall  be  entitled  to  at  least  one  Convention  vote  of  such  dis- 
trict, for  his  nomination,  whenever  his  popular  vote  therein 
shall  equal  or  exceed  the  number  of  voters  required  to  elect 
one  delegate  therefrom  under  Rule  A;  and  the  number  of 
such  Convention  votes  to  which  he  shall  be  entitled,  when 
more  than  one,  shall  be  a  number  equal  to  the  number  of  dele- 
gates who  could  be  elected  under  said  rule  by  the  voters  who 
voted  for  him  at  said  primary  election. 


270  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

D. — The  Convention  votes  to  which  a  candidate  shall  be- 
come entitled  under  Rule  C  shall  remain  to  him  so  long  as  he 
continues  a  candidate  before  the  Convention,  but  in  case  no 
candidate  shall  have  a  majority  of  Convention  votes  reported 
from  the  districts,  the  Convention  shall  proceed  to  perfect  a 
nomination  under  the  following  regulations  : 

1.  The  districts  shall  be  called  over,  and  the  delegates  from 
each  shall  report  to  the  Convention  the  Convention  votes  of 
their  district ;  first  the  vote  or  votes  pledged  by  the  popular 
home-voting  to  candidates  who  remain  before  the  Convention, 
and  next  any  vote  or  votes  unpledged  to  candidates  or  freed 
by  the  withdrawal  of  candidates. 

2.  Convention  votes  shall  become  freed  by  the  voluntary 
declination  of  candidates  and  by  striking  off  the  name  of  the 
candidate  lowest  on  the  list  at  each  vote  after  the  first. 

3.  Unpledged  and  freed  Convention  votes  from  a  district, 
when  less  in  number  than  the  whole  Convention  vote  of  the 
district,  shall  be  cast  by  the  delegation  therefrom  or  by  a 
majority  of  them  acting  jointly ;  but  when  all  the  Convention 
votes  from  a  district  shall  be  unpledged,  or  shall  become  freed, 
each  delegate  therefrom  may  cast  one  vote  separately,  or  have 
his  vote  separately  reported. 


APPENDIX. 


271 


;tj»I7ersitt! 


APPENDIX. 

PROCEEDINGS  AND  DEBATE  IN  PARLIAMENT  UPON  LIMITED 
VOTING  IN  THREE-MEMBERED  DISTRICTS. 


In  the  House  of  Lords,  July  30,  1867. 

The  reform  bill  being  under  consideration — 

Lord  Cairns  moved  an  amendment,  to  come  in  after  clause 
eight  of  the  bill,  as  follows : 

"At  any  contested  election  for  any  county  or  borough  represented 
by  three  members  no  person  shall  vote  for  more  than  two  candidates." 

In  supporting  this  amendment  he  explained  that  there  would 
be  at  least  eleven  constituencies  to  which  the  plan  proposed  by 
it  would  be  at  once  applicable,  and  he  foresaw  that  if  there 
should  be  a  further  alteration  in  the  distribution  of  electoral 
power  the  great  probability  was  that  such  alteration  would  go 
in  the  direction  of  increasing  those  three-cornered  constituen- 
cies. This  consideration  made  him  more  anxious  that  some 
proposition  of  this  kind  should  be  adopted.  He  then  pro- 
ceeded at  length  to  present  the  reasons  which  had  occurred  to 
him  in  favor  of  his  amendment,  and  to  answer  and  repel  cer- 
tain objections  which  might  be  urged  against  it. 

A  debate  followed,  in  which  the  amendment  was  supported 
by  Earl  Kussell,  Earl  Spencer,  Earl  Stanhope,  Earl  Cowper, 
the  Earl  of  Carnarvon,  Lord  Houghton,  the  Earl  of  Shrews- 
bury, and  Viscount  Stratford  de  Kedcliffe ;  and  was  opposed 
on  behalf  of  the  administration  by  the  Earl  of  Malmesbury 
and  the  Duke  of  Marlborough.  Lord  Denman  suggested  that 
the  proposition  should  be  made  the  subject  of  a  separate  bill. 

Upon  a  division  the  vote  stood : 

For  the  amendment 142 

Against  it 51 

Majority 91 

13  273 


274  PROPORTIONAL   KEPRESENTATION. 

Lord  Cairns  then  proposed  the  following  additional  clause : 

"  At  a  contested  election  for  the  city  of  London  no  person  shall  vote 
for  more  than  three  candidates." 

The  clause  was  agreed  to. 

The  London  Times  the  day  following  contained  an  elaborate 
and  powerful  editorial  in  support  of  the  proposition  and  in 
commendation  of  the  action  taken  by  the  House  of  Lords.  It 
declared  that  that  House  had  "  by  a  single  vote  covered  many 
errors  and  justified  the  opinions  of  its  warmest  admirers.  Such 
a  triumph  of  reason  and  truth,"  it  continued,  "  may  well  star- 
tle us,  accustomed  as  we  have  been  during  this  session  to 
the  rapid  growth  of  convictions."  "The  idea  of  modifying 
our  electoral  machinery  so  as  to  secure  in  three-membered 
constituencies  the  proportionate  representation  of  both  the 
great  divisions  of  party  has  made  its  way  by  its  inherent  jus- 
tice. The  verdict  of  the  lords  has  been  decisive,  but  we  do 
not  believe  that  it  in  any  degree  outstrips  the  independent 
opinion  of  the  House  of  Commons,  still  less  that  it  is  at  vari- 
ance with  the  deliberate  judgment  of  the  country.  It  has  been 
everywhere  confessed  that  the  adoption  in  one  form  or  another 
of  the  principle  of  cumulative  voting  was  essential  to  main- 
tain the  character  of  our  institutions,  and  that  through  it,  and 
through  it  alone,  could  the  redistribution  of  electoral  power 
(which  all  prescient  statesmen  regard  as  inevitable)  be  recon- 
ciled with  the  preservation  of  our  representative  government." 

"  The  arguments  on  behalf  of  the  proposal  advanced  by 
Lord  Cairns  were  overwhelming.  He  himself  treated  the 
question  in  the  succinct  dialectic  style,  of  which  he  is  a  master, 
and  the  chain  of  his  reasoning  was  perfect.  But  he  did  not 
stand  alone.  In  fact  every  one  who  took  part  in  the  discus- 
sion, with  the  exception  of  the  ministers  who  represented  the 
Government,  was  on  his  side.  It  mattered  not  whether,  like 
Lord  Russell,  they  spoke  from  the  front  bench  of  the  Oppo- 
sition, or  like  Lord  Stanhope  and  Lord  Shrewsbury,  they 
avowed  themselves  faithful  supporters  of  the  administration 
and  resolute  to  do  nothing  which  should  interfere  with  the 
success  of  the  bill ;  whether,  like  Lord  Spencer  and  Lord 
Cowper,  they  expressed  the  views  of  independent  Liberals ; 
like  Lord   Carnarvon,  they  argued   from  the  position  of  a 


PAELIAMENTARY    DEBATE.  275 

thoughtful  Conservative ;  like  Lord  Stratford,  they  uttered  the 
sentiments  of  a  man  above  party ;  or,  like  Lord  Houghton, 
confessed  their  sympathy  with  pure  democracy,  the  result  was 
the  same.  One  and  all  saw  in  the  proposed  representation  of 
minorities  a  suggestion  consonant  with  the  strictest  principles 
of  justice  and  equity,  and  therefore  to  be  depended  upon  as 
stable  when  artificial  securities  must  prove  worthless." 

"  It  is  only  necessary  to  remember  that  the  House  of  Com- 
mons consults  and  deliberates  as  well  as  votes  to  see  how  neces- 
sary it  is  to  the  due  performance  of  its  functions  that  it  should 
contain  members  representing  all  sections  of  the  community. 
The  power  of  decision  can  never  be  endangered  by  the  propor- 
tionate representation  of  minorities,  but  the  deliberate  forma- 
tion of  opinion  is  exposed  to  great  hazard  if  the  moderating 
influences  of  .dissenting  minorities  be  excluded.  Parliament 
itself  must  be  improved  by  the  addition  of  such  men  as  will 
be  chosen  by  the  wealthy  and  intelligent  merchants  and  manu- 
facturers who  are  now  unrepresented  in  the  largest  towns,  and 
of  the  members  who  will  be  returned  by  the  Liberal  minorities 
of  counties.  The  effect  of  Lord  Cairns's  amendment  on  the 
members  for  three-membered  constituencies  must  be  equally 
beneficial,  and  its  consequences  on  the  constituencies  themselves 
will  prove  of  transcendent  importance.  The  voters  who  are 
now  hopelessly  outvoted  and  whose  political  energies  become 
feeble  by  disuse  will  start  into  fresh  vitality.  Enfranchised  in 
deed,  and  not  merely  in  name,  they  will  be  animated  by  the 
consciousness  of  power.  They  will  be  brought  into  direct 
relation  with  the  Legislature."  "  The  Lords  have  shown  their 
independence  and  their  foresight.  At  a  point  of  the  highest 
importance  in  the  history  of  the  representative  institutions  of 
the  country  they  have  been  faithful  to  themselves  and  to  their 
duties.  On  minor  questions  they  have  shown  themselves  too 
ready  to  defer  to  the  decision  of  the  ministers  of  the  Crown, 
but  when  the  character  of  the  future  government  of  the  nation 
was  at  stake  they  asserted  their  own  judgment  against  all 
attempts  to  betray  them  to  a  false  position." 

In  the  House  of  Commons,  August  8,  1867. 

On  the  order  of  the  day  for  the  consideration  of  the  amend- 
ments made  by  the  House  of  Lords  to  the  reform  bill,  the 


276  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  Mr.  Disraeli,  said  that  the 
Cairns  amendment  "had  been  opposed  on  the  part  of  her  Ma- 
jesty's Government  in  the  House  of  Lords  with  all  the  author- 
ity that  a  Government  can  fairly  exercise  over  a  deliberative 
assembly ;  but  he  was  bound  to  say  that  it  was  carried  by  an 
overwhelming  majority ;  indeed,  he  must  confess  that  it  was 
almost  unanimously  carried  by  the  House  of  Lords,  because, 
when  the  minority  was  told,  he  observed  that  it  consisted 
almost  entirely  of  the  members  of  the  administration."  He 
therefore,  in  deference  to  this  strong  expression  of  opinion 
by  the  House  of  Lords,  advised  a  concurrence  in  the  amend- 
ment. 

Subsequently,  the  same  evening,  when  the  amendment  came 
up  for  distinct  consideration,  Mr.  Bright  moved  to  disagree 
with  the  amendment  of  the  Lords.  He  expressed  surprise  at 
the  speech  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  in  view  of  his 
former  speech  when  the  same  matter  had  been  previously 
before  the  House.  He  wished  he  could  find  a  suitable  word 
to  express  his  contempt  for  the  proposition  without  expressing 
in  the  slightest  degree  anything  that  might  be  offensive  to 
honorable  members  on  his  side  of  the  House.  But  the  mem- 
ber from  Westminster  (Mr.  Mill)  and  his  friends  thought  that 
the  plan  was  in  some  degree  an  approach  to  the  principle  of 
the  plan  under  which  everybody  should  be  represented  and 
under  which  such  things  as  majorities  and  minorities  in  elec- 
tion contests  should  hereafter  be  unknown.  [Hear,  hear,  from 
Mr.  Mill.] 

Now,  he  thought  those  gentlemen  who  were  in  favor  of  Mr. 
Hare's  plan  were  not  in  the  slightest  degree  bound  to  support 
this  plan.  There  was  no  intention  in  the  country  at  present  to 
establish  Mr.  Hare's  plan,  and  the  carrying  of  this  proposi- 
tion would  be  an  unmixed  injustice  to  the  boroughs  affected  by 
it.  The  proposition  was  not  likely  to  lead  to  the  plan  of  Mr. 
Hare,  but  probably  to  have  a  contrary  effect  by  reason  of  the 
ill  will  it  would  create  in  these  large  boroughs  and  in  the 
country.  The  change  proposed  to  be  made  was  a  fundamental 
change.  There  was  no  precedent  for  it  in  parliamentary  his- 
tory. It  affected  fundamentally  the  power  of  not  only  the 
constituency  but  of  every  individual  in  it.  The  alteration 
proposed  had  not  been  asked  for.     During  six  hundred  years 


PARLIAMENTARY   DEBATE.  277 

the  principle  of  election  by  the  majority  had  prevailed  in  the 
selection  of  members  of  the  House.  He  suggested  that  the 
House  at  least  suspend  its  decision  in  favor  of  the  proposition 
until  it  had  been  a  longer  time  before  the  country  and  a  fuller 
opportunity  afforded  the  constituencies  of  making  up  their 
minds  upon  it.  He  cited  the  cases  of  Liverpool,  Manchester, 
Birmingham,  and  Leeds.  They  had  been  entitled  to  two 
members  each,  making  eight  altogether.  By  the  bill  they 
were  each  to  have  one  additional  member,  and  under  the  plan 
proposed  there  would  be  eight  on  one  side  and  four  on  the  other 
upon  important  public  questions,  and  of  course  the  four  on  one 
side  wTould  neutralize  four  of  those  on  the  other.  Assuming  that 
party  ties  were  adhered  to  these  four  great  constituencies  would 
be  so  emasculated  and  crippled  that  they  would  have  but  four 
votes  to  bestow  which  would  affect  any  of  those  great  ques- 
tions to  which  he  had  referred.  The  assigning  of  additional 
members  to  those  boroughs  upon  this  plan  would  not  increase 
but  would  actually  diminish  their  power  in  the  House.  He 
could  speak,  he  was  sure,  for  Manchester  and  for  Birmingham, 
that  the  great  majority  of  the  constituency  and  population  of 
those  towns  would  be  opposed  to  the  proposition  that  additional 
members  should  be  given  them,  if  given  under  this  crippling 
and  injudicious  clause. 

Mr.  Beresford  Hope  declared  himself  unable  to  rise  to 
the  heights  of  democratic  Toryism  which  had  characterized 
the  speech  of  the  honorable  member  for  Birmingham,  [Mr. 
Bright.]  Was  the  case  of  Birmingham  miserable  above  that 
of  all  other  boroughs  ?  Birmingham  was  the  seat  of  one  of 
our  great  staples ;  Stoke  was  another.  He  himself  was  the 
majority  member  for  Stoke,  and  his  honorable  colleague  was  the 
minority  member  for  that  borough.  The  Conservatives  were 
entitled  to  one  member,  but  he  was  of  opinion  that  from  their 
wealth,  position,  intellect,  and  numbers  the  Liberals  of  Stoke 
were  likewise  entitled  to  send  a  member  to  Parliament.  Well, 
one  Conservative  and  one  Liberal  wTere  returned  by  the 
borough.  Would  the  honorable  member  from  Birmingham 
say  it  was  humbled  in  consequence  of  that  circumstance  ?  So 
far  was  he  from  taking  such  a  view  that  he  had  refused  to  be 
concerned  in  bringing  down  a  second  Conservative  member 
because  he  believed  it  would  be  tyranny  to  do  so.    There  were, 


278  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

say  fifty-five  thousand  Conservatives  and  forty-five  thousand 
Liberals  in  Stoke. 

Now,  would  it  be  fair  that  either  of  those  parties  should  be 
unrepresented  ?  By  the  existing  arrangement  the  whole  popu- 
lation of  Stoke  was  better  served  in  that  House.  So  much  for 
the  case  of  the  two-handed  boroughs ;  and  if  they  took  the 
case  of  the  three-handed  boroughs  it  was  a  juggling  with 
words  and  a  misrepresentation  of  fact  to  say  that  a  representa- 
tion of  minorities  would  deprive  the  majorities  in  those  bor- 
oughs of  a  fair  share  of  representation  in  that  House.  If  the 
minority  in  Birmingham  should  secure  a  member  who  could 
equal  the  honorable  member  (Mr.  Bright)  in  eloquence  it 
would  give  them  a  very  great  advantage  indeed ;  but  he  denied 
that  giving  the  third  member  for  that  borough  to  the  minority 
wTould  be  a  political  injustice  to  the  borough.  If  honorable 
members  came  to  the  House  of  Commons  merely  to  count 
noses  at  the  table  there  wTould  be  something  in  the  honorable 
member's  argument ;  but  in  no  other  sense  would  the  influence 
of  the  two  Liberal  members  for  Birmingham  be  counterbal- 
anced. The  honorable  member,  whom  he  was  happy  to  see  on 
the  first  Opposition  bench — (Mr.  Bright  was  in  conversation 
with  Mr.  Gladstone) — for  no  man  had  a  better  right  to  that 
position,  and  he  would  be  there  hereafter,  [a  laugh,]  had 
drawn  a  touching  picture  of  four  towns  who  had  at  present 
eight  members  and  would  have  twelve,  but  who,  if  this  amend- 
ment of  the  Lords  were  adopted,  wTould  only  have  four ;  but  if 
he  might  ask  the  honorable  gentleman  to  descend  from  the  re- 
gions of  eloquence  to  those  of  plain  fact,  he  would  invite  him 
to  examine  how  matters  really  stood  on  these  four  boroughs. 
Manchester  had  two  Liberal  members ;  Liverpool  had  two 
Conservative  members ;  so  that  these  two  boroughs  wrote  each 
other  off.  Leeds  had  one  Liberal  member,  and  one  Conserva- 
tive ;  thus  its  two  members  wrote  each  other  off.  Birmingham, 
however,  had  the  good  fortune  to  be  represented  by  two  Lib- 
erals ;  so  that  according  to  the  doctrine  of  the  honorable  mem- 
ber the  whole  four  boroughs  were  represented  by  his  colleague 
and  himself.     [A  laugh,  and  "hear,  hear."] 

Sir  J.  Jervoise  advocated  the  proposition  for  giving  repre- 
sentation to  the  minority.  He  observed  that  if  any  argument 
were  needed  in  support  of  such  a  proposal  it  would  be  found 


PARLIAMENTARY    DEBATE.  279 

in  the  fact  that  the  Government,  though  in  the  minority,  had 
brought  in  this  reform  bill.     [A  laugh,  and  "  hear,  hear."J 

Mr.  Scourfield  had  voted  for  the  proposal  before  and 
would  support  it  again.  He  cordially  agreed  with  what  had 
been  said  by  the  honorable  member  for  Westminster  a  few 
evenings  since — that  he  would  not  desire  to  see  oppression  prac- 
ticed, even  by  the  side  to  which  he  was  most  attached.  When 
the  honorable  member  for  Birmingham  said  that  the  liberties 
of  England  would  suffer  detriment  if  there  were  no  election 
contests,  he  could  not  help  thinking  that  the  honorable  mem- 
ber spoke  as  if  the  life-blood  of  all  the  election  agents  and 
lawyers  in  the  kingdom  were  flowing  in  his  veins.  [Laughter.] 
The  fact  was,  that  election  contests  were  frequently  unmitigated 
curses,  and  many  places  had  been  seriously  injured  by  their 
means.  ["  Hear,  hear."]  He  was  not  aware,  for  instance, 
that  Lancaster,  Totness,  Reigate,  and  Great  Yarmouth  were 
any  better  off  because  they  had  been  the  scenes  of  contested 
elections.     ["  Hear,  hear."] 

Mr.  Buxton  wished  to  touch  upon  a  single  argument  which 
had  not,  he  thought,  received  the  attention  it  deserved.  It 
seemed  to  him  that  valuable  as  the  other  results  would  be  of 
the  adoption  of  the  proposed  arrangement,  no  one  of  them 
would  be  of  greater  importance  than  this :  that  it  would  call 
forth  so  much  political  vigor  and  life  in  the  constituencies  to 
which  it  was  applied.  It  was  curious  that  those  who  had  not 
given  this  subject  much  consideration  often  objected  to  this 
proposal,  because  they  said  that  by  extinguishing  contests  this 
arrangement  would  destroy  political  vitality.  He  was  confi- 
dent that  its  effect  would  be  exactly  the  reverse ;  that  it  would 
be  of  singular  use  in  preventing  political  stagnation.  That 
would  be  clear  if,  instead  of  dealing  with  the  question  in  the 
abstract,  they  took  a  concrete  example.  Take,  for  example, 
the  town  of  Birmingham,  in  which  it  was  proposed  to  adopt 
this  plan.  Could  there  be  a  doubt  that  if  no  such  arrange- 
ment were  made  Birmingham  would  henceforth  return  three 
gentlemen  of  the  same  political  hue  ? 

The  Liberal  committee  would  select  three  candidates,  and 
the  majority  of  householders  in  the  borough  wrould  be  certain 
to  support  them.  If  there  were  ever  a  contest  it  wrould  be  a 
contest  between  the  Liberals  bidding  against  each  other ;  but 


280  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

in  all  human  probability  there  would  be  no  contest  at  all ;  and 
those  electors,  perhaps  a  very  large  and  important  body  of 
men,  but  who  might  not  go  so  far  in  their  political  views  as  the 
mass  of  small  householders,  would  be  politically  extinct. 
They  would  feel  it  totally  hopeless  to  attempt  to  carry  a  candi- 
date, and  they  would  resign  themselves  with  more  or  less  bitter- 
ness to  political  death.  They  would  feel  that  they  were  alto- 
gether excluded  from  any  influence  whatever  over  the  destinies 
of  their  country  :  not  merely  that  they  could  not  hope  to  rule, 
but  that  they  could  not  even  be  represented  in  the  council  of 
the  nation.  They  would  accordingly  sink  into  hopeless  apathy, 
while  the  majority  having  everything  their  own  way,  not  en- 
joying the  advantage  of  being  opposed  and  forced  to  struggle 
and  strive,  would  themselves  also  be  likely  to  grow  at  once 
apathetic  and  arrogant.  He  was  not  devising  this  state  of 
things  out  of  his  own  imagination  ;  they  knew  that  exactly 
this  had  happened  in  many  instances  both  across  the  water  and 
in  certain  constituencies  at  home,  where  one  party,  be  it  Con- 
servative or  be  it  Liberal,  had  held  irresistible  sway.  It  would 
be  invidious  to  do  so ;  otherwise  he  could  easily  remind  the 
House  of  many  boroughs  and  many  counties  in  which  utter 
apathy  and  stagnation  had  actually  resulted  from  the  feeling 
of  the  minority  that  any  exertion  of  theirs  must  be  vain. 

But  now  suppose,  on  the  other  hand,  that  instead  of  all  the 
three  seats  being  at  the  disposal  of  one  committee  the  arrange- 
ment now  proposed  were  adopted ;  immediately  every  elector 
in  the  constituency  would  be  stirred  into  life.  Those  who  be- 
longed to  the  minority  instead  of  giving  up  the  whole  affair  as 
a  bad  job,  shrugging  their  shoulders,  and  feeling  that  although 
they  were  Englishmen  they  were  as  destitute  of  political  influ- 
ence as  if  they  were  so  many  Indians,  would  immediately  begin 
to  organize  themselves  as  a  party  to  form  a  committee  to  look 
out  for  a  candidate  and  combine  to  carry  him.  He  admitted 
that  very  possibly  no  contest  would  ensue ;  but  there  would  be 
as  much  demand  for  strenuous  exertions  and  for  individual 
self-sacrifice  on  the  part  of  the  minority  as  if  a  contest  were 
certain.  Political  deadness  would  be  exchanged  for  political 
animation.  But  to  the  majority  this  change  would  bring  no 
less  cause  of  excitement  and  vigor.  Instead  of  gleefully  ac- 
cepting their  three  candidates  and  carrying  them  without  an 


PAKLIAMENTAKY   DEBATE.  281 

effort  the  party  would  be  driven  to  keep  its  machinery  in  high 
order,  to  choose  the  best  candidates  that  could  be  found,  and, 
in  short,  to  strain  every  nerve  to  hold  their  own.     And  yet, 
though  each  party  would  thus  be  compelled  to  be  on  the  alert 
and  to  maintain  its  vigor,  actual  contests  would  probably  be 
rare.     The  beauty  of  this  arrangement  would  be  that  it  would 
give  all  the  political  activity  that  contests  are  supposed  to  en- 
gender, but  without  that  grievous  moral  injury  that  contests 
almost  inevitably  inflict.     Now,  it  has  been  shown  that  these 
eleven  constituencies  affected  by  this  proposition  would  contain 
2,300,000  persons.     If,  then,  the  minority  should  not  be  able 
to  carry  its  candidate  no  harm  could  ensue ;  but  if  they  carried 
them  all  they  must  represent  a  body  of  some  600,000  or  700,000 
persons.     It  could  only  be  for  the  advantage  not  only  of  the 
minority  itself  but  of  the  majority  as  well,  and  of  Parliament, 
and  of  the  nation,  that  such  a  body  of  men,  comprising  a  large 
proportion  of  the  wealth  and  intelligence  of  our  largest  cities, 
should  enjoy  some  share  of  influence  over  the  destinies  of  their 
country. 

Sir  C.  Russell,  as  a  representative  of  one  of  the  three-cor- 
nered constituencies,  opposed  the  Lords'  amendment,  but  his 
remarks  were  not  important  nor  prolonged. 

Mr.  Knatchbull-Hugessest,  in  supporting  the  amendment, 
differed  from  many  to  whose  judgment  he  was  accustomed  to 
defer.  But  he  was  about  to  give  his  vote  with  the  sanction  of 
high  authority,  for  the  proposition  had  previously  received  the 
support  of  a  large  minority  of  that  House  taken  in  about  equal 
proportions  from  both  political  parties,  and  had  now  received 
the  support  of  a  large  majority  of  the  other  House,  embracing 
names  identified  with  the  growth  of  liberal  principles  in  the 
country.  The  honorable  member  from  Birmingham  (Mr. 
Bright)  had  said  that  Birmingham  ought  to  have  a  larger  rep- 
resentation than  Arundel ;  but  if  a  third  member  were  given  to 
Birmingham  on  the  plan  proposed  he  would  pair  against  one 
of  the  majority  members,  and  the  representation  would  be  re- 
duced virtually  to  a  level  with  that  of  Arundel,  which  had  one 
member.  The  fallacy  of  that  argument  was  this :  what  the 
honorable  gentleman  and  his  colleague  represented  was  not 
really  the  whole  community  of  Birmingham,  but  some  6000  or 
8000  electors  as  opposed  to  some  4000  or  5000  who  differed 


282  PKOPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

from  him  and  were  totally  unrepresented.  But  to  go  one  step 
further.  It  was  true  that  upon  questions  in  which  party  inter- 
ests alone  were  involved,  under  the  proposed  system  the  three 
members  from  Birmingham  would  go  into  the  lobby,  two  on 
one  side  and  one  on  the  other.  Yet  with  regard  to  all  ques- 
tions affecting  local  interests  as  well  as  those  great  commercial 
and  manufacturing  questions  on  which  Birmingham  was  pecu- 
liarly entitled  to  be  heard,  the  three  members  would  be  found 
voting  together  and  throwing  their  whole  weight  into  the  scale 
in  the  interest  of  that  great  constituency. 

The  honorable  member  said  Birmingham  would  not  have  its 
full  weight  in  the  representative  body.  Did  he  mean  to  say 
that  the  wealth,  the  importance  of  a  constituency  was  derived 
only  from  the  majority?  Had  the  conservative  minority  in 
London  nothing  to  do  with  the  weight  and  importance  of  the 
constituency  ?  It  was  plain  that  they  ought  to  give  representa- 
tion to  all  the  elements  that  constituted  the  importance  of  a 
constituency. 

He  insisted  that  two  great  advantages  would  be  secured  by 
adopting  the  proposed  system  of  representation.  In  the  first 
place,  in  times  of  popular  excitement  it  would  insure  the  return 
to  Parliament  of  eminent  men  who  would  otherwise  be  excluded. 
Did  the  honorable  member  from  Birmingham  recollect  the  re- 
sult of  the  China  vote  and  his  exclusion  from  Parliament? 
[Hear.]  Similar  cases  might  occur  in  time  to  come,  and  honest 
and  able  men  might  be  excluded  from  Parliament  when  their 
services  would  be  most  necessary  for  the  welfare  of  the  country, 
and  when  thousands  of  their  fellow-countrymen  would  be  will- 
ing to  combine  to  secure  their  return. 

The  second  great  advantage  from  the  adoption  of  this  system 
was  the  inducement  it  would  offer  to  large  numbers  of  persons 
to  take  part  in  the  political  affairs  of  the  country,  who  might 
otherwise  be  indisposed  to  give  their  votes.  This  wras  neither  a 
party  nor  a  class  question,  because  there  were  large  Liberal 
minorities  in  counties,  as  there  were  large  Conservative  minori- 
ties in  towns,  which  wrere  now  unrepresented,  and  had  no  in- 
ducement to  vote.  He  desired  to  see  the  greatest  amount  of 
intelligence  and  the  largest  number  of  persons  possible  engaged 
irt  taking  part  in  our  political  affairs.  Such  participation  was 
one  of  the  most  essential  elements  of  democracy — that  every 


PARLIAMENTARY    DEBATE.  283 

man  in  the  community  should  feel  himself  to  be  a  component 
part  of  the  State — should  assist  in  framing  the  laws  which  he 
had  to  obey,  and  should  throw  his  whole  individual  strength 
and  vigor  into  the  constitution.  Now,  if  this  principle  of  rep- 
resentation was  a  right  one,  why  should  they  shrink  from  adopt- 
ing it  because  it  was  said  that,  for  the  last  six  hundred  years, 
the  precedents  had  been  the  other  way?  [Hear,  hear.]  Eng- 
land was  the  foremost  in  the  van  of  civilization,  and  why  should 
she  not,  in  reforming  her  whole  representative  institutions,  in- 
troduce a  plan  of  this  sort,  if  it  were  shown  to  be  a  good 
one,  and  thus  render  her  constitution  a  model  for  the  wTorld  ? 
[Hear.]  But  the  honorable  member  from  Birmingham  had 
asked  why  the  proposal,  if  adopted,  was  to  be  limited  to  a 
few  large  boroughs,  and  not  be  applied  to  every  constituency 
throughout  the  country?  He  would  reply,  that  if  it  were 
shown  to  be  good,  why  should  they  reject  it  because  its  appli- 
cation was  limited  ?  If  it  turned  out  that  it  worked  well, 
nothing  could  be  easier  than  to  extend  its  operation  hereafter. 
The  vote  which  he  wras  about  to  give  he  believed  to  be  a  wise 
and  patriotic  one,  and  he  knew  it  to  be  an  honest  one,  as  it  wras 
founded  upon  sincere  convictions. 

Mr.  Newtdegate  supported  the  amendment.  He  believed 
that  if  it  were  adopted  it  would  be  possible  hereafter  further  to 
redistribute  the  representation  of  the  country  so  as  to  secure 
justice  both  in  boroughs  and  counties.  He  should  vote  for  it 
because  he  hoped  the  result  of  it  would  be  to  give  the  people, 
as  they  advanced  in  intelligence,  fuller  opportunities  than  had 
been  hitherto  accorded  them  of  making  their  opinions  known 
in  that  House. 

Mr.  Goschen  spoke  against  the  amendment,  insisting  that 
it  had  not  been  duly  considered  ;  that  it  was  an  innovation 
and  not  conservative  in  character.  The  remainder  of  his 
remarks  was  composed  principally  of  criticisms  upon  the 
various  positions  occupied  by  members  who  supported  the 
proposition. 

Mr.  Hubbard  said  the  bill  was  full  of  innovations,  that  the 
objection  that  this  proposition  was  an  innovation  applied  to 
the  whole  bill.  Was  not  household  suffrage  itself  an  inno- 
vation ? 

Mr.  Gladstone  spoke  at  length  and  against  the  amendment. 


284  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

A  prominent  point  in  his  speech  was  that  if  the  proposition 
were  agreed  to  it  would  have  to  be  extended  hereafter  to  the 
constituencies  generally ;  and  he  distinctly  indicated  that  such 
extension  would  be  made.  He  insisted  upon  further  time  for 
considering  so  important  a  proposition,  and  repeated  the  argu- 
ment that  the  addition  of  one  member  to  Birmingham  and 
each  of  the  other  boroughs  mentioned  in  the  bill  would  not  be 
advantageous  to  them  upon  the  new  plan  of  voting ;  for  the 
power  of  majorities  therein,  instead  of  being  in  point  of  fact 
increased,  would  be  diminished.  His  most  important  observa- 
tion, however,  should  be  given  in  his  exact  language.  It  was 
as  follows : 

"  If  adopted  at  all,  this  proposition  must  be  adopted  with 
perhaps  the  knowledge,  and  at  least  with  the  certainty,  that 
whether  we  admit  it  ourselves  or  not  it  must  unfold  and  expand 
itself  over  the  whole  country  and  completely  reconstruct  the 
system  of  distribution  of  seats."     [Hear,  hear.] 

Mr.  Lowe  concluded  the  debate  with  an  animated  and  able 
speech  in  favor  of  the  amendment.  He  remarked  that  his 
right  honorable  friend  (Mr.  Gladstone)  had  said  that  he  con- 
sidered the  constituency  and  the  majority  of  the  constituency 
the  same  thing;  in  those  few  words  summing  up  the  whole 
fallacy  which  had  pervaded  the  debate.  The  honorable  mem- 
ber from  Birmingham's  speech  rested  on  the  groundless  as- 
sumption that  when  anything  was  true  of  the  majority  of  Bir- 
mingham it  was  true  of  the  whole  of  Birmingham.  Taking 
their  own  arguments,  he  wondered  that  gentlemen  who  refused 
to  give  representation  to  minorities  were  willing  to  even  admit 
their  existence.  He  should  like  to  know  on  what  principle 
they  acted  in  forcing  on  the  Government  a  third  member  in 
the  boroughs  except  as  an  homage  to  numbers.  [Cheers.]  It 
was  said  that  in  introducing  personal  representation  you  were 
doing  away  with  local  representation.  This  is  again  the  same 
fallacy.  Gentlemen  have  accustomed  themselves  so  much  to 
overlook  the  existence  of  minorities  that  they  will  not  allow 
them  to  live  even  in  the  places  where  they  actually  reside. 
[Laughter.]  He  could  not  in  the  least  understand  what  there 
was  in  a  minority  that  should  make  it  less  local  because  it  was 
less  numerous. 

Mr.  Lowe  concluded  as  follows :   There  is  a  sort  of  worship 


PARLIAMENTARY    DEBATE.  285 

of  the  majority  which,  after  all,  is  a  mere  political  superstition. 
True  representation,  the  idea  of  true  representation,  is  to  leave 
no  portion  of  the  constituencies  unrepresented.  [Hear.]  We 
have  a  specimen  of  the  old  and  rugged  way  of  doing  things  in 
the  case  of  juries.  We  require  them  to  be  unanimous,  and  as 
that  is  not  in  the  nature  of  human  things,  we  shut  them  up  in 
"  durance  vile  "  until  they  come  to  an  agreement.  That  system 
not  having  been  found  practicable  under  all  circumstances, 
mankind  hit  upon  the  plan  of  representation  by  majorities  as  a 
better  mode  of  settling  their  differences.  Well,  there  is  no 
absolute  reason  for  stopping  there.  The  art  of  representation, 
like  other  arts,  is  progressive ;  and  if  means  can  be  found  for 
increasing  the  number  of  members,  and  then  adapting  your 
system  to  that  increase  by  the  cumulative  vote,  so  as  not  to 
disfranchise  minorities  and  to  give  some  representation  to  the 
whole  of  the  constituency,  so  far  from  regarding  that  as  an  in- 
novation upon  the  constitution,  I  think  we  ought  to  hail  it  as 
an  advance  in  the  science  of  government.     [Cheers.] 

The  great  difference  between  ancient  and  modern  societies 
lies  in  the  invention  of  the  principle  of  representation.  It  was 
from  the  want  of  that  power  of  representation  that  the  Roman 
empire  was  reduced  to  place  itself  under  the  tyranny  of  a 
Cresar.  It  is  only  by  the  existence  of  that  power  that  large 
free  governments  have  become  possible.  This  is  just  an  in- 
stance of  the  changes  which  may  be  produced  by  the  use  of  the 
most  simple  expedients.  Instead  of  regarding  this  principle 
with  hatred  and  jealousy,  I  think  we  shall  act  more  wisely  if 
we  investigate  and  accept  it  as  a  just  and  necessary  improve- 
ment of  that  system  of  representative  government  which  has 
obtained  among  us,  upon  which,  in  a  great  measure,  the  per- 
petuity and  glory  of  our  country  depend. 

The  House  then  divided,  when  there  appeared : 

Ayes 204 

Noes 253 

Majority 49 

So  the  motion  to  disagree  to  the  Lords'  amendment  was  lost, 
and  the  clause  stood  a  part  of  the  bill.  The  announcement 
of  the  numbers  was  received  with  cheers. 

The  next  amendment,  that  at  a  contested  election  for  the  city 


286  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

of  London  no  person  should  vote  for  more  than  three  candi- 
dates, was  then,  after  a  brief  debate,  agreed  to  by  a  majority 
of  sixty-four. 

When  the  reform  bill  was  first  considered  by  the  House  of 
Commons  the  cumulative  vote  was  proposed  by  way  of  amend- 
ment, but  rejected.  The  motion  for  it  was  made  by  Mr.  Lowe 
on  the  4th  of  July,  in  the  following  words  : 

"That  at  any  contested  election  for  a  county  or  borough  represented 
by  more  .than  two  members,  and  having  more  than  one. seat  vacant,  every 
voter  shall  be  entitled  to  a  number  of  votes  equal  to  the  number  of 
vacant  seats,  and  may  give  all  such  votes  to  one  candidate  or  may  dis- 
tribute them  among  the  candidates  as  he  thinks  fit." 

This  amendment  was  debated  on  the  day  of  its  introduction 
and  again  on  the  next  day,  and  received  the  support  of  the 
mover  and  of  Mr.  Liddell,  Mr.  Thomas  Hughes,  Mr.  Gorst, 
Mr.  Morrison,  Mr.  Beach,  Mr.  Fawcett,  Mr.  Newdegate,  Vis- 
count Cranborne,  Mr.  J.  Stuart  Mill,  and  Mr.  Buxton,  while 
it  was  opposed  by  Mr.  Shaw  Lefevre,  Sir  Robert  Collier,  Mr. 
Adderley,  Mr.  Bright,  Mr.  Henley,  and  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer. 

It  was  lost  by  a  vote  of,  yeas  173,  nays  314.  The  large 
number  of  votes  it  received  upon  its  first  consideration  was 
evidence  of  its  strength  whenever  it  should  be  subjected  to 
examination  and  debate,  and  inspirited  its  friends  to  further 
exertion.  In  fact,  it  appeared  evident  that  the  opposition  of 
the  administration,  through  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer, 
alone  prevented  its  adoption  at  that  time,  and  such  explanation 
of  the  result  was  distinctly  stated  by  the  Times  of  August  9 
in  editorial  comments  upon  the  adoption  of  the  Cairns'  amend- 
ment. It  is  to  be  remembered  constantly  in  following  the 
debates  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  the  prominent  men 
who  spoke  against  the  cumulative  vote  and  the  Cairns'  amend- 
ment represented  districts  which  were  to  elect  three  members 
under  the  provisions  of  the  bill.  Consequently  they  were 
deeply  interested  as  political  men  in  securing  in  their  home 
districts  the  election  of  the  third  member  by  the  majority. 
Buckinghamshire,  represented  by  Mr.  Disraeli,  Birmingham, 
represented  by  Mr.  Bright,  and  other  districts  that  contributed 
speakers  to  the  debate  in  opposition  to  the  proposed  reform, 


A   MINORITY    VETO    PROPOSED.  287 

are  all  three-member  districts,  in  which  the  local  political 
majority  could  not,  under  the  new  plan,  elect  the  third  member. 
It  remains  to  be  observed  in  this  review  of  the  proceedings 
in  Parliament  that  the  Cairns'  amendment  secures  substantially 
the  same  result  as  the  cumulative  vote  would  in  the  districts, 
the  counties,  and  boroughs,  to  which  it  is  applied.  In  the 
triangular  districts  it  will  ordinarily  secure  the  third  member 
to  the  minority,  and  in  London  (which  elects  four  members) 
the  fourth  member.  But  it  is  very  evident  that  it  is  a  proposi- 
tion which  is  incapable  of  extended  application,  and  therefore 
inferior  to  the  plan  of  the  cumulative  vote.  The  latter  will 
adapt  itself  conveniently  and  effectually  to  all  districts  elect- 
ing more  than  one  member,  while  the  Cairns'  amendment  can 
hardly  be  extended  beyond  the  triangular  districts  to  which  it 
has  a  convenient  application. 


MINORITY    REPRESENTATION.* 

It  must  be  admitted  that  Government  is,  with  us,  in  an  un- 
satisfactory condition.  Many  evils  exist,  notwithstanding  pop- 
ular control  and  the  efforts  of  just  men  in  public  life  to  prevent 
or  repress  abuses.  It  is,  therefore,  timely  and  proper  to  in- 
quire wherein  our  plan  of  Government  is  defective,  and  to 
adopt  some  amendment  of  it,  which  will  improve  its  practical 
action. 

With  us,  the  people  are  to  govern,  instead  of  one  man  or  a 
few.  They  are  to  govern  themselves,  constituting  ours,  a  sys- 
tem of  self-government.  But  this  is  not  to  be  taken  absolutely 
and  without  qualification.  Sovereignty  resides  with  the  State 
electors,  who  constitute  but  one-fifth  of  the  population.  But 
the  powers  of  sovereignty,  as  exhibited  in  the  laws,  extend  over 
the  whole. 

The  fact  is  thus,  because  it  has  been  so  agreed  upon  and 
settled.  For  political  powers  are  conventional,  being  founded 
in  compact  or  assent.     Ours  is  a  Government  of  the  most 

*  Printed  for  private  circulation,  February,  1862.  "Republican"  print, 
Bloomsburg,  Pa. 


288  PROPORTIONAL    REPRESENTATION. 

worthy — of  those  best  qualified,  most  fit,  most  capable.  Those 
members  of  the  social  body  who  are  incapable,  or  least  capa- 
ble, are  excluded  from  political  power, — as,  minors,  females, 
paupers,  and  unnaturalized  foreigners. 

.  In  the  electors,  then — a  select  body  or  part  of  the  popula- 
tion— resides  the  power  to  rule  or  govern,  and  this  power  is  ex- 
ercised through  agents,  who  represent  them.  Government, 
then,  in  its  restricted  sense  of  an  organism  for  legislation  and 
administration,  is  an  Agency,  and  possesses  only  such  powers 
as  are  imparted  to  it  by  the  electors.  And  those  powers  are 
held  in  trust,  and  subject  at  all  times  to  change  or  revocation. 

In  what  manner  the  electors  shall  be  represented — the  rules 
by  which  such  representation  shall  bo  secured  and  regulated — 
and  what  shall  be  the  laws  of  representative  action,  are  ques- 
tions for  agreement  among  those  who  constitute  the  sovereignty, 
and  their  solution  is  shown  by  the  Constitution,  the  funda- 
mental law  established  by  the  electors.  A  practical  difficulty 
arises  in  representing  a  numerous  body  of  electors,  from  the 
diversity  of  interests  and  opinions  which  will  always  prevail 
amongst  them.  Identity  of  interest  and  unanimity  of  opinion 
will  scarcely  ever  be  found  to  exist.  To  secure  action,  there- 
fore, in  an  electoral  body  so  constituted,  or  in  a  numerous  body 
representing  them  in  the  Government,  it  is  necessary  to  adopt 
the  doctrine  that  a  part  only  may  act  for  the  whole.  And 
hence  arise  practical  rules  by  which  the  power  of  the  whole 
electoral  or  representative  body  is  wielded  by  three-fourths, 
two-thirds,  a  majority,  or  even  a  smaller  number.  A  plurality 
rule  is  ordinarily  provided  for  popular  elections,  and  a  majority 
rule  for  legislative  action,  except  in  reviewing  a  measure  vetoed 
by  the  Executive,  when  a  two-thirds  rule  is  substituted.  And 
the  judicial  department  decide  by  the  majority  rule  the  cases 
that  fall  within  its  jurisdiction. 

But  these  several  arrangements,  or  rules,  are  founded  upon 
considerations  of  convenience  and  expediency,  and  involve  no 
fundamental  principle  of  right.  It  is  perfectly  competent  for 
the  sovereign  power  to  substitute  one  rule  for  another,  in  any 
of  the  cases  just  mentioned,  or  to  introduce  one  altogether 
new.  The  great  principle  to  be  regarded  is  that  of  the  govern- 
ment of  the  people  by  themselves,  and  the  practical  rules  by 
which  it  is  attempted  to  apply  this  principle,  should  be  adapted 


A    MINORITY    VETO    PROPOSED.  289 

to  their  object,  and  should  be  changed  whenever  shown  to  be 
insufficient  or  injurious,  or  should  be  limited  or  supplemented 
by  other  constitutional  provisions. 

That  arrangement  would  be  most  perfect  in  theory,  which 
would  secure  to  every  member  of  the  political  body  a  voice  in 
the  government.  But  this  result,  or  any  near  approach  to  it, 
cannot  be  attained  by  a  majority  or  plurality  rule  for  popular 
elections.  And  a  rule  requiring  unanimity,  or  a  three-fourths 
or  two-thirds  vote,  at  such  elections,  would  be  intolerably 
inconvenient  if  not  wholly  impracticable. 

If,  then,  no  practicable  rule  among  all  those  named,  will  se- 
cure complete  popular  representation,  or  any  near  approach  to 
it ;  and  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  virtual  disfranchisement  of  a 
large  part  of  the  electors  be  objectionable  and  injurious,  (as  it 
certainly  is,)  it  is  plain  that  something  further  must  be  pro- 


And  such  further  proposition  for  the  more  perfect  represen- 
tation of  the  people,  must  be  based  upon  some  division  of  the 
electoral  body  into  parts,  and  must  deal  with  those  parts  sepa- 
rately and  distinctly.  Now,  the  most  marked,  extensive  and 
permanent  division  of  men  in  a  Republic,  is  into  political 
parties,  usually  two  in  number,  and  whenever  greater  in  num- 
ber tending  to  consolidate  into  two.  For  all  practical  purposes 
we  may  assume  that  there  will  be,  always,  a  division  of  electors 
into  a  major  and  a  minor  party — a  greater  and  a  less — each 
representing  opinions  and  interests  different  and  distinct  from 
those  represented  by  the  other,  and  sometimes,  though  not 
always,  in  conflict  with  them.  But,  it  is  certain  (as  already 
shown,)  that  a  majority  or  plurality  rule  for  popular  elections, 
especially  under  a  system  of  nominations  by  party  conventions, 
will  cause  the  disfranchisement  of  the  minority  party,  and  sub- 
ject it  to  the  will  and  pleasure  of  the  greater.  Any  rule,  or 
device,  therefore,  which  will  secure  to  the  minority  the  power 
of  defending  itself  against  the  aggression  of  the  majority,  will 
secure  one  of  the  main  objects  of  the  constitution,  to  wit :  the 
protection  of  individual  rights,  and  of  all  the  leading  interests 
of  society,  against  government  abuses.  Without  such  power 
of  self-defence,  lodged  somewhere  in  the  system,  a  majority 
rule  will  change  the  Government  into  a  despotism  of  numbers, 
and   prepare  the  way  for  anarchy  or   revolution.     For   the 

19 


290  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

despotism  of  many  is  just  as  intolerable  to  the  individuals  and 
interests  oppressed,  as  that  of  one  or  a  few,  and  just  as  certainly 
tends  to  produce  resistance  and  convulsion. 

To  secure  the  community  against  the  despotism  of  a  ma- 
jority, and  against  government  abuses  mainly  consequent 
thereon,  our  Constitution  provides  many  peculiar  arrangements 
of  power,  usually  described  as  "  checks  and  balances,"  as  well 
as  prohibitions  against  the  exercise  of  particular  powers.  Of 
all  the  checks  so  provided,  that  of  the  Veto  is  most  important 
and  useful,  and  it  deserves  a  particular  examination. 

It  is  secured  in  the  Legislative  branch  of  the  Government 
by  dividing  that  branch  into  two  Houses,  and  requiring  the 
assent  of  both  to  the  enactment  of  laws.  Thus  each  possesses 
the  power  to  veto  any  measure  originating  with  the  other. 

An  Executive  Veto  is  also  provided,  extending  to  all  acts 
of  the  Legislative  branch  in  the  nature  of  laws.  But  this  veto 
is  not  absolute,  as  it  may  be  overruled  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of 
both  Legislative  Houses. 

There  is  also  a  Judicial  Veto,  less  extensive  but  more  abso- 
lute than  that  of  the  Executive.  It  is  confined  to  unconstitu- 
tional acts  of  the  Legislature,  but  as  to  such  it  has  complete 
effect  in  any  given  case,  and  cannot  be  overruled. 

But  these  checks,  although  useful  and  proper,  are  manifestly 
insufficient  to  secure  wise  and  just  government.  In  point  of 
fact,  they  do  not  secure  it,  and  in  consequence  wide-spread  dis- 
satisfaction exists  in  the  community.  The  Legislative  Houses 
will  not  check  each  other  upon  partisan  measures  when  they 
agree  politically,  nor  upon  many  others  when  strong  corrupting 
influences  assail  both.  Nor  will  the  Executive  Veto  be  ap- 
plied when  the  Legislative  majority  and  the  Governor  are  of 
the  same  party — the  very  case  where  a  check  is  most  needed. 
And  we  have  seen  that  the  Judicial  Veto  is  of  limited  applica- 
tion. The  judges  cannot  annul  an  act  although  shown  to  be 
unjust,  inexpedient,  and  profligate,  unless  it  be  also  unconstitu- 
tional. 

An  additional  check  is  therefore  necessary  and  ought  to  be 
provided  at  once,  by  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution.  Let 
the  minority  be  represented  directly,  in  the  Government,  and 
be  armed  with  a  power  of  self-defence  against  majority  aggres- 
sion.    Let  ampler  representation  of  the  people  correct  the  evils 


A    MINORITY    VETO    PROPOSED.  291 

in  government,  exhibited  by  experience — by  time  and  trial — 
and  furnish  additional  evidence  of  the  wisdom  of  our  funda- 
mental principle  of  government  by  the  people. 

A  proposition  with  these  objects,  may  be  stated  in  the  follow- 
ing form  : 

The  candidate  second  highest  in  vote  at  Gubernatorial  elections, 
to  become  President  of  the  Senate,  and  possess  the  power  of  vetoing 
bills. 

By  this  provision  the  minority,  for  the  time  being,  would  be 
represented  by  its  chosen  chief  for  purposes  of  defence  against 
a  hostile  interest,  and  the  existing  vetoes  of  the  Constitution 
would  be  supplemented  by  one  which  will  apply,  in  proper 
cases,  where  they  will  not.  And  thus  the  assent  of  both  politi- 
cal parties  will  be  given  to  new  laws,  and  neither  one  can  im- 
pose upon  the  other  a  measure  grossly  obnoxious  or  injurious. 
From  which  will  result  greater  contentment  among  the  people, 
an  abatement  of  party  violence,  and  a  great  decrease  of  in- 
justice and  corruption  in  the  Government  itself. 

Substantially,  the  proposition  is,  that  the  minority  shall  have 
power  to  protect  itself.  Through  its  representative,  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Senate,  it  may  require  a  two-thirds  legislative  vote 
for  the  enactment  of  laws.  It  is  not  a  power  to  initiate  laws — 
to  establish  an  affirmative  policy — to  wield  patronage — to  in- 
terfere with  executive  or  judicial  duties ;  but  to  object  to  new 
projects — to  defeat,  or  delay  legislation,  except  against  a  de- 
cided public  opinion  represented  by  a  two-thirds  vote.  And,  as 
a  Constitutional  check,  it  operates  where  the  judicial  veto  can- 
not reach,  and  when  the  executive  veto  will  not  be  used. 

As  a  curb  upon  legislation,  this  Protective,  or  Minority 
Veto,  (as  it  may  be  called,)  would  be  efficient,  appropriate,  and 
salutary,  in  a  high  degree ;  as  will  appear  from  considering  the 
following  results  to  be  attained  by  it : 

1.  (As  already  stated,)  an  increased  amount  of  popular  as- 
sent to  the  enactment  of  laws,  thus  carrying  more  fully  into 
effect  our  fundamental  principle  of  government  by  the  people. 
Laws  will  not  go  upon  the  statute  book  branded  by  party  hos- 
tility ;  they  will  be  more  heartily  accepted  by  the  community, 
and  be  better  obeyed  and  enforced. 

2.  Conciliation  of  the  minority,  inducing  an  increase  of  at- 
tachment to  the  Government  and  a  decrease  of  hostility  to  its 


292  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

administration.  Participating  in  the  powers  of  the  Govern- 
ment, and  thereby  secured  against  aggression,  the  minority 
would  be  less  passionate  and  violent,  and  the  peril  of  insurrec- 
tion or  revolution  would  be  removed. 

3.  Increased  stability  of  the  laws,  and  preservation  of  a  con- 
sistent policy  in  their  enactment. 

4.  But  the  principal  utility  of  the  Protective  Veto,  would  be 
found  in  its  prevention  of  bad  laws.  Most  of  these  may  be 
classed  as  corrupt,  partisan,  or  unconstitutional ;  as,  the  re- 
charter  of  the  United  States  Bank,  in  1838  ;  the  Main  Line 
Sale  Bill,  of  1857  ;  the  bill  transferring  the  State  Canals  to  the 
Sunbury  and  Erie  Kailroad  Company,  in  1858,  and  its  supple- 
ments; and  the  Tonnage  Tax  repeal,  of  1861.  To  which  may 
be  added  an  extensive  list  of  corporation  acts,  and  local  laws. 
Nor  are  we  to  omit  from  mention  those  offensive  and  flagrant 
examples  of  injustice,  called  Apportionment  laws,  which  would, 
standing  alone,  demand  the  establishment  of  a  Minority  veto. 
The  septennial  Apportionments,  in  1850  and  1857,  of  Senators 
and  Kepresentatives  throughout  the  State,  were  in  many  of 
their  provisions  unjust,  and  in  some  unconstitutional.  And 
the  most  recent  Apportionment — that  of  1861,  for  Members  of 
Congress — was  an  extreme  outrage.  By  a  just  bill,  propor- 
tioned to  the  relative  strength  of  parties  as  shown  by  the  Gub- 
ernatorial election  of  1860,  twelve  members  of  Congress  would 
have  been  assigned  to  one  party,  and  eleven  to  the  other.  By 
the  bill  actually  passed,  the  numbers  stand  nineteen  to  four, 
the  minority  being  disfranchised  to  the  extent  of  seven  mem- 
bers for  ten  years,  and  the  representation  of  the  people  of 
Pennsylvania,  in  Congress,  being  to  that  extent  perverted. 

Were  the  Protective  Veto  a  provision  of  the  Constitution,  it 
would  prevent  the  passage  of  laws  like  those  just  mentioned, 
and  thus,  to  a  great  extent,  preserve  the  purity  of  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  integrity  of  the  Constitution,  as  well  as  the  rights 
and  interests  of  the  minority.  Its  benefits  would  not  be  con- 
fined to  the  minority.  The  whole  body  of  the  people  would 
enjoy  the  advantages  of  improved  action  in  the  Government, 
which  it  would  produce. 

By  our  State  Constitution  of  1776,  a  Council  of  Censors  was 
established,  whose  duty  it  was  to  review  the  action  of  the 
several  departments  of  Government,  and  to  declare  to  the  peo- 


A   MINORITY   VETO   PROPOSED.  293 

pie  all  departures  from  the  Constitution  by  either.  It  was 
intended  that  this  body  should  hold  the  Government,  in  all  its 
branches,  responsible  to  public  opinion ;  that  thereby  the 
system  of  republican  rule  then  established  should  be  preserved 
from  abuse,  and,  especially,  that  all  minority  and  individual 
rights  under  the  Constitution,  should  be  preserved  from  in- 
vasion. But  that  body  had  no  power  to  enforce  its  decisions, 
and  from  this  cause,  and  from  its  breaking  into  factions  on  ac- 
count of  the  number  of  its  members,  it  fell  into  disrepute,  and 
was  not  continued  in  existence  by  the  Constitution  of  1790. 

But,  the  objects  in  view  in  constituting  the  Council  of  Cen- 
sors, were  laudable  and  proper,  and  can  be  attained,  to  a  great 
extent,  by  the  Protective  Veto  now  proposed.  Thereby  an 
officer,  of  the  first  rank  of  ability,  would  be  placed  in  a  suitable 
position  to  check  and  limit  the  action  of  the  Legislature ;  to 
defend  the  principles  of  the  fundamental  law  against  invasion ; 
to  baffle  the  agents  of  corruption  in  their  attempts  to  prostitute 
the  Government  to  their  purposes  ;  and  to  protect  those  inter- 
ests of  society  which  would,  otherwise,  be  sacrificed  or  injured 
by  partisan  injustice.  Whenever  objectionable  measures  were 
proposed  by  the  dominant  party,  it  would  be  the  interest  and 
desire  of  the  minority  represented  by  the  President  of  the 
Senate,  to  have  them  sent  to  the  people  for  examination  and 
discussion,  which  could  be  effected  by  this  veto,  operating  as  it 
would  in  the  nature  of  an  appeal  to  them  from  the  legislative 
majority ;  while,  at  the  same  time,  there  would  be  no  motive 
for  interposing  this  power  of  appeal  upon  measures  of  real 
merit,  the  discussion  of  which,  before  the  people,  would 
strengthen,  instead  of  weakening  the  party  proposing  them. 
And  if  a  proper  measure  were  vetoed,  its  discussion  would  se- 
cure a  two-thirds  vote  for  it  in  the  Legislature,  or  an  abandon- 
ment of  objection  to  it  by  the  President  of  the  Senate.  It 
would  only  be  delayed,  and  it  would,  eventually,  go  into  effect 
with  an  increased  weight  of  public  sentiment  in  its  favor. 

That  "  the  world  is  governed  too  much,"  and  that  "  that 
government  is  best  which  governs  least,"  are  maxims  of  com- 
mon acceptation.  And  with  us,  in  view  of  our  experience, 
there  is  good  cause  for  holding,  that  laws  are  supplied  to  the 
community  beyond  its  wants  and  to  its  injury ;  that  the  influ- 
ences in  favor  of  legislation  are  unduly  strong  in  the  absence 


294  PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

of  effective  checks;  and  that  constitutional  limitations  and 
declarations  of  rights,  will  not  be  duly  observed  in  the  absence 
of  power  distinctly  and  suitably  provided  for  their  enforcement. 
A  majority  will  be  apt  to  construe  the  principles  and  provis- 
ions of  a  constitution  according  to  their  interests  and  passions, 
and  there  must  be,  therefore,  powerful  checks  upon  them,  to 
prevent  over-action,  or  wrong  action  of  the  government  they 
control. 

Our  Election  Boards  in  Pennsylvania  represent  both  politi- 
cal parties,  and  exemplify  some  of  the  advantages  of  minority 
representation.  A  single  Inspector  is  voted  for  by  each  elector, 
but  the  two  candidates  highest  in  vote  are  chosen ;  thus  se- 
curing in  all  ordinary  cases  the  representation  of  both  parties 
in  the  board.  This  arrangement  has  proved  most  useful  in 
practice,  and  is  justly  esteemed  to  be  a  valuable  guard  against 
partisan  injustice,  as  wrell  as  fraud.  It  has,  no  doubt,  con- 
tributed greatly  to  preserve  our  popular  elections  from  de- 
generacy. 

By  the  division  of  the  State  into  districts  for  the  election  of 
Senators  and  Representatives,  minority  representation  is  ob- 
tained, to  some  extent,  in  the  Legislature.  For  the  majority 
party  in  the  State  will  not  have  a  majority  in  all  the  districts 
into  which  it  is  divided  ;  and  a  plurality  rule  for  elections  some- 
what disturbs  the  regularity  of  results.  Upon  the  whole,  how- 
ever, it  is  nearly  certain  that  the  party  in  a  majority  in  the  State 
will  control  the  Legislature  and  act  its  pleasure  in  the  enact- 
ment of  laws.  And  it  will  so  district  the  State  by  Apportionment 
laws  that  the  opposing  party  will  be  deprived  of  its  due  share 
of  representation.  And  it  is  certain  that  in  most  cases  of  con- 
flict between  parties  in  the  Legislature,  the  representation  of 
the  minority,  resulting  from  district  apportionment,  is  quite 
illusory ;  except  where  the  two  Houses  happen  to  differ  politi- 
cally, the  power  of  the  majority  will  be  as  complete  as  its 
exercise  will  be  unscrupulous. 

Representation  of  the  minority  by  a  negative  power  or  veto, 
then,  stands  vindicated  by  all  the  considerations  detailed  in 
the  present  paper.  And  it  does  not  depart  from  principles 
already  in  the  Constitution,  but  only  gives  to  them  a  new  and 
necessary  application.  The  principle  of  the  veto,  and  the 
principle    of   minority    representation,    we    already   possess. 


A    MINORITY    VETO    PROPOSED.  295 

What  is  proposed  is  that  these  be  combined  in  a  new  pro- 
vision, simple  in  character,  but  effective  in  action,  which  shall 
stand  as  a  bulwark  of  defence  against  great  and  notorious 
evils.  Political  parties,  considered  as  embodiments  of  all  the 
main  interests  and  opinions  of  society,  are  to  be  regarded  in 
the  distribution  of  power,  and  one  of  them  be  made  to  check 
another.  And  as  such  parties  are  inevitable,  and  as  they 
thoroughly  and  permanently  divide  the  mass  of  the  people, 
what  objection  can  there  be  to  a  recognition  of  their  existence 
in  the  Constitution?  In  fact,  is  it  not  necessary  that  these, 
the  most  powerful  forces  which  act  upon  the  government,  shall 
be  dealt  with  and  regulated,  or  at  least  put  under  a  measure 
of  control,  by  the  fundamental  law  ?  If  this  be  not  done,  we 
hazard  nothing  in  saying  that  they  will  pervert  the  action  of 
the  government,  and  eventually  destroy  it.  There  being  no 
actual  balance  of  political  powers,  but  on  the  contrary  un- 
checked party  domination,  violence,  injustice,  and  corruption 
will  come  in  as  a  flood,  until  discord  and  passion  reign  su- 
preme, and  a  divided  and  exasperated  people  be  prepared  to 
abandon  free  government  and  accept  the  rule  of  a  master. 

Note. — The  election  of  a  Lieutenant  Governor  would  complete  the 
proposition  discussed  in  this  paper.  But  being  a  subordinate  question 
it  is  omitted. 

[Editor's  Note. — The  date  of  the  foregoing  Essay  shows  the  early 
inclination  of  the  author's  mind  in  matters  of  electoral  reform.  The 
proposition  of  a  minority  veto,  contained  in  it,  is  quite  novel,  but  may 
deserve  consideration  and  development  hereafter.  It  is  believed  that  the 
writer  intended  it  to  be  accompanied  by  provisions  looking  to  the 
choice  of  alternates  for  both  the  Governor  and  President  of  the  Senate, 
so  that  their  offices  would  always  be  fitly  filled  and  controlled  by  the 
proper  political  interest.] 


INDEX. 


Berwick  borough,  act  for  free  vote  in,  237. 

Bloomsburg,  town  of,  act  to  organize,  233 ;   its  practical  operation,  153, 

163,  180,  246,  247. 
Bloom  Poor  District,  election  of  Directors  for,  154,  237,  253. 
Borough  Supplement,  act,  229  ;  speech  on,  in  Senate  of  Pennsylvania,  157. 
Boroughs  in  Pennsylvania,  act  for  free  vote  in  elections  of  Councilmen 

for,  229  ;  acts  for  same  in  boroughs  of  Northumberland  County,  235 ; 

in  Berwick,  237  ;  Chambersbnrg,  242;  Hulmeville,  241 ;  Milton,  236  ; 

Northumberland,  (election  in,)  251 ;   Shamokin,  241 ;  Snydertown, 

240 ;  Sunbury,  238 ;  Uniontown,  239. 

Cairns,  Lord,  amendment  to  reform  bill,  41,  273 ;  his  remarks  thereon, 

117,  274. 
Chambersburg  borough,  act  for  election  of  Councilmen  in,  by  free  vote,  242. 
Columbia  County  rules  of  nomination,  258. 
Committee  of  Senate,  Report  on  representative  reform,  65. 
Convention,  act  of  Pennsylvania,  1872,  manner  of  electing  members,  230  ; 

of  New  York  in  1867,  ibid.,  40,  91,  155. 
Councilmen  in  Pennsylvania  boroughs,  manner  of  electing,  general  act, 

229.     For  special  acts  see  Boroughs. 
County  Commissioners  and  Auditors,  bill  for  election  of,  151,  162. 
Corruption  in  English  boroughs,  22,  23. 

Crawford  County  plan  of  nomination  for  office  condemned,  256,  257. 
Cummings,  Alexander,  presides  at  Philadelphia  meeting,  64,  n. 
Cumulative  Vote.     See  Free  Vote. 

Directors  or  Managers  of  incorporated  companies,  choice  of,  by  free 

vote,  224,  226. 
Dutcher,  Salem,  citation  from,  xi. 

Electoral  colleges,  their  defects  and  remedies  for,  209.    See  Presi- 
dential Electors. 

Fractional  votes,  their  utility  and  convenience,  145 ;  manner  of  count- 
ing, 148,  223.  224,  255. 

297 


298  INDEX. 

Free  Vote,  the,  described,  8,  44,  70,  139,  163 ;  illustrations  of  its  opera- 
tion, 10,  45,  54,  58,  97, 172,  184,  245 ;  its  indirect  effect  on  single  elec- 
tions, 139;  its  superiority  over  other  plans,  70,  74,  155;  its  conveni- 
ence, 73 ;  conformity  to  republican  principles,  75 ;  its  justice,  77 ; 
will  check  corruption,  20,  50,  79;  will  guarantee  peace,  18,  19,  83; 
and  improve  representative  bodies,  10,  8G. 

Its  use  in  stockholders'  elections  for  choice  of  directors  or  managers  of 
corporations,  144,  224,  22G ;  and  in  nominations  for  office,  144,  256. 

Its  application  to  the  election  of  representatives  in  Illinois,  155,  165, 
220 ;  to  Senators  in  West  Virginia,  227  ;  and  to  municipal  elections 
in  Pennsylvania,  to  wit :  to  Councilmen  in  boroughs,  229  ;  to  same 
in  Northumberland  County,  235;  to  town  of  Bloomsburg,  153,  163, 
180,  233,  246,  247  ;  to  borough  of  Berwick,  237  ;  Chambersburg,  242 ; 
Ilulmeville,  241 ;  Milton,  236 ;  Northumberland,  251 ;  Kiverside, 
239  ;  Shamokin,  241 ;  Snydertown,  240  ;  Sunbury,  236  ;  and  Union- 
town,  239;  to  Bloom  Poor  district,  154,  237,  253;  bills  for  applica- 
tion of,  to  election  of  representatives  in  Congress,  1,  65,  113. 

Gerrymandering,  free  vote  remedy  for,  17,  47. 
Gray,  Earl,  on  cumulative  vote,  28,  121. 

Hare,  Thomas,  citation  from,  xi. 
Ilulmeville  borough,  act  for  free  vote  in,  241. 

Illinois,  constitutional  amendments,  155,  219. 

Incorporated  Companies,  choice  of  directors  or  managers  for,  in  Illinois, 

224 ;  in  West  Virginia,  226. 
Inspectors  of  election,  manner  of  choosing  in  Pennsylvania,  36,  90,  157 ; 

act  regulating  choice  of,  228. 

Jordan,  Francis,  Secretary  of  Commonwealth,  letter  to,  182. 
Judges,  choice  of,  by  limited  vote  in  Chicago,  225. 

Jury  commissioners,  manner  of  electing,  in  Pennsylvania,  38,  91,  160; 
act  regulating  election  of,  229. 

Limited  Vote,  the,  named,  36 ;  defined,  69 ;  for  choice  of  election  in- 
spectors, 36,  90,  157,  228  ;  jury  commissioners,  38,  91,  160,  229  ;  dele- 
gates-at-large  to  New  York  Convention,  40,  91,  155;  to  Pennsylvania 
Convention,  230;  judges  of  appeals  in  New  York,  155;  judges  in 
Chicago,  225 ;  election  committee  of  Pennsylvania  Senate,  243 ; 
school  directors  in  Philadelphia,  37,  238 ;  and  assessors,  37  ;  school 
directors  in  certain  townships  of  Bradford  and  Susquehanna  Coun- 
ties, Pennsylvania,  238;  Cairns'  amendment  for,  41,  93;  remarks 
on,  117,  120 ;  debated  in  House  of  Commons,  275 ;  Mill's  opinion  of, 
125;  Mr.  Buckalew's,  74,  80,  155. 


INDEX.  299 

Lowe,  Plon.  Robert,  amendment  to  reform  bill,  92,  115;  remarks  on 
Cairns'  amendment,  284. 

Medill,  Joseph,  complimentary  references  to,  226. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  on  limited  and  cumulative  voting,  25, 124;  on  propor- 
tional representation,  126. 

Milton  borough  act  for  election  of  councilmen  by  free  vote,  236. 

Minority  Representation,  an  essay,  app.,  287. 

Morton,  O.  P.,  Senator,  member  committee  on  representative  reform,  113 ; 
reports  joint  resolution  proposing  an  amendment  to  Constitution, 
187  ;  motion  to  amend  House  joint  resolution,  1S7,  205,  n. 

New  York,  choice  of  members-at-large  to  constitutional  convention,  40, 
91,  155  ;  constitutional  amendment  for  election  of  judges  of  court  of 
appeals,  155. 

Nominations  to  Office,  256 ;  Columbia  county  rules  for,  258. 

Northumberland  borough,  election  in,  for  councilmen,  251. 

Northumberland  County,  act  for  free  vote  in  elections  of  Councilmen  of 
boroughs  in,  235. 

Objections  to  free  vote  noticed:  1.  That  it  would  delocalize  representa- 
tion, 59,  112;  2.  That  it  would  increase  effect  of  corrupt  influence, 
172 ;  3.  That  it  fails  in  the  filling  of  vacancies,  149 ;  4.  That  it  is  op- 
posed to  the  principle  that  the  majority  shall  rule,  6,  45,  49,  127, 
167, 182. 

Parliamentary  boroughs,  corruption  in,  22,  23. 
Parliamentary  debate  on  limited  voting,  app.,  273,  275. 
Parliamentary  elections,  certain  returns  of,  examined,  94,  98. 
Pennsylvania  statutes  for  reformed  voting,  228 ;  local  elections  in,  245 ; 

representation  of  Congressional  districts,  11. 
Philadelphia  speech,  31 ;  choice  of  school  directors  in  Philadelphia,  37, 

238 ;  and  assessors,  37. 
Poor  directors,  act  for  choice  of,  in  Bloom  poor  district,  237 ;  election  of, 

253. 
Popular  vote  for  President  at  former  elections,  213 ;  for  nominations  to 

office,  256. 
President,  table  of  popular  and  electoral  votes  for,  at  former  elections,  213. 
Presidential  electors,  choice  of,  103,  186,  206,  209 ;  statistics  of  elections 

of,  189,  206,  213,  215;  Senate  report  on,  103;  speech  on,  206;  Col. 

Wheeler's  essay  on,  209;  proposed  constitutional  amendment  as  to 

manner  of  choosing,  104,  187,  205. 

Representatives  in  Congress,  speech  on  manner  of  electing,  1 ;  bills 
for  election  of,  by  free  vote,  1,  114;  manner  of  electing  representa- 
tives in  Illinois,  220;  Utah  amendment,  227. 


300 


INDEX. 


Riverside  borough,  act  for  free  vote  in,  239. 

Russell,  Earl,  proposition  for  limited  vote,  119 ;  remarks  on,  120. 

School  directors,  bill  for  choice  of,  163;    acts  for,  238,  242.    See 

Boroughs. 
Senate  speech,  1 ;  Senate  report  on  representative  reform,  65. 
Shamokin  borough,  act  for  free  vote  in,  241. 
Snydertown  borough,  act  for  free  vote  in,  240. 
Social  science  address,  138. 
Successive  majorities,  representation  of,  182. 
Sunbury  borough,  act  for  free  vote  in,  236  ;  election  in,  250. 

Unioxtown  borough,  act  for  free  vote  in,  239. 

Utah,  constitutional  amendment  for  choice  of  representatives,  227. 

Wade,  Benj.  F.,  Senator,  reports  bill  for  free  vote  in  elections  of  Rep* 

resentatives  in  Congress,  113. 
West  Virginia,  constitutional  amendments,  226. 
Wheeler,  Col.  John  H.,  essay  on  choice  of  Presidential  Electors,  209. 


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